Hopkins Papers
The Presidents Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the Presidents Chief of Staff (Leahy)
Memorandum Relative to “Policy Concerning Disposition of Lend-Lease Material Following the Defeat of Germany”
| References:1 | a. J.C.S. 771/3; 771/4 |
| b. J.C.S. 162nd Meeting, Item 3 | |
| c. J.C.S. 165th Meeting, Item 5 |
I think that this document2 should not be approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the following reasons:
1. In Paragraph 3, Page 18, the report states—“Following the defeat of Germany, Lend-Lease nations outside the Western Hemisphere should be notified of and should accept their obligation to return to the continental United States or to the control of the United States Government, as may be determined by and in the priorities to be established by the United States, etc.”
This action is contrary to a formal agreement between the allied nations, including Great Britain and Russia. Article 5 of the first Master Agreement between Great Britain and ourselves3 provides that “The Government of the United Kingdom will return to the United States of America at the end of the present emergency, as determined by the President, such defense articles, etc.” Similar pro visions are contained in all other Master Agreements. There is no language in these agreements that implies, directly or indirectly, that this action will be taken until the defeat of all our enemies.
2. The J.C.S. 771/6, in Paragraph 3, further states—“such munitions transferred under Lend-Lease as shall not have been destroyed, lost or consumed and as, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, [Page 175] are not required by such nations for their use against Japan in accordance with our agreed strategy or for other purposes within their cognizance as may be specified by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”
This, I believe, is contrary to an agreement between the American and the British Governments and, if not a formal agreement between the two governments, at least an agreement between the President and the Prime Minister. This agreement provides that the entire munition resources of Great Britain and the United States will be deemed to be in a common pool and that a Combined Board will advise on all assignments, both in quantity and priority, whether to Great Britain and the United States or other of the United Nations.
3. It seems to me that apart from the above reasons, at this particular stage of the war, such a unilateral action on our part is fraught with probabilities of unnecessary friction which should be, at the least, delayed until after the collapse of Germany. At that time the American policy in relation to this matter should be discussed fully with our allies.
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None printed. The references are those cited in J.C.S. 771/6 (not printed), of which Hopkins had a copy. J.C.S. 771/3 was the source of a memorandum containing the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on “Policy Concerning Assignments of Lend-Lease Munitions Following the Defeat of Germany”, which the President had approved on May 10, 1944. J.C.S. 771/6 proposed a further memorandum to the President seeking approval of a more detailed elaboration of the policy. Following receipt of Hopkins’ memorandum of September 7, and more particularly following receipt by Marshall and King of Roosevelt’s letter of September 9 (post, p. 180), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, meeting at Quebec on September 12, suspended action on J.C.S. 771/6 and
↩- “a. Took note of the President’s wish that no policy for lend-lease be established for the future until further instructions from him.
- “b. Instructed the Secretaries to inform all agencies to whom J.C.S. 771/3 had been forwarded that the paper had been withdrawn.” (J.C.S. Files)
- i.e., J.C.S. 771/6.↩
- Signed at Washington, February 23, 1942. For text, see Department of State, Executive Agreement Series No. 241; 56 Stat. (2) 1433.↩