Foreign Relations of the United States, Conference at Quebec, 1944

Roosevelt Papers

Memorandum by the Assistant to the President’s Naval Aide (Elsey)¹

[Undated.]

Occupation of Austria and the Balkans

Decisions concerning post-surrender occupation of Austria and the Balkans were made easily in contrast with decisions concerning Germany and France. In May, General Wilson, Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean, asked the Combined Chiefs of Staff for a directive to allow him to plan for the occupation of southeastern Europe, an area which had not been covered by COSSAC’s planning as it was out of his sphere. The British Chiefs prepared a draft directive for General Wilson and sent it to the U.S. Chiefs for concurrence.^*

They approved the draft but felt that a statement of U.S. policy should be included, a paper which should of course be approved by the President since it involved major political and economic considerations. The statement of our Balkan policy which the Chiefs prepared for Presidential study was based on the two letters of the President to the Secretary of State of February 21² (“I do not want the United States to have the post-war burden of reconstituting France, Italy and the Balkans”) and April 30³ (“This Government is of the opinion that the southern zone and Austria should be occupied by British Forces”). The President approved the following statement on May 27 and the Joint Chiefs then sent it to the British Chiefs of Staff:^†

“With regard to the occupation of southeast Europe the policy of the United States may be summarized as follows:

• “A. No United States forces will be employed as occupational forces in southern Europe, including Austria, or southeast Europe, including the Balkans. Such United States forces as may be present in these areas due to military operations will be withdrawn as soon as practicable after the cessation of hostilities.
• “B. United States participation in civil affairs in southern and southeast Europe will be limited to procurement and shipment of supplies to Albania, Yugoslavia, and Greece, and to the employment of a small number of officers in connection with distribution until such time as U.N.R.R.A. can take over these duties.”

These paragraphs were incorporated into the British directive to General Wilson and it was sent to him on June 9.^‡ The problems with respect to Austria and the Balkans which seemed to have been so quickly solved was [were] suddenly confused, however, by twin inquiries from the Foreign Office and the British Chiefs of Staff requesting clarification of our position. The British commented that the June 9 directive to General Wilson stated that we would not occupy Austria, whereas on May 31 Ambassador Winant had informed the European Advisory Commission that “he was authorized to accept the proposal for the tripartite occupation of Austria.”⁴ The State Department was taken by surprise and telegraphed Winant on June 15⁵ that, so far as it knew, our policy on Austria had not changed; we still believed that “Austria should be occupied by British forces.”^§

Mr. Winant replied two days later. He explained that, although Russia and Great Britain had agreed on tripartite occupation of Austria, he had had no instructions on the subject. “On the last day I was in Washington [May 26],”⁶ he wrote, “I accordingly took this matter up with the President and obtained his permission to agree to the tripartite control of Austria on the understanding that I would in no way commit us respecting the size of the contingent that we might be willing to contribute for this occupation. In working on the drafts concerning the subject of occupation of Austria, I rejected, for example, the phrase ‘will be occupied by the forces of three countries’ and have used the less concise phrase ‘tripartite control.’ When General Marshall was here I discussed this question with him and explained our limited position.”^||

Ambassador Winant’s belated account of his discussion with the President clarified the situation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the British Chiefs on 12 July, in answer to their query, that “there is no change in the policy of the United States Government as regards occupational forces for Austria except that a token force similar to the force planned for Berlin may be sent to Austria in connection with a tripartite control of Austria that may be agreed upon.”^¶ The State Department made a similar reply to the Foreign Office.^**

Meanwhile General Wilson had continued his planning for the occupation of Austria and at the end of July he reported that he plans, with General Eisenhower’s approval, to occupy Austria with four British divisions.^††

1. This paper was an appendix to Elsey’s memorandum on zones of occupation in Europe, ante, p. 145. Elsey informed the Historical Office of the Department of State on January 12, 1955, that he had prepared the memorandum “immediately prior to” the Second Quebec Conference at the request of the President’s Naval Aide (Brown). “Knowing that the subject of zones of occupation would have a prominent place on the agenda of that conference, Admiral Brown directed me to write a briefing paper on the issues between the United Kingdom and the United States on zones of occupation in Germany and Austria, the paper to be based on the Map Room files and the files of Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Admiral Leahy and the President.” (Historical Office Files)
2. C.C.S. 320/14, 10 May 1944. [Footnote in the source text.]
2. See Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, p. 184, fn. 12. Roosevelt’s memorandum to Stettinius of February 21, 1944, is not printed (740.00119 Control (Germany)/2–2144).
3. Not printed (740.00119 EAC/172c).
4. J.C.S. 577/12, 18 May 1944. J.C.S. 577/13, 20 May 1944. J.C.S. 577/14, 28 May 1944. [Footnote in the source text.]
5. C.C.S. 320/18, 11 June 1944. [Footnote in the source text. For a portion of the text of the directive to Wilson dated June 9, 1944, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, p. 434.]
4. See Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, pp. 231, 435.
5. See ibid., p. 435.
6. J.C.S. 577/15, 3 July 1944. C.C.S. 320/20, 7 July 1944. [Footnote in the source text]
6. The bracketed date appears in the source text.
7. J.C.S. 577/15, 3 July 1944. [Footnote in the source text. For the full text of Winant’s telegram No. 4844 to Hull, dated June 17, 1944, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, p. 436.]
8. C.C.S. 320/21, 12 July 1944. [Footnote in the source text.]
9. J.C.S. 577/16, 19 July 1944. [Footnote in the source text. For Hull’s telegram No. 5537 to Winant on this subject, dated July 15, 1944, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, p. 451.]
10. Message for the Combined Chiefs of Staff from General Wilson ( Naf 749), 29 July 1944. [Footnote in the source text.]