Foreign Relations of the United States, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the United States Joint Staff Planners ¹

secret
Enclosure to C.C.S. 235

[ Washington ,] 18 May 1943.

Defeat of Germany From the United Kingdom

problem

1. To present a plan for the defeat of Germany (showing the course of operations and their feasibility) by concentrating on the biggest possible invasion force in the United Kingdom as soon as possible.

assumptions, 1943–44

2. a. Russia remains an effective Ally in the war and is containing the bulk of the German forces. She is at peace with Japan.

b. No amphibious operations will be undertaken in the Mediterranean area subsequent to Husky .

c. Husky starts on the date at present planned and all organized opposition in the island ceases by 31 August. Landing craft can be released by 15 August for movement to other areas for further operations by 15 August.

d. Sickle continues at full scale as planned.

e. Air operations in the Mediterranean area will be limited to the protection of shipping and the bombing of Italy and other remunerative Axis targets.

f. Spain remains neutral.

g. Turkey is either neutral or an active Ally.

objective

3. The decisive defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe as early as practicable.

general strategic considerations european—Mediterranean area, 1943–44

4. To attain this objective we believe that the courses of action outlined below are essential:

a. Sickle , and the bomber offensive from the United Kingdom.

b. Bolero , in order to achieve the primary objective, Roundup , in the spring of 1944.

c. Keep Russia in the war.

d. Mediterranean air operations after Husky must not prejudice Sickle , the bomber offensive from the United Kingdom, Bolero , and Roundup .

5. A sound strategic concept for the defeat of Germany at the earliest possible date can only be developed after careful analysis of existing and anticipated conditions in the entire European-Mediterranean area in 1943–44. Our strategic concept is firmly based on such an assessment, and accepts the following premises:

a. Defeat of the Western Axis by means of an invasion from the Mediterranean is unsound strategically and logistically.

b. The United Kingdom is an unparalleled base from which, to create conditions for a successful landing on the Continent and to launch the decisive invasion of the Fortress of Europe.

c. Germany intends to concentrate on the defeat of the Russian armed forces in 1943. Only a major threat from another direction will divert Germany from this purpose, as she is fully conscious that failure on the Russian Front means her ultimate defeat by the United Nations. The minor operations in the Mediterranean which could be conducted after Husky , within the limited capabilities of the United Nations, even if they resulted in the defection or collapse of Italy, would be of lesser importance to Germany than the defeat of Russia. The United States and British forces are incapable of interfering seriously, by Military action other than air, with Axis operations against Russia in 1943. Germany will either fail or succeed in Russia this summer.

d. We believe that Russia will continue to require the major part of the Axis effort in 1944. The heavy pressure on the Axis by the Russian armies, together with the devastating results of an overwhelming and uninterrupted bomber offensive from the United Kingdom, Africa, and Sicily, will create a situation favorable for Roundup in April 1944.

e. We further believe: that the elimination of Italy is not a prerequisite for the creation of conditions favorable for Roundup ; that the elimination of Italy may possibly be brought about without need of further amphibious operations in the Mediterranean, by a successful Husky and an intensified bomber offensive against Italy—in fact Italian defection might precede Husky ; that if, after Husky , Italy has not surrendered or collapsed, the advantages to be gained in eliminating Italy by conducting further amphibious operations are not worth the cost in forces, shipping, amphibious equipment, and time; that secondary operations after Husky to eliminate Italy will have a drastic effect in forces, shipping, amphibious equipment, and time on our main effort— Sickle , the bomber offensive, Bolero , and Roundup .

f. Experience in Torch and in preparation for Husky has shown that once an operation, even though admittedly secondary, is directed, the desire to insure its success leads to increasing demands for greater and greater forces. Such would undoubtedly be the case with secondary operations in the Mediterranean after Husky , especially if directed against Italy. The additional forces can only be provided at the direct expense of Sickle , Bolero , and Roundup .

axis capabilities in the spring of 1944

(Reference C.I.C. 24, 16 May 1943)²

General

6. Germany will be increasingly war weary and will be faced with an economy inadequate to a prolonged war, resulting, among other things, in the armed forces beginning to experience shortages in supply. The presence of Russia on the East and the Allied threat on the West will prevent the hoped for remanning of industry by men released from the armed forces. Her total number of divisions will remain approximately static, but they will be under strength. Our build-up in the United Kingdom will offer for the first time a positive threat of a war on a second front. While this build-up is being effected, the bomber offensive will be carrying the striking power of the United Nations to the Germans and creating conditions favorable for a successful invasion.

Ground Forces

7. In the spring of 1944, German ground forces may be estimated at about 280 combat divisions, which could be distributed as follows:

Eastern Front (including Finland)	195
Norway	11
Poland	2
Denmark	2
Southeastern Europe	11
France and Low Countries	32	(⅓ refitting)
Germany (Strategic reserve)	27	(⅓ refitting)

8. An attack against the European coast would be met by coastal divisions varying, with the area attacked, from 2–3 to 3–5. The mobile reserves of 2 to 4 divisions could begin to arrive after 24 hours, but the movement of these divisions can reasonably be expected to be delayed by aerial action.

9. The strategic reserve in Germany will total a maximum of 18 understrength divisions. Units could begin to arrive in 4 days and the total could be in France, but not in the areas of operations, in 3½ weeks. If this movement were not undertaken prior to our attack, it would require 5 weeks to complete the move to France. If units could be spared from the Eastern Front, the first division would arrive in 14 days and 2 each week thereafter. Continued air attack on these units while enroute will materially reduce their combat effectiveness.

Air Forces

10. The number of airplanes is difficult to determine, but after planes have been allocated to the Russian Front, it is estimated that there will be 2050 planes available for all other areas.

11. It is estimated that on 1 May 1944 there will be 950 combat airplanes in France and the Low Countries. These might be reinforced immediately by 100 additional planes. Within a week, 450 planes probably could be concentrated in the area giving a total of 1500 planes, assuming no losses. Further reinforcements woukl depend on Germany’s will to strip the Russian Front, but in any event the absolute number of German planes is of relatively minor importance due to the United Nations’ preponderance (8 to 1) of air powder, in the United Kingdom.

Naval Forces

12. An invasion would probably be opposed at sea by 70 E–boats, 17 destroyers, 30 torpedo boats, and a large but indeterminate number of submarines.

Summary

13. A cross-Channel assault would be faced, initially, with from 2 to 5 coastal defense divisions which might be reinforced by 2 to 4 mobile divisions after a minimum of 24 hours. A minimum delay of from 3 to 5 weeks can be expected before the 18 understrength divisions in Germany could be moved to France. Additional time would be required to move them to the combat zone.

14. Our overwhelming air superiority (8 to 1) could seriously delay, or even prevent, the arrival of reserves, if not eliminate them entirely from early arrival in combat. This applies equally to the mobile reserves in France as well as to the 18 understrength divisions in Germany. Therefore, 3 to 4 coastal divisions must be defeated initially and a build-up effected to face a reinforcement of 2 to 4 divisions which may arrive in & depleted and disorganized condition, as a result of our air attacks. After 30 to 60 days, Germany might be in a position to face us with a maximum of 15–20 understrength divisions. At this time their air strength would be negligible unless they chose to strip other areas including the Russian Front.

concept of the operation

Target Date

15. Because 1 April 1944 coincides with the completion of the 4th phase of the Allied bomber offensive against Germany, and is the earliest date on which the weather becomes favorable for a cross-Channel operation, it should be accepted for planning purposes as the date on which we must be prepared to re-enter the Continent. The continued examination of the results of the bomber offensive and the integration of its effects with other factors, including events on the Russian Front and in the Mediterranean, will enable the United Nations to decide by November, 1943, if a change in the proposed target date should be necessary.

General Concept

16. The Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander for cross-Channel operations has been directed to study and prepare plans for invasion at any time with whatever forces may be available. This planning is proceeding, but has not yet progressed to a full study of Roundup .³ Lacking complete examination of this problem, only the broader aspects of a plan can be presented. Detailed exam illation may therefore result in some modifications to the plan presented herewith.

17. In general, it is proposed that an operation be conducted to secure a lodgment in the north of France, It is estimated that ten divisions will be required for the initial cross-Channel movement, and that sufficient amphibious assault craft will be available to float those required in the initial assault provided those now in the Mediterranean are moved to the United Kingdom on the completion of Husky , and that no other major amphibious operations in the Mediterrean are undertaken. Thereafter, a build-up of forces [should?] be accomplished at the maximum rate consistent with available port capacities together with an exploitation of the lodgment to secure additional ports and air bases. When a sufficient build-up of forces and the organization of logistical establishments have been accomplished, and when the effect of the air offensive has been reflected in decreased German resistance, the advance to the heart of the German citadel can be accomplished.

availability of united nations forces

Air Forces

18. The U.S.A.A.F. program and the R.A.F. projected order of battle for April, 1944, is indicated below. The U.S.A.A.F. must be given first priority on shipping if the bomber offensive program is to be accomplished.

	U.S.A.A.F .		R.A.F.
	Groups	Aircraft ( U.E. )	Squadrons	Aircraft ( U.E. )
Heavy Bombers	51	2448	80	1600
Medium Bombers	9	576	12	240
Light and Dive Bombers	13	832	13	260
Bomber Reconn.			1	14
Day Fighter	25	2500	62	1116
Night Fighter			19	412
Fighter Reconn.			15	231
Army Support (Fighters)			8	112
Army Support (Bombers)			4	56
Photo Reconn.	2	168	5	100
Observation	4	336	10	160
Air/Sea Rescue			8½	170
Transport	8½	442	7	190
	112½	7302	244½	4061

Ground Forces

19. If commitments to other theaters remain at the 1943 level there will be available in the United States, through 1944, more divisions than can be shipped to the United Kingdom. After Husky , 6 additional U. S. divisions in the Mediterranean will be available for use elsewhere.

20. The British will have 10 offensive divisions available in the United Kingdom by October, 1943. This may be increased to 14 divisions by 1 April 1944. After Husky , 11 additional British divisions in the Mediterranean will be available for use elsewhere.

Build-up in the United Kingdom

21. The build-up in the United Kingdom for a cross-Channel operation can be obtained by the movement of forces from the United States only, or by moving troops from the United States and transferring surplus U. S. and British formations from North Africa. The two methods of build-up are indicated below (priority on shipping has been given to the air force units and provides for completion of U.S.A.A.F. build-up by May, 1944). These figures are based on British estimates of the numbers that can be processed through U. K. ports rather than on a larger number which can actually be moved by available shipping.

Build-up ( divs .) From the United States Only (See Appendix “A”⁴)

	1 Oct 1943	1 Jan 1944	1 Apr 1944	1 Jul 1944	1 Oct 1944	1 Jan 1945
U. S.	7	13	20	25	28	31
British	10	10	14*	14	14	14
Total	17	23	34	39	42	45

22. It is reasonable to assume that operations have secured continental ports through which troops and cargo may pass, and that the flow through U. K. ports has been increased, thus permitting the following build-up:

	1 Jul 1944	1 Oct 1944	1 Jan 1945
Total divisions	43	50	64

23. Build-up ( divs .) From the United States and North Africa (See Appendix “A“)

	1 Oct 1943	1 Jan 1944,	1 Apr 1944	1 Jul 1944	1 Oct 1944	1 Jan 1945
U. S.	6	8	10	18	24	27
British	10	14	24	25	25	25
Total	16	22	34	43	49	52

These figures are based on what the British have indicated can be processed through U. K. ports and not on the availability of shipping. The latter would permit a material increase in the build-up indicated were it not for the limitations imposed by the port capacities of the United Kingdom.

24. The second method of build-up, from the United States and North Africa, is presented because of the desirability of using battle seasoned units for the initial cross-Channel operations. Units can be found in the Mediterranean that are not only composed of veterans, but that have also participated in large-scale amphibious operations.

Amphibious Assault Craft

25. Appendix “B” lists the amphibious assault craft which will be available after Husky , and also after each of two major amphibious operations subsequent to Husky , if such operations are conducted.⁴

Garrisons in the Mediterranean

26. Proposed garrisons in the Mediterranean are contained in Appendix “C.”⁵

effect of operations subsequent to husky on roundup and sickle

Ground Forces

27. If major operations, other than by air, are undertaken in the Mediterranean after the successful completion of Husky , no ground forces may be released for Bolero until after the collapse of Italy.

28. Such operations may interfere seriously with Roundup if shipping available for Bolero has to be diverted to reinforce and support the forces engaged in the Mediterranean.

29. The time required to gain the objective of the Mediterranean operations—the collapse of Italy—is indefinite. Success cannot be expected before 1 January 1944. After that date sufficient time remains to move two divisions from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom before the target date selected for Roundup , but there can be no assurance that shipping will be available. Roundup would probably be deprived, therefore, of battle-experienced troops.

30. Little would be gained in the build-up following Roundup by moving any other available forces from the Mediterranean to the “United Kingdom over the movement of similar numbers from the United States.

Air Forces

31. After providing for an air offensive against Italy, convoy projection, and defense, about 900 combat aircraft and 250 transports will be available and could be moved to the United Kingdom following the completion of Husky . However, if further advances are undertaken, all aircraft employed at the time of Husky will remain in the Mediterranean until offensive operations are completed. All of the fighters (550), most of which are first line, and 250 transports, sufficient to lift two parachute regiments simultaneously, would be retained in the Mediterranean for garrison and supply of additionally occupied areas. Only light bombers and special purpose airplanes (about 350) could be released for transfer to the United Kingdom.

Amphibious Assault Craft (see Appendix “B”)

32. If no operations are conducted subsequent to Husky , the number of amphibious assault craft available for Roundup will total 4,657 of all types.

33. After one major amphibious operation subsequent to Husky , the total will be reduced to 3,540, or 76 percent of the maximum.

34. A second major amphibious operation subsequent to Husky will reduce the total to 2,461 or 53 percent of the total.

35. If the second operation is not undertaken until the middle of November 1943, the amphibious assault craft remaining cannot arrive in the United Kingdom until about 1 March 1944.

36. It is probable that the amphibious assault craft available after Husky will not meet fully the maximum vehicle requirements of a large scale Roundup . It is apparent, therefore, that any lesser number would be entirely inadequate.

conclusions

37. After Husky , the main effort of the United Nations should be concentrated on executing Sickle , the bomber offensive, Bolero , and Roundup .

38. The planning date for Roundup should be 1 April 1944.

39. The launching of a Roundup operation about 1 April 1944 is considered entirely feasible, and the movement of United States and British resources to the United Kingdom, therefore, should be executed.

40. Operations in the Mediterranean subsequent to Husky should be limited to the air offensive, because any other operations would use resources vital to Roundup and present the risk of a limitless commitment of United Nations resources to the Mediterranean vacuum, thus needlessly prolonging the war.

1. Circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff under cover of the following note by the Secretaries: “The attached memorandum by the U. S. Joint Staff Planners, prepared after consultation with the British Joint Planning Staff, contains a plan for the defeat of Germany showing the course of operations and their feasibility by concentrating the biggest possible invasion force in the U. K. as soon as possible.” This memorandum was prepared pursuant to a directive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on May 15, 1943; see ante, p. 84. The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered this memorandum together with a companion British memorandum, C.C.S. 234, supra, at their morning meeting on May 19; see ante, p. 112. The consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff of these papers resulted in their agreement upon certain resolutions incorporated into C.C.S. 237/1, May 20, 1943, post, p. 281.
2. Not printed.
3. For an account of the planning in the first half of 1943 for a cross Channel invasion of the continent, see Harrison, chapter ii.
4. Not printed.
5. These 4 additional British divisions are dependent on the present program of conversion of defensive divisions to an offensive type. [Footnote in the source text.]
4. Not printed.
5. Not printed.