J.C.S. Files
The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet
(
King
)
to the Secretaries of the
Combined Chiefs of Staff
1
secret
Enclosure to C.C.S.
335
[
Washington
,] 3 September
1943.
CominCh File FF1/L11–7
Serial: 001863
Subject: Allocation of CVE Type Ships to England.
Reference: (a) Report of
Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board, serial 0011, dated 27 August,
1943.2
- 1.
- There is great need for additional CVE type ships in anti-submarine operations. I am
aware of the policy of the Royal Navy that basic and extensive
alterations are necessary in CVEs, built in the United States, to U.S. naval
specifications, before these ships can be operated by the
British.
- 2.
- With reference to paragraph 16(e) of
the enclosure, it is my view that further efforts should be made
to advance the date of operational readiness of these ships
rather than change allocations already agreed upon.
Enclosure
secret
[
Washington
,] 27 August
1943.
The Allied Anti-Submarine
Survey Board to the Commander in Chief, United
States Fleet (
King
)3
Serial: 0011
Subject: Employment of CVE’s in offensive action against U–Boats.
- 1.
- The Board has given consideration to the recent success in
the Anti-Submarine War and the marked falling off in tonnage
of shipping lost. It is felt that in certain quarters the
past successful months and the present lull may tend to
distract attention from the Battle of the Atlantic, as, in
fact, has occurred during similar lulls in the past.
- 2.
- The number of submarines at sea today, considering the
number potentially available, is very low. The cause of this
temporary reduction [Page 1297] in enemy effort is not entirely
certain, but the Board, cannot believe that this situation
will continue indefinitely. It is possible that at least 150
submarines could suddenly appear in the Atlantic, which,
regardless of A/S tactics
which have proved so successful during the past few months,
might well result in a serious increase in sinkings.
- 3.
- The Board has moreover given consideration to the change
in tactics employed by U–Boats on passage to and from the Bay of
Biscay ports. The recent success of the Bay air and surface
offensive has caused the enemy to adopt a route close to the
coast of Spain where effective air support can be afforded
to his submarines and where the Bay A/S patrols are least effective. This has met
with a considerable degree of success and a consequent
falling off in the U–Boat
sinkings. There is thus a gap in the offensive as a
whole.
- 4.
- It is considered essential that this gap in the Bay
offensive should be closed insofar as is possible and it
would appear that with this change of the enemy tactics the
only really satisfactory remedy is the immediate employment
of CVE’s on offensive A/S operations in the Southern
approaches to the Bay. A minimum of two CVE’s on station would be
required for this purpose.
- 5.
- In addition to the above the Board wishes strongly to
point out the other pressing A/S commitments for these valuable vessels. The
proportion of independent shipping sunk during the war far
exceeds that sunk while in convoy. There will never be
sufficient escorts to protect all ships at sea but it is not
generally appreciated that at any one time there are on the
high seas a very large percentage of unescorted ships. The
belief that unless the enemy returns to an offensive against
the Atlantic lifeline he has lost the U–Boat war cannot be wholly
subscribed to. Should the enemy be able and decide to
operate a hundred submarines against independent shipping it
will only be necessary for each submarine to sink One ship per month for our shipping
losses to return to the unacceptable figure of previous
months. It may well be that with defeat of “pack tactics”
the enemy may resort to this dispersed form of U–Boat warfare providing he
can find a means of breaking through the blockade of his
bases.
- 6.
- In the opinion of the Board, apart from the Bay, the most
pressing need is for a carrier in the Cape–Mozambique
Channel area. A large percentage of sinkings in the past
months have been in this area and in July alone 12 out of
the 14 ships sunk were unescorted. The distances involved
make the employment of a CVE
the only practicable form of
offensive against these U–Boats. (It is understood that the carrier
(HMS Unicorn) originally assigned the Eastern Fleet is
now employed on special operations.)
- 7.
- It is also possible that the Bay offensive may force the
enemy to make greater use of the Northern approaches. It is
possible to cover this area by air and, with the
reinforcements recently sent to the Bay offensive, it may
now be possible to detach a squadron from the Bay to
strengthen an offensive against this Northern U–Boat route. Should,
however, aircraft not be available for this route, it would
appear that consideration must be given to the employment of
a CVE when available.
- 8.
- During the visit of the Board to West Africa the Board was
impressed with the lack of proper escorts in the area.
Subsequently, although a comparatively large number of
U–Boats operated in
this area, the fact that there has been only one U–Boat sunk or even probably
damaged bears out the opinion formed during the Board’s
visit. The desirability of having an escort carrier in this
command should therefore be kept in mind when planning
future requirements.
- 9.
- It is also desired to stress the importance of the time
factor. The disasters which overcame the U–Boat during the months of
May, June and July undoubtedly resulted in a serious
weakening of morale. If the most is to be made of this
weakening it is essential in no way to relax the pressure
but to continue to harass and sink U–Boats so that the crews have no chance of
regaining their morale. Should they do so and regain the
initiative the effect on Allied grand strategy might well be
serious.
- 10.
- It is apparent from operations in the past 6 months that
the use of Support Groups and particularly Support Groups with CVE’s had a very large share in
the successful anti-U–Boat
campaign. The CVE was
originally developed for A/S
operations; but it is fully appreciated that the
increasingly rapid developments in Allied strategy have
created urgent demands for this valuable type of craft for
operations other than anti-U–Boat offensives. At the same time it appears
that an unduly small proportion are now being employed on
anti-submarine work.
- 11.
-
CCS 203, dated 24 April,
19434
(Annex I to App C) sets up 31 CVE’s as the minimum for Atlantic A/S operations and although a
large number of this type have been placed in commission, at
the present moment only five (all U.S. Navy) are actually
being used in the Atlantic for this purpose. Of the 13
British CVE’s in commission
in the Atlantic none are at this moment being used for
A/S work. Of the 6 that
are operational 4 are allocated to CinC Mediterranean for special operations, one
is refitting and one has serious defects. Of the remaining
seven two are working up, 4 are undergoing modifications and
one is assigned for deck landing training.
- 12.
- It is understood that seven CVE’s are allocated to the British for delivery
in the next three months. However, extensive modifications
required by the Admiralty, together with working-up time,
etc., involves a delay of 24 to 30 weeks from the time of
delivery to date of becoming operational. These
modifications cover changes in gasoline installations, bomb
stowage, and fighter direction.
- 13.
- At the present stage of the war these delays are not
considered acceptable. By the employment of larger crews the
U.S. Navy have proved that they can operate these ships most
successfully without these very lengthy modifications.
Failing some drastic cut in these delays it appears to the
Board that it is worthy of consideration that as many of
these next seven CVE’s as
they are able to man and equip with planes be reallocated to
the U.S. Navy so that an adequate proportion may be employed
on A/S operations
immediately. It is estimated that all seven could be
operational by about the end of January, 1944 which would
effect an over-all saving of at least three months. A
subsequent readjustment of the British allocation should be
made.
- 14.
- In the opinion of the Board no considerations should be
allowed to stand in the way of getting the maximum number of
these highly valuable ships into service in the shortest
possible time.
- 15.
-
Conclusion:
- In conclusion the Board wishes to stress that the present
lull in the enemy’s Atlantic offensive in no way justifies
any relaxation of the Allied Anti-Submarine effort. On the
contrary, it is essential to maintain the maximum pressure
that operational commitments permit in order to ensure that
the enemy has no time to improve his present weakened state
of morale.
- 16.
-
Recommendations:
- The following recommendations are now made:
- (a)
- That a minimum of two British CVE’s on station be
employed Now against the
U–Boats passing
in and out of the Southern approaches to the
Bay.
- (b)
- That one British CVE be allocated to the Cape–Mozambique
Channel area for offensive A/S operations.
- (c)
- That steps be taken to increase the offensive
against the Northern passage and that failing
adequate shore based aircraft consideration be given
to the employment of a CVE when available.
- (d)
- That the inadequacy of A/S offensive measures in West Africa be
kept in mind with a view to allocation of a CVE to this area in due
course.
- (e)
- That failing a drastic reduction in delay in
getting British CVE’s into operation, consideration be
given to the U.S. Navy manning some or all of the
next 7 CVE’s
allocated to Britain with a view [Page 1300] to a higher proportion
of these vessels being employed on A/S operations with the
minimum delay.
J. M. Mansfield
Rear Admiral, R.N.
J. L. Kauffman
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.
