Foreign Relations of the United States, Conference at Quebec, 1944

J.C.S. Files

Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff¹

top secret
C.C.S. 618/2

[Washington,] 29 August 1944.

Machinery for Coordination of United States-Soviet-British Military Effort

References: C.C.S. 618² and 618/1³

1. In C.C.S. 618 we circulated the text of certain messages which had been exchanged between the Head of the British Military Mission in Moscow⁴ and the British Chiefs of Staff concerning a proposal put forward by Marshal Stalin to the United States Ambassador in Moscow⁵ at the end of June,⁶ to the effect that it might be desirable to create some machinery through which the efforts of our respective forces could be coordinated.

2. The British Chiefs of Staff have since discussed this matter with General Burrows and have instructed us to put forward the attached memorandum which represents their views.

3. The British Chiefs of Staff have been informed of the text of C.C.S. 618/1 and suggest that the whole matter should be discussed at the next Conference.

Enclosure

top secret

[Undated.]

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

Proposed Combined Committee in Moscow

1. We have now discussed with General Burrows, the proposal put forward by Marshal Stalin to the United States Ambassador in Moscow at the end of June, to the effect that it might be desirable to create some machinery through which the efforts of our respective forces could be co-ordinated.

2. We get the impression that Marshal Stalin’s proposal was very tentative but we conclude that he is interested in it, in view of the fact that Marshal Vassilievsky referred to the matter in conversation with General Deane during the latter’s visit to the Russian front.⁷ In the course of this conversation Marshal Vassilievsky stated that the Soviet General Staff would be interested in the formation of some sort of Combined Committee in Moscow, and would like to know what are the proposals of the Chiefs of Staff in this respect. It therefore appears that nothing is likely to materialise unless we make the next move. Whether we should, or should not, do so depends upon the character and scope of the responsibilities with which the proposed combined committee is to be charged.

3. It will be recalled that the possibility of setting up a United Chiefs of Staff organisation was discussed at Sextant.⁸ On that occasion, we expressed the view that the relations of such a body to the Combined Chiefs of Staff would be very difficult, and that it might even claim to be the more representative body, and, therefore, to exercise jurisdiction over the Combined Chiefs of Staff. We emphasised that the representatives of such a body would not have the authority to make big decisions and that, in consequence, the organisation would serve no useful purpose, except as a means of improving liaison; and we added that this could be done better by improving the arrangements already existing in Washington, London and Moscow.

4. The Combined Chiefs of Staff were in general agreement with these views and agreed:—

(a) that they should not take the initiative in putting forward the proposal; and

(b) that if the U.S.S.R. should raise the question the difficulties of, and objections to, any form of standing United Chiefs of Staff Committee should be frankly explained to them.

5. We, ourselves, stand today exactly where we stood at Sextant. We are wholly opposed to the creation of a United Chiefs of Staff Committee of the character suggested at Sextant.

6. On the other hand, we think that there is much to be said for improving our liaison with the Soviet Military authorities. This might well be achieved by the creation of a Combined British, American and Soviet Committee in Moscow, provided that it is clearly understood that this Committee:—

(a) is purely consultative and advisory and has no power to make decisions;

(b) that it deals solely with operational and intelligence matters, and does not impinge upon the work that is at present being done by the European Advisory Commission, such as civil affairs, etc.

7. We propose that the senior members of the existing Military Mission in Moscow should be the British representatives on this Committee. Any other arrangement would inevitably detract from their prestige and usefulness.

8. If the United States Chiefs of Staff accept the above lay-out, we suggest that Generals Burrows and Deane should be instructed to take the matter up with the Soviet military authorities immediately on their return to Moscow.

A. F. Brooke
C. Portal
Andrew Cunningham

1. For the discussion of this paper by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 172d Meeting, September 12, 1944, see post, p. 307.
2. Ante, p. 9.
3. Supra.
4. Lieutenant General Montagu Brocas Burrows.
5. W. Averell Harriman.
6. According to Deane, pp. 152–153, Stalin made this proposal to Harriman on June 28, 1944.
7. On July 22, 1944. See Deane, pp. 208–209.
8. See Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, pp. 336–337.