Foreign Relations of the United States, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943

J. C. S. Files

Study by the United States Joint Staff Planners¹

secret
Enclosure to C.C.S. 219

[Washington,] 14 May 1943.

Conduct of the War in 1943–1944

1. united nations overall objective

The overall objective of the United Nations, in conjunction with Russia and other Allies, is to bring the war against Germany, Japan, and Italy to a successful conclusion at the earliest possible date.

2. overall strategic concept for the prosecution of the war

a. In cooperation with Russia and other Allies to force an unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.

b. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate unconditional surrender can be forced.

c. Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers and, if possible with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to force the unconditional surrender of Japan. If, however, conditions develop which indicate that the war as a whole can be brought more quickly to a successful conclusion by the earlier mounting of a major offensive against Japan, the strategical concept set forth herein may be reversed.

3. operations in the atlantic and european-african areas

a. Secure the lines of comunications in the Atlantic by defeating the U–boat and removing other threats to these sea communications.

b. European Area

(1) Conduct a full-scale assault from the United Kingdom against the Continent in the spring of 1944.

(2) Conduct a vigorous air offensive with a view to reducing Germany’s war potential and to making feasible a cross-Channel operation and exploitation from lodgments on the Continent in the spring of 1944.

(3) Build up appropriate forces in the United Kingdom for tasks (1) and (2).

(4) Prepare for and return to the Continent in the event of German disintegration at any time from now onwards with whatever forces may be available at the time.

c. African Area

(1) Accomplish Husky .

(2) After the completion of Husky , or in the event that Husky is cancelled, conduct limited offensive operations in the Mediterranean Area. These operations will be designed:

(a) To destroy Italian war potential by continuing air attacks from Mediterranean bases;

(b) To continue support to Russia by the diversion of Axis forces and materials;

(c) To force dispersion of Axis forces in order to facilitate a cross-Channel operation; and

(d) To maintain the security of our positions and communications in the Mediterranean Area.

The strength of the forces to be employed in the Mediterranean will be so limited as not to prejudice the success of a cross-Channel operation in 1944. U. S. ground and naval forces will not be employed in the Mediterranean east of Sicily.

4. operations in the pacific and far east

a. Conduct operations to maintain lines of communication in the Pacific, particularly to Australia; to maintain pressure on Japan, retain the initiative, force attrition, contain the Japanese Fleet in the Pacific, and attain or retain positions of readiness for a full-scale offensive against Japan; and to keep China in the war.

b. For these purposes, U. S. Naval forces will be increased to a maximum consistent with the minimum requirements in the Atlantic. With due regard to the requirements of the main effort against the European Axis, air and ground forces will be provided so as to facilitate joint action and make optimum use of the increasing strength of U. S. Naval forces.

c. Offensive operations in the Pacific and Far East in 1943–1944 will have the following objectives:

(1) Conduct of air operations in and from China.

(2) Seizure of Burma.

(3) Ejection of the Japanese from the Aleutians.

(4) Seizure of the Marshall and Caroline Islands.

(5) Seizure of the Solomons, the Bismarck Archipelago, and Japanese held New Guinea.

5. assistance to russia, china, and the combatant french

a. Sustain the Soviet forces by the greatest volume of munitions that can be supplied and transported to Russia without militating against the attainment of the overall objectives.

b. Sustain China by continuing to furnish munitions to the greatest extent practicable.

c. Continue to furnish munitions to the combatant French in Northwest Africa on the scale previously agreed upon.

1. This paper was circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 14, 1943, under cover of the following memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff: “The enclosed study was prepared by the United States Joint Staff Planners and meets with the approval of the United States Chiefs of Staff. It is submitted for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.” It was read by Leahy during the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 14; see ante, p. 54.