J.C.S. Files
McFarland Minutes
The Prime Minister, at the President’s request, opened the discussion. He said that since Sextant the affairs of the United Nations [Page 313] had taken a revolutionary turn for the good. Everything we had touched had turned to gold, and during the last seven weeks there had been an unbroken run of military successes. The manner in which the situation had developed since the Teheran Conference gave the impression of remarkable design and precision of execution. First there had been the Anzio landing, and then, on the same day as the launching of the great Operation Overlord, we had captured Rome, which had seemed the most perfect timing. He wished to congratulate the United States Chiefs of Staff on the success of Dragoon, which had produced the most gratifying results. It was already probable that eight or nine thousand prisoners had been captured, and the south and western parts of France were now being systematically cleared of the enemy. He was firmly convinced that future historians would give a great account of the period since Teheran.2
The President said that no little of the credit for the conception of Dragoon should be attributed to Marshal Stalin. It was close to being his suggestion rather than ours.
The Prime Minister, continuing, said that he was glad to be able to record that, although the British Empire had now entered the sixth year of the war it was still keeping its end up with an over-all population, including the overseas Dominions and Colonies, of only 70,000,000 white people. The British Empire effort in Europe, counted in terms of divisions in the field, was about equal to that of the United States. This was as it should be. He was proud that the British Empire could claim equal partnership with their great ally, the United States, whom he regarded as the greatest military power in the world. The British Empire effort had now reached its peak, whereas that of their ally was ever-increasing. There was complete confidence in General Eisenhower and his relations with General Montgomery were of the best, as were those between General Montgomery and General Bradley. The part played by General W. B. Smith in directing and cementing the staffs was of the highest order. The control of operations in France was in capable hands. An efficient integrated American-British staff machine had been built up, and the battle was being brilliantly exploited.
Turning to Italy, The Prime Minister said that General Alexander had resumed the offensive at the end of August. Since then the Eighth Army had suffered about 8,000 and the Fifth Army about 1,000 casualties. The Fifth Army had hitherto not been so heavily engaged, but they were expected to make a thrust that very day. The British have a great stake in Italy. The army in this theater was the largest [Page 314] representative British Empire Army in existence. There were in all sixteen British Empire divisions, consisting of eight British, two Canadian, one New Zealand, one South African and four British Indian divisions. He, the Prime Minister, had been anxious lest General Alexander might be shorn of certain essentials for the vigorous prosecution of his campaign. He now understood that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had agreed that there should be no withdrawals from General Alexander’s Army until either Kesselring’s Army had been beaten, or was on the run out of Italy.3
General Marshall said there was no thought of withdrawing any forces until the outcome of General Alexander’s present operations was known.
The Prime Minister emphasized that if the Germans were run out of Italy we should have to look for fresh fields and pastures new. It would never do for our armies to remain idle. He had always been attracted by a right-handed movement, with the purpose of giving Germany a stab in the armpit. Our objective should be Vienna. If German resistance collapsed, we should, of course, be able to reach Vienna more quickly and more easily. If not, to assist this movement, he had given considerable thought to an operation for the capture of Istria, which would include the occupation of Trieste and Fiume. Pie had been relieved to learn that the United States Chiefs of Staff were willing to leave in the Mediterranean certain LST’s now engaged in Dragoon, to provide an amphibious lift for the Adriatic operation, if this was found desirable and necessary. An added reason for this right-handed movement was the rapid encroachment of the Russians into the Balkans and the consequent dangerous spread of Russian influence in this area. He preferred to get into Vienna before the Russians did as he did not know what Russia’s policy would be after she took it.
The Prime Minister then reviewed the campaign in Burma. This had been on a considerable scale. 250,000 men had been engaged, and the fighting for Imphal and Kohima had been extremely bitter. General Stilwell was to be congratulated on his brilliant operation, resulting in the capture of Myitkyina. There had been 40,000 battle casualties and 288,000 sick of which latter, happily, the great proportion recovered and returned to duty. As a result of this campaign, the air line to China had been kept open and India rendered secure from attack. It was estimated that the Japanese had lost 100,000 men in this, the largest land engagement of Japanese forces.
In spite of these successes, it was, however, most undesirable that the fighting in the jungles of Burma should go on indefinitely. For this [Page 315] reason, the British Chiefs of Staff had put forward Plan Dracula, which would be preceded by Plan Capital Phase I and as much as was necessary of Phase II. Difficulties were being experienced in making available the necessary forces and transporting them to the Southeast Asia Theater in time to carry out Dracula before the monsoon of 1945. The present situation in Europe, favorable as it was, did not permit a decision being taken now to withdraw forces. What was wanted was to keep an option open for as long as possible, and every effort was being directed to this end.
There were certain elements inimical to Anglo-American good relations which were putting it about that Great Britain would take no share in the war against Japan once Germany had been defeated. Far from shirking this task, the British Empire was eager to play the greatest possible part.4 They had every reason for doing so. Japan was as much the bitter enemy of the British Empire as of the United States. British territory had been captured in battle and grievous losses had been suffered. The offer he, the Prime Minister, now wished to make, was for the British Main Fleet to take part in the main operations against Japan under United States Supreme Command.
The President said that the offer was accepted on the largest possible scale.5
The Prime Minister, continuing, said there would be available a powerful and well-balanced force, including, it was hoped, at the end of next year, their newest 15–inch battleship. A fleet train of ample proportions had been built up, which would render the fleet independent for a considerable time of shore base resources. He said that the placing of a British fleet in the Central Pacific would not prevent a detachment being made to work with General MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific if this was desired. This would include air forces. There was, of course, no intention to interfere in any way with General MacArthur’s command.
As a further contribution to the defeat of the enemy, the Royal Air Force would like to take a part in the heavy bombardment of Japan. A bomber force of 1500 planes could be made available for this purpose and would like a proportionate share with the four or five thousand American planes in striking at the heart of the enemy. As regards land forces, when Germany had been beaten, it would probably be possible to move six divisions from the European Theater to the East, to be followed perhaps by a further six at a later date. In Burma there were 15 divisions which might ultimately be drawn [Page 316] upon. He had always advocated an advance across the Bay of Bengal and operations to recover Singapore, the loss of which had been a grievous and shameful blow to British prestige which must be avenged. It would not be good enough for Singapore to be returned to us at the peace table. We should recover it in battle. These operations would not debar the employment of small British Empire components with United States forces in the Pacific.
There was nothing cast iron in these ideas. First we should do Dracula, and then survey the situation. If a better plan could be evolved, it should certainly not be ruled out in advance. Our keyword should be to engage the largest number of our own forces against the largest number of the enemy at the earliest possible moment.
The President thanked the Prime Minister for his lucid and comprehensive review of the situation. It was a matter of profound satisfaction that at each succeeding conference between the American and British representatives there had been ever-increasing solidarity of outlook and identity of basic thought. Added to this there had always been an atmosphere of cordiality and friendship. Our fortunes had prospered but it was still not quite possible to forecast the date of the end of the war with Germany.
It seemed clear that the Germans were withdrawing from the Balkans and appeared likely that in Italy they would retire to the line of the Alps. The Russians were on the edge of Hungary. The Germans had shown themselves good at staging withdrawals and had been able to save large numbers of personnel although much material had been lost. If the battle went well with General Alexander, we should reach the Piave reasonably soon. All forces in Italy should be engaged to the maximum intensity.
In the west it seemed probable that the Germans would retire behind the Rhine. In his view the “West Wall” was the right bank of the Rhine which would present a formidable obstacle. He thought we should plan to force the barrier of the Rhine and then consider the situation. We should have to turn the line either from the east or from the west. For this purpose our plans must be flexible. The Germans could not yet be counted out and one more big battle would have to be fought. The operations in the East would to some extent depend on how the situation developed in Europe. He agreed that we should not remain in Burma any longer than it was necessary to clean up the Japanese in that theater. The American plan was to regain the Philippines and to dominate the mainland of Japan from the Philippines or Formosa and from bridgeheads which would be seized in China. If forces could be established on the mainland of China, China could be saved. American experience had been that the “end run” method paid a handsome dividend. Rabaul was an example of this by-passing technique which had been employed with considerable success [Page 317] at small cost of life. Would it not be equally possible to by-pass Singapore by seizing an area to the north or east of it, for example, Bangkok? Singapore may be very strong and he was opposed to going up against strong positions.
The Prime Minister suggested that the seizure of localities such as Penang and the Kra Isthmus or Moulmein should, be studied. As far as Singapore was concerned he did not favor the by-passing method. There would undoubtedly be a large force of Japanese in the Malay Peninsula and it would help the American operations in the Pacific if we could bring these forces to action and destroy them in addition to achieving the great prize of the recapture of Singapore. If Formosa were captured, would the Japanese garrisons to the south be completely cut off?
Admiral King replied that these garrisons would be strangulated and must ultimately perish.
The Prime Minister said that all these projects were being examined and would be put in order. No decision could be taken until after Rangoon had been captured. It should not be overlooked that Marshal Stalin had volunteered a solemn undertaking at Teheran that Russia would enter the war against Japan the day that Hitler was beaten.6 There was no reason to doubt that Stalin would be as good as his word. The Russians undoubtedly had great ambitions in the East. If Hitler was beaten, say, by January, and Japan was confronted with the three most powerful nations in the world, they would undoubtedly have cause for reflection as to whether they could continue the fight.
The President referred to the almost fanatical Japanese tenacity. In Saipan not only the soldiers but also the civilians had committed suicide rather than be taken.
Sir Charles Portal said that he hoped to have available between 600 and 800 heavy bombers for operations against the mainland of Japan. These could be supplemented by a considerable number of medium bomber squadrons.
The Prime Minister asked about the employment to be made of the British Fleet.
The President said his thought was to use it in any way possible.
Admiral King said that a paper on this subject had been prepared for reference to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.7 The question was being actively studied.
The Prime Minister asked if it would not be better to employ the new British ships in place of battle-worn vessels of the United States.
[Page 318]Admiral King replied that speaking for himself, he could only say that the matter was under examination.
The Prime Minister said that the offer had been made and asked if it was accepted.
The President replied in the affirmative.
The Prime Minister enquired whether an undertaking could be given for the British Air Force to participate in the main operations.
General Marshall said that he and General Arnold were trying to see how best to fit in the maximum number of aircraft for these operations. It was not so long ago that we were crying out for airplanes—now we had a surplus. He suggested that if the British were heavily engaged in Southeast Asia and in Malaya they would require a large proportion of their air forces for these operations. Was there a distinction between these latter operations and the operations envisaged by Sir Charles Portal for heavy bombardment of Japan?
Sir Charles Portal replied that there was a distinction. The Lancaster bomber, if refuelled in the air, had a range nearly approaching that of the B–29. Without refuelling in the air these aircraft had a range of 800 or 900 miles.8
The President observed that there were certain groups in the United States, and he had no doubt that similar groups existed in Great Britain, who evinced a kindly attitude towards the Germans. Their theory was that evil could be eradicated from the German make-up and the nation could be rejuvenated by kindness.
The Prime Minister said that such sentiments would hardly be tolerated in Great Britain. The British people would demand a strong policy against the Germans. The German working man should be allowed sufficient food for his bare need, and work, but no more. The more virulent elements such as the Gestapo and the young fanatics should be deported to work in rehabilitating the devastated areas of Europe. Plans for the partition of Germany were now in the course of preparation but no final decisions had been taken.
In conclusion, The Prime Minister said that it was clear that a very great measure of agreement existed between the American and British Staffs.
Admiral Leahy agreed that this was so. He did not foresee any insuperable difficulties in reaching agreement on all points at issue.
- According to the British minutes of this meeting, Churchill said “that future historians would say that the period since Teheran had shown the successful working of an extraordinarily efficient inter-Allied war machine.” See Ehrman, p. 509.↩
- See the mintues of the 172d Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of staff, ante, p. 305.↩
- For the British minutes of the discussion at this meeting of participation of British forces in the Pacific war, see Ehrman, pp. 518–519. They quote Churchill as saying that the Brtish Empire was “ardent to play the greatest possible part”.↩
- In the British minutes referred to in fn. 4, above, Roosevelt’s statement is placed two sentences later and is recorded as follows: “The President intervened to say that the British fleet was no sooner offered than accepted.”↩
- Concerning Stalin’s statement on this subject at the Tehran Conference, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, pp. 489, 499–500.↩
- The paper referred to was circulated as C.C.S. 452/27, September 13, 1944, post, p. 447.↩
-
The British minutes referred to in fn. 4, above, have the following additional statement by Churchill at this point:
↩“The Prime Minister remarked that for the future good relations of the two countries, on which so much depended, it was of vital importance that the British should be given their fair share in the main operations against Japan. The United States had given the most handsome assistance to the British Empire, in the fight against Germany. It could only be expected that the British Empire in return should give the United States all assistance in their power towards the defeat of Japan.” See Ehrman, p. 519.