J.C.S. Files

Report by the Combined Staff Planners 1
Enclosure to C.C.S. 329/2

Implementation of Assumed Basic Undertakings and Specific Operations for the Conduct of the War, 1943–1944: Availability of Resources To Meet the Requirements of Critical Strategy

1. We have examined the available means of the United Nations with the object of assessing our ability to carry out the policy agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

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2. A summary of this policy, which has been taken as a basis of our investigation, is attached as Annex I.

3. We would emphasize that the purpose of this investigation is to examine whether the operations decided on at Quadrant are within our resources, and not to imply binding commitments or decisions on the part of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

4. The principle has been accepted that, for war against Japan, the forces to carry out operations from the East, including the Southwest Pacific, shall be provided by the United States, and for operations from the West by Great Britain, except for special types not available to Great Britain which will be provided by the United States, or vice versa. The employment of Dominion forces will be a matter of discussion between all governments concerned.

5. Our conclusions are set out below.

ground forces (annex ii)

6. The necessary ground forces for operations from the United Kingdom and in the Mediterranean and Pacific theaters, can be made available. Searching investigations are proceeding to determine if the forces required for operations in Northern Burma can be found by the target date of mid-February 1944.

naval forces (annex iii)

7. Apart from Bullfrog the naval forces necessary for approved operations will be available, subject to a revision of the support forces required in the Mediterranean, if a decision is made to execute the Southern France operation. No such revision can be made until a plan is available. For Bullfrog the requirements provisionally estimated at Trident 2 were as follows:—

2 Fleet Carriers (CV) 6 Escort Carriers (CVE)
3 Old Battleships (BB) 40 Destroyers (DD)
4 Heavy Cruisers (CA) 32 Escorts (DE)
6 Light Cruisers (CL) 8 Minesweepers
2 A.A. Cruisers 14 Submarines

It is estimated that the British will not be able to meet these forces in full and that there will be the following deficiencies:—

1 Escort Carrier (CVE) 8 Escorts (DE)
21 Destroyers (DD) 6 Submarines, at most

Note: The possibility of conflict of the deployment for Bullfrog with Overlord and the South of France operation must be borne in mind.3

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No additional operational commitments for British naval personnel can be met in addition to those planned up to 1 May 1944, except at the expense of some other operation or undertaking.

air forces (annex iv) 4

8. The air resources required to meet the operations specified in this paper are available subject to:—

The possible deficiency of land based aircraft for operations in the Pacific (See Appendix D5) which may arise unless the war with Germany has been concluded in time to release the additional resources required.
The decision that the operations in the Mediterranean Theater (See Appendix B6) shall be limited to the capabilities of the air resources specifically allocated.

9.7 The extent of all operations in support of resistance groups8 will be related to the advantages to be gained and will be limited by the supply of heavy bomber aircraft. Large-scale diversions of heavy bombers from the Combined Bomber Offensive are not forecast.9

10.10 The major factor now restricting the support of air and ground forces in China by air transport is the deficiency of base facilities in Assam Province of India and of transportation into Assam Province from Calcutta.

assault shipping and landing craft (annex v)

11. There will be sufficient landing ships and craft for approved operations in 1943 and until the summer of 1944. Landing ships and craft will, however, be the bottleneck limiting the full scope of assault in the approved operations, both in the Pacific and the Atlantic. Appendices “A” and “B”11 of Annex V are made out on the assumption that landing craft will be sent from the Mediterranean to Overlord so as to arrive by 15 December 1943, and assault ships by 1 March 1944.

12. To provide sufficient landing craft after the summer of 1944, an acceleration and increase in the present British and U.S. assault shipping and landing craft programs is necessary, probably at the expense of cargo ship and escort production and certain army items.

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supply of critical items (annex vi)

13. In the absence of detailed plans of operations for each theater, it is not possible to give finalized requirements and estimated detailed shortages of critical items. A provisional estimate is, however, set out in Annex VI. Temporary shortages will exist for a few special items, (as set out in paragraph 1 b of Annex VI). It is anticipated that these deficiencies will be made up early in 1944, and they do not appear to be of great consequence.

shipping (annex vii)

14. Apart from a small deficit in the Pacific, which will be met by the end of the first quarter of 1944,12 there is sufficient personnel shipping capacity to meet our known requirements.

A careful operation of cargo shipping should enable us to meet all essential commitments.

The Shipping Annex (VII) takes no account of accommodation, depot and repair ships which will be required by the British Navy in the South-East Asia area for the satisfactory prosecution of the war against Japan.13

oil (annex viii)

15. An examination of the oil position has revealed that the critical item is 100 octane aviation gasoline, of which there will be a pronounced shortage through 1944. Steps are being taken to find a solution to this problem, not only by the substitution of lower grades of aviation gasoline for training and other purposes, but also by taking steps to expedite to the maximum extent possible the completion of the aviation gasoline manufacturing program.

16. In all theaters there is a very real need for smaller tankers, particularly where it is necessary to supply newly established beachheads and bases. There appear to be sufficient large sea-going tankers, in existence and coming from new construction, to meet requirements for bulk movements of petroleum products.

Annex I

Basis of Investigation

The following operations and undertakings have been used as a basis for this investigation. They are not arranged in order of priority.

i—use of the azores islands

1. The British obtain the use of facilities in the Azores from 8th October 1943 for intensified sea and air operations against the U–Boat.

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2. These facilities are extended to embrace operational and transit use by the United States.

ii—operations in europe


3. The combined bomber offensive from all convenient bases. This operation will continue to have the highest strategic priority.

4. Support resistance groups in Europe.

Operations in Northwest Europe.

5. Overlord takes place on 1st May 1944 in accordance with the approved plan which allows for employment of the following:—

Assault: 5 divisions (simultaneously loaded in landing craft).
2 divisions—follow-up.
2 airborne divisions.
Subsequent build-up: At least 20 divisions.
Total: At least 29 divisions of which 7 divisions will return to U.K. from the Mediterranean.

6. As between Operation Overlord and operations in the Mediterranean, where there is a shortage of resources, available resources will be distributed and employed with the main object of ensuring the success of Overlord .

Operations in the Mediterranean.

7. Operations in the Mediterranean will be carried out with the forces allotted at Trident . In addition such French forces as may be re-equipped and fit for war will be used.

8. First Phase. The elimination of Italy as a belligerent and establishment of air bases in the Rome area and, if feasible, further north.

9. Second Phase. Seizure of Sardinia and Corsica.

10. Third Phase. The maintenance of unremitting pressure on the German forces in north Italy.

11. Offensive operations against southern France to establish a lodgment in the Toulon-Marseilles area and exploit northwards in order to create a diversion in connection with Overlord . The target date for planning purposes—1st May 1944.

12. Minimum essential defensive garrison commitments.

iii—operations in the pacific and far east theater

Operations in Southeast Asia.

13. As the main effort, carry out operations for the capture of Upper Burma in order to improve the air route and establish overland communications with China. These operations to include the extensive [Page 1137] use of long range penetration groups. Target date—mid-February 1944.

The extent of these operations to be dependent upon logistic considerations as affected by the recent floods.

14. To continue to build up and increase the air routes and air supplies to China, and the development of facilities, with a view to:—

Keeping China in the war;
Intensifying operations against the Japanese;
Maintaining increased U.S. and Chinese air forces in China;
Equipping Chinese ground forces.

15. To continue preparations for an amphibious operation in the spring of 1944, of the order of those contemplated at Trident for the capture of Akyab and Ramree.

16. Preparation of the necessary bases for operations in the Southeast Asia Command.

Operations in China.

17. Air operations in and from China.

Operations in the Pacific.

18. Operations to seize:

Objective Target date for planning
Gilberts 15th November 1943
Marshalls 1st January 1944
Western New Guinea 1st February 1944:
New Ireland 1st May 1944
Ponape 1st June 1944
Admiralty Islands 1st June 1944
Truk 1st September 1944
Palaus or Marianas—Guam 31st December 1944

iv—other undertakings

19. Maintain the security and war making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and British Isles.

20. Support and maintain the war making capacity of our forces in all areas.

21. Maintain vital overseas lines of communications, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U–Boat menace.

22. Undertake such measures as may be necessary to provide China with a volume of supplies to keep China actively in the war against Japan.

23. To sustain the Soviet forces by the greatest volume of munitions that can be supplied and transported to Russia without militating against the attainment of the over-all objectives.

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24. Continue to supply such equipment to Turkey as we can spare and as the Turks, in the opinion of the Commander in Chief, Middle East, can absorb.*

25. To provide for the maintenance of prisoners of war.

26. To provide for the economic support of countries occupied by the United Nations.

27. To re-arm and re-equip eleven French Divisions and supporting troops in North Africa by 31st December, 1943, insofar as this does not interfere with operations scheduled previous to Quadrant .

Annex II

Land Forces

section i—mediterranean

1. Resources available.

After allowing for the return to the United Kingdom of four American and three British divisions, there will be the following forces available in the Mediterranean on 1 November 1943:

British U.S. French
(including 2 Polish)
5 5 29

2. Undertakings (garrison requirements).

British U.S. French (Native) Total
Sicily and Southern Italy 1 1
Sardinia 1 1
Corsica 1 1
N. Africa, Palestine, Syria, Cyprus 2 § 2
Italy 4 4
7 2 9
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3. The balance which will, therefore, be operationally available on 1 November 1943, will be as follows:

British U.S. French (Native) Total
12|| 5 3 20

4. After 1 November 1943, six further French (Native), divisions will become operationally available, making a total of 11 divisions in June 1944. Of these six further divisions, four will be required for garrison duties in N. Africa, leaving two extra divisions available for operations.

5. By June 1944, there will, therefore, be available in the Mediterranean theater 22|| Allied Divisions.

6. The British divisions shown as available in paragraph 1 above are exclusive of some 14 Independent Brigades which are the equivalent of four and two-thirds divisions, but have no supporting troops. These Brigades will assist in the garrison commitments shown in paragraph 2 above.

section ii—united kingdom

7. Forces available.

The forces available in the United Kingdom on 1 May 1944, will be as follows:

British: 13 divisions
3 divisions from Mediterranean
1 airborne division
American: 14 ex U.S. (includes 2 now in U.K.)
4 divisions from Mediterranean
 1 airborne division ex U.S.

8. Of the above, five American divisions, which will be in the United Kingdom or enroute, will not be operationally available on 1 May 1944. These five American divisions will, however, be operationally available two months from their date of arrival and can, therefore, be used in the build-up subsequent to the initial assaults. During May, June and July 1944, assuming operations start in May, reception and dispatch facilities in the United Kingdom will limit the build-up to two, one and one division respectively, making the total number of American divisions in the United Kingdom and on the Continent approximately 23 by August 1944. Thereafter it is assumed that direct despatch from. [Page 1140] the U.S. to the lodgment area may be commenced at the rate of three to five divisions per month.

9. Forces operationally available on 1 May 1944.

The total forces which will therefore be operationally available on 1 May 1944, are as follows:

British: 16 divisions (includes Canadians)
American: 13 divisions
Airborne: 2 divisions (one British and one American)
Total: 31 divisions

In addition to the above, five American divisions will be available for the subsequent build-up which should continue at the rate, if practicable, of three to five divisions per month, starting about August 1944, through ports made available on the Continent.

section iii—india and burma

10. Required for operations.

British: 8⅔ divisions (including five assault and two follow-up brigades)
6 long range penetration groups
1 parachute brigade
Chinese: 13 divisions

11. Resources available.

Existing formations will have to be converted to find the additional L.R.P. groups required, unless these are found from west African formations, and the necessary suitable divisions for land operations in Northern Burma.

This matter is now undergoing detailed investigation in India, and in the War Office, and the effect of the implications cannot yet be assessed. These forces are not readily available, and therefore every effort must be made without delay to provide them from resources now available in India. The British undertake to clarify data on available resources for inclusion in this paper as an addendum. Chinese forces available amount to 22 divisions (assuming 10,000 to a division). This will allow nine divisions in reserve.

section iv—the azores

12. No significant land forces are required, the necessary facilities in the Islands having been made available as a result of negotiations.

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section v—the pacific

13. Resources available.

The following major United Nations ground forces are present in or projected for the area as of 1 January 1944:

Central Pacific 4 Infantry Divisions
South Pacific 5 Infantry Divisions
2 Marine Divisions
1 New Zealand Division
Southwest Pacific 4 Infantry Divisions
1 Infantry Division (1st Cav. Div.)
1 Marine Division
11 Australian Divisions
Total 29

Note: Of the above eleven Australian divisions, three infantry divisions (6th, 7th and 9th) are available for offensive operations; the remaining six infantry divisions and two armored divisions are presently assigned for defense.

14. Requirements for contemplated operations.

The following additional divisions are required for operations in the Pacific and will be made available from U.S. resources:

6 Infantry divisions (amphibious)
1 Marine division
 1 Airborne division
Total additional 8
Already allotted 29
Total available and to be made available 37

This estimate is based on reorganizing divisions after combat and recommitting them to subsequent operations. Interchange of divisions between theaters is also contemplated. As a result, the above estimate of requirements should be considered a minimum for planning purposes.

Annex III

Provision of Naval Forces

specific operations

Cross-channel operations ( Overlord ).

1. Sufficient British light forces will be made available to counter a probable German threat within the Channel, while the British Home [Page 1142] Fleet will be of sufficient strength to counter any move by German heavy units. The remaining naval forces required have not yet been assessed, but it is the intention that these shall be found by the British, with some augmentation from the U.S.

U.S.–U.K. movement.

2. Two U.S. escort groups previously assigned to the UGF convoys (which are being discontinued) will be available for other employment commencing in September, 1943.

Operations in the Mediterranean.

3. On the assumption that British and U.S. combatant forces at present allocated to the Mediterranean are not reduced, sufficient forces will be available to support approved post- Husky operations, but not specifically for the southern France operation for which planning is not yet complete. If decision is made to execute that operation, a revision of support forces in the Mediterranean will be required, especially in view of the carrier borne air support considered necessary. It is the intention that the British will provide these suppport forces.

4. There is a requirement of 135 escorts in the Mediterranean for operational and through Mediterranean convoys. This requirement is at present being met by 116 British escort vessels with some assistance from British and United States destroyers. Certain of the British escorts have been loaned from the Eastern Fleet and from U.K. coastal convoys, leaving deficiencies therein.

Pacific operations.

5. U.S. ships now available and becoming available in 1943 and 1944 are adequate for the operation now approved for the Pacific areas.

Amphibious operations from India. 14

6. The British can provide forces as follows:

Assault Forces Covering Forces
4 cruisers (CL) 2 fleet carriers (CV)
5 escort carriers (CVE) 3 battleships (OBB)
2 AA cruisers 4 heavy cruisers (CA)
5 destroyers (DD) 2 light cruisers (CL)
24 escorts (DE) 14 destroyers (DD)
8 minesweepers
8 submarines at least

Note: The possibility of conflict of the above deployment with Overlord and the South of France Operation must be borne in mind.15

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7. At Trident it was estimated there would be needed from the United States for the Akyab–Ramree operation, set for December 1, 1943, the following naval forces:

Assault Forces Covering Forces
5 escort carriers (CVE) Two fleet carriers (CV)
21 destroyers (DD) Should Italy be out of the war, the British will be able to provide one of these.
6 submarines (SS)
Tanker Force
8 escorts (DE) Victorious is counted as a United States unit.

Since then four additional escort carriers have been transferred to Great Britain. Further, major operations in the Central Pacific involving extensive use of naval forces will probably prevent these forces from becoming available for Burma operations in February, 1944.


8. General requirements for the escorts for the specific strategic operations projected in this paper can be met from our combined resources without unduly weakening the convoy escorts and support groups required for the existing convoy system, except as noted in paragraph 4. Additional escorts required for the north Russian convoys, should they be resumed, and for any necessary adjustments in existing convoy cycles can, however, only be met from new construction and a reduction in the number of support groups employed.

Naval personnel—General.

9. The accepted general policy is that landing craft will be manned and maintained by personnel from the nation supplying the forces engaged in the operation unless specifically arranged otherwise.

Naval personnel—British.

10. On the assumption that the manpower proposals now before the War Cabinet are approved, the British naval personnel for the approved operations will be found, although, in order to meet the Overlord requirements, it will be necessary temporarily to close certain schools and establishments. Personnel due to be returned from the Mediterranean for Overlord , or to proceed to India, must do so and cannot be held for the offensive operations against Southern France, which requirement must be met from those remaining on the station.

11. No additional operational requirements for British naval personnel, over and above that at present planned up to 1 May 1944, can be met, except at the expense of some other operation or undertaking.

Naval personnel—American.

12. Personnel for approved operations and maintenance of craft therefor can be provided. This involves a commitment over and above [Page 1144] those agreed to at Trident , to provide for Overlord 135 officers and 1511 men to man certain support craft involved in the U.S. part of the operation.

Annex IV

Provision of Air Forces

The following appendices show the resources available to us for the various operations:
  • Appendix “A”—Combined Bomber Offensive from U.K. and Cross-Channel Operation Overlord .16
  • Appendix “B”—Operations from the Mediterranean.17
  • Appendix “C”—Operations in Southeast Asia.18
  • Appendix “D”—Operations in the Pacific.19
  • Appendix “E”—Support of Resistance Groups in Europe and Balkans.
  • Appendix “F”—Air Operations in and from China.
The group or squadron strength as measured in terms of unit equipment (U.E.) does not provide an exact measure of air force strength. Ability to endure prolonged periods of heavy combat activity is measured by the adequacy of reserves of airplanes and crews. The reserve airplanes are not included in the strength data as the percentage held in reserve varies with intensity of activity and with other factors.
The tactical role formerly assigned to dive bombers has been largely taken over by the fighter-bomber in the land-based air forces. [Page 1145] Since the fighter is readily transposable to the fighter-bomber, it has been necessary to combine day fighter and fighter-bomber strengths.
Appendix E to Annex IV

Support of Resistance Groups in Europe and Balkans

1. The following British aircraft are allocated to the support of resistance groups in Europe and the Balkans:

Heavy Bombers Miscl. Aircraft
U.K. Bases 22 14
Med. Bases 36

2. No further heavy bomber aircraft can be allocated for this purpose without retarding the rate of build-up of heavy bomber squadrons in British Bomber Command.

3. Priority for aircraft has recently been given to the support of resistance groups in Greece and the Balkans.

4. Further assistance can therefore only be given to resistance groups in Europe at the expense of the Bomber Offensive, or the support of guerrilla forces in Greece and the Balkans.

5. Due to their special role in the Combined Bomber Offensive the heavily armed high altitude day bomber types used by the U.S. Army Air Force are not suitable or available for night operations in support of guerrilla forces.

Appendix F to Annex IV

Air Operations in and From China

The 14th Air Force in China has a strength, as of 23 August 1943, of one (1) heavy bomber group (35 U.E.), one (1) medium bomber squadron (13 U.E.) and five (5) fighter squadron[s] (125 U.E.). If logistical considerations permit, the U.S. fighter force in China will be expanded to thirteen squadron[s] (325 U.E.) by March, 1944. The medium bomber strength will be augmented to one group (57 U.E.) by 1 January 1944.
The Chinese Air Force will have, by 1 January 1944, four medium bomber squadrons (40 U.E.) and 10 fighter squadrons (100 U.E.). The fighter force will be expanded in 1944 to 20 squadrons (200 U.E.).
The Air Transport Command has, as of 23 August 1943, available in India sufficient aircraft to lift tonnage to China at the rate of 7,000 tons per month.
The provision of base facilities and refueling facilities in Assam Province are at present the major factors restricting the flow of material [Page 1146] to China. It is anticipated that the monthly lift to China will be increased to 10,000 tons per month by November, 1943. Further expansion of the Air Transport facilities into China is under consideration.
Annex V

Assault Shipping and Craft

General situation

1. See Appendix “A”20 for the allocations and estimated availability of British landing ships and craft to 1 January 1945, and Appendix “B” giving the same information for U.S. landing ships and craft. The quantity and rate of new production are shown in the Appendices. Appendix “C” contains the casualty rates and serviceability factors used for planning purposes.

2. The present position in landing ships and craft is such that there is everywhere a deficit of landing craft. Operations are limited in many cases solely by the lack of these vessels.

3. Studies are under way which it is hoped will increase the rate of U.S. landing craft production. However, the result of these studies at the present time indicates that such an acceleration cannot be felt before April 1944. Similar efforts should be made in the U.K. to improve the situation for Overlord , the Mediterranean and later to prosecute the war in the Far East. The British have indicated that there may be difficulty in manning amphibious craft in additional numbers.

future operations in the Mediterranean in connection with overlord

4. The assault ships and craft now in the Mediterranean are all that can be provided for immediate post- Husky operations in that theater.

5. In accordance with the guiding principle that, “as between operation Overlord and operations in the Mediterranean, where there is a shortage of resources, available resources will be distributed and employed with the main object of insuring the success of Overlord ,” future operations in the Mediterranean should not be allowed to encroach upon the assault craft planned at Trident to be withdrawn from the Mediterranean for Overlord . Production both in the U.S. and U.K. together with the necessities in other theaters will permit Overlord to be satisfactorily mounted by 1 May 1944 only if these Mediterranean ships and craft are used. The Tables of Appendices [Page 1147] “A” and “B” indicate the numbers and types of the U.S. and British ships and craft so involved as well as the scheduling of their delivery to U.K. The numbers are substantially the same as at Trident . It may be necessary to move 15 additional LCT(5), or their equivalent LCT lift, from the Mediterranean to Overlord .

6. Bad weather likely to be encountered off the Bay of Biscay after November, together with the need for the early formation and training of the assault forces for Overlord makes it requisite that landing craft sent from the Mediterranean for Overlord be sent as soon as practicable and, in the case of British LCT types, not later than early November.

7. The combat loaders should be released as follows:

U.S. APA’s and AKA’s and AGC—as soon after immediate post- Husky operations as possible, and after a refit in U.S., to be utilized for training and participation in Overlord .

British LSI(L)’s—as soon after immediate post- Husky as possible for normal troop movements, principally to increase the Bolero lift.

British LSH—as soon after immediate post-HusKY operations as possible, for Overlord .

8. a. The nature of the assault on southern France in order to create a diversion in connection with Overlord is not known, as no definite plan has been formulated. The losses of landing ships and craft in Husky were much smaller than estimated at Trident . Excluding planned withdrawals from the Mediterranean to Overlord and Bull-frog, it is estimated that there should be left available in the Mediterranean by 1 May 1944 sufficient assault ships and craft to mount approximately 27,000 troops and 1,500 vehicles. The ships and craft shown do not provide a balanced assault lift (See Appendices “A” and “B”) and the lift is not great. However, any operations that may be planned are to be planned with the resources shown as available herein. Augmentation is not considered practicable without drawing from Overlord . The British LSI(L)’s available for operations against southern France should be on station by 1 March 1944.

b. In order to provide for carrying the small ship-borne landing craft which will be used in the Mediterranean the U.S. LST’s to remain there should be the ones having davits.


9. The assault shipping and craft indicated as available for Overlord in Appendices “A” and “B” are the same as at Trident with very minor exceptions. Landing craft destined for Overlord will arrive in time for the operation, though the complete allotment of some types [Page 1148] from the United States will not arrive as early as desired by COSSAC. This, however, cannot be improved.


10. a. Three LSI(L) with their landing craft and one LSC have already been ordered to sail from the Mediterranean for India. One LSH, one LSI(H) and the remaining six LSI(L) with their landing craft, should be sailed so as to arrive in India by 15 November 1943. The ten U.S. and eight British LST for the operation are now on passage from the U.S. to India.

b. All the landing ships and craft requested by General Auchinleck for this operation will be available with the exception of 12 LCG(L) and 9 LCT(5).

c. The provision of LSP is dealt with in Annex VII.

d. The LSI(L) should be released immediately after the operation so as to be employed for trooping movements if not required for further operations.

Pacific Operations

11. Broad estimates of over-all requirements of assault shipping and landing craft for the campaign against Japan indicate deficiencies in certain types, particularly APA’s, LST’s, and LSD’s.

12. The small U.S. APA’s and AKA’s now authorized and building by the Maritime Commission will be required in the early future and their completion is a matter of urgency. The Maritime Commission has been advised in this matter. In addition, others will be required to insure the speed of the advance across the Pacific toward Japan.

13. It is anticipated that the major British and U.S. landing ships and craft surviving Overlord can be made available to leave the European Theater in September 1944 for use in the Pacific and southeast Asia.


14. a. There will be sufficient landing ships and craft for approved operations in 1943 and until the summer of 1944. Landing ships and craft will, however, be the bottleneck limiting the full scope of assault in the approved operations, both in the Pacific and the Atlantic.

Appendices “A” and “B” of Annex V are made out on the assumption that landing craft will be sent from the Mediterranean to Overlord so as to arrive by 15 December 1943, and assault ships by 1 March 1944.

b. In order to provide sufficient landing craft after the summer of 1944, an acceleration and increase in the present British and U.S. assault shipping and landing craft programs is necessary.

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Annex VI

Availability of Critical Supply and Construction Items


In general, the United Nations will be able to provide the critical supply and construction items for the specific operations projected except as indicated hereafter. In the absence of detailed plans of operations and specific lists of equipment and supply requirements, a more definite statement is not justified.

Overall shortages of radar and radio equipment are rapidly being eliminated. Adequate distribution of these items to U.S. Army Air Forces will be made by the end of September, 1943. All requirements will be met by June, 1944.
Certain items of equipment, notably special Air Forces vehicles, heavy trucks, two and one-half ton amphibious trucks (DUKWs), landing vehicle tracked (L.V.T. II and L.V.T.(A)II), portable gasoline-driven generators, and cargo-handling equipment, are now short and must be expected to continue short for several months. Demands for these items are increasingly heavy and production is not yet sufficient to meet all requirements. The United States production of N.L. pontoon equipment may fall short of additional requirements and is, in any case, uneconomical of shipping. Urgent steps must therefore be taken to start production outside the United States.

i—use of the azores islands

1. Requirements can be met, subject to the limitations indicated in general paragraphs above.

ii—operations in europe

Operation “ Pointblank ” and other air operations in Europe

1. Requirements are being met, subject to limitations indicated in the general paragraphs above.

Support of resistance groups in Europe

2. Requirements can be met.

Operation “ Overlord

3. Requirements can be met. However, the low rate of troop movements to the U.K. during the spring and summer of 1943 has forced a high rate of movement during the fall and winter of 1943–1944. Limitations of cargo shipping and U.K. port capacity have necessitated preshipment of equipment for units scheduled to move from August 1943 to May 1944. A balance will be reached only about 1 May 1944. Preshipment has been accomplished by reducing certain equipment of units in training in the United States and depot stocks of [Page 1150] these items to dangerously low levels. Should it become necessary to divert to some other theater U.S. air and ground units now destined for Overlord , part of the equipment for such units could only be made available by withdrawal from the United Kingdom.

4. Amphibious training facilities as required by the over-all plan are being provided to meet the arrival of landing craft.

5. The plans for establishment of the artificial harbors required by Overlord operations are being made the matter of thorough investigation and it is anticipated that means can be provided to meet the requirements. Consideration and all possible action is necessary to move pontoon drydocks and equipment in amounts comparable to landing craft transferred from the Mediterranean to Overlord .

Operations in the Mediterranean

6. Since these operations are to be executed with the means now available in the Mediterranean, the only supply requirement (other than the completion of the equipment of the French forces) will be maintenance. Naval logistic requirements are either in the area or have been provided for.

iii—operations in the pacific and far east theater

Operations in India-Burma–China

1. Requirements insofar as they are known, can be met. Additional requirements are expected and it is probable that they can be met, subject to the limitations indicated in the general paragraphs, above.

Operations in the Pacific

2. Requirements are being met.

iv—other undertakings


1. Insofar as they are known, requirements can be met, subject to the limitations indicated in the general paragraphs, above.

Rearming and reequipping of French forces in North Africa

2. Equipment for 11 French divisions and the supporting troops in North Africa can be provided by 31 December 1943.

v—projected requirements for amphibious operations

The range and speed of contemplated amphibious operations indicate heavy future requirements for amphibious vehicles and auxiliary servicing ships of all types. The provision of these vehicles and ships together with the development of new types requires urgent consideration. Such action has already been initiated as regards U.S. development and production of two and one-half ton amphibious trucks (DUKWs).

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Annex VII


part i [—] british dry cargo shipping requirements 21

1. British Military Cargo Shipping Requirements for the last four months of 1943 and the first half of 1944 have been reexamined in the light of the revised strategy, agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

These requirements are now as follows:

[Paragraph 2 contains two tables summarizing required monthly sailings in 1943 and 1944 for the maintenance and build-up of British forces overseas.]

3. In addition shipping will be required for allied operational purposes as follows:

(a) Priceless . The shipping required for Avalanche now amounts to 126 vessels. It is probable that these will be required to be retained until December, a smaller number, say 100, until February-March and thereafter about 50 for operations in the South of France and other Mediterranean movement. In addition, the Coaster Fleet in the Mediterranean will need to be retained indefinitely for internal maintenance.

(b) Overlord . Requirements in the initial stages will be 100 oceangoing ships and approximately 200 Coasters for the carriage of M.T. vehicles and a further 200 Coasters for the carriage of stores.

Subsequently the majority of the Coasters will be progressively released but the stores lift will require tonnage of small ocean-going and large Coaster type up to a maximum of the order of 500,000 tons deadweight.

In addition, there may be a requirement for block ships for the construction of “Synthetic Ports” and it is possible that up to 50 vessels of some 450 feet length by 45 feet height keel to deck might be involved.

(c) Bullfrog . According to the present plan 21 M.T. ships will be required from January to April inclusive and thereafter approximately five ships monthly will require to be loaded within the Indian Ocean area on account of maintenance.

(d) Alacrity and Oatmeal . Operation Alacrity will require three ships to sail towards the end of September but thereafter maintenance requirements will be extremely small. Oatmeal will require the sailing of 17 vessels for one voyage in September–October.

[Page 1152]

part ii[—]availability of british controlled dry cargo tonnage (1600 g.r.t. & over)

[Paragraph 5 forecasts a deficit of 3.1 million deadweight tons for the second half of 1943 and a deficit of 3.2 million deadweight tons for the first half of 1944.]

6. After allowing for imports in certain bare boat chartered ships and for 1,500 tons average in each scheduled Bolero sailing, the deficits in tonnage shown above are equivalent to:

384 sailings in the last 4 months of 1943, 488 sailings in the first half of 1944.

These are allowed for in the U.S. statement in Part III.

7. No provision has been made for:

Shipment of coal to Italy. It is anticipated, however, that Italian shipping will contribute substantially towards this commitment.
Additional civil commitments to Portugal.
Possible provision of “blockships” for Overlord . This commitment is indefinite but is already the subject of urgent investigation under the direction of C.O.S.S.A.C.

part iii[—]u.s. cargo shipping position

The requirements listed in the following summary include those expressed in paragraph 6 of Part II of this Annex, and in addition incorporate 50 ships for operation Priceless and 80 MT ships for operation Overlord , being the balance required after those to be provided from British controlled tonnage.

Summary of Requirements for U.S. Cargo Shipping in Terms of Sailings

1943 1944
Requirement Sept. 4th Qtr. 1st Qtr. 2d Qtr.
(15) Total requirements 541 1,768 1,684 1,606
(16) Total available 549 1,731 1,905 1,982
(17) Balance +8 -37 +221 +376

Note: a. The foregoing is based on the assumption that each Bolero cargo ship will lift approximately 1,500 tons of British import cargo and on the other hand the equivalent of 12 shiploads of measurement cargo on Bolero account will be lifted monthly in U.K. import vessels.

b. See comments by Mr. L. W. Douglas and Lord Leathers below.22

[Page 1153]

Comments by Mr. L. W. Douglas and Lord Leathers on the Dry Cargo Shipping Position
(Circulated as C.C.S. 329/1)

In May we pointed out that the deficiencies in shipping resources available to meet the estimated requirements during the last half of 1943 were susceptible of being satisfactorily managed. This appears to have been the case, though the last four months of this year indicate a tight position.

Now we believe that the suggested surpluses in the first half of 1944 do not reflect the real situation, first, because planned operations may impose heavier burdens on our resources than are now contemplated and, secondly, because the war requirements have not been fully submitted. This is emphasized by the fact that the estimated number of sailings required during each of the first and second quarters of 1944 is substantially less than during the last quarter of 1943.

We feel it necessary to add this comment lest the figures give rise to misleading interpretations.

L. W. Douglas Leathers

part iv [—]personnel shipping position


1. In examining the British personnel shipping resources and determining their optimum deployment, the following assumptions have been made:—

That known operational requirements will be as in a of Table I attached23 and, for purposes of calculating the British aid to U.S. troop movements have been counted against British resources.
That British personnel will be required to carry out troop movements, other than operational, as scheduled in b of Table I attached.
That losses of escorted class of troopships during the period under consideration (September 1943–June 1944) will offset additions to the escorted troopship fleet, and that about seven percent of the escorted troopship fleet is permanently immobilized for repairs and refits. Losses of unescorted troopships cannot be made good by new construction, and the calculations have been made on a basis of no losses in this class.
That personnel movement to Mediterranean and Indian Ocean destinations and to South and East Africa is carried out through the Mediterranean on a monthly convoy cycle and that this and other troop convoy cycles remain as at present.
That the available British controlled personnel shipping in the Indian Ocean is capable of meeting local requirements (except for certain operational requirements) in that theater.
That troopships fitted for assault loading (LSI(L) and LSP) will be released to troop movement on conclusion of operations to which they are now assigned.
That the C.I.B. cargo ships which are being converted to LSI(L) in the U.S.A. will only be available for troop movement during their delivery voyage to the U.K. and thereafter will be used entirely on operations.
That the number of troopships in escorted Bolero Sickle convoys may be increased to 30 ships if circumstances permit.

2. The Bolero Sickle movement program during the period September 1943 to April 1944 makes demands on the fast unescorted class which are so exacting that there is no margin for contingencies.

3. Table II attached shows the extent of the assistance which it is estimated that British personnnel shipping can provide towards the movement of U.S. troops on the following routes:—

U.S.A. to United Kingdom ( Bolero - Sickle movement)
Iceland to United Kingdom (one division)
North Africa to United Kingdom (equivalent of one division)
U.S.A. to North Africa
U.S.A. to India (transhipping in North Africa)
U.S.A. to South or Southwest Pacific

Ship operating requirements may cause fluctuations in the movements scheduled for each month.

United States

4. The deployment of U.S. personnel shipping, and of British personnel shipping which is estimated to be available for the movement of U.S. troops, is shown in Table III. It should be noted that Table III indicates capabilities under the distribution of troop lift assumed in this paper. A comparison of capabilities with forecast requirements shows the following general position:

a. Joint Army and Navy Requirements in Pacific.

Troop lift available in September will not eliminate the large backlog presently existing, but beginning in October, transport capacity will be available to meet monthly requirements and substantially to reduce this backlog. The tabulation below summarizes this situation.

Central. South and Southwest Pacific
September 4th Quarter 1st Quarter 2nd Quarter
1943 1944
Cumulative Deficit 56,500 24,900 14,400 700
[Page 1155]

b. Build-up of U.S. Forces in U.K.

The requirement for a balanced force of approximately 1,416,000 U.S. Troops, including 19 divisions, in the U.K. by May 1944 can be met if the expectations over the period are realized. It is estimated that 14 U.S. divisions will be operationally available on 1 May 1944.
The build-up of U.S. forces includes the transfer of 4 divisions from the Mediterranean area in November 1943, and of 1 division from Iceland in August 1943.
The limitations on cargo reception in the U.K. during May, June and July 1944 will restrict build-up to two, one, and one divisions in the respective months. There is an indicated surplus of troop shipping in the Atlantic during the period between mounting date of Overlord and the date on which movements can be made direct into continental ports.

c. Mediterranean Requirements.

Troop capacity to this area after August 1943 is based on replacement requirements.
U.S. personnel shipping (2 XAP’s) now in the Mediterranean is scheduled to augment the U.K. build-up program beginning in January 1944.

d. China–Burma–India.

The requirements for this area can be met.

e. Alaska.

The requirements for this area can be met.

f. Other Areas—Including Newfoundland, Greenland, Bermuda, Iceland, West and Central Africa, Caribbean and South Atlantic, Middle East and Persian Gulf.

Troop movements to these areas represent a very small proportion of the total and consist almost wholly of replacements. Total strengths show a gradual reduction.


5. Active examination is being made of measures to provide some margin for contingencies in this very tight program of United Nations troopship operation which the basic strategy during the period September 1943–June 1944 demands.

6. It is pointed out that the early arrival of certain Port, Depot and Engineer units is essential if the maximum quantity of Bolero Sickle cargo is to be handled, and high priority must be given to the dispatch of these troops in the Bolero Sickle convoys.

part v [—]conclusions

The presently estimated required troop lift in the Atlantic and India areas will be met within the prescribed period of time, but in [Page 1156] the Pacific there is a deficiency which will be substantially reduced at the end of this year.

To achieve this result and to have a reserve against contingencies will impose a heavy strain on troop transports. After 1 May 1944 there appears to be, according to present calculations, an easing of this strain.

The combined cargo shipping position indicates a deficit of 29 sailings during the last four months of this year, and a surplus during the first half of 1944.

This deficit, if handled with full cooperation among the various demanders, can be covered, but even so, it indicates a tight position throughout the period.

Annex VIII



1. Estimates have been made of service demands of petroleum products to implement the specifically agreed Quadrant decisions. While there has been no opportunity to make a combined final and detailed survey of refinery capacities and crude oil availability it is our judgment that adequate facilities exist, or are in process, or can be made ready in time to meet Quadrant decisions requirements, with the exception of high grade aviation gasoline (100 octane or higher).

These estimates include essential civilian requirements.

100 octane aviation gasoline

2. The critical petroleum item is 100 octane aviation gasoline. The total production of this grade of fuel is now being consumed and requests for allocations are far greater than can be met from production at the present time. Anticipated increase in production is offset by correspondingly increased requirements in the various theaters.

3. Based on current estimates there will be a daily world-wide shortage of 68,000 barrels during September 1943. This shortage decreases progressively until the first quarter 1944 when it is estimated that shortage will average 6,492 barrels per day. Requirements then increase over production until the end of 1944 when production fails to meet requirements by a total of 53,586 barrels per day.

4. The only apparent solution to this problem is priority of allocation to the theaters prescribed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and the substitution to the fullest degree of lower grades of aviation gasoline for training and other purposes until the new manufacturing program is more nearly in balance with requirements.

[Page 1157]

5. The Army and Navy Petroleum Board, acting through a staff of officers assigned to it by the U.S. Army and Navy, have taken steps to expedite to the maximum extent possible the completion of the aviation gasoline manufacturing program. The responsibility for this program rests with the Petroleum Administration for War and the joint service activities above mentioned are carried out in cooperation with that organization.


6. Existing large seagoing tankers plus conservative estimate of deliveries from new construction over the next several months will meet requirements for bulk movements of petroleum to areas of consumption.

7. In all theaters there is a very real need for smaller tankers, particularly where necessary to supply newly established beachheads and bases, as for operations in the Pacific, Southeast Asia, Overlord and the Mediterranean. They are particularly important for operations in the Pacific, and in addition are being requested in increasing numbers in the United Kingdom and the Mediterranean. Steps are now being taken to determine requirements. Such as cannot be supplied from present building programs will be requested in new construction.

Pipeline in Southeast Asia

8. The construction of the pipeline through Burma, and later into China, will greatly facilitate the delivery of petroleum products to allied forces in those areas. The ocean terminus of the pipeline will be served by an adequate battery of tanks to be erected, and these in turn will receive their deliveries from tankers, the supply for which is being planned.

  1. As amended and approved at the 116th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, held at Quebec, August 24, 1943. See ante, p. 963. Circulated under cover of a note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 329/2), August 26, 1943. The changes in the original report by the Combined Staff Planners (C.C.S. 329, August 24, 1943) made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff during their 116th Meeting are described in the footnotes, below.
  2. The estimates referred to were in C.C.S. 244/1, annex in, not printed.
  3. This note was added to C.C.S. 329 by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
  4. In C.C.S. 329 the heading before paragraph 8 read “Operations Pointbank and Overlord ”.
  5. i.e., appendix D to annex iv; not printed. See post, p. 1144, fn. 19.
  6. i.e., appendix B to annex iv; not printed. See post, p. 1144, fn. 17.
  7. In C.C.S. 329 the heading “Operations in Support of Resistance Groups” appeared before paragraph 9.
  8. In C.C.S. 329 this sentence began: “The extent of these operations”.
  9. This sentence was underscored in C.C.S. 329.
  10. In C.C.S. 329 the heading “Air Operations in and from China” appeared before paragraph 10.
  11. Not printed.
  12. C.C.S. 329 read: “will be met by the beginning of 1944”.
  13. This paragraph was added to C.C.S. 329 by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
  14. See paragraph d, C.C.S. 322/1. [Footnote in the source text. The paper referred to, entitled “Policy Towards Turkey”, August 30 (sic), 1943, is not printed as such, but is identical in substance with paragraph 62 of C.C.S. 319/5, ante, p. 1131, except that it begins, “The British Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion”.]
  15. Includes one airborne division. [Footnote in the source text.]
  16. Includes on[e] F[ree] F[rench] division. [Footnote in the source text.]
  17. The garrison commitment in N. Africa will be filled by French Divisions in training. [Footnote in the source text]
  18. Includes one airborne division. [Footnote in the source text.]
  19. Includes one airborne division. [Footnote in the source text.]
  20. 2 additional divisions as reserve will be held in India. [Footnote in the source text.]
  21. In C.C.S. 329 this heading read “The Capture of Akyab–Ramree”.
  22. This note was added to C.C.S. 329 by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
  23. Not printed. Paragraph 5 of appendix A contained the following “Conclusion on Availability of Forces”:

    “There will be sufficient forces available for the Combined Bomber Offensive, and for Overlord , with the exception of 270 transport aircraft.

    “Consideration is being given to the transfer of four additional troop carrier groups (208 airplanes U.E.) from the Mediterranean to United Kingdom for Operation Overlord . If accomplished, this action will leave a deficit of 62 troop carrier transport aircraft against the requirement for 1,004 transports.”

  24. Not printed. This appendix indicated that aircraft in excess of the Trident plans would be available in the Mediterranean area as of October 1, 1943.
  25. Not printed. This appendix indicated that 23 squadrons in excess of the Trident plans would be available for Southeast Asia operations as of February 1944.
  26. Not printed. This appendix indicated that (1) aircraft allocated as of January 1, 1944, would be sufficient to carry out the planned operation in the New Guinea-Bismarck-Admiralty Islands area subsequent to Cartwheel in the period to September 1, 1944; (2) a deficiency was anticipated for operations in New Guinea subsequent to the Wewak–Kavieng operation unless Germany were defeated in time to permit the deployment of some of the heavier types of aircraft; (3) the addition of one heavy bomber group and one medium bomber group would be necessary to carry out planned operations in the Gilbert and Marshall Islands; (4) sufficient aircraft would be available for the Ponape operation, assuming that the additions referred to under 3 above could be found; (5) additional forces might be required for the Caroline Islands (Truk) operation; and (6) requirements for the Palau Islands operation could not yet be determined.
  27. The appendices to annex v are not printed. See Coakley and Leighton, pp. 212–214.
  28. In C.C.S. 329 this heading read “Dry Cargo Shipping Requirements in British Strategic Areas”.
  29. This paragraph and the following Douglas-Leathers memorandum were added to C.C.S. 329 by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Douglas-Leathers memorandum had been circulated separately as C.C.S. 329/1, “Comments on the Dry Cargo Shipping Position (Annex vii, Part 3, C.C.S. 329)”, August 24, 1943. Cf. Coakley and Leighton, p. 216.
  30. Concerning table iii to part iv of annex vii, see Coakley and Leighton, p. 220. The other tables referred to in this part are not printed.