Foreign Relations of the United States, Conference at Quebec, 1944

Roosevelt Papers

Department of State Briefing Paper¹

top secret

[Undated.]

Anglo-American-Russian Relations

Great Britain has long profited from her ability to shift the balance of power in Europe and has traditionally sought the role of the “honest broker” between other nations. The present preponderance of Russia outweighs the rest of Europe and Great Britain combined. It is accordingly natural that the British should seek to maintain a balance between the United States and the Soviet Union and to play the role of “honest broker” between them.

The absence of any conflict of vital interest between the United States and the U.S.S.R., however, and the number of points at which British and Soviet interests impinge make it appear probable that we, whether we choose it or not, may be forced to play such a role. The vital importance which the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff attach to solidarity between the three great powers is concisely stated in the following excerpt from a letter of May 16, 1944 from Admiral Leahy:²

“From the point of view of national and world-wide security, our basic national policy in post-war settlements of this kind should seek to maintain the solidarity of the three great powers and in all other respects to establish conditions calculated to assure a long period of peace, during which, it may be hoped, arrangements will be perfected for the prevention of future world conflicts. The cardinal importance of this national policy is emphasized by a consideration of the fundamental and revolutionary changes in relative national military strengths that are being brought about in Europe as a result of the war.

“It would seem clear that there cannot be a world war, or even a great war, which does not find one or more of the great military powers on each side. At the conclusion of the present war, there will be, for the foreseeable future, only three such powers—the United States, Britain, and Russia. Since it would seem in the highest degree unlikely that Britain and Russia, or Russia alone, would be aligned against the United States, it is apparent that any future world conflict in the foreseeable future will find Britain and Russia in opposite camps.

“In appraising possibilities of this nature, the outstanding fact to be noted is the recent phenomenal development of the heretofore latent Russian military and economic strength—a development which seems certain to prove epochal in its bearing on future politico-military international relationships, and which has yet to reach the full scope attainable with Russian resources. In contrast, as regards Britain several developments have combined to lessen her relative military and economic strength and gravely to impair, if not preclude, her ability to offer effective military opposition to Russia on the continent except possibly in defensive operations in the Atlantic coastal areas. In a conflict between these two powers the disparity in the military strengths that they could dispose upon that continent would, under present conditions, be far too great to be overcome by our intervention on the side of Britain. Having due regard to the military factors involved—resources, manpower, geography and particularly our ability to project our strength across the ocean and exert it decisively upon the continent—we might be able to successfully defend Britain, but we could not, under existing conditions, defeat Russia. In other words, we would find ourselves engaged in a war which we could not win even though the United States would be in no danger of defeat and occupation.

“It is apparent that the United States should, now and in the future, exert its utmost efforts and utilize all its influence to prevent such a situation arising and to promote a spirit of mutual cooperation between Britain, Russia and ourselves. So long as Britain and Russia cooperate and collaborate in the interests of peace, there can be no great war in the foreseeable future.

“The greatest likelihood of eventual conflict between Britain and Russia would seem to grow out of either nation initiating attempts to build up its strength, by seeking to attach to herself parts of Europe to the disadvantage and possible danger of her potential adversary. Having regard to the inherent suspicions of the Russians, to present Russia with any agreement on such matters as between the British and ourselves, prior to consultation with Russia, might well result in starting a train of events that would lead eventually to the situation we most wish to avoid.”

It seems probable that solidarity can best be attained if none of the three powers seeks the role of intermediary between the other two and each of the three works directly with the other two. We should, however, make every effort to prevent discord developing between the other two.

In particular we should:

1. Endeavor to prevent the development in Europe or elsewhere of British and Soviet spheres of influence, with the inevitable potentialities of friction and conflict which that would entail; and

2. Make every effort to secure the full participation of the Soviet Union in the General International Organization and to induce the Soviet Government to settle its international problems through the Organization.

1. Annex 1 to Hull’s memorandum to Roosevelt dated September 6, 1944, which was sent to the White House under cover of a further memorandum of September 8. See ante, p. 120.
2. For the paragraphs of Leahy’s letter of May 16, 1944, not included in this briefing paper, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 106–107, fn. 4.