Foreign Relations of the United States, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943

Department of the Army Files: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters ( Eisenhower ) to the Chief of Staff, United States Army ( Marshall )¹

secret

Algiers , 21 August 1943.

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9. General statements made as follows:²

a. Estimated Germany would require some 15 Divisions for occupation of Italy if Italian Troops cooperated. Possible more would be brought in. These likely be chiefly withdrawn from France. No permanent fortifications as yet on Genoa–Ravenna Line.

b. Best tactics for Allies would be to land in Leghorn area between Grosetto and Spezia. German lines of communication into Italy particularly via Brenner [Pass] extremely vulnerable and should be attacked by Allies.

c. Germans intended defend Sardinia and Corsica. Italian Forces to be withdrawn from Corsica but not Sardinia.

d. 2 Italian Divisions recently sent North Italy to offset occupation of Brenner area by Germans. Had been no actual fighting as result of this but firm attitude of Italians had caused Germans to hesitate in number of their actions. (AGWar personal for Marshall from Eisenhower repeated Combined Chiefs of Staff ( Kkad ) repeated Troopers personal for DMI USFor pass to Troopers . From Strong from G–2 Freedom signed Eisenhower cite fhgbi ).

e. Strength of German Military Personnel in Italy estimated at 400,000.

f. Genoa–Ravenna Line would be extremely difficult to penetrate owing hilly nature of country and narrow roads.

g. Conference on 14 August held at Bologna at which General Roatta, Field Marshal Rommel and General Jodl present. Plans for defence of Italy discussed. These included return of Italian troops from France, Slovenia and North Croatia. Final result discussions not known.

h. Italian Army short of gasoline and entirely dependent on Germany for this. Italy would require supplies of wheat and coal if Germany ceases to provide. Italian Army short of many types of weapons especially anti tank guns, anti tank ammunition and boots.

i. Italian Fleet had only sufficient fuel oil for one main fleet action. Mussolini was responsible for stopping Italian Fleet putting to sea on several occasions in order to have it to counter any attack on Italian Peninsula. Germans informed Italians that submarine warfare was to be put on completely new basis which they thought would have considerable success. No details disclosed.

j. Italian Air Force very short of material but fighter element considered good. All Italian airfields except a few small ones in hands of Germans.

k. German policy towards Russia was to hold back reserves and adopt defensive policy in hope Russians would wear themselves out. Germans considered this might happen by spring 1944. German Divisions totalled 260 of which 50 to 60 in reserve. Up to December 1942 estimated German permanent casualties killed or wounded three million. Russian divisions numbered 320. Ribbentrop reckoned on Allied, especially American, war weariness increasing.

l. Ribbentrop has threatened that if Italy turned against Germany gas would be used against the country and most terrible vengeance would be exacted on Italian people as an example to remainder of Satellites.³ Italian people had no gas masks or protection against gas. Italian Army almost in same position. Hungary might follow Italian example but Roumania and Bulgaria less likely.

m. Allies could not look for collapse in German morale owing to Gestapo. Number of Generals desirous of getting rid of Hitler but this unlikely at present owing considerable loyalty towards him.

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1. Sent to the War Department at Washington as telegram No. W–7938/4256, Naf 335. The number of the message as sent to Quebec is not given on the source text. The extract printed here omits an account of the German order of battle as of August 12, 1943.
2. At the military discussions with Castellano held at Lisbon, referred to in Eisenhower’s telegram No. Naf 334, supra.
3. In telegram No. Naf 336 of August 22, 1943, addressed to Marshall, Eisenhower reported further on this subject: “In spite of arguments to contrary he [Castellano] appeared convinced that the German threat to use gas was real and that such a danger existed.” (Department of the Army Files)