Foreign Relations of the United States, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

May 25, 1943, 10:30 a.m.

secret

1. Conclusions of the Minutes of the 95th Meeting²

Admiral King suggested an amendment to Conclusion c of Item 2.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Approved the Conclusions of the 95th Meeting as recorded in the Minutes, but with the substitution of the word “Pacific” for “Indian” in Conclusion c of Item 2 and the addition of the words “(including Burma)” after the words “Far Eastern Theaters.”

2. Final Report to President and Prime Minister
(C.C.S. 242/4 and 242/5)³

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them C.C.S. 242/4, together with certain amendments suggested by the Prime Minister (C.C.S. 242/5).

Certain other minor amendments were suggested and approved.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Approved the final report to the President and Prime Minister, as modified by C.C.S. 242/5 and as amended in the course of discussion.

3. Implementation of Decisions Reached at the Trident Conference
(C.C.S. 250)⁴

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners covering suggested directives and instructions to General Eisenhower and General Morgan, prepared in the light of the decisions reached at the Trident Conference.

Sir Alan Brooke suggested an amendment to paragraph 1 c of the Memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered certain amendments to the draft directives contained in Enclosures “A” and “B.”

General Marshall presented a proposal that an additional statement be added at the end of paragraph 1 of C.C.S. 250 to the effect that shipping available for Post- Husky Mediterranean operations would amount to 15 combat loaders and 90 cargo ships.

Sir Charles Portal indicated that he thought that before the British Chiefs of Staff could agree to specify an exact number of ships the matter would have to be explored further.

Admiral King suggested adding the statement at the end of paragraph one: “Further instructions will be issued as to the availability of combat loaders and cargo ships.”

Admiral King’s proposal was agreed to.

Admiral Leahy suggested that the recommendations in the covering Memorandum to the Combined Staff Planners, as amended, be approved, but that the final directives be prepared by the Secretariat in the light of the discussion and of the latest decisions.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

a. Approved the covering memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners as amended in the course of discussion.⁵

b. Approved the draft directive to General Eisenhower (Enclosure “A”) and the draft supplementary directive to the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander (Designate) (Enclosure “B”), subject to the incorporation therein by the Secretaries of the agreed decisions that had been arrived at subsequent to the preparation of these draft directives.⁶

4. Suggested Statement To Be Made to the Chinese (Unnumbered C.C.S. Memorandum dated 25 May 1943)⁷

General Marshall said that since he had a meeting with the Chinese Representatives at 3 p.m. that afternoon he would like guidance from the Combined Chiefs of Staff as to the form in which the decisions of the Conference should be conveyed to the Chinese.⁸ He urged that the decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with reference to Burma be presented as proposals since it would be improper to imply a decision had been made regarding the use of the Generalissimo’s forces.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff were of the opinion that the formal transmission of the decisions to the Chinese should be made by the President and Prime Minister to the Generalissimo.

Certain amendments to the draft contained in the memorandum under discussion were then inserted in order to conform to this conception.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Approved with minor amendments, the suggested statement to be made to the Chinese.^*

5. Proposals for Improving Combined Planning
(C.C.S. 251)⁹

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered a Memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners containing certain proposals for improving Combined Planning.

Sir Alan Brooke suggested an amendment to paragraph 2 a of the Memorandum designed to make it clear that the war against Japan should be considered as a whole.

Admiral Leahy suggested that paragraph 2 b should be eliminated since, in his view, the function of the Combined Staff Planners was to advise the Combined Chiefs of Staff on plans prepared by theater commanders and not to personally assist theater commanders. He felt that the presence of the Combined Staff Planners at theater headquarters might interfere with the function of theater commanders and their staffs.

Admiral Cooke and Captain Lambe explained that this paragraph had been inserted since it was believed that the Combined Staff Planers could, if they visited General Eisenhower’s headquarters, prove useful by imparting information and data as regards resources which would assist him in drawing up his plans and, at the same time, themselves learn at an early stage of the possible plans and requirements.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:

Approved the proposals put forward by the Combined Staff Planners, subject to certain amendments which have been incorporated in C.C.S. 251/1.¹⁰

6. Conclusion of the Conference

Sir Alan Brooke said that, on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff, he would like to express most heartfelt thanks for the kindness, both official and unofficial, which the British Chiefs of Staff had received during their visit. They had been met in a spirit of cooperation which had proved most helpful. The fundamental value of the exchange of views between the Chiefs of Staff of the two Nations had been proved by the fact that they had agreed to hold the next Conference at an early date. Short periods between meetings were, he felt, essential. If the lapse of time between successive meetings was too long, the views of each nation were more likely to become divergent.

Sir Alan Brooke paid tribute to the Combined Staff Planners who had worked at great pressure and whose high standard of work had gone far to assist the Combined Chiefs of Staff in reaching rapid decisions.

With regard to the results of the Conference, agreement had been reached on all vital points and through the process of reaching agreement, each side had achieved a clearer appreciation of the outlook and conception of the other. Finally, the Conference had strengthened those ties of friendship between the two Staffs, which was so essential to true cooperation in the war.

Admiral Leahy, on behalf of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff, said that they too had an equal appreciation of the value of this conference and looked forward with assurance to equally successful results from future conferences. Frequent meetings were, in his opinion, essential. It had been a great pleasure to him to assist, for the first time, in personal consultation with the British Chiefs of Staff. This Conference had enabled the Chiefs of Staff to clarify the outlook for the immediate future and subsequent conferences would enable them to deal as successfully with future problems.

2. Ante, p. 184.
3. C.C.S. 242/3, May 24, 1943, post, p. 359, as considered and revised during the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill on May 24 (ante, p. 189), was circulated as C.C.S. 242/4, not printed. C.C.S. 242/5, May 25, 1943, is printed post, p. 363. C.C.S. 242/6, May 25, 1943, post, p. 364, the approved version of the Final Report to the President and Prime Minister, incorporated the amendments suggested by Churchill as well as the revisions of C.C.S. 242/4 made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the course of this meeting.
4. C.C.S. 250, May 24, 1943, memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners, not printed. For the final version of the memorandum as amended and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, see C.C.S. 250/1, post. p. 284.
5. Post, p. 284.
6. Post, pp. 284 and 286.
7. Post, p. 377.
8. No record has been found of Marshall’s meeting with the Chinese representatives. See the editorial note, post, p. 208.
9. Subsequently published as Annex to the White House Minutes, 25 May 1943. [Footnote in the source text. See post, p. 204.]
9. Not printed.
10. Not printed.