Foreign Relations of the United States, Conference at Quebec, 1944

Roosevelt Papers

Department of State Briefing Paper¹

secret

[Undated.]

The Italian Situation

Bonomi’s Government has successfully weathered its first two months. Its position, however, will remain precarious without tangible proof of Allied sympathy, especially as the industrial north is liberated.

The British last May proposed the conclusion of a “preliminary peace treaty”.² They felt that this would end the anomalous situation whereby Italy is both defeated enemy and co-belligerent, clear the way for normal relationships, and yet not prejudice the ultimate peace settlement. We agreed to discuss possible terms but differed from the British thesis that no concessions should meanwhile be made to Italy. The more urgent problems should be solved wherever possible without delay. Mr. Churchill has now told Ambassador Kirk in Rome that he disapproved of a preliminary treaty and preferred UNRRA participation in Italian relief and “a recognition of the present government along the lines already accorded by the Soviet.”³ Press reports portraying the Prime Minister as sympathetic to the Bonomi Government and convinced that the Italian[s] have “worked their pas sage” foreshadow a more favorable British policy toward Italy. We should welcome such a change in attitude, having felt for some time that it is to the general interest to strengthen Italian confidence in democratic government and in the democratic powers.

The most urgent problems are those of civilian relief and rehabilitation. The physical obstacles to their solution have been augmented by divergences in British and American views.

Economic Problems. The civilian supply program thus far has been entirely a military responsibility, of which the U.S. Army now wishes to be relieved. It is proposed to finance United States supplies, except such limited supplies as the Army may temporarily continue to provide, by making available to the Italians under appropriate Allied controls the equivalent in dollars of lire paid to our troops in Italy. Though willing for us to finance our own share in this way, the British have questioned extending the present limited military scope of the supply program and appear sensitive about the reaction of our European Allies to any appreciable aid to Italy. We believe the most essential items of rehabilitation should be included to help the Italian economy to begin functioning and are seeking British agreement.

We have intended proposing at the UNRRA Council meeting in September limited UNRRA participation in relief activities in Italy, involving care and repatriation of displaced persons and public health activities including the furnishing of needed medical supplies and technical assistance. The total estimated cost would be between 35 and 50 million dollars. There has been some indication of British reluctance to support such a program.

The present food supply in Italy would suffice for bare subsistence rations if means of transportation from one region to another were available. Additional trucks and coal to operate local railroads are needed.

Other major questions now in the foreground are:

Allied Control Machinery. Military interest in the Allied Control Commission is decreasing. It will be necessary to determine its future status, particularly whether its control functions should continue after they are no longer needed to protect military operations. This will depend on (a) the status to be accorded Italy, (b) Italy’s relations with bordering states pending a final peace settlement, and (c) the internal situation. Such of its economic functions as must continue after termination of military control can be handled either through a control organization as at present or an economic mission to the Italian Government.

Ambassador Kirk believes that the Commission should now be headed by a civilian, who would continue for the present to be responsible to the Theater Commander. Kirk also recommends appointment of an American, who should be an expert on economic matters. The British might agree. It is expected that the Commission’s Economic Section will shortly be staffed by civilian experts, continuing, however, under military command. Many other functions of the Commission can soon be abandoned or turned over to the Italians.

The Moscow Declaration⁴ provided that the Theater Commander would in time turn over his presidency of the Commission to the Advisory Council. We have recommended to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that the Advisory Council be tied in more closely with the day to day problems of the Commission both to improve its present advisory role and to prepare it to assume the above functions if this course proves desirable.⁵

The Armistice Terms. The severe long terms of surrender⁶ are a source of weakness to any Italian government. They are unquestionably out of date, and many of them have never been applied. In reply to the Bonomi memorandum of July 22,⁷ we agreed to study any specific suggestions for their revision.⁸ We have not pursued this question in view of the British proposal for a preliminary peace to replace the armistice regime.

We did not wish to publish the long terms until some step to offset the reaction could be announced. Pressure in Italy for publication is growing, however, and we have advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff that if this becomes advisable the Italian government itself should take the responsibility for publication.⁹

Italian Armed Forces. The Italians continue to press for fuller military participation. It has finally been decided to furnish combat equipment for three divisions of the Corps of Liberation. General Wilson also recommends increasing the Italian armed forces from 444,300 to 470,000 men.

Prisoners of War. Italian troops captured before the surrender continue to be prisoners of war, even those now employed in combat zones as service units. It should be possible to remove that stigma without prejudice to any military interest. In June we recommended this course to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff,¹⁰ who referred it to the British Chiefs of Staff and AFHQ.

Italian Participation in International Affairs. The Italians should not be precluded from all international contacts. We proposed inviting an Italian observer to the Bretton Woods Conference.¹¹ The British, French and Yugoslavs were opposed, while the Russians and Greeks agreed. We also favor Italy’s participation in such bodies as the International Labor Office.

Some form of Italian representation with the Allied Governments besides the U.S.S.R.¹² seems advisable. We have informed Bonomi of our willingness to receive in an unofficial capacity an Italian technical representation to discuss financial and economic questions and report directly to the Italian Government on such matters as the treatment of Italian prisoners of war here.¹³

Territorial Problems. Our preliminary studies have been based on the criteria: (1) territory should not be taken from Italy merely to punish a defeated enemy or reward an ally; (2) ethnic considerations should predominate, though economic and strategic factors would be kept in mind; (3) as to colonies, native welfare is the first concern; other colonial empires should not be aggrandized by the addition of Italian colonies; and, if Italian colonies are placed under international trusteeship, efforts might be made to place under similar trusteeship at least some other colonial possessions.

In order not to prejudice final settlements, we have advised the extension of Allied Military Government to all metropolitan territory within the 1939 frontiers as liberated; administration thereof by Anglo-American military forces exclusively; and in disputed areas the employment of more Allied and fewer local Italian officials than elsewhere in Italy.

1. Annex 6 to Hull’s memorandum to Roosevelt dated September 6, 1944, which was sent to the White House under cover of a further memorandum of September 8. See ante, p. 120.
2. See Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. iii, p. 1117.
3. This passage is quoted from Kirk’s telegram No. 231 to Hull, dated August 24, 1944, not printed (865.01/8–2444).
4. The provision referred to is contained in paragraph 7 of annex 3 to the secret protocol signed November 1, 1943, at the conclusion of the Tripartite Conference held at Moscow. See Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. i, pp. 758–759; Department of State, Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776–1949, vol. 3, p. 824.
5. Recommendation not printed.
6. Signed at Malta, September 29, 1943; terms modified by a protocol signed at Brindisi, November 9, 1943. For texts, see Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1604; Department of State, Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776–1949, vol. 3, pp. 775, 854; 61 Stat. (3) 2742, 2761.
7. See Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. iii, p. 1142.
8. See ibid., p. 1145.
9. The communication referred to is not printed (740.00119 Control (Italy)/8–1944).
10. Recommendation not printed.
11. i.e., the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference held at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1–22, 1944.
12. The Soviet Union had established relations with the Italian Government in March 1944, without prior notice to the United States and British Governments. See Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. iii, pp. 1048 ff.
13. See Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. iii, p. 1146.