Foreign Relations of the United States, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

May 24, 1943, 4:45 p.m.

secret

Report to the President and Prime Minister
(C.C.S. 242/3)¹

The President indicated his satisfaction and that of the Prime Minister with regard to the unanimity of opinion and the satisfactory decisions that had been arrived at by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He was particularly grateful that so much had been accomplished in such a short time. He said the Prime Minister recalled that in the last war decisions were made with undue speed. There was no organized group which corresponded to our Combined Chiefs of Staff which was able to provide continuity in the strategic direction of the war.

The Prime Minister said that “today we meet in the presence of a new fact”; namely, what might prove to be decisive progress in the anti-U–boat war. There were indications that there might be as many as 30 sinkings in May. If this continued, a striking change would come over the scene.

The President then read the draft report contained in C.C.S. 242/3. There was complete agreement on all items until he came to paragraphs 6 and 7 under Section III. These were amended slightly.

section iii, paragraph 9—rearmament of french forces

With regard to paragraph 9 under Section III, Admiral King pointed out that the original paper provided only for the equipment of French Army Forces in North Africa. At his suggestion the paragraph was changed to apply to French Forces in Africa.

The Prime Minister said that Admiral Godefroy had received an order from Vichy to scuttle his ships in Alexandria. He had replied that he had definitely thrown in his lot with General Giraud’s forces. As a result of this action the British Government would probably lift the pay ban on Godefroy’s squadron. It was now Admiral Godefroy’s desire that his heavy ships would proceed around the Cape, call at Dakar, and then proceed to the United States for refitting.

section iv, paragraph 1 a —operation to seize the azores

The Prime Minister said that the political considerations involved in the seizure of the Azores must be considered. There was a possibility that the Islands might be secured without the necessity of utilizing a force as strong as 9 battalions. He suggested that a smaller force might approach the Azores in June. From 7 to 10 hours before its arrival, the Portuguese Government might be approached diplomatically and told that the force was en route. If they were received without opposition, the Portuguese Government would be reimbursed by whatever figure might be set. He thought the chances were possibly 3 to 1 that the Portuguese Government would submit.

The Prime Minister said that he personally favored an expedition in sufficient force to take the Islands. His government, however, had not as yet authorized him to approve such action. The British cabinet members felt that the matter should be further discussed on his return.²

General Marshall said that if a smaller force could be assembled in June which would act as a threat to back up a diplomatic approach, he would favor such action. He thought the present success in the anti-submarine warfare made it even more imperative that the use of the Islands be obtained as soon as possible.

Admiral King pointed out that if President Salazar refused to give his assent and the smaller force failed to attack, the Allied Forces would be in a bad position. They would have the humiliation of withdrawing; the Germans would know of the diplomatic approach and, as a result, would stiffen the resistance of the Islands.

The President said that he had never liked the idea of being put in a position of permitting President Salazar to call our bluff. He was inclined to favor the approach with sufficient force to take the Islands in the event that President Salazar refused to permit a peaceful occupation.

General McNarney suggested the possibility of reinforcing the bluff by timing it with the sailing of a Husky convoy from the United Kingdom.

The Prime Minister said that the earlier operation would have a good prospect of success as the Portuguese would have no way of knowing how strong the force was with which they were threatened.

General Ismay said that a plan was being examined to see if something less than a full-scale operation could be mounted.

The Prime Minister said that he was content to leave paragraph 1 a of Section IV as it was written, and that he would discuss the matter with his government upon his return to England and let the President know the outcome of these discussions. He suggested the addition of the following sentences to the end of the paragraph: “The possibility of an earlier move will receive further study. The political decision involved will be settled in the meanwhile by the two governments.”

The President suggested that in his discussions with the Cabinet the Prime Minister might bear in mind the alternative of an approach to the Portuguese Government by the U.S.A. and Brazil. In any case, the idea that Brazil might provide the occupying force would be a strong factor in influencing the Portuguese Government to submit.

section iv, paragraph 2 b —cross-channel operations

The President then read paragraph 2 of Section IV regarding the combined bomber offensive from the United Kingdom and the cross-Channel operations. He asked if the decision as written in paragraph 2 b precluded the use of French Divisions in the assault to be made on the Continent.

The Prime Minister suggested that the use of French Forces might be covered if the last subparagraph of paragraph 2 b could be changed to read “that the follow-up divisions might come from the United States or elsewhere.”

The President said, however, that he was considering the advisability of having a French Division as either one of the 9 assault divisions, or, at least, as one of the first 20 build-up divisions. He thought that politically it was of great importance to have the French represented in the first attempt to reconquer French soil.

General Marshall asked if there was any possibility of this decision being communicated to the French.

The Prime Minister replied that he thought that would be extremely dangerous. General Giraud and General de Gaulle were soon to have another meeting. He felt that this meeting might result in violent disputes. General Giraud had become stronger because of the Tunisian victories while de Gaulle would think, of course, that he was about to regain control. The important thing was not to let these two French generals create discord between the United States and the British. He did not feel reassured regarding the outcome of the Giraud–de Gaulle conference. He thought it extremely important not to inform the French of our decisions when there was the prospect of a split.³

The President said he thought it was entirely satisfactory to leave any mention of the utilization of French Forces in the assault on the Continent out of the paper which was under consideration provided it was recorded in the minutes of the present meeting and if it was understood by the Staffs that serious consideration should be given to the participation of some French Forces early in the operation.

Admiral King pointed out that the decision regarding cross-Channel operations, as set forth in paragraph 2 b of Section IV, failed to make any mention of the month by month planning that was being undertaken by General Morgan in London for the purpose of insuring readiness on the part of such forces as were available in the United Kingdom in the event of the German crackup.⁴

The President agreed that it would be a good idea to put agreed decisions concerning month by month planning in the report. He pointed out that it was impossible to tell when a break in the German resistance might take place. In the last war the first element of the German Forces to crack was the submarine crews. He felt that at the rate they were now losing submarines, that is, one a clay, the crews would be unable to stick it. German submarine losses in 1918 were not as great as those they are now experiencing and yet they had induced a break in the German morale. Recently airplanes have entered two theaters of operations with definite objectives. These had failed to reach their objective by 10 or 20 miles, but it is known that the reports they rendered when they returned to their bases stated that the objectives had been reached. He thought that this was indicative of a bad state of morale and efficiency in the German Air Force. These conditions were bound to spread. As soon as the German ground forces learned that they did not have adequate air protection and that the U–boat campaign had failed, the news would spread rapidly and a serious break in morale might come unexpectedly. For these reasons it was essential that the Allies be prepared to take advantage of such conditions whenever they might occur. The President also said that there had been rumors of a German evacuation of Norway. He thought that plans should be under preparation to take advantage of such a contingency.

The Prime Minister suggested that a subparagraph be put into the paper at the end of paragraph 2 b of Section IV which would read as follows: “Meanwhile preparations will be continuously kept up to date in order to take advantage of a collapse of the enemy in France, or, alternatively, for the occupation of Norway in the event of a German withdrawal.”

In reply to a question by the President, Sir Charles Portal said that for bombing operations, air bases in Norway would not be of great assistance. It would be more economical to utilize those in England than it would be to build new ones in Norway, especially since Norway would not greatly extend the bombing range. He added, however, that it would have a very beneficial effect if fighters could be based on air fields in southern Norway.

The Prime Minister pointed out that if Norway could be occupied, it would reopen our communications with Russia. This fact, in itself, would make it imperative that immediate advantage be taken of the situation.

The Prime Minister said that the United States authorities would be kept informed of studies being made by General Morgan’s Staff in this regard.

section iv, paragraph 2 c—operations in the mediterranean to eliminate italy from the war

The Prime Minister inquired whether the Poles were included in the forces detailed in this paragraph as available for garrisons and operations in the Mediterranean.

Sir Alan Brooke confirmed that these were included in the 19 British or Allied Divisions.

The Prime Minister said that he hoped that it was not the intention of this paragraph to commit us to carrying out particular operations. For example, he would be very much opposed to any idea of an operation to capture Sardinia as a sequel to Husky . This would be an eccentric operation, which would have no influence on the securing of the great prize open to us if we could take the toe and heel of Italy, and gain touch with the insurgents of the Balkan countries.

Admiral King pointed out that it was stated in the paragraph that cach specific operation would be subject to the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Sir Alan Brooke said that General Eisenhower would not be able to tell which operation he could do after Husky until the situation had declared itself. The idea, therefore, was to plan several operations and to decide, at the meeting to be held after Husky had been launched, which of them to carry out.

The President said that it was certainly difficult to foretell what the conditions would be. For example, it might be that a movement in Sardinia to separate from Mussolini’s regime might gain way, and consequently comparatively small forces could gain possession of the island. Or again, as one report suggested, the Germans might decide to withdraw their forces behind the Po, in which case entry into southern Italy would be easy. It might be better to widen the instructions to General Eisenhower, and to tell him to prepare operations against all parts of southern Europe.

General Marshall said that General Eisenhower would prepare a number of different operations, and which of them was adopted would be determined when we saw how Husky went. General Eisenhower had already put in summaries of plans against the heel and toe of Italy, and against Sardinia, and had expressed a preference for Sardinia. Air Chief Marshal Tedder had dissented from this conclusion, mainly on account of the difficulties of staging an attack on Sardinia with adequate air support.⁵

Sir Charles Portal said that Air Chief Marshal Tedder had also thought that the value of northern Italy as a base from which to bomb Germany had been underrated.

The Prime Minister said that the prime factor which should be kept in mind was the position in the Balkans, where 34 Axis Divisions were held in play by rebels, who would become much more active if we could gain touch with them through Durazzo, or any other suitable point. Of course, if Italy went out of the war, then the Italian Divisions would have to withdraw, and Germany would either have to fill the gap, or retire to the Danube. The effect on Turkey would be very important. None of these effects could possibly accrue from an operation against Sardinia.

Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that General Eisenhower would be instructed to prepare those operations which were best calculated to eliminate Italy. It was the elimination of Italy which would place these prizes within our grasp, and the right operation to bring this about would depend upon the situation after Husky . Moreover, much would depend upon events on the Russian Front. It might be that the presence of large numbers of Germans in the toe and heel would make a direct assault on this unprofitable—in which case Sardinia would be a better choice.

The Prime Minister did not agree that Sardinia could be an acceptable alternative. Operations in the general direction of the Balkans opened up very wide prospects, whereas the capture of Sardinia would merely place in our possession a desirable island. There was nothing in the paper which would indicate to General Eisenhower that we held a view on this matter. The politico-strategic aspect would not be present in his mind.

The President said he did not feel ready to make up his mind on this matter. Certainly there were greater advantages in going to places other than Sardinia, but he did not think we were ready yet to say where.

Discussion then took place on the exact meaning of the word to mount an operation.

Sir Alan Brooke said that to mount an operation meant to draw up the plans, to allocate the forces, and to give them the necessary special training. Husky , for example, had been mounted during Vulcan . It was quite possible to mount more than one operation at a time, as considerable changes could always be made, and, indeed, had been made quite recently in the Husky plan.

The Prime Minister thought that the word mount meant the fixing on a particular operation for execution to the exclusion of others. He did not think more than one operation at a time could be mounted with the same resources.

After some further discussion, The Prime Minister suggested that he should take further time to consider this paragraph, and said that he would propose certain amendments for consideration.

section iv. paragraph 2 d—the bombing of ploeşti

The Prime Minister said that he hoped the bombing of Ploeşti would not be carried out if it meant a considerable inroad into the preparatory aerial bombardment for Husky .

General McNarney said that the bombers which would be taken from the North African Theater to bomb Ploeşti would only be away for four or five days. It was the units which would come from the United Kingdom which would be absent for a longer period.

General Marshall pointed out that the type of aircraft to be used was the B–24, which was not of such value for the Husky preparatory bombardment as the B–17. He thought that if Ploeşti could be seriously damaged, it would be a blow of tremendous importance in support of operations on the Russian Front. The decision depended upon the comments and recommendations of the Commander in Chief, North African Theater.

section iv, paragraph 3 a—operations in the Burma–china theater

The President asked Mr. Hopkins what he thought the Generalissimo’s reactions would be to these proposals.

Mr. Hopkins replied that he did not think that the Generalissimo should be told of the decisions reached in the Conference. He predicted that if he were told, he would not agree with them, although secretly he would not be unhappy about them. He would resent more than anything else not having been consulted. Mr. Hopkins suggested that Mr. Soong be told tomorrow that Anakim is to go on.

General Marshall said that he thought the Chinese would have to be told a little more about the operations than was proposed by Mr. Hopkins. The Chinese were constantly pressing to see him concerning the decisions that were made, and he felt it wise to tell them everything except the details concerning the capture of Akyab and Ramree Islands.

The President said in this regard they simply should be told that an occupation of a base on the Burma Coast by amphibious operations was included in the decision but that the details would have to be worked out after further consideration.

The Prime Minister proposed that the Chinese should be informed as follows:

“Further study of Anakim has led to the following plan:

• “1. A large scale build-up of air combat forces and a rapid build-up of the air transport route to China.
• “2. A vigorous offensive in the northern part of Burma with the purpose of opening the Burma Road and regaining contact with China.
• “3. Amphibious operations against the coast of Burma with the view to controlling communications in the Bay of Bengal.”

The Prime Minister however, indicated that he would prepare a written suggestion as to what should be told to the Chinese.⁶

section vi, paragraph 1—equipment for turkey

The Prime Minister said he wished it definitely understood that the Turks would be informed regarding the origin of any equipment that was given to them from United States production. He felt that the same rule should apply to equipment given to Russia.

General Marshall said that in discussing the paragraph regarding equipment for Turkey, the United States Chiefs of Staff had been concerned more with the availability of the equipment and its effects on our training than they were with who received the credit for giving it to the Turks.

The Prime Minister said he understood the situation perfectly.

The President went on to consider the remainder of the paper which was agreed to in all its details by both him and the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister then said that he would like to give further consideration to the paper. He proposed to submit a suggestion regarding the post- Husky operations in the Mediterranean and also a proposal regarding the information that was to be given to the Chinese concerning the Burma decisions. He suggested, therefore, that the meeting adjourn at this time to meet again at 1130 on Tuesday morning, 25 May 1943.

This was agreed to.

1. Post, p. 359.
2. The views of the British War Cabinet on this matter are set forth in the telegram of May 21, 1943, from Eden and Attlee to Churchill, post, p. 312, and the telegram of May 24, 1943, from Eden and Attlee, quoted in Eden, p. 455.
3. Discussions between de Gaulle and Giraud began at Algiers on May 31, 1943, and resulted in the agreement of June 3, 1943, providing for the unification of the French liberation movement and the establishment of the French Committee of National Liberation. For documentation regarding the concern of the United States over the disunity between Giraud and de Gaulle in French North Africa and the steps leading to the recognition by the United States of the administrative authority of the French Committee of National Liberation, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. ii, pp. 23 ff., and post, pp. 320 ff.
4. The planning done by General Morgan’s staff during the first half of 1943 for the occupation of the Continent in case of a German collapse is described in Harrison, pp. 79–82.
5. The views of Eisenhower and Tedder regarding operations to be pursued after Husky are set forth in C.C.S. 223, May 14, 1943, post, p. 253.
6. For text of the draft statement considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, see post, p. 377.