J.C.S. Files
Combined Chiefs of Staff Supplementary Minutes1
1. Review of Strategic Situation in Light of Italian Collapse
The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a memorandum by the Prime Minister and[to the] President,4 together with a draft of the conclusions regarding the action which should be taken on the [Page 1223] proposals contained in C.C.S. 341/1 prepared by the Combined Staff Planners.
Sir John Dill suggested that the paper presented by the Combined Staff Planners was perhaps too long and not in the form required for submission to the Prime Minister. He thought that it should be used as a basis for discussion but that a codicil was what the Prime Minister had asked for, based on the events which had taken place since Quadrant . He thought that the codicil should indicate what action would have to be taken. Thus it would be necessary to examine the project for the despatch of a balanced British naval force to the Pacific, and the logistic problems involved; the Combined Intelligence Committee might be called upon to report on the German build-up possible in Northern Italy, a subject on which there was apparently some disagreement at present; then again, it would be necessary to examine the whole question of support to the guerillas in the Balkans; this, it would seem, should be proceeded with on the lines envisaged at Quadrant as it was to be hoped that it would be possible for us to use Dalmatian Coast ports without the necessity of seizing them by amphibious operations.
Before leaving the subject of the support of guerilla activities in the Balkans Sir John Dill said that in view of contacts already established it would seem best that the Commander in Chief, Middle East, should continue to be responsible but that the closest of cooperation would be necessary with General Eisenhower in this connection.
As regards the Italian forces, Sir John Dill thought that perhaps in the codicil the opinion should be expressed that Italian forces could not be expected to be of much fighting value in view of their demoralized condition but that they might be of value on the lines of communication.
Admiral Leahy and General Marshall said that they agreed, in general, with Sir John Dill’s comments.
After a brief discussion, The Combined Chiefs of Staff invited General Ismay to prepare a draft memorandum for submission to the Prime Minister and President.
After an interval in which other subjects were discussed, General Ismay presented a draft memorandum, prepared in the light of the above discussion. This memorandum was then examined and certain minor amendments were agreed to.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Instructed the Secretaries to forward the memorandum, as amended in the course of discussion,* to the President and Prime Minister, [Page 1224] after obtaining Admiral King’s concurrence to the terms of this document.
6. “ Habbakuks”
Sir John Dill suggested that the two memoranda were largely in agreement and that the necessary details regarding the composition of the Habbakuk board and its draft directive should be worked out between the two naval staffs.
Admiral King suggested that the two drafts should be referred to the Combined Administrative Committee for report.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Instructed the Combined Administrative Committee to examine C.C.S. 315/3 and 315/4 and to put forward to the Combined Chiefs of Staff a draft composition and terms of reference for the combined Habbakuk board.
7. Operations of Red Air Force Subsequent to Tidalwave”
(C.C.S. 255/17)
Admiral Leahy said that in his personal view it might be inadvisable at this time to ask the Russian Government to undertake this additional task when, in their opinion, they were already achieving so much. This might have an adverse effect on our relations with the Soviet Government.
Sir John Dill pointed out that Great Britain and America also considered that their own armed forces were taking all possible action. The Russians were frequently asking us to undertake certain tasks and he could see no reason why some demands should not be made of them. He realized that long range strategic bombing was not generally undertaken by the Red Air Force, but he considered that on military grounds there could be no objection to the Combined Chiefs of Staff suggesting to the President and Prime Minister that an approach be made to the Russian Government. The political aspect of the matter would be [Page 1225] taken into consideration by the President and Prime Minister in making their decision.
General Arnold said that the distance over which the Russian Air Force would have to operate was not as great as that undertaken by the U.S. Air Force in their raid on Ploeşti. The Russians possessed long range bombers but we had no knowledge of how many of them existed. A request to undertake this raid might elucidate the strength of the Russian long range bomber force.
General Arnold then presented a draft memorandum to the President and Prime Minister8 containing the text of a suggested telegram to be sent to Marshal Stalin.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Agreed to put forward to the President and Prime Minister the draft memorandum, as amended in the course of discussion,†
9. Plans for the Use of the Azores
(C.C.S. 270/79)
Sir John Dill said that the memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff had been referred to the British Chiefs of Staff but that no answer had yet been received.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
- a.
- Agreed to defer consideration of C.C.S. 270/7.
- b.
- Took note that this paper had been referred to the British Chiefs of Staff.
11. Directive for the Control Commission and AMG in Italy
(C.C.S. 33910)
Admiral Leahy pointed out that it would appear from paragraph 4 a of the memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff that it was proposed that General Eisenhower should designate a U.S. Officer who would serve not only as Deputy President of the Control Commission but also as Military Governor of Unoccupied Italy. It might be considered that this officer would be in a position to remove the Italian King and Government. Such action might obviously be highly undesirable.
General Macready pointed out that this was certainly not the intention. The Military Governor referred to would be Military Governor only of Occupied Italy. The Combined Civil Affairs Committee were [Page 1226] still studying this problem and certain views had that morning been received from the Foreign Secretary in a telegram to the Prime Minister. London considered that the Deputy to General Eisenhower on the Control Commission should be a civilian rather than a soldier.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Agreed to defer consideration of C.C.S. 339.
12. Propaganda Committee
(C.C.S. 310/311)
Admiral Leahy pointed out that the President had obviously not appreciated that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had already arranged for representatives of O.W.I. and P.W.E. to sit on the proposed committees.
General Marshall said that he felt that the machinery proposed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff was badly needed. A line of news or propaganda once started was difficult to stop or alter. He instanced various occasions where very rapid decisions on this subject had been required.
Sir John Dill presented a draft memorandum from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Prime Minister and President, expressing the view that machinery on the lines suggested was militarily very necessary.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Instructed the Secretaries to submit to the Prime Minister and President the draft memorandum‡ referred to above.
- The supplementary minutes were given limited distribution under a cover sheet bearing the following note: “It is requested that special precautions be taken to insure the secrecy of these Supplementary Minutes.”↩
- Post, p. 1290.↩
- “Review of Strategic Situation in the Light of the Italian Collapse”, September 10, 1943; not printed. For the text of the report to Roosevelt and Churchill approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, see post, p. 1290.↩
- Post, p. 1287.↩
- Subsequently circulated as [the enclosure to] C.C.S. 341/2. [Footnote in the source text. See post, p. 1290.]↩
- Memorandum toy the United States Chiefs of Staff, “ Habbakuks”. September 8, 1943; not printed. The United States Chiefs of Staff recommended that Admiral King be directed to establish a United States-British-Canadian board to be responsible for (a) construction of a section of Habbakuk II ; (b) continuing the design of a full-size Habbakuk II ; (c) study of the construction and facilities necessary for a full-size Habbakuk II ; and (d) submitting progress reports to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. (J.C.S. Files)↩
- Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff, “ Habbakuks”, September 8, 1943; not printed. The British memorandum on composition of the proposed tripartite board was more elaborate than the United States proposal. The British paper summarized the functions of the board as follows: “will undertake all necessary research and experiments, will finalise such designs as are found to be practical, and will prepare drawings, plans and specifications for the construction of Habbakuk II.” (J.C.S. Files)↩
- Post, p. 1245.↩
- Not printed. For the text of the memorandum as approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, see post, p. 1256.↩
- Subsequently circulated as [the enclosure to] C.C.S. 255/2. [Footnote in the source text. See post, p. 1256.]↩
- Post, p. 1293.↩
- Post, p. 1269.↩
- Not printed as such. For the text of Roosevelt’s memorandum of September 7, 1943, to Leahy, which was circulated in C.C.S. 310/3, see post, p. 1316.↩
- (Subsequently circulated as [the enclosure to] C.C.S. 310/4. [Footnote in the source text. See post, p. 1317.]↩