J.C.S. Files
Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes
Reports of discussion and conclusions reached on Items 1 and 2 are contained in Supplementary Minutes,3 issued with limited distribution.
3. Data as Basis for Allocation of Landing Craft
(C.C.S. 3334)
Admiral Horne suggested that since the 1st of the month was already passed, the instructions should be altered so that reports are rendered immediately and subsequently on the 1st of every month.
Sir John Dill agreed with this suggestion. He considered that the best method of collecting the reports would be for the British and U.S. Chiefs of Staff to collect initially reports from those theaters and areas for which they were respectively responsible, including the U.S. and the U.K., while the report from the North African Theater would be rendered directly to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. All these reports would then be collated in Washington and would be available to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He suggested that the actual form of these reports might well be worked out by the Navy Department and Admiralty in consultation.
General Marshall drew attention to the importance of clearly understood reports which should be rendered in exactly similar forms. He reminded the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the difficulties which had been experienced in evaluating reports on availability of aircraft.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
- a.
- Approved the recommendation of the United States Chiefs of Staff that a detailed report covering the status of all types of landing ships and craft should be submitted by the commanders concerned immediately and on the 1st of each month hereafter.
- b.
- Agreed that the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff should be responsible for collecting the data regarding the theaters and areas for [Page 1202] which they were responsible and should forward them to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, data from a combined theater such as North Africa to be submitted direct to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
- c.
- Directed the Secretaries to work out in direct touch with the naval staffs the form that the reports should take covering in general the items listed in paragraph 5 of C.C.S. 333.
4. Hospital Ships
(C.C.S. 228/65)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
- a.
- Agreed to the suggestion of the Canadian Government that the words “attached to the armed forces” should be inserted after the words “combatant, and noncombatant personnel” in paragraph 2e(2) of C.C.S. 228/3.6 (Subsequently published as C.C.S. 228/7.7)
- b.
- Took note that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff had no objection to paragraph 2 of C.C.S. 228/3 being promulgated in a Confidential Book by the British Admiralty.
5. Propaganda
a. Propaganda Plans
(C.C.S. 3328)
Sir John Dill said that he agreed with the proposals put forth in this paper. This method had been tried in connection with the present operations against Italy and had produced quick and successful results.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Approved the recommendation of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff that the directive in the Enclosure to C.C.S. 332 should be sent to all theater commanders.
b. Propaganda Committee
(C.C.S. 310/19)
General Marshall put forward certain amendments to the proposed recommendation to the President and Prime Minister contained in C.C.S. 310/1.
General Marshall mentioned the importance of coordination between the propaganda decisions given in India to cover the Southeast [Page 1203] Asia Command, and those in Washington to cover the Pacific. In this connection he considered that the U.S. representatives in India should be charged with the responsibility for keeping in close touch with the propaganda for the Pacific decided on in Washington. Mr. Elmer Davis was satisfied with the proposals put forward in C.C.S. 310/1 though he would have preferred either that the entire direction should be centered in Washington, or that at least an additional committee should have been set up in Algiers to deal with the Mediterranean.
Sir John Dill said that he believed that the propaganda with regard to Europe must be dealt with as a whole and not split as between London and Algiers. He referred to the difference of organization for propaganda in London and Washington. In the British view the civilian representatives should be from the State Department and Foreign Office and these representatives should preside. It was also felt that P.W.E. and O.W.I. should be represented on the committees.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Approved the submission to the President and Prime Minister of the recommendations contained in C.C.S. 310/1 as amended. (The amended paper subsequently published as C.C.S. 310/2.10)
6. British and U.S. Secrecy Definitions
(C.C.S. 210/211)
Sir John Dill said he was glad to accept the proposals put forward by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff with regard to secrecy definitions. He felt it only right to say, however, that while he would communicate the United States’ suggestion that the British “Most Secret” should be dropped, this was so firmly established that he had serious doubts as to whether it could be eliminated.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Approved the recommendations of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff in paragraph 2 of this paper.
7. Intelligence and Quasi-Intelligence Activities in India
Sir John Dill said that he accepted the U.S. Chiefs of Staff views on the two British reservations. He felt sure that satisfactory integration [Page 1204] would be achieved in the Southeast Asia Command. He hoped, however, that the U.S. memorandum did not mean that the existing arrangements whereby certain U.S. officers worked with British intelligence organizations, and vice versa, would be affected.
General Marshall assured him that this was not the intention.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Approved the proposal made by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, as outlined in C.C.S. 196/2 with the first reservation to that proposal suggested by the British Chiefs of Staff in paragraph 4 of the same paper. (The detailed proposal with the accepted amendments included and the accepted reservation incorporated will be subsequently published as C.C.S. 196/4.14)
8. Planning for the Handling of Civil Affairs in Enemy Occupied Areas Which May Become Theaters of Operations
(C.C.S. 190/715)
General Marshall suggested that the word “military” should be inserted before the word “directive” in the new paragraph 6 of the directive to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee contained in C.C.S. 190/7. He explained that this word was in order to insure that directives to theater commanders on these matters should be passed through the Combined Chiefs of Staff and not through political channels.
Sir John Dill said that the new paragraph 6 as amended could be accepted, but that the Dominion approval had not yet been obtained.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Approved the revised wording of paragraph 6 of C.C.S. 190/6/D,16 as set out in C.C.S. 190/7, subject to inserting the word “military” before the word “directive” in the first sentence. It is understood that the concurrence of the Dominions has yet to be received.
9. Netherlands Marine Landing Force
(C.C.S. 33117)
Sir John Dill suggested that the Dutch approach might have been prompted by a feeling that more equipment could be obtained from the United States than had been possible from the United Kingdom. He suggested that the word “appreciation” might be substituted for the word “interest” in the suggested reply to the Netherlands Mission.
[Page 1205]The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Agreed to defer action on this paper.
Reports of discussion and conclusions reached on Items 10, 11, 12 and 13 are contained in Supplementary Minutes, issued with limited distribution.
- Post, p. 1205.↩
- “Data as Basis for Allocation of Landing Craft”, August 31, 1943; not printed. In this paper the United States Chiefs of Staff recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff direct all theater commanders to submit on the first of each month, effective at once, status reports covering all types of landing craft under their control, showing “for each type the total number of craft assigned, gains, losses, numbers out of commission, expected time for repairs, and number available for immediate operations.” (J.C.S. Files) The quoted passage is the portion of paragraph 5 of C.C.S. 333 referred to in subparagraph c of the minutes, below.↩
- “Hospital Ships”, August 31, 1943; not printed. In this paper the United States Chiefs of Staff expressed themselves along the lines of the action by the Combined Chiefs of Staff recorded here.↩
- “Hospital Ships”, July 9, 1943. This paper is not printed as such, but its text, as amended by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on September 3, was circulated as the enclosure to C.C.S. 228/7, September 4, 1943, post, p. 1318.↩
- Post, p. 1318.↩
- Post, p. 1313.↩
- “Propaganda Committee”, September 2, 1943; not printed. For the text of the amended paper approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, see post, p. 1315.↩
- Post, p. 1315.↩
- “British and U.S. Secrecy Definitions”, August 31, 1943; not printed. The principal proposal advanced in it by the United States Chiefs of Staff was that the British Chiefs of Staff “be invited to consider the desirability of combining their two classifications ‘most secret’ and ‘secret’ to a single classification ‘secret’”.↩
- Ante, p. 424.↩
- Post, p. 1237.↩
- Post, p. 1240.↩
- Post, p. 1237.↩
- “Charter, Civil Affairs Committee”, July 3, 1943; not printed.↩
- Post, p. 1238.↩