J. C. S. Files
Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes
1. Defeat of the Axis Powers
in Europe
(C.C.S. 237)2
(Previous Reference: C.C.S. 88th Meeting, Item 3)3
The Committee considered the draft resolutions contained in C.C.S. 237 and agreed to certain amendments which are incorporated below.
[Here follows text of C.C.S. 237/1, May 20, 1943, post, p. 281.]
(These resolutions to be subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 237/1.)
(At this point the Secretaries entered the meeting.)
2. Operations From Inoia
In reply to a question by Sir Charles Portal, Admiral Leahy said that he understood the term Anakim to mean operations in Burma and not to cover other operations based on India against such places as Sumatra or the Malayan Peninsula. The Chinese believed that they had received a firm promise that the British and Americans would, towards the end of 1943, undertake operations in Burma aimed at opening a road to China. He personally now accepted that the original operations which included the capture of Rangoon were impracticable, but he believed nevertheless that an operation to open a land route to China must be undertaken. This might take the form of attacking in North Burma with a view to capturing Mandalay and opening a route through Ledo, at the same time seizing Akyab and Ramree Island.
In reply to a question by Admiral Leahy, Sir Alan Brooke said that the Andaman Islands contained only one small air field and their capture, except as part of large scale operations, was not worth while.
3. Provision of Transport Aircraft for Huskt
Sir Charles Portal said that despite the additional aircraft promised there was still a deficiency of 80 transports for the new Husky plan. He had discussed the subject with General Smith who was most anxious that every possible step should be taken to provide them. If trained crews were the bottleneck the Royal Air Force could provide [Page 119] them. He suggested that this matter might be further discussed at a future meeting, say Friday, of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
General McNarney said that crews were not the limiting factor. The additional 80 aircraft required could only be provided at the expense of the South Pacific. He believed that if the air-borne troops visualized were essential to the success of the plan, these could all be dropped by using the same aircraft for two drops. He fully appreciated the timing of these drops would not be perfect, but was convinced that by this means all the air-borne troops required could be put across.
General Marshall said that the theater commander must be and had been backed to the limit but in this case the limit had been reached and the aircraft required were not available.
General McNarney agreed.