Foreign Relations of the United States, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943

PR 10 “Foreign Relations of U.S.”/9–1069

The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to the Secretary of State ¹

[Quebec, August 23, 1943.]

In December 1941 Stalin informed the Foreign Secretary that he regarded the question of U.S.S.R.’s western frontiers as “the main question for us in the war.”

Stalin during the Foreign Secretary’s visit to Moscow in 1941, Molotov in London in 1942 and Maisky speaking to the Foreign Secretary in March 1943,² have all said that Curzon Line³ with minor modifications would be satisfactory basis for frontier settlement.

Neither His Majesty’s Government nor, so far as we are aware, United States Government, have indicated to Soviet Government what their views on this question are. We have little doubt, however, that the Soviet Government would be much easier to deal with on Polish and other matters if His Majesty’s Government and United States Government could let them know that we are prepared in practice to contemplate a substantial measure of satisfaction on what we understand Soviet territorial claims to be, while not abandoning our principle of not recognising during the war any territorial changes.

His Majesty’s Government consider that an equitable solution of Russian claims would be something on the following lines: (a) Poland to receive in the west Danzig, East Prussia and Upper Silesia, and to be content in the east with the Curzon Line adjusted to include city of Lwów in Poland. (b) Other frontiers.—Eventual recognition of Russia’s 1941 frontiers with Finland and Roumania, and of Soviet sovereignty over the Baltic States.

If the views of the United States Government do not differ radically from the above, there might be a basis for a joint intimation of our views to Soviet Government, in the course of any discussion with them of the general post-war settlement. His Majesty’s Government wish to consider advisability of such action now because:—

(a) Recent exchanges of personal telegrams between the Prime Minister and Stalin show that the latter desires closer consultation on future operations.⁴ This is natural now that we are embarked on operations in Europe which are likely soon to affect south-eastern Europe more or less directly. The views of Soviet Government will have to be taken into consideration and their attitude is likely to be suspicious and uncooperative unless they get some reassurances upon this “main question” of frontiers.

(b) When some time ago His Majesty’s Ambassador in Moscow⁵ broached with M. Molotov the question of the Soviet attitude to postwar questions in Germany, he received a definite indication that the Soviet Government wished to discuss such matters with His Majesty’s Government and United States Government, with a view to reaching firm agreement. The matter has not been pursued pending discussion with United States Government, but if we want to break down Soviet suspicions and get into real contact with them on major matters we think it unwise to leave discussions further in suspense. The organisation of a Free German Movement⁶ is an added reason for resuming discussions.

We for our part would not wish to announce formally any understanding that might be reached with the Soviet on these lines, and we should also ask them to keep it to themselves until such time as it could be presented as part of a general territorial settlement.

We must face the fact that, if we do proceed thus, we cannot be certain that publicity will not be given to the facts either from the Soviet or the Polish side.

There could, of course, be no intention of giving the Soviet Government satisfaction on the point of frontiers unless they, on their side, are willing to play a useful part in post-war organisation as we conceive it. But it is so certain that the Russians will raise this point if we get into discussion that it seems essential that we should know how we propose to deal with it.

There could, of course, be no question at this stage of any agreement written or unwritten with the Soviet Government on frontier question. This would be contrary to the assurances we gave Poland in 1941 when the Soviet Polish Treaty⁷ was signed and again in 1942 at time of the negotiations for an Anglo-Soviet treaty.⁸ We should therefore propose to inform the Polish Government that in our view no final settlement of Polish-Soviet difficulties can be found so long as there is no agreement on the frontier question. This question will have to be solved sooner or later. It could be left until the Soviet armies re-enter Polish territory, but it is our belief that a satisfactory solution would then be all the harder to obtain. We and the United States Government would propose therefore to approach the Soviet Government in the matter and discuss it with them.

It is probable that the Soviet Government would agree to something on the lines of paragraph 3 (a) above.⁹ We know that it is difficult, maybe impossible, for this or any Polish Government, during the course of the war, to accept any surrender of former Polish territory. But it might perhaps help them if the United States and United Kingdom Governments were to recommend to them such a solution, conditional on Poland receiving the compensation indicated.

1. Not found in United States files; printed from a copy obtained by the editors from the British Foreign Office. Although the source text is undated and unsigned, this paper was identified by the Foreign Office as the note which Eden gave to Hull during their meeting at Quebec on August 23, 1943. See ante, p. 949.
2. For further details of Anglo-Soviet discussions of the Polish-Soviet boundary on the three occasions referred to, see Eden, pp. 335, 380–381, 429–430.
3. For the origin and a description of the Curzon Line, see Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xiii, pp. 793–794.
4. See particularly Stalin’s message to Churchill of June 24, 1943, printed in Stalin’s Correspondence, vol. i, pp. 136–138.
5. Sir Archibald Clark Kerr.
6. Concerning the Free Germany Committee, founded at Moscow on July 12, 1943, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. iii, pp. 552, 571–574.
7. Signed at London, July 30, 1941. See Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, pp. 243–245.
8. Signed at London, May 26, 1942. For text, see British and Foreign State Papers, vol. cxliv, p. 1038.
9. i.e., clause a of paragraph 4 above as the paragraphing is arranged in the source text.