J.C.S. Files
Memorandum by the Combined Staff
Planners
1
secret
[
Washington
,] 25 May
1943.
Attachment to C.C.S.
250/1
Implementation of Decisions Reached at the
Trident Conference
- 1.
- In order that there may be no delay in action to implement the
decisions arrived at the
Trident
Conference, the Combined Staff Planners recommend as
follows:
-
a.
- That a directive be issued to General Eisenhower for
operations after
Husky
(Enclosure A).
-
b.
- That a supplementary directive be issued to General
Morgan (Enclosure B).
-
c.
- That General Morgan should be instructed to give, as
soon as possible, a preliminary estimate of the
requirements for operation
Roundhammer
in transport aircraft and gliders.
- 2.
- In view of the urgency of completing the
Roundhammer
plan, we suggest that further consideration should be
given to the early appointment of the Supreme Commander.
Enclosure A
Draft Directive to General Eisenhower
1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved:
a. That forces and equipment shall be
established in the United [Page 285] Kingdom with the object of mounting an
operation with target date 1 May 1944 to secure a lodgment on
the Continent from which further offensive operations can be
carried out. The scope of the operation will be such as to
necessitate the following forces being present and available for
use in the United Kingdom by 1 May 1944, in addition to the air
forces then available.
|
Assault:
|
5 |
Infantry Divisions (simultaneously loaded in landing
craft) |
|
2 |
Infantry Divisions—Follow-up |
|
2 |
Air-borne Divisions |
| Total |
9 |
Divisions in the Assault |
|
Build-up:
|
20 |
Divisions available for movement into lodgment
area |
| Total |
29 |
Divisions |
The possibility of adding one French Division
will be considered at a later date.
The expansion of logistical facilities in the United Kingdom will
be undertaken immediately, and after the initial assault the
seizure and development of Continental ports will be expedited
in order that the build-up forces may be augmented by follow-up
shipments from the United States or elsewhere of additional
divisions and supporting units at the rate of 3 to 5 divisions
per month.
b. That the Allied Commander in Chief
North Africa will be instructed, as a matter of urgency, to plan
such operations in exploitation of
Husky
as are best calculated to eliminate Italy from the war
and to contain the maximum number of German forces. Which of the
various specific operations should be adopted, and thereafter
mounted, is a decision which will be reserved to the Combined
Chiefs of Staff. The Allied Commander in Chief in North Africa
may use for his operations all those forces available in the
Mediterranean Area except for four American and three British
divisions which will be held in readiness from 1 November onward
for withdrawal to take part in operations from the United
Kingdom, provided that the naval vessels required will be
approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff when the plans are
submitted. The additional air forces provided on a temporary
basis for
Husky
will not be considered available. It is estimated that
the equivalent strength of 19 British and Allied, 4 United
States, and 4 French divisions, or a total of 27 divisions will
be available for garrisons and operations in the Mediterranean
Area subsequent to
Husky
. These figures exclude the 4 United States and 3
British divisions to be transferred to the United Kingdom and
the 2 British divisions constituting the British commitment to
Turkey. It [Page 286] is further
estimated that there will be available after
Husky
a total of 3,648 aircraft including 242 heavy bombers
(day and night), 519 medium bombers (day and night), 299 light
and dive bombers, 2,012 fighters, 412 transports, and 164 army
cooperatives. Further instructions will be issued as to the
availability of combat loaders and cargo ships.
2. You are directed to submit proposals with appropriate
recommendations for operations in the Mediterranean Area, to be
carried out concurrently with or subsequent to a successful
Husky
. All considerations related to your proposed operations
must be [in] consonance with the Combined Chiefs of Staff
agreements quoted in paragraph 1 above. Proposals will be
submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff not later than 1 July
1943.
3. Landing Craft. In view of necessity for
starting preparations in the United Kingdom at once for
cross-Channel operations referred to in paragraph 1 a above, it may be necessary after
Husky
to withdraw from the Mediterranean and Levant:
-
a.
- The crews of all landing craft that may be lost in
Husky
.
-
b.
- Maintenance and base staffs, with repair equipment and
spare gear surplus to those required for the upkeep of landing ships
and craft then remaining.
The landing craft available for operations in the Mediterranean
after
Husky
are based on an estimate of 50 per cent loss in that
operation. If the losses are less than this, surplus crews and
craft may have to be returned to the U. K. This does not
necessarily apply to special ships.
Enclosure B
Draft Supplementary Directive to the Chief
of Staff to the Supreme Commander (Designate)
Amphibious Operations From the U.
K.
1. Under the terms of your present directive2 you have been instructed to
prepare plans for:
-
a.
- An elaborate camouflage and deception scheme extending
over the whole summer with a view to pinning the enemy
in the West and keeping alive the expectation of
large-scale cross-Channel operations in 1943. This would
include at least one amphibious feint with the [Page 287] object of
bringing on an air battle employing the Metropolitan
Royal Air Force and the U.S. 8th Air Force.
-
b.
- A return to the Continent in the event of German
disintegration at any time from now onwards with
whatever forces may be available at the time.
-
c.
- A full-scale assault against the Continent in 1944 as
early as possible.
2. In amplification of paragraph c above
the Combined Chiefs of Staff have now resolved that forces and
equipment shall be established in the United Kingdom with the
object of mounting an operation with target date 1 May 1944, to
secure a lodgment on the Continent from which further offensive
operations can be carried out.
3. You will, therefore, plan an operation based on the presence
of the following ground forces available for use in the U.K. on
1 May 1944:
|
Assault:
|
5 |
Infantry Divisions simultaneously loaded in
landing craft. |
|
2 |
Infantry Divisions—follow up. |
|
2 |
Air-borne Divisions. |
| Total: |
9 |
Divisions in the assault. |
|
Build-up:
|
20 |
Divisions available for movement into lodgment
area. |
| Total: |
29 |
Divisions. |
A detailed statement of the forces which it is estimated will be
available for this operation will be provided separately, and
the possibility of adding one French Division will be considered
at a later date.
4. The expansion of logistical facilities in the U. K. will be
undertaken immediately. You should plan for the development and
seizure of Continental ports, after the initial assault, in
order that the buildup forces may be augmented, and follow-up
shipments may be made from the United States, or elsewhere, of
additional divisions and supporting units at the rate of 3 to 5
divisions per month.
The preparation and constant keeping up to date of plans for an
emergency crossing of the Channel in the event of a German
collapse will proceed in accordance with the directive already
given to you. In addition, you will prepare and submit to the
Combined Chiefs of Staff a plan for sending forces to Norway in
the event of a German evacuation becoming apparent.
5. Your outline plan for this operation
should be prepared and submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff
as early as possible and not later than 1
August 1943.
