Foreign Relations of the United States, Conference at Quebec, 1944

J.C.S. Files: Telegram

The Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command ( Mountbatten ) to the Combined Chiefs of Staff ¹

top secret

Kandy , 8 September 1944.

266. Reference Warx 26742.² Top secret for Combined Chiefs of Staff information British Chiefs of Staff cite 273.

part i. progress of operations

1. 11th Army Group

a. XV Ind. Corps. Operations in Arakan largely confined to active and offensive patrolling much hampered by monsoon conditions and thick jungle. No major changes in dispositions, though units of 81st (WA) Division have been moved to counter possible Japanese threat to our Chittagong–Dehazari line of communications from the Moythe–Labawa area.

b. XXXIII Ind. Corps

(1) Enemy. No reports yet of any strong Japanese defensive position capable of holding up our advance for any appreciable period either in the Dabaw Valley or on the Tiddim Road. In the former there are reports of small numbers of Japanese at Yazagyo and Yedok, and on the Tiddim Road there may be an attempt to hold us up in the area just north of Tonnang. The Japanese on the Chindwin and Tiddim front show every sign of complete disorganization and lack of coordinated control. There are signs, however, of an attempt to gather together the remnants of 15th and 31st Divisions east of the Chindwin.

(2) Own troops. Operations to clear the enemy from west of the Chindwin have proceeded satisfactorily and there are now no enemy on this side of the river north of Sittaung. The latter was occupied by our troops on 4th September and active patrolling is taking place northwards and southwards on the west bank of the Chindwin down the Tiddim Road, has progressed speedily and has now reached MS114, 48 miles north of Tiddim.

Japanese opposition has not been strong and the rate of progress has been largely dictated by the state of the road.

In the Rabaw Valley, our rate of advance has been satisfactory though hampered by swollen streams. Leading troops have now reached a point approximately half way between Memu and Kalemyo, without encountering any serious opposition.

2. Northern Combat Area Command and Yunnan Force

a. 36th Division has reached Pinbaw in the Mogaung–Katha railway corridor. Patrols have entered Hopin without encountering enemy resistance. 29th Brigade has reached Pinbaw. 72nd Brigade is based in the area of Namana.

b. On the Myitkyina–Bhamo Road Chinese forces have reached Kazu. Patrols are operating five miles south of Kazu without making enemy contact. It is reported that there are no Japanese troops north of Nalong.

c. The Japanese are withdrawing from the Hopin area, and a Prisoner of War report gave Mawhun as the next area of strong resistance in the Hopin–Indaw corridor. There are indications of a build-up along the Katha–Shwebo–Bhamo line.

d. Present directive to Northern Combat Area Command remains to secure the Myitkyina–Mogaung area. In pursuance of this directive the line Pinbaw–Kazu has been occupied.

e. Offensive operations by Yunnan force are in progress in the areas of Tengchung, Lungling and Sungshan.

3. Air

Allied air forces have now gained almost complete air superiority in this theater. The following air activities are now in progress:

a. A strategic air offensive against enemy lines of communication and supply bases by bombers and long range fighters. These operations include the bombing of the Burman-Siam railway, and minelaying in the main rivers and harbours of Burma.

b. Direct support by Third Tactical Air Force of our land forces pursuing the enemy towards the river Chindwin and Tiddim, and XV Corps in the Arakan.

c. Direct support by Tenth U.S. Army Air Force of the Northern Combat Area Command Forces advancing from Mogaung and Myitkyina, and of the Chinese forces west of the Salween.

d. Transport of troops and supplies to forward areas.

part ii. immediate intentions

4. Enemy Situation in Burma

a. Ground. Japanese have at present nine divisions in Burma and 10th division expected shortly. Three divisions on the Chindwin and two in north Burma are estimated as 30 percent to 40 percent effective, two in northeast Burma probably 60 percent effective, remaining two in Arakan 100 percent effective. Continued arrival of replacements at recent rates would enable Japanese forces to be brought up to 80 percent effectiveness by end of year.

Present indications Japanese may try and carry out offensives in Arakan and Salween early in dry season, probably with primary object of causing diversion and thus gaining time to reform their forces.

b. Air. Current first line strength in SEAC is estimated at 450 aircraft with 165 in Burma–Siam/South FIC of which 70 (all fighters) are in Burma. By the end of the monsoon there may be a total of 410 first line aircraft in SEAC of which Burma–Siam/South FIC would have an estimated 200 (of which half are fighters).

5. Intentions

a. The intention is to take advantage of the enemy disorganization by pressing as far as possible down the Tiddim Road and the Kabaw Valley and if opportunity offers to secure Kalewa and Kalemyo.

The Japanese are unlikely to resist us in strength north of the areas Yazagyo (in the Kabaw Valley) and Tonzang (at Milestone 133 on the Tiddim Road), but may do so there or further south. It is too early to say whether they will. If they do not the present operations should result in the capture of Kalemyo by about mid-November.

If, on the other hand, they do, then an airborne operation will be necessary. Conditions in the Kabaw Valley prohibit movement of medium artillery and tanks until the roads are sufficiently dry, and Mawlaik must be secured in due course to remove any threat from that area. Having secured Kalemyo the intervening ground is of such a difficult nature that there may be some delay before we can capture Kalewa. Preparations must therefore be continued for an airborne operation.

b. In the Arakan, 3rd SS Brigade will be used to carry out minor amphibious operations to threaten the enemy line of communications and possibly divert his strength from the Kaladan Valley. 3rd SS Brigade would be released from these operations as necessary for Dracula .

c. In northeast Burma I intend to continue operations to secure the Mogaung–Myitkyina area.

d. Air operations on existing scale will continue with intention to harass enemy land and water lines of communication and continue tactical support of land forces.

1. Sent also to the War Department and to Eisenhower’s headquarters at London. The message was relayed by the War Department to Quebec as telegram No. 28363 and was received there September 10 as telegram No. Octagon–in –9. It was noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 174th Meeting, September 14, 1944. See post, p. 335.
2. See ante, p. 32, fn. 5, concerning the message to which Mountbatten was replying.