J.C.S. Files
Report by the Combined Staff
Planners1
Secret
Enclosure to C.C.S.
329/2
[Washington,] 26 August
1943.
Implementation of Assumed Basic
Undertakings and Specific Operations for the Conduct of the
War, 1943–1944: Availability of
Resources To Meet the Requirements of Critical Strategy
1. We have examined the available means of the United Nations
with the object of assessing our ability to carry out the policy
agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
[Page 1133]
2. A summary of this policy, which has been taken as a basis of
our investigation, is attached as Annex I.
3. We would emphasize that the purpose of this investigation is
to examine whether the operations decided on at
Quadrant
are within our resources, and not to imply binding
commitments or decisions on the part of the Combined Chiefs of
Staff.
4. The principle has been accepted that, for war against Japan,
the forces to carry out operations from the East, including the
Southwest Pacific, shall be provided by the United States, and
for operations from the West by Great Britain, except for
special types not available to Great Britain which will be
provided by the United States, or vice versa. The employment of
Dominion forces will be a matter of discussion between all
governments concerned.
5. Our conclusions are set out below.
ground forces (annex ii)
6. The necessary ground forces for operations from the United
Kingdom and in the Mediterranean and Pacific theaters, can be
made available. Searching investigations are proceeding to
determine if the forces required for operations in Northern
Burma can be found by the target date of mid-February 1944.
naval forces (annex iii)
7. Apart from
Bullfrog
the naval forces necessary for approved operations will
be available, subject to a revision of the support forces
required in the Mediterranean, if a decision is made to execute
the Southern France operation. No such revision can be made
until a plan is available. For
Bullfrog
the requirements provisionally estimated at
Trident
2 were as follows:—
2 |
Fleet Carriers (CV) |
6 |
Escort Carriers (CVE) |
3 |
Old Battleships (BB) |
40 |
Destroyers (DD) |
4 |
Heavy Cruisers (CA) |
32 |
Escorts (DE) |
6 |
Light Cruisers (CL) |
8 |
Minesweepers |
2 |
A.A. Cruisers |
14 |
Submarines |
It is estimated that the British will not be
able to meet these forces in full and that there will be the
following deficiencies:—
1 |
Escort Carrier (CVE) |
8 |
Escorts (DE) |
21 |
Destroyers (DD) |
6 |
Submarines, at most |
Note: The possibility of conflict of the
deployment for
Bullfrog
with
Overlord
and the South of France operation must be borne in
mind.3
[Page 1134]
No additional operational commitments for British naval personnel
can be met in addition to those planned up to 1 May 1944, except
at the expense of some other operation or undertaking.
air forces (annex iv)4
8. The air resources required to meet the operations specified in
this paper are available subject to:—
- (a)
- The possible deficiency of land based aircraft for
operations in the Pacific (See Appendix D5) which may arise unless
the war with Germany has been concluded in time to
release the additional resources required.
- (b)
- The decision that the operations in the Mediterranean
Theater (See Appendix B6) shall be limited to the capabilities
of the air resources specifically allocated.
9.7
The extent of all operations in support of resistance
groups8 will be related to
the advantages to be gained and will be limited by the supply of
heavy bomber aircraft. Large-scale diversions of heavy bombers
from the Combined Bomber Offensive are not forecast.9
10.10 The major
factor now restricting the support of air and ground forces in
China by air transport is the deficiency of base facilities in
Assam Province of India and of transportation into Assam
Province from Calcutta.
assault shipping and landing craft (annex
v)
11. There will be sufficient landing ships and craft for approved
operations in 1943 and until the summer of 1944. Landing ships
and craft will, however, be the bottleneck limiting the full
scope of assault in the approved operations, both in the Pacific
and the Atlantic. Appendices “A” and “B”11 of Annex V are made
out on the assumption that landing craft will be sent from the
Mediterranean to
Overlord
so as to arrive by 15 December 1943, and assault ships
by 1 March 1944.
12. To provide sufficient landing craft after the summer of 1944,
an acceleration and increase in the present British and U.S.
assault shipping and landing craft programs is necessary,
probably at the expense of cargo ship and escort production and
certain army items.
[Page 1135]
supply of critical items (annex vi)
13. In the absence of detailed plans of operations for each
theater, it is not possible to give finalized requirements and
estimated detailed shortages of critical items. A provisional
estimate is, however, set out in Annex VI. Temporary shortages
will exist for a few special items, (as set out in paragraph 1
b of Annex VI). It is anticipated
that these deficiencies will be made up early in 1944, and they
do not appear to be of great consequence.
shipping (annex vii)
14. Apart from a small deficit in the Pacific, which will be met
by the end of the first quarter of 1944,12 there is sufficient
personnel shipping capacity to meet our known requirements.
A careful operation of cargo shipping should enable us to meet
all essential commitments.
The Shipping Annex (VII) takes no account of accommodation, depot
and repair ships which will be required by the British Navy in
the South-East Asia area for the satisfactory prosecution of the
war against Japan.13
oil (annex viii)
15. An examination of the oil position has revealed that the
critical item is 100 octane aviation gasoline, of which there
will be a pronounced shortage through 1944. Steps are being
taken to find a solution to this problem, not only by the
substitution of lower grades of aviation gasoline for training
and other purposes, but also by taking steps to expedite to the
maximum extent possible the completion of the aviation gasoline
manufacturing program.
16. In all theaters there is a very real need for smaller
tankers, particularly where it is necessary to supply newly
established beachheads and bases. There appear to be sufficient
large sea-going tankers, in existence and coming from new
construction, to meet requirements for bulk movements of
petroleum products.
Annex I
Basis of Investigation
The following operations and undertakings have been used as a
basis for this investigation. They are not arranged in order
of priority.
i—use of the azores islands
1. The British obtain the use of facilities in the Azores
from 8th October 1943 for intensified sea and air operations
against the U–Boat.
[Page 1136]
2. These facilities are extended to embrace operational and
transit use by the United States.
ii—operations in europe
General.
3. The combined bomber offensive from all convenient bases.
This operation will continue to have the highest strategic
priority.
4. Support resistance groups in Europe.
Operations in Northwest Europe.
5.
Overlord
takes place on 1st May 1944 in accordance with the
approved plan which allows for employment of the following:—
Assault:
|
5 |
divisions (simultaneously loaded in landing
craft). |
|
2 |
divisions—follow-up. |
|
2 |
airborne divisions. |
Subsequent build-up:
|
At least 20
divisions. |
Total: |
At least 29 divisions of which 7
divisions will return to U.K. from the
Mediterranean. |
6. As between Operation
Overlord
and operations in the Mediterranean, where there is
a shortage of resources, available resources will be
distributed and employed with the main object of ensuring
the success of
Overlord
.
Operations in the Mediterranean.
7. Operations in the Mediterranean will be carried out with
the forces allotted at
Trident
. In addition such French forces as may be
re-equipped and fit for war will be used.
8. First Phase. The elimination of
Italy as a belligerent and establishment of air bases in the
Rome area and, if feasible, further north.
9. Second Phase. Seizure of Sardinia
and Corsica.
10. Third Phase. The maintenance of
unremitting pressure on the German forces in north
Italy.
11. Offensive operations against southern France to establish
a lodgment in the Toulon-Marseilles area and exploit
northwards in order to create a diversion in connection with
Overlord
. The target date for planning purposes—1st May
1944.
12. Minimum essential defensive garrison commitments.
iii—operations in the pacific and far
east theater
Operations in Southeast Asia.
13. As the main effort, carry out operations for the capture
of Upper Burma in order to improve the air route and
establish overland communications with China. These
operations to include the extensive
[Page 1137]
use of long range penetration groups.
Target date—mid-February 1944.
The extent of these operations to be dependent upon logistic
considerations as affected by the recent floods.
14. To continue to build up and increase the air routes and
air supplies to China, and the development of facilities,
with a view to:—
-
a.
- Keeping China in the war;
-
b.
- Intensifying operations against the
Japanese;
-
c.
- Maintaining increased U.S. and Chinese air forces
in China;
-
d.
- Equipping Chinese ground forces.
15. To continue preparations for an amphibious operation in
the spring of 1944, of the order of those contemplated at
Trident
for the capture of Akyab and Ramree.
16. Preparation of the necessary bases for operations in the
Southeast Asia Command.
Operations in China.
17. Air operations in and from China.
Operations in the Pacific.
18. Operations to seize:
Objective
|
Target date for planning
|
Gilberts |
15th November 1943 |
Marshalls |
1st January 1944 |
Western New Guinea |
1st February 1944: |
New Ireland |
1st May 1944 |
Ponape |
1st June 1944 |
Admiralty Islands |
1st June 1944 |
Truk |
1st September 1944 |
Palaus or Marianas—Guam |
31st December 1944 |
iv—other undertakings
19. Maintain the security and war making capacity of the
Western Hemisphere and British Isles.
20. Support and maintain the war making capacity of our
forces in all areas.
21. Maintain vital overseas lines of communications, with
particular emphasis on the defeat of the U–Boat menace.
22. Undertake such measures as may be necessary to provide
China with a volume of supplies to keep China actively in
the war against Japan.
23. To sustain the Soviet forces by the greatest volume of
munitions that can be supplied and transported to Russia
without militating against the attainment of the over-all
objectives.
[Page 1138]
24. Continue to supply such equipment to Turkey as we can
spare and as the Turks, in the opinion of the Commander in
Chief, Middle East, can absorb.*
25. To provide for the maintenance of prisoners of war.
26. To provide for the economic support of countries occupied
by the United Nations.
27. To re-arm and re-equip eleven French Divisions and
supporting troops in North Africa by 31st December, 1943,
insofar as this does not interfere with operations scheduled
previous to
Quadrant
.
Annex II
Land Forces
section i—mediterranean
1. Resources available.
After allowing for the return to the United Kingdom of four
American and three British divisions, there will be the
following forces available in the Mediterranean on 1
November 1943:
Divisions
|
|
British
|
U.S.
|
French
(Native) |
Total
|
|
19†
(including 2 Polish) |
5 |
5‡
|
29 |
2. Undertakings (garrison requirements).
|
British
|
U.S.
|
French (Native) |
Total
|
Sicily and Southern
Italy |
1 |
— |
— |
1 |
Sardinia |
— |
— |
1 |
1 |
Corsica |
— |
— |
1 |
1 |
N. Africa, Palestine, Syria,
Cyprus |
2 |
— |
—§
|
2 |
Italy |
4 |
— |
— |
4 |
|
7 |
— |
2 |
9 |
[Page 1139]
3. The balance which will, therefore, be operationally
available on 1 November 1943, will be as follows:
|
British
|
U.S.
|
French (Native) |
Total
|
|
12||
|
5 |
3 |
20 |
4. After 1 November 1943, six further French (Native),
divisions will become operationally available, making a
total of 11 divisions in June 1944. Of these six further
divisions, four will be required for garrison duties in N.
Africa, leaving two extra divisions available for
operations.
5. By June 1944, there will, therefore, be available in the
Mediterranean theater 22|| Allied Divisions.
6. The British divisions shown as available in paragraph 1
above are exclusive of some 14 Independent Brigades which
are the equivalent of four and two-thirds divisions, but
have no supporting troops. These Brigades will assist in the
garrison commitments shown in paragraph 2 above.
section ii—united kingdom
7. Forces available.
The forces available in the United Kingdom on 1 May 1944,
will be as follows:
British:
|
13 |
divisions |
|
3 |
divisions from Mediterranean |
|
1 |
airborne division |
American:
|
14 |
ex U.S. (includes 2 now in U.K.) |
|
4 |
divisions from Mediterranean |
|
1 |
airborne division ex U.S. |
|
36 |
|
8. Of the above, five American divisions, which will be in
the United Kingdom or enroute, will not be operationally
available on 1 May 1944. These five American divisions will,
however, be operationally available two months from their
date of arrival and can, therefore, be used in the build-up
subsequent to the initial assaults. During May, June and
July 1944, assuming operations start in May, reception and
dispatch facilities in the United Kingdom will limit the
build-up to two, one and one division respectively, making
the total number of American divisions in the United Kingdom
and on the Continent approximately 23 by August 1944.
Thereafter it is assumed that direct despatch from.
[Page 1140]
the U.S. to the
lodgment area may be commenced at the rate of three to five
divisions per month.
9. Forces operationally available on 1 May
1944.
The total forces which will therefore be operationally
available on 1 May 1944, are as follows:
British:
|
16 |
divisions (includes Canadians) |
American:
|
13 |
divisions |
Airborne:
|
2 |
divisions (one British and one
American) |
Total:
|
31 |
divisions |
In addition to the above, five American divisions will be
available for the subsequent build-up which should continue
at the rate, if practicable, of three to five divisions per
month, starting about August 1944, through ports made
available on the Continent.
section iii—india and burma
10. Required for operations.
British:
|
8⅔ |
divisions¶
(including five assault and two follow-up
brigades) |
|
6 |
long range penetration groups |
|
1 |
parachute brigade |
Chinese:
|
13 |
divisions |
11. Resources available.
Existing formations will have to be converted to find the
additional L.R.P. groups
required, unless these are found from west African
formations, and the necessary suitable divisions for land
operations in Northern Burma.
This matter is now undergoing detailed investigation in
India, and in the War Office, and the effect of the
implications cannot yet be assessed. These forces are not
readily available, and therefore every effort must be made
without delay to provide them from resources now available
in India. The British undertake to clarify data on available
resources for inclusion in this paper as an addendum.
Chinese forces available amount to 22 divisions (assuming
10,000 to a division). This will allow nine divisions in
reserve.
section iv—the azores
12. No significant land forces are required, the necessary
facilities in the Islands having been made available as a
result of negotiations.
[Page 1141]
section v—the pacific
13. Resources available.
The following major United Nations ground forces are present
in or projected for the area as of 1 January 1944:
Central Pacific
|
4 |
Infantry Divisions |
South Pacific
|
5 |
Infantry Divisions |
|
2 |
Marine Divisions |
|
1 |
New Zealand Division |
Southwest Pacific
|
4 |
Infantry Divisions |
|
1 |
Infantry Division (1st Cav. Div.) |
|
1 |
Marine Division |
|
11 |
Australian Divisions |
Total
|
29 |
|
Note: Of the above eleven Australian
divisions, three infantry divisions (6th, 7th and 9th) are
available for offensive operations; the remaining six
infantry divisions and two armored divisions are presently
assigned for defense.
14. Requirements for contemplated
operations.
The following additional divisions are required for
operations in the Pacific and will be made available from
U.S. resources:
|
6 |
Infantry divisions (amphibious) |
|
1 |
Marine division |
|
1 |
Airborne division |
Total additional |
8 |
|
Already allotted |
29 |
|
Total available and to be made
available |
37 |
|
This estimate is based on reorganizing divisions after combat
and recommitting them to subsequent operations. Interchange
of divisions between theaters is also contemplated. As a
result, the above estimate of requirements should be
considered a minimum for planning purposes.
Annex III
Provision of Naval Forces
specific operations
Cross-channel operations (
Overlord
).
1. Sufficient British light forces will be made available to
counter a probable German threat within the Channel, while
the British Home
[Page 1142]
Fleet will be of sufficient strength to counter any move by
German heavy units. The remaining naval forces required have
not yet been assessed, but it is the intention that these
shall be found by the British, with some augmentation from
the U.S.
U.S.–U.K. movement.
2. Two U.S. escort groups previously assigned to the UGF convoys (which are being
discontinued) will be available for other employment
commencing in September, 1943.
Operations in the Mediterranean.
3. On the assumption that British and U.S. combatant forces
at present allocated to the Mediterranean are not reduced,
sufficient forces will be available to support approved
post-
Husky
operations, but not specifically for the southern
France operation for which planning is not yet complete. If
decision is made to execute that operation, a revision of
support forces in the Mediterranean will be required,
especially in view of the carrier borne air support
considered necessary. It is the intention that the British
will provide these suppport forces.
4. There is a requirement of 135 escorts in the Mediterranean
for operational and through Mediterranean convoys. This
requirement is at present being met by 116 British escort
vessels with some assistance from British and United States
destroyers. Certain of the British escorts have been loaned
from the Eastern Fleet and from U.K. coastal convoys,
leaving deficiencies therein.
Pacific operations.
5. U.S. ships now available and becoming available in 1943
and 1944 are adequate for the operation now approved for the
Pacific areas.
Amphibious operations from
India.14
6. The British can provide forces as follows:
|
Assault Forces
|
|
Covering Forces
|
4 |
cruisers (CL) |
2 |
fleet carriers (CV) |
5 |
escort carriers (CVE) |
3 |
battleships (OBB) |
2 |
AA cruisers |
4 |
heavy cruisers (CA) |
5 |
destroyers (DD) |
2 |
light cruisers (CL) |
24 |
escorts (DE) |
14 |
destroyers (DD) |
8 |
minesweepers |
|
|
8 |
submarines at least |
|
|
Note: The possibility of conflict of
the above deployment with
Overlord
and the South of France Operation must be borne in
mind.15
[Page 1143]
7. At
Trident
it was estimated there would be needed from the
United States for the Akyab–Ramree operation, set for
December 1, 1943, the following naval forces:
|
Assault Forces
|
Covering Forces
|
5 |
escort carriers (CVE) |
Two fleet carriers (CV) |
21 |
destroyers (DD) |
Should Italy be out of the war, the British
will be able to provide one of these. |
6 |
submarines (SS) |
|
|
Tanker Force
|
|
8 |
escorts (DE) |
Victorious is counted as a
United States unit. |
Since then four additional escort carriers
have been transferred to Great Britain. Further, major
operations in the Central Pacific involving extensive use of
naval forces will probably prevent these forces from
becoming available for Burma operations in February,
1944.
Escorts.
8. General requirements for the escorts for the specific
strategic operations projected in this paper can be met from
our combined resources without unduly weakening the convoy
escorts and support groups required for the existing convoy
system, except as noted in paragraph 4. Additional escorts
required for the north Russian convoys, should they be
resumed, and for any necessary adjustments in existing
convoy cycles can, however, only be met from new
construction and a reduction in the number of support groups
employed.
Naval personnel—General.
9. The accepted general policy is that landing craft will be
manned and maintained by personnel from the nation supplying
the forces engaged in the operation unless specifically
arranged otherwise.
Naval personnel—British.
10. On the assumption that the manpower proposals now before
the War Cabinet are approved, the British naval personnel
for the approved operations will be found, although, in
order to meet the
Overlord
requirements, it will be necessary temporarily to
close certain schools and establishments. Personnel due to
be returned from the Mediterranean for
Overlord
, or to proceed to India, must do so and cannot be
held for the offensive operations against Southern France,
which requirement must be met from those remaining on the
station.
11. No additional operational requirements for British naval
personnel, over and above that at present planned up to 1
May 1944, can be met, except at the expense of some other
operation or undertaking.
Naval personnel—American.
12. Personnel for approved operations and maintenance of
craft therefor can be provided. This involves a commitment
over and above
[Page 1144]
those agreed to at
Trident
, to provide for
Overlord
135 officers and 1511 men to man certain support
craft involved in the U.S. part of the operation.
Annex IV
Provision of Air Forces
- 1.
- The following appendices show the resources available
to us for the various operations:
- Appendix “A”—Combined Bomber Offensive from
U.K. and Cross-Channel Operation
Overlord
.16
- Appendix “B”—Operations from the
Mediterranean.17
- Appendix “C”—Operations in Southeast
Asia.18
- Appendix “D”—Operations in the Pacific.19
- Appendix “E”—Support of Resistance Groups in
Europe and Balkans.
- Appendix “F”—Air Operations in and from
China.
- 2.
- The group or squadron strength as measured in terms of
unit equipment (U.E.)
does not provide an exact measure of air force strength.
Ability to endure prolonged periods of heavy combat
activity is measured by the adequacy of reserves of
airplanes and crews. The reserve airplanes are not
included in the strength data as the percentage held in
reserve varies with intensity of activity and with other
factors.
- 3.
- The tactical role formerly assigned to dive bombers
has been largely taken over by the fighter-bomber in the
land-based air forces.
[Page 1145]
Since the fighter is readily
transposable to the fighter-bomber, it has been
necessary to combine day fighter and fighter-bomber
strengths.
Appendix E to Annex IV
Support of Resistance Groups in Europe
and Balkans
1. The following British aircraft are allocated to the
support of resistance groups in Europe and the Balkans:
|
Heavy Bombers
|
Miscl.
Aircraft
|
U.K. Bases |
22 |
14 |
Med. Bases |
36 |
— |
2. No further heavy bomber aircraft can be allocated for this
purpose without retarding the rate of build-up of heavy
bomber squadrons in British Bomber Command.
3. Priority for aircraft has recently been given to the
support of resistance groups in Greece and the Balkans.
4. Further assistance can therefore only be given to
resistance groups in Europe at the expense of the Bomber
Offensive, or the support of guerrilla forces in Greece and
the Balkans.
5. Due to their special role in the Combined Bomber Offensive
the heavily armed high altitude day bomber types used by the
U.S. Army Air Force are not suitable or available for night
operations in support of guerrilla forces.
Appendix F to Annex IV
Air Operations in and From China
- 1.
- The 14th Air Force in China has a strength, as of 23
August 1943, of one (1) heavy bomber group (35 U.E.), one (1) medium bomber
squadron (13 U.E.) and
five (5) fighter squadron[s] (125 U.E.). If logistical considerations permit,
the U.S. fighter force in China will be expanded to
thirteen squadron[s] (325 U.E.) by March, 1944. The medium bomber
strength will be augmented to one group (57 U.E.) by 1 January
1944.
- 2.
- The Chinese Air Force will have, by 1 January 1944,
four medium bomber squadrons (40 U.E.) and 10 fighter squadrons (100 U.E.). The fighter force
will be expanded in 1944 to 20 squadrons (200 U.E.).
- 3.
- The Air Transport Command has, as of 23 August 1943,
available in India sufficient aircraft to lift tonnage
to China at the rate of 7,000 tons per month.
- 4.
- The provision of base facilities and refueling
facilities in Assam Province are at present the major
factors restricting the flow of material
[Page 1146]
to China. It is
anticipated that the monthly lift to China will be
increased to 10,000 tons per month by November, 1943.
Further expansion of the Air Transport facilities into
China is under consideration.
Annex V
Assault Shipping and Craft
General situation
1. See Appendix “A”20 for the allocations and
estimated availability of British landing ships and craft to
1 January 1945, and Appendix “B” giving the same information
for U.S. landing ships and craft. The quantity and rate of
new production are shown in the Appendices. Appendix “C”
contains the casualty rates and serviceability factors used
for planning purposes.
2. The present position in landing ships and craft is such
that there is everywhere a deficit of landing craft.
Operations are limited in many cases solely by the lack of
these vessels.
3. Studies are under way which it is hoped will increase the
rate of U.S. landing craft production. However, the result
of these studies at the present time indicates that such an
acceleration cannot be felt before April 1944. Similar
efforts should be made in the U.K. to improve the situation
for
Overlord
, the Mediterranean and later to prosecute the war
in the Far East. The British have indicated that there may
be difficulty in manning amphibious craft in additional
numbers.
future operations in the Mediterranean
in connection with
overlord
4. The assault ships and craft now in the Mediterranean are
all that can be provided for immediate post-
Husky
operations in that theater.
5. In accordance with the guiding principle that, “as between
operation
Overlord
and operations in the Mediterranean, where there is
a shortage of resources, available resources will be
distributed and employed with the main object of insuring
the success of
Overlord
,” future operations in the Mediterranean should not
be allowed to encroach upon the assault craft planned at
Trident
to be withdrawn from the Mediterranean for
Overlord
. Production both in the U.S. and U.K. together with
the necessities in other theaters will permit
Overlord
to be satisfactorily mounted by 1 May 1944 only if
these Mediterranean ships and craft are used. The Tables of
Appendices
[Page 1147]
“A”
and “B” indicate the numbers and types of the U.S. and
British ships and craft so involved as well as the
scheduling of their delivery to U.K. The numbers are
substantially the same as at
Trident
. It may be necessary to move 15 additional LCT(5), or their equivalent
LCT lift, from the
Mediterranean to
Overlord
.
6. Bad weather likely to be encountered off the Bay of Biscay
after November, together with the need for the early
formation and training of the assault forces for
Overlord
makes it requisite that landing craft sent from the
Mediterranean for
Overlord
be sent as soon as practicable and, in the case of
British LCT types, not later
than early November.
7. The combat loaders should be released as follows:
U.S. APA’s and AKA’s and AGC—as soon after
immediate post-
Husky
operations as possible, and after a refit
in U.S., to be utilized for training and
participation in
Overlord
.
British LSI(L)’s—as
soon after immediate post-
Husky
as possible for normal troop movements,
principally to increase the
Bolero
lift.
British LSH—as soon
after immediate post-HusKY operations as possible, for
Overlord
.
8. a. The nature of the assault on
southern France in order to create a diversion in connection
with
Overlord
is not known, as no definite plan has been
formulated. The losses of landing ships and craft in
Husky
were much smaller than estimated at
Trident
. Excluding planned withdrawals from the
Mediterranean to
Overlord
and Bull-frog, it is estimated that there
should be left available in the Mediterranean by 1 May 1944
sufficient assault ships and craft to mount approximately
27,000 troops and 1,500 vehicles. The ships and craft shown
do not provide a balanced assault lift (See Appendices “A”
and “B”) and the lift is not great. However, any operations
that may be planned are to be planned with the resources
shown as available herein. Augmentation is not considered
practicable without drawing from
Overlord
. The British LSI(L)’s available for operations against
southern France should be on station by 1 March 1944.
b. In order to provide for carrying
the small ship-borne landing craft which will be used in the
Mediterranean the U.S. LST’s
to remain there should be the ones having davits.
Overlord
9. The assault shipping and craft indicated as available for
Overlord
in Appendices “A” and “B” are the same as at
Trident
with very minor exceptions. Landing craft destined
for
Overlord
will arrive in time for the operation, though the
complete allotment of some types
[Page 1148]
from the United States will not
arrive as early as desired by COSSAC. This, however, cannot be improved.
Bullfrog
10. a. Three LSI(L) with their landing craft and one LSC have already been ordered
to sail from the Mediterranean for India. One LSH, one LSI(H) and the remaining six
LSI(L) with their
landing craft, should be sailed so as to arrive in India by
15 November 1943. The ten U.S. and eight British LST for the operation are now
on passage from the U.S. to India.
b. All the landing ships and craft
requested by General Auchinleck for this operation will be
available with the exception of 12 LCG(L) and 9 LCT(5).
c. The provision of LSP is dealt with in Annex
VII.
d. The LSI(L) should be released immediately after the
operation so as to be employed for trooping movements if not
required for further operations.
Pacific Operations
11. Broad estimates of over-all requirements of assault
shipping and landing craft for the campaign against Japan
indicate deficiencies in certain types, particularly APA’s, LST’s, and LSD’s.
12. The small U.S. APA’s and
AKA’s now authorized and
building by the Maritime Commission will be required in the
early future and their completion is a matter of urgency.
The Maritime Commission has been advised in this matter. In
addition, others will be required to insure the speed of the
advance across the Pacific toward Japan.
13. It is anticipated that the major British and U.S. landing
ships and craft surviving
Overlord
can be made available to leave the European Theater
in September 1944 for use in the Pacific and southeast
Asia.
conclusions
14. a. There will be sufficient
landing ships and craft for approved operations in 1943 and
until the summer of 1944. Landing ships and craft will,
however, be the bottleneck limiting the full scope of
assault in the approved operations, both in the Pacific and
the Atlantic.
Appendices “A” and “B” of Annex V are made out on the
assumption that landing craft will be sent from the
Mediterranean to
Overlord
so as to arrive by 15 December 1943, and assault
ships by 1 March 1944.
b. In order to provide sufficient
landing craft after the summer of 1944, an acceleration and
increase in the present British and U.S. assault shipping
and landing craft programs is necessary.
[Page 1149]
Annex VI
Availability of Critical Supply and
Construction Items
general
In general, the United Nations will be able to provide the
critical supply and construction items for the specific
operations projected except as indicated hereafter. In the
absence of detailed plans of operations and specific lists
of equipment and supply requirements, a more definite
statement is not justified.
-
a.
- Overall shortages of radar and radio equipment are
rapidly being eliminated. Adequate distribution of these
items to U.S. Army Air Forces will be made by the end of
September, 1943. All requirements will be met by June,
1944.
-
b.
- Certain items of equipment, notably special Air Forces
vehicles, heavy trucks, two and one-half ton amphibious
trucks (DUKWs), landing
vehicle tracked (L.V.T.
II and L.V.T.(A)II), portable gasoline-driven
generators, and cargo-handling equipment, are now short
and must be expected to continue short for several
months. Demands for these items are increasingly heavy
and production is not yet sufficient to meet all
requirements. The United States production of N.L. pontoon equipment may
fall short of additional requirements and is, in any
case, uneconomical of shipping. Urgent steps must
therefore be taken to start production outside the
United States.
i—use of the azores islands
1. Requirements can be met, subject to the limitations
indicated in general paragraphs above.
ii—operations in europe
Operation “
Pointblank
” and other air operations in Europe
1. Requirements are being met, subject to limitations
indicated in the general paragraphs above.
Support of resistance groups in
Europe
2. Requirements can be met.
Operation “
Overlord
”
3. Requirements can be met. However, the low rate of troop
movements to the U.K. during the spring and summer of 1943
has forced a high rate of movement during the fall and
winter of 1943–1944. Limitations of cargo shipping and U.K.
port capacity have necessitated preshipment of equipment for
units scheduled to move from August 1943 to May 1944. A
balance will be reached only about 1 May 1944. Preshipment
has been accomplished by reducing certain equipment of units
in training in the United States and depot stocks of
[Page 1150]
these items to
dangerously low levels. Should it become necessary to divert
to some other theater U.S. air and ground units now destined
for
Overlord
, part of the equipment for such units could only be
made available by withdrawal from the United Kingdom.
4. Amphibious training facilities as required by the over-all
plan are being provided to meet the arrival of landing
craft.
5. The plans for establishment of the artificial harbors
required by
Overlord
operations are being made the matter of thorough
investigation and it is anticipated that means can be
provided to meet the requirements. Consideration and all
possible action is necessary to move pontoon drydocks and
equipment in amounts comparable to landing craft transferred
from the Mediterranean to
Overlord
.
Operations in the Mediterranean
6. Since these operations are to be executed with the means
now available in the Mediterranean, the only supply
requirement (other than the completion of the equipment of
the French forces) will be maintenance. Naval logistic
requirements are either in the area or have been provided
for.
iii—operations in the pacific and far
east theater
Operations in India-Burma–China
1. Requirements insofar as they are known, can be met.
Additional requirements are expected and it is probable that
they can be met, subject to the limitations indicated in the
general paragraphs, above.
Operations in the Pacific
2. Requirements are being met.
iv—other undertakings
General
1. Insofar as they are known, requirements can be met,
subject to the limitations indicated in the general
paragraphs, above.
Rearming and reequipping of French forces
in North Africa
2. Equipment for 11 French divisions and the supporting
troops in North Africa can be provided by 31 December
1943.
v—projected requirements for amphibious
operations
The range and speed of contemplated amphibious operations
indicate heavy future requirements for amphibious vehicles
and auxiliary servicing ships of all types. The provision of
these vehicles and ships together with the development of
new types requires urgent consideration. Such action has
already been initiated as regards U.S. development and
production of two and one-half ton amphibious trucks (DUKWs).
[Page 1151]
Annex VII
Shipping
part i [—] british dry cargo shipping
requirements21
1. British Military Cargo Shipping Requirements for the last
four months of 1943 and the first half of 1944 have been
reexamined in the light of the revised strategy, agreed by
the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
These requirements are now as follows:
[Paragraph 2 contains two tables summarizing required monthly
sailings in 1943 and 1944 for the maintenance and build-up
of British forces overseas.]
3. In addition shipping will be required for allied
operational purposes as follows:
(a)
Priceless
. The shipping required for
Avalanche
now amounts to 126 vessels. It is probable that
these will be required to be retained until December, a
smaller number, say 100, until February-March and thereafter
about 50 for operations in the South of France and other
Mediterranean movement. In addition, the Coaster Fleet in
the Mediterranean will need to be retained indefinitely for
internal maintenance.
(b)
Overlord
. Requirements in the initial stages will be 100
oceangoing ships and approximately 200 Coasters for the
carriage of M.T. vehicles and
a further 200 Coasters for the carriage of stores.
Subsequently the majority of the Coasters will be
progressively released but the stores lift will require
tonnage of small ocean-going and large Coaster type up to a
maximum of the order of 500,000 tons deadweight.
In addition, there may be a requirement for block ships for
the construction of “Synthetic Ports” and it is possible
that up to 50 vessels of some 450 feet length by 45 feet
height keel to deck might be involved.
(c)
Bullfrog
. According to the present plan 21 M.T. ships will be required from
January to April inclusive and thereafter approximately five
ships monthly will require to be loaded within the Indian
Ocean area on account of maintenance.
(d)
Alacrity
and
Oatmeal
. Operation
Alacrity
will require three ships to sail towards the end of
September but thereafter maintenance requirements will be
extremely small.
Oatmeal
will require the sailing of 17 vessels for one
voyage in September–October.
[Page 1152]
part ii[—]availability of british
controlled dry cargo tonnage (1600 g.r.t. & over)
[Paragraph 5 forecasts a deficit of 3.1 million deadweight
tons for the second half of 1943 and a deficit of 3.2
million deadweight tons for the first half of 1944.]
6. After allowing for imports in certain bare boat chartered
ships and for 1,500 tons average in each scheduled
Bolero
sailing, the deficits in tonnage shown above are
equivalent to:
384 |
sailings in the last 4 months of 1943, |
488 |
sailings in the first half of 1944. |
These are allowed for in the U.S. statement
in Part III.
7. No provision has been made for:
-
a.
- Shipment of coal to Italy. It is anticipated,
however, that Italian shipping will contribute
substantially towards this commitment.
-
b.
- Additional civil commitments to Portugal.
-
c.
- Possible provision of “blockships” for
Overlord
. This commitment is indefinite but is
already the subject of urgent investigation under
the direction of C.O.S.S.A.C.
part iii[—]u.s. cargo shipping
position
The requirements listed in the following summary include
those expressed in paragraph 6 of Part II of this Annex, and
in addition incorporate 50 ships for operation
Priceless
and 80 MT ships for
operation
Overlord
, being the balance required after those to be
provided from British controlled tonnage.
Summary of Requirements for U.S. Cargo
Shipping in Terms of Sailings
|
|
1943
|
1944
|
|
Requirement
|
Sept.
|
4th Qtr.
|
1st Qtr.
|
2d Qtr.
|
(15) |
Total requirements |
541 |
1,768 |
1,684 |
1,606 |
(16) |
Total available |
549 |
1,731 |
1,905 |
1,982 |
(17) |
Balance |
+8 |
-37 |
+221 |
+376 |
Note: a. The foregoing is based on
the assumption that each
Bolero
cargo ship will lift approximately 1,500 tons of
British import cargo and on the other hand the equivalent of
12 shiploads of measurement cargo on
Bolero
account will be lifted monthly in U.K. import
vessels.
b. See comments by Mr. L. W. Douglas
and Lord Leathers below.22
[Page 1153]
Comments by Mr. L. W. Douglas and Lord
Leathers on the Dry Cargo Shipping Position
(Circulated as C.C.S.
329/1)
In May we pointed out that the deficiencies in shipping
resources available to meet the estimated requirements
during the last half of 1943 were susceptible of being
satisfactorily managed. This appears to have been the case,
though the last four months of this year indicate a tight
position.
Now we believe that the suggested surpluses in the first half
of 1944 do not reflect the real situation, first, because
planned operations may impose heavier burdens on our
resources than are now contemplated and, secondly, because
the war requirements have not been fully submitted. This is
emphasized by the fact that the estimated number of sailings
required during each of the first and second quarters of
1944 is substantially less than during the last quarter of
1943.
We feel it necessary to add this comment lest the figures
give rise to misleading interpretations.
part iv [—]personnel shipping
position
British
1. In examining the British personnel shipping resources and
determining their optimum deployment, the following
assumptions have been made:—
-
a.
- That known operational requirements will be as in
a of Table I attached23 and, for
purposes of calculating the British aid to U.S.
troop movements have been counted against British
resources.
-
b.
- That British personnel will be required to carry
out troop movements, other than operational, as
scheduled in b of Table I
attached.
-
c.
- That losses of escorted class of troopships during
the period under consideration (September 1943–June
1944) will offset additions to the escorted
troopship fleet, and that about seven percent of the
escorted troopship fleet is permanently immobilized
for repairs and refits. Losses of unescorted
troopships cannot be made good by new construction,
and the calculations have been made on a basis of no
losses in this class.
-
d.
- That personnel movement to Mediterranean and
Indian Ocean destinations and to South and East
Africa is carried out through the Mediterranean on a
monthly convoy cycle and that this and other troop
convoy cycles remain as at present.
-
e.
- That the available British controlled personnel
shipping in the Indian Ocean is capable of meeting
local requirements (except for certain operational
requirements) in that theater.
-
f.
- That troopships fitted for assault loading (LSI(L) and LSP) will be released to
troop movement on conclusion of operations to which
they are now assigned.
-
g.
- That the C.I.B. cargo ships which are being
converted to LSI(L)
in the U.S.A. will
only be available for troop movement during their
delivery voyage to the U.K. and thereafter will be
used entirely on operations.
-
h.
- That the number of troopships in escorted
Bolero
–
Sickle
convoys may be increased to 30 ships if
circumstances permit.
2. The
Bolero
–
Sickle
movement program during the period September 1943
to April 1944 makes demands on the fast unescorted class
which are so exacting that there is no margin for
contingencies.
3. Table II attached shows the extent of the assistance which
it is estimated that British personnnel shipping can provide
towards the movement of U.S. troops on the following
routes:—
U.S.A.
|
to United Kingdom (
Bolero
-
Sickle
movement) |
Iceland |
to United Kingdom (one division) |
North Africa |
to United Kingdom (equivalent of one
division) |
U.S.A.
|
to North Africa |
U.S.A.
|
to India (transhipping in North Africa) |
U.S.A.
|
to South or Southwest Pacific |
Ship operating requirements may cause
fluctuations in the movements scheduled for each month.
United States
4. The deployment of U.S. personnel shipping, and of British
personnel shipping which is estimated to be available for
the movement of U.S. troops, is shown in Table III. It
should be noted that Table III indicates capabilities under
the distribution of troop lift assumed in this paper. A
comparison of capabilities with forecast requirements shows
the following general position:
a. Joint Army and Navy Requirements in
Pacific.
Troop lift available in September will not eliminate the
large backlog presently existing, but beginning in October,
transport capacity will be available to meet monthly
requirements and substantially to reduce this backlog. The
tabulation below summarizes this situation.
|
Central. South and Southwest
Pacific
|
|
September
|
4th Quarter |
1st Quarter
|
2nd Quarter
|
|
1943
|
1944
|
Cumulative Deficit |
56,500 |
24,900 |
14,400 |
700 |
[Page 1155]
b. Build-up of U.S. Forces in U.K.
- (1)
- The requirement for a balanced force of approximately
1,416,000 U.S. Troops, including 19 divisions, in the
U.K. by May 1944 can be met if the expectations over the
period are realized. It is estimated that 14 U.S.
divisions will be operationally available on 1 May
1944.
- (2)
- The build-up of U.S. forces includes the transfer of 4
divisions from the Mediterranean area in November 1943,
and of 1 division from Iceland in August 1943.
- (3)
- The limitations on cargo reception in the U.K. during
May, June and July 1944 will restrict build-up to two,
one, and one divisions in the respective months. There
is an indicated surplus of troop shipping in the
Atlantic during the period between mounting date of
Overlord
and the date on which movements can be made
direct into continental ports.
c. Mediterranean Requirements.
- (1)
- Troop capacity to this area after August 1943 is based
on replacement requirements.
- (2)
- U.S. personnel shipping (2 XAP’s) now in the Mediterranean is
scheduled to augment the U.K. build-up program beginning
in January 1944.
d. China–Burma–India.
The requirements for this area can be met.
e. Alaska.
The requirements for this area can be met.
f. Other Areas—Including
Newfoundland, Greenland, Bermuda, Iceland, West and Central
Africa, Caribbean and South Atlantic, Middle East and
Persian Gulf.
Troop movements to these areas represent a very small
proportion of the total and consist almost wholly of
replacements. Total strengths show a gradual reduction.
General
5. Active examination is being made of measures to provide
some margin for contingencies in this very tight program of
United Nations troopship operation which the basic strategy
during the period September 1943–June 1944 demands.
6. It is pointed out that the early arrival of certain Port,
Depot and Engineer units is essential if the maximum
quantity of
Bolero
–
Sickle
cargo is to be handled, and high priority must be
given to the dispatch of these troops in the
Bolero
–
Sickle
convoys.
part v [—]conclusions
The presently estimated required troop lift in the Atlantic
and India areas will be met within the prescribed period of
time, but in
[Page 1156]
the
Pacific there is a deficiency which will be substantially
reduced at the end of this year.
To achieve this result and to have a reserve against
contingencies will impose a heavy strain on troop
transports. After 1 May 1944 there appears to be, according
to present calculations, an easing of this strain.
The combined cargo shipping position indicates a deficit of
29 sailings during the last four months of this year, and a
surplus during the first half of 1944.
This deficit, if handled with full cooperation among the
various demanders, can be covered, but even so, it indicates
a tight position throughout the period.
Annex VIII
Petroleum
Requirements
1. Estimates have been made of service demands of petroleum
products to implement the specifically agreed
Quadrant
decisions. While there has been no opportunity to
make a combined final and detailed survey of refinery
capacities and crude oil availability it is our judgment
that adequate facilities exist, or are in process, or can be
made ready in time to meet
Quadrant
decisions requirements, with the exception of high
grade aviation gasoline (100 octane or higher).
These estimates include essential civilian requirements.
100 octane aviation gasoline
2. The critical petroleum item is 100 octane aviation
gasoline. The total production of this grade of fuel is now
being consumed and requests for allocations are far greater
than can be met from production at the present time.
Anticipated increase in production is offset by
correspondingly increased requirements in the various
theaters.
3. Based on current estimates there will be a daily
world-wide shortage of 68,000 barrels during September 1943.
This shortage decreases progressively until the first
quarter 1944 when it is estimated that shortage will average
6,492 barrels per day. Requirements then increase over
production until the end of 1944 when production fails to
meet requirements by a total of 53,586 barrels per day.
4. The only apparent solution to this problem is priority of
allocation to the theaters prescribed by the Combined Chiefs
of Staff, and the substitution to the fullest degree of
lower grades of aviation gasoline for training and other
purposes until the new manufacturing program is more nearly
in balance with requirements.
[Page 1157]
5. The Army and Navy Petroleum Board, acting through a staff
of officers assigned to it by the U.S. Army and Navy, have
taken steps to expedite to the maximum extent possible the
completion of the aviation gasoline manufacturing program.
The responsibility for this program rests with the Petroleum
Administration for War and the joint service activities
above mentioned are carried out in cooperation with that
organization.
Tankers
6. Existing large seagoing tankers plus conservative estimate
of deliveries from new construction over the next several
months will meet requirements for bulk movements of
petroleum to areas of consumption.
7. In all theaters there is a very real need for smaller
tankers, particularly where necessary to supply newly
established beachheads and bases, as for operations in the
Pacific, Southeast Asia,
Overlord
and the Mediterranean. They are particularly
important for operations in the Pacific, and in addition are
being requested in increasing numbers in the United Kingdom
and the Mediterranean. Steps are now being taken to
determine requirements. Such as cannot be supplied from
present building programs will be requested in new
construction.
Pipeline in Southeast Asia
8. The construction of the pipeline through Burma, and later
into China, will greatly facilitate the delivery of
petroleum products to allied forces in those areas. The
ocean terminus of the pipeline will be served by an adequate
battery of tanks to be erected, and these in turn will
receive their deliveries from tankers, the supply for which
is being planned.