Foreign Relations of the United States, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943
J.C.S. Files
Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff1
The following summary of recent correspondence with A.F.H.Q. North African Theater relating to post- Husky operations, has been made for the convenience of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in connection with the discussion on post- Husky operations tabled for the 113th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 20 August 1943.
J. R. Deane
Combined Secretariat
Summary of Messages Exchanged With Allied Force Headquarters
1. Naf 250 From General Eisenhower, Dated 30 June 1943
This message summarizes the operations following
Husky
that General Eisenhower considers to be possible
assuming that seven veteran divisions will be sent to the U.K.
In paragraph five he states: “In order to be in a position to
take advantage of whichever line of action shows itself more
likely to achieve my mission, I have arranged for planning to be
undertaken for:
2. Fan 165 From the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Dated 16 July 1943
“The strategic concept in your Naf 250 accepted for planning purposes. In addition, the Combined Chiefs of Staff wish to express their interest in the possibilities of a direct amphibious landing operation against Naples in lieu of an attack on Sardinia, if the indications regarding Italian resistance should make the risks involved worthwhile.”
3. Naf 265 From General Eisenhower, Dated 18 July 1943
The last paragraph is as follows: “In view of these considerations and assuming that substantial German reinforcement in Southern Italy has not taken place, I recommend carrying the war to the mainland of Italy immediately Sicily has been captured, and request very early approval in order that no time be lost in making preparation.”
4. Fan 169 From the Combined Chiefs of Staff to General Eisenhower, Dated 20 July 1943
“The recommendations contained in the last paragraph of your Naf 265 are approved, you should, however, extend your amphibious operations northward as far as shore-based fighter cover can be made effective.”
5. Fan 175 From the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Dated 26 July 1943
“With the object of expediting the elimination of Italy from the war, the Combined Chiefs of Staff consider you should plan forthwith [Page 1065] Avalanche to be mounted at the earliest possible date, using the resources already available to you for Priceless . …”2
6. Naf 303 From General Eisenhower, Dated 28 July 1943
“The air problem facing us in Avalanche is one of some difficulty, first, because of the distance from possible bases to provide cover for the initial assault and second, because of the increased effort required for neutralization of hostile air and disrupting lines of communications. Another difficulty arises because of the intensive air effort we have been maintaining for some weeks and the additional necessity for continuing this effort in a rapid clean-up of the Husky Operation. This clean-up is an essential preliminary to the Avalanche Operation in order to get necessary airfields and to have a reasonable bridgehead in the Buttress area in order that German reserves may not be, with immunity, rushed directly to the point of landing.”
7. Naf 307 From General Eisenhower, Dated 2 August 1943
This reads in part: “Yesterday I had a meeting with the three commanders in chief. Conclusions reached were in line with those reported following a similar conference of a week ago. We are positive that a lodgment must be made in the Buttress area before any bold stroke should be attempted such as Avalanche . On the other hand, our hope is that this lodgment can be made without employing troops otherwise available for Avalanche . If ad hoc crossing of Straits proves too difficult, and former landing operations in close support of that effort are forced upon us, then the Avalanche project must be delayed materially.…”2
8. Naf 318 From General Eisenhower, Dated 10 August 1943
This message reads in part: “Meeting of commanders in chief was held today in Tunis. General agreement to effect that every effort must be made to mount Avalanche with 10th Corps so equipped with landing craft that it can be used either on that operation or on Buttress if latter proves to be necessary. Every effort must be made to establish a bridgehead on Toe employing only troops and means now in Sicily. Agreed that we should avoid, if humanly possible, penning up sizeable forces in Toe where they could be rather easily contained, particularly since to do so would practically eliminate any chance of Avalanche type of operation this year. This is because of necessary use of landing craft in maintaining over beaches the troops we would have in Toe.”
From the above, it appears that General Eisenhower has been given definite authority to operate against the mainland of Italy with a [Page 1066] very distinct preference expressed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff for Operation Avalanche . General Eisenhower, on the other hand, has indicated that to do Avalanche , either Buttress or an ad hoc crossing of the Sicily troops to the Toe of Italy must be effected in order to provide shore-based air cover for Avalanche . This conception has at least the tacit approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
9. W6959 From General Bedell Smith to General Whiteley, Dated 10 August 1943
This signal gave information regarding Avalanche . Timing of all future operations must depend primarily upon date of completion of Sicilian campaign. All commanders were agreed that the establishment of considerable forces in Calabria would almost certainly result in stalemate being reached in Calabria this year, or at best, would permit only slow, laborious advance. Number of landing craft required would prevent any further amphibious operation this year on the scale of Avalanche . Two months from now weather conditions would prevent use of strips in Calabria and unless we could obtain all-weather airfields such as exist in Naples area, we should be unable to apply our air strength and would be unable to count upon the degree of air supremacy enjoyed up till now.
Previous conclusions confirmed that prior to Avalanche it was essential to obtain small bridgehead in Calabria in order to open Straits, hold German troops in Calabria and prevent them being employed in reinforcement of Avalanche area. Ability to do this and at the same time to launch Avalanche dependent entirely on serviceability of landing craft. Assessment being made of minimum landing craft requirements to see whether Baytown or Avalanche could be mounted at or about the same time. Risks of Avalanche fully appreciated, particularly in light of apparent German reinforcement of Italy. Considered, however, that prize to be gained makes considerable risk acceptable. By air action in meantime it might be possible to make Italian people force a policy of non-cooperation with Germany on present Italian Government and so make Avalanche easier. As circumstances at the time might prevent launching of Avalanche allocation of landing craft and loading of 10th Corps to proceed so that it could be employed either in Buttress or Avalanche . Following decisions therefore made:
To proceed with Avalanche preparations with target date 7 September.
Flexibility of 10th Corps and allocation of landing craft to be such that either Buttress or Avalanche could be launched.
8th Army to make every effort to seize bridgehead with resources of craft remaining after allocation to 10th Corps.
[Page 1067]Actual dates of operations to depend upon date of completion of Sicilian Battle.
Operations Barracuda and Goblet cancelled.
5th Corps to be in AFHQ reserve.
Air effort against communications in Italy to be maintained at highest possible level consistent with maintenance requirements.
10. W7323 From General Bedell Smith to General Whiteley, Dated 14 August 1943
Gave provisional figures of build-up dependent on:
- a.
- Whether Baytown – Avalanche mounted, or Baytown – Buttress mounted.
- b.
- Date of initial assault.
- c.
- Progress made on mainland.
- d.
- State of port of Naples when captured.
If German resistance in Calabria weakens and Baytown can be exploited, intention is for 8th Army to move into Calabria and advance north and east with a view to joining up with Avalanche forces and occupying Heel. Maximum number of divisions which can be maintained through Calabria is 6. Forces available for further build-up, if required: one U.S. division, ex Sicily; two French divisions; 5 corps of two or three divisions from Middle East; First and Sixth Armored Divisions; further French divisions. Assuming target date for Avalanche 7th September, it appeared that the following forces could be put on the mainland through Naples by 1st December. Either 6 divisions and tactical air force, or 5 divisions plus tactical and strategical air force. In addition 3 divisions through the Toe and possibly up to 3 further divisions by ferry service into Calabria from Sicily. Estimated rate of build-up after 1st December might be one Division per month. L.S.T.’s essential for the above build-up until at least 1st December. The above based on no shipping limitations.
11. W7445 From General Bedell Smith to General Whiteley, Dated 15th August 1943
Results of Avalanche and succeeding operations likely to depend upon build-up race between the Germans and ourselves. Once we can get a firm hold on the Naples Area we should be well placed but it is at least probable that thereafter we may have to fight our way slowly and painfully up Italy. The difficulty of amphibious and overland operations against Southern France should not be minimized. Desirable areas in Southern France for amphibious assault cannot be reached by shore-based single-engined fighters operating either from Northern Italy or Corsica. Ability to undertake amphibious operation therefore dependent on German air strength in Europe being so reduced or [Page 1068] otherwise committed that assault can take place under cover of carrier-borne or twin-engined fighters. Availability of land forces will depend upon defensive commitments in Northern Italy, which should not exceed a maximum of 10 divisions, and on our ability to equip and transport remainder of divisions then in Mediterranean. Estimate that 24 divisions will be available, of which perhaps not more than 16 will be fit for operations.
12. Naf 326, 16th August, From General Eisenhower
In spite of every effort, enemy is succeeding in evacuating much personnel and light equipment across the Straits. Crossing the Straits should be attempted by us as quickly as necessary supporting guns and supplies can be accumulated. Present indications as to date between September 1st and 4th, and for Avalanche target date September 9th. Since a 10 day interval between the two assaults would greatly alleviate difficulties in landing craft, we are straining every nerve to make the first assault on the earliest possible date.
13. From General Bedell Smith to General Whiteley, Dated 17 August 1943
Avalanche will be undertaken before next moonlight period and preceded at maximum interval by Baytown , which hoped to launch before end of August or early September. Target date Avalanche may be deferred till September 11th.