Foreign Relations of the United States, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943

Roosevelt Papers

Memorandum Prepared by the British Embassy¹

May 22, 1943, 1:15 p.m.

Memorandum

The Prime Minister met the following at luncheon at the Embassy on May 22nd, 1943:—

The Vice President (Mr. Wallace), the Secretary of War (Mr. Stimson), the Secretary of the Interior (Mr. Ickes), the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate (Senator Connally) and the Under-Secretary of State (Mr. Sumner Welles).

World and Regional Councils

In the course of a general talk about the structure of a post-war settlement, Mr. Churchill said that the first preoccupation must be to prevent further aggression in the future by Germany or Japan. To this end he contemplated an association of the United States, Great Britain and Russia. If, as he understood, the United States wished to include China in an association with the other three, he was perfectly willing that this should be done; but however great the importance of China, she was not comparable to the others. On these Powers would rest the real responsibility for peace. They together with certain other Powers should form a Supreme World Council.

Subordinate to this World Council there should be three Regional Councils, one for Europe, one for the American Hemisphere and one for the Pacific.

Europe

Mr. Churchill thought that after the war Europe might consist of some twelve states or confederations who would form the Regional European Council. It was important to recreate a strong France, whatever we might think about French deserts or the probable difficulty of achieving our purpose. For the prospect of having no strong country on the map between England and Russia was not attractive. Moreover the Prime Minister could not easily foresee the United States being able to keep large numbers of men indefinitely on guard in Europe. If such an experiment were tried he could not believe it would last for more than one Presidential election. Great Britain could not do so either. No doubt it would be necessary, and he thought it would be possible, that the United States should be associated in the same way in the policing of Europe, in which Great Britain would obviously also have to take part; but France also must assist.

Then there would be Spain and Italy. He also hoped that in South Eastern Europe there might be several confederations; a Danubian federation based on Vienna and doing something to fill the gap caused by the disappearance of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Bavaria might join this group. Then there should be a Balkan federation.

He would like to see Prussia divided from the rest of Germany, forty million Prussians being a manageable European unit. Many people wished to carry the process of division further and divide Prussia itself into component parts, but on this question the Prime Minister reserved judgment. Poland and Czechoslovakia he hoped would stand together in friendly relations with Russia. This left the Scandinavian countries, and Turkey, which last might or might not be willing with Greece to play some part in the Balkan system.

Mr. Wallace asked about Belgium and Holland suggesting that they might join France. Mr. Churchill said that was a possibility, or alternatively they might form a group of the Low Countries with Denmark. Mr. Wallace asked whether the Prime Minister contemplated the possibility of Switzerland joining with France, but the Prime Minister was disposed to regard Switzerland as a special case.

In his view each of the dozen or so of the European countries should appoint a representative to the European Regional Council thus creating a form of United States of Europe. He thought Count Coudenhove-Kalergi’s ideas on this subject had much to recommend them.

The American Hemisphere

Similarly there might be a Regional Council for the Americas of which the Prime Minister thought Canada would naturally be a member and would represent the British Commonwealth.

The Pacific

There should be a Regional Council for the Pacific in which he supposed that Russia would participate. He thought it was quite possible that when the pressure on her western frontiers had been relieved Russia would turn her attention to the Far East.

Relation of the Regional Councils to the Supreme World Council

The Regional Councils should be subordinate in the Prime Minister’s view to the World Council. The members of the World Council should sit on the Regional Councils in which they were directly interested and he hoped that in addition to being represented on the American Regional Council and the Pacific Regional Council, the United States would also be represented on the European Regional Council. However this might be, the last word would remain with the Supreme World Council, since any issues that the Regional Councils were unable to settle would automatically be of interest to the World Council and bring the World Council in.

Mr. Wallace thought that the other countries would not agree that the World Council should consist of the four major Powers alone. Mr. Churchill agreed and expressed the view that to the four Powers should be added others by election in rotation from the Regional Councils. The central idea of the structure was that of a three-legged stool—the World Council resting on three Regional Councils. But he attached great importance to the regional principle. It was only the countries whose interests were directly affected by a dispute who could be expected to apply themselves with sufficient vigour to secure a settlement. If countries remote from a dispute were among those called upon in the first instance to achieve a settlement the result was likely to be merely vapid and academic discussion.

Mr. Wallace asked what in practice would be the procedure if, for example, there were a dispute between Peru and Ecuador. Mr. Churchill said that such a dispute would fall to be dealt with in the first place by the American Regional Council but always under the general overriding authority of the World Council. In the instance chosen the interests of countries outside the American Hemisphere would hardly be affected; but plainly a dispute which threatened the peace of the world might very well not be susceptible to being treated only on a regional basis and the Supreme World Council would quickly be brought in.

Neutrality

Mr. Churchill was asked whether the association of nations which he contemplated would be confined to the United Nations, or include the neutrals. He said that in his view there was advantage in trying to induce those nations at present neutral to join the United Nations before the end of the war. He thought we ought to use all possible persuasion and pressure to secure this when it could be done with safety to the nation concerned. An example was Turkey. His policy was to help Turkey to build up her own forces to the point where, at the right moment she could and would effectively intervene. When the United Nations brought the guilty nations to the bar of justice, he could see little but an ineffective and inglorious role for Mr. de Valera and others who might remain neutral to the end.

The Lessons of the League of Nations

Mr. Churchill maintained that we had much to learn from the experience of the League of Nations. It was wrong to say that the League had failed. It was rather the member States who had failed the League. Senator Connally agreed and pointed to the achievements of the League in the years immediately after 1919. Mr. Stimson also agreed and thought that if the original guarantee to France had not fallen through subsequent French policy and also the history of the League would have been very different.

National and International Forces

Mr. Churchill said that force would clearly be required to see that peace was preserved. He suggested that there should be an agreement between the United Nations as to the minimum and maximum armed forces which each would maintain. The forces of each country might be divided into two contingents, the one to form the national forces of that country, and the other to form its contingent to an international police force at the disposal of the Regional Councils under the direction of the Supreme World Council. Thus if one country out of twelve in Europe threatened the peace, eleven contingents would be ready to deal with that country if necessary. The personnel of the international contingent provided by each country would be bound, if it were so decided by the World Council, to undertake operations against any country other than their own. Mr. Wallace said that bases would be required for these contingents. Mr. Churchill agreed. In this connection he said that he would place a total prohibition for an indefinite time upon the practice in the enemy countries, and certainly in Germany, of the art of flying. There should be international air lines, for example, operating in and through Prussia which would give the Prussians as good a service at as cheap rates as obtained elsewhere, but they should neither be allowed to fly themselves nor to build aircraft.

Fraternal Association Between Great Britain and the United States

Mr. Churchill said that there was something else in his mind which was complementary to the ideas he had just expressed. The proposals for a world security organization did not exclude special friendships devoid of sinister purpose against others. He could see small hope for the world unless the United States and the British Commonwealth worked together in what he would call fraternal association. He believed that this could take a form which would confer on each advantages without sacrifice. He would like the citizens of each without losing their present nationality to be able to come and settle and trade with freedom and equal rights in the territories of the other. There might be a common passport or a special form of passport or visa. There might even be some common form of citizenship, under which citizens of the United States and of the British Commonwealth might enjoy voting privileges after residential qualification and be eligible for public office in the territories of the other, subject of course to the laws and institutions there prevailing.

Then there were bases. He had himself welcomed the Destroyer-Bases deal not for the sake of the destroyers, useful as these were, but because he felt it was to the advantage of both countries that the United States should have the use of such bases in British territory as she might find necessary to her own defence, for a strong United States was a vital interest of the British Commonwealth and vice versa. He looked forward therefore to an extension of the practice of common user [use] of bases for the common defence of common interests. Take the Pacific where there were countless islands possessed by enemy powers. There were also British islands and harbours. If he had anything to do with the direction of public affairs after the war, he would certainly advocate that the United States had the use of those that they might require for bases.

American Opinion. Importance of Concluding an Agreement During the War

All the American guests present said that they had been thinking on more or less the lines propounded by the Prime Minister, and thought that it was not impossible that American opinion would accept them or something like them. The Ambassador asked Mr. Welles whether he thought that the establishment of a Regional Council for Europe would have the effect of leading United States opinion to disinterest itself in European affairs. Mr. Welles was not afraid of this, having regard to the overriding responsibility of the Supreme World Council and the relation between it and the Regional Councils. Mr. Stimson said most emphatically that in his opinion there would be a tendency to relax after hostilities ceased, and a reluctance to embark upon new international experience. He believed that it would be much easier to secure American agreement during the war; indeed that it was a case of during the war or never. The others were disposed to agree, and all felt that the best approach to future cooperation was to present such plans for the future as a continuation of the cooperation now in force, and to do so while the war was still proceeding.

The Prime Minister made two other suggestions both of which carried the warm assent of those present. First, that after the war we should continue the practice of Combined Staff conversations, and second, that we should by constant contact, take whatever steps were necessary to ensure that the main lines of our foreign policy ran closely together.

Mr. Wallace said to the Ambassador as he left that it was the most encouraging conversation in which he had taken part for the last two years.

Mr. Churchill on all occasions stated that he was expressing only personal views.

1. The source text was sent to Roosevelt by Halifax on May 28, 1943 with the following explanation: “Winston has asked me to send you the enclosed record of a conversation at the Embassy on May 22nd when he gave an outline of his ideas about the post-war security order. He tells me that he expressed similar views to you, but thought you might like to see this note. He wishes to make it clear that on all occasions he stated that he was expressing only personal views.”

   In the Stimson Diary, this meeting is recorded in the following manner:

   “The conversation started with Russia—the Prime Minister’s views of Stalin; then it went on to the postwar problems that confront us; there the Prime Minister held forth at length on his views and towards the end I got into it and he and I had a duet; it was rather good fun talking again on that subject which I know quite a good deal about. Everybody emphasized the need of force but I warned them not [to] rely solely upon force created by treaty; it must be something that grows out of the war itself—an alliance between the people who are really fighting now and whom our people have grown to trust. I also emphasized the necessity of preparing against a great depression like the last one which is bound to follow the war some years afterwards and to prepare for it by avoiding tariff barriers and also clearing the currency. They told me I made quite an impression—several people speaking to me—Ickes and Sumner Welles particularly.” (Stimson Papers)