J.C.S. Files
Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff1
most secret
C.C.S. 327
C.C.S. 327
[Quebec,] 23 August 1943.
Operations From India
- 1.
- We have now received a number of telegrams from Commander in Chief in India giving his views on the possibility of operations in [Page 1006] Northern Burma, in the light of the generous offer of assistance put forward by the United States Chiefs of Staff.2
- 2.
- These telegrams discuss the subject in great detail, and it is quite clear that they cannot be examined fully during the present Conference. We propose, therefore, to take them back to London, have them examined at once, and let the United States Chiefs of Staff know as soon as we can the extent to which we would like to take advantage of their assistance.
- 3.
- Meanwhile, it has been possible to extract from these
telegrams a brief summary of the Commander in Chief’s views, and
we think they should be brought to the notice of the Combined
Chiefs of Staff before the Conference breaks up. Briefly, on the
assumption that first priority must be accorded to raising the
capacity of the air route to China, the Commander in Chief
estimates that:—
- a.
- Even with the assistance now offered, he will be short on 1st March 1944, by a total of 102,000 tons, of the supplies and material required to enable him to fulfill the undertakings agreed at Trident for Northern Burma.3
- b.
- The deficiency must either fall on the Ledo operation or must be shared between the Ledo and Imphal operations. It cannot be borne exclusively by the Imphal advance as the capacity then available would not enable us to maintain the forces necessary to repel a Japanese incursion.
- c.
- If a certain reduction in the capacity allotted to the Ledo operations could be accepted, the Commander in Chief estimates that it should be possible to undertake a limited advance to the areas forward of Tamu and Tiddim which we occupied prior to the monsoon this year. It is not clear whether General Stilwell can accept this reduction however without causing the Ledo operations to be abandoned. In General Auchinleck’s opinion the extensive use of L.R.P.Gs in the manner proposed by Brigadier Wingate will not alleviate the position since the L.R.P.Gs must be followed up by our main forces to hold the ground gained, and the capacity of the L. of C. will not be sufficient for the purpose.
- d.
- Even these limited operations will apparently absorb the whole capacity of the L. of C. for the coming winter, and will make impossible the long-term improvements of the L. of C. which are essential if we are to contemplate the longer term increase of supplies to China by land or by air.
- 4.
- We have not the figures available in Quebec to explain in detail how the Commander in Chief arrives at the above conclusions, and further investigation will be necessary in India before definite [Page 1007] decisions can be taken as to what is to be done. Before this investigation can be carried any further, however, it is clear that a policy decision is required from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
- 5.
- Broadly speaking there are three possible courses open to us
in Northern Burma in the dry season 1943–44; and it seems clear
that the existing capacity of the L. of
C. will not allow us to do more than one of these
fully:—
- First Course. To put our main effort into the land and air operations which are necessary to establish land communications with China and to improve and secure the air route. It is believed that this can only be done at the expense of the air lift to China.
- Second Course, To give first priority of resources to increasing air supplies to China. It is believed that if this is to be done there will not be sufficient transportation capacity to sustain offensive operations in Northern Burma. The air route will therefore remain liable to interruption.
- Third Course. To adopt a longer term policy and put our main effort into the development of the L. of C. so that we shall be able in the 1944–45 season both to make the air route secure and to deliver a far greater tonnage to China. This could be done if we are prepared to curtail land operations and accept a smaller rate of delivery to China in the meantime.
- 6.
- We should like to discuss these three courses with the United States Chiefs of Staff so that we shall be in a position to give guidance to the Supreme Commander immediately we return to London. Our own feeling is that we should adopt the first course and put our main effort into offensive operations with the object of establishing land communications with China and improving and securing the air route. We suggest that the successful conquest of Northern Burma in the coming dry season which should result in our joining hands with the Chinese, should go far to compensate the Generalissimo for a temporary reduction in the supplies he will receive by air. Priorities between the three courses will not be rigid and we therefore propose to instruct the Supreme Commander, in formulating his proposals, to regard this decision as a guide and bear in mind the importance of the longer term development of the L. of C.