J.C.S. Files
Memorandum by the Chief of the British Air
Staff (Portal)1
most secret
Enclosure to C.C.S.
309
[
Quebec
,] 15 August 1943.
“
Pointblank
”
1. I annex an appreciation by Air Intelligence of the trend of
development and disposition of the German Fighter Force in relation
to “
Pointblank
”.
The salient points are:—
-
a.
- The German Fighter Force has increased by 22% since 1
January 1943.
-
b.
- Its strength on the Western Front has been doubled since
the same date.
-
c.
- The increase on the Western Front has absorbed the entire
expansion under a.
-
d.
- Fighter units and experienced fighter pilots have
nevertheless had to be withdrawn from the Mediterranean and
Russian Fronts as well, in spite of the critical situation
on those fronts.
-
e.
- In spite of the present strain on the German night
fighters they are being used by day to counter the deep
daylight penetration of “
Pointblank
” into Germany.
2. The build-up of the Eighth Bomber Command as required in the
“
Pointblank
” plan approved by the C.C.O.S. at
Trident
2 should
have been 1068 aircraft on the 15th August. The comparable figure of
the actual build-up achieved on that date was 921 (including 105
detached to North Africa).
3. The present strength of the G.A.F.
Fighter Force is 2260 aircraft in first line units compared with a
strength of 2000 which it was hoped would not be exceeded if “
Pointblank
” could have been executed as planned. Thus the G.A.F. Fighter Force is 13% stronger
than had been hoped, and this in spite of increased successes in
Russia and the Mediterranean which were not taken into account in
the “
Pointblank
” plan.
4. I do not set out the above information in order to make a
criticism of an inability to have achieved complete fulfillment of
“
Pointblank
”. My object is to bring out the fact that, in spite of some
shortfall in the build-up, Germany is now faced with imminent
disaster if only the pressure of “
Pointblank
” can be maintained and increased before the increase in the G.A.F. Fighter Force has gone too far.
There is no need for us to speculate about the effect of “
Pointblank
” on Germany. The Germans themselves, when they weaken the
Russian and Mediterranean fronts in the face of serious reverses
there, tell us by their acts what importance to attach to it.
5. The daylight “Battle of Germany” is evidently regarded by the
Germans as of critical importance and we have already made them
throw into it most, if not all, of their available reserves.
If we do not now strain every nerve to bring enough force to bear to
win this battle during the next two or three months but are content
to see the 8th Bomber Command hampered by lack of reinforcements
just as success is within its grasp, we may well miss the
opportunity to win a decisive victory against the German Air Force
which will have incalculable effects on all future operations and on
the length of the war. And the opportunity, once lost, may not
recur.
6. I, therefore, urge most strongly that we should invite the U.S.C.O.S. to take all practicable
steps at the earliest possible date to [Page 1020] increase the striking power of the 8th Bomber
Command as much as possible during the next two months.
Annex
British Intelligence Appreciation
G.A.F.
Single-Engined Fighter Reinforcement of the
Western Front, January—July, 1943
1. Strength and Disposition, The Initial
Equipment (I.E.) of the G.A.F. single-engined fighter force
as a whole increased by 245 aircraft from 1,095 to 1,340 between
1 January and 1 August 1943. The disposition of this force in
the main operational areas on the respective dates was as
follows:
|
1–1–43
|
1–8–43
3
|
Difference
|
| Western Front |
305 |
600 |
+295 |
| Mediterranean |
320 |
295 |
–25 |
| Russian Front |
430 |
395*
|
–35 |
| Refitting |
40 |
50 |
+10 |
| Total |
1,095 |
1,340 |
245 |
2. It will be seen that the fighter force on the Western Front
has been doubled during the period under review and that this
increase has in effect more than absorbed the entire expansion
which has occurred; it has in addition entailed a weakening of
both the Mediterranean and Russian Fronts notwithstanding the
important military campaigns in those areas where the Axis
forces have suffered serious reverses since the beginning of the
year.
3. Sources of Increased Strength. The
raising of S.E. fighter strength
on the Western Front has been accomplished in two ways:
a. As a result of the defensive strategy
forced on the G.A.F. since the
end of 1942 in face of growing Allied air power on the Western
Front, in the Mediterranean and in Russia, Germany was forced to
adopt the policy of achieving the maximum possible expansion of
fighter production.
The outcome of this policy is clearly seen in the formation of
new fighter units and of the expansion of others; in addition
there has been a noticeable tendency to maintain the actual
strength of many fighter units well in excess of I.E., particularly on the Western
Front.
b. By the withdrawal of units from the
Mediterranean and Russia.
[Page 1021]
4. The reinforcement of the Western Front as a result of the
above measures can be analyzed as follows:
| Newly formed units |
} |
165 |
|
| Expansion of existing
units |
|
| Transferred from
Russia |
|
90 |
|
| Transferred from
Mediterranean |
|
60 |
|
| Gross Total |
|
315 |
|
| Loss [Less?]:
|
|
|
|
| Fighter units transferred to
fighter-bomber Category |
|
20 |
|
| Net Total Increase |
|
295 |
aircraft |
5. Redisposition on the Western Front. A
most striking change in the disposition of the G.A.F. fighter force on the Western
Front has taken place since 1 January in order to secure the
greatest possible defensive strength to cover the approaches to
Germany. Prior to that date, the German fighter dispositions
were mainly to cover the North coast of France, Belgium and the
Low Countries against R.A.F.
fighter sweeps in these areas and against such daylight bombing
of occupied territory as then took place.
The comparative dispositions are shown as follows:
|
Area
|
I.E. at 1–8–43
|
I.E. at 1–1–43
|
Differences
|
| France (West of the
Seine) |
95 |
95 |
0 |
| France (East of the Seine and
Belgium) |
105 |
70 |
+35 |
| Holland |
150 |
40 |
+110 |
| N.W. Germany |
180 |
35 |
+145 |
| Denmark and S. Norway |
50 |
35 |
+15 |
| Trondheim and N.
Norway |
20 |
30 |
–10 |
| Total |
600 |
305 |
+295 |
The salient points which emerge are:
-
a.
- The greatly increased defenses of Northwest Germany
have absorbed 50% of the total increased fighter
strength on the Western Front.
-
b.
- The balance of this increase has gone mainly to the
Belgium–Holland area.
A point not clearly revealed by the above figures has been the
movement eastwards of French based units and the bringing of
others from Norway to Northwest Germany; there has therefore
been a strong tendency to concentrate the maximum possible
forces into the area [Page 1022]
between the Scheldt and the Elbe. Nevertheless it is certain
that the present fighter strength defending Northwest Germany
and its approaches is still inadequate for its purpose; this is
supported by the increasing use of night-fighters for daylight
interception especially against deep penetration into Germany
where the resources of the G.A.F. are inadequate to maintain S.E. day fighter forces.
7. Reason for Increased Defenses. The
doubling of the German S.E.
fighter force on the Western Front and the allocation of
virtually the whole of this increase to Belgium, Holland and
Northwest Germany are attributable solely to the development of
Allied day bombing of Germany. The defense of Germany against
these attacks has in fact become the prime concern of the G.A.F. and is being undertaken even at the expense
of air support for military operations on other fronts. There is
no reason to suppose that this will not continue to constitute
the main commitment of the defensive fighter forces of the
G.A.F.: if anything this
commitment is likely to increase and the transfer of further
units to the Western Front from other operational areas cannot
be excluded.
8. Strain on Crews. Despite their strength
and flexibility the fighter defenses of Germany are liable to be
subject to extreme strain over periods of sustained day and
night attacks on Germany: this was particularly noticeable
during the last week in July when day fighters were extensively
employed as night fighters in addition to their day operations
and conversely night fighters had to be employed for day
interception. The effects of such continued activity on crews
must inevitably have been severe and there is evidence that in
the later raids during this period opposition was less
determined and Allied losses noticeably reduced. There is no
doubt that during this period the German fighter defenses were
subjected to the most severe test they have yet experienced.
9. Transfer of Experienced Pilots to Western
Front. The urgent necessity of the defense of Germany
has not only deprived the Russian and Mediterranean Fronts of
units, let alone reinforcements; it has also entailed a
deterioration in quality of the fighter pilots employed in those
fronts, notably Russia since there is strong evidence that the
most experienced pilots are being transferred to the Western
Front and replaced by others of inferior skill.
10. Conclusions
a. There can be no doubt that Germany
regards the defense of the Reich against daylight air attack as
of such supreme importance that adequate support for military
operations in Russia and the Mediterranean has been rendered
impossible. In Russia, the fighter force actually engaged on the
entire front is now little more than half that [Page 1023] on the Western Front; this
fighter weakness has unquestionably been an important
contributory factor to the German failure in Russia this
year.
Similarly in the Mediterranean despite the wide areas exposed to
Allied air attack from Sardinia to Crete and the need for
support of Italy no reinforcement whatever has been forthcoming;
consequently Allied air operations have been carried out with
the maximum of success and minimum loss against negligible
opposition, thereby largely contributing to present conditions
in Italy.
b. The Western Front with a fighter
strength almost equal that of the Mediterranean and Russian
Fronts combined constitutes the only source from which
reinforcements needed elsewhere can be provided unless further
new units are formed; this however appears unlikely in the
immediate future. Consequently in the event of South Germany
becoming exposed to air attack by day, it seems inevitable that
such fighter defenses as may be set up must be derived almost
exclusively from the West; the defense of South Germany against
air attack on a scale equivalent to that now existing on the
Western Front would necessitate the reduction of the fighter
force in that area by up to 50% dependent on the then existing
commitments of the G.A.F. in the
Mediterranean and elsewhere.
