J.C.S. Files
The Combined Staff
Planners to the Combined Chiefs of
Staff
1
secret
Enclosure to C.C.S.
313
[Quebec,] 18 August 1943.
Memorandum
Subject: Appreciation and Plan for the Defeat of
Japan (C.P.S. 83).
1. In their 90th Meeting on 20 May 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff
“directed the Combined Staff Planners to initiate a study and
[Page 976]
prepare for consideration
by the Combined Chiefs of Staff an appreciation leading up to an
outline plan for the defeat of Japan, including an estimate of the
forces required for its implementation.”2
2. In their 102nd Meeting on 16 July 1943, the Combined Chiefs of
Staff directed the Combined Staff Planners to place an appreciation
and plan for the war against Japan before the Combined Chiefs of
Staff during
Quadrant
.
3. Combined planning teams, working in London in June and in
Washington in July, completed C.P.S.
83 on 8 August with the exception of certain Tables of Forces which
are under preparation and should be completed prior to the end of
Quadrant
. A summary of C.P.S. 83 is
attached.
4. On the basis of the premises adopted, the Combined Staff Planners
consider that the measures set forth as being necessary for the
defeat of Japan, namely, the retention of China as an effective
ally, the destruction of Japanese sea and air forces, the blockade
of Japan, and the large scale bombing of the Japanese homeland as a
preliminary to the possible invasion of Japan, are sound.
5. The general lines of advance—through the Central and Southwest
Pacific, and possibly in the Northwest Pacific by United States’
forces; and through the Straits of Malacca and China Sea by British
forces, with the development of a line of supplies to China through
Burma, are concurred in.
6. The dates on which operations are to be undertaken, with the
consequent prolonged duration, envisages, as set forth by the
Planning Team, the least favorable conditions to be anticipated. The
Planning Teams state that conditions less unfavorable will permit
the expediting of the contemplated operations.
7. Even on this conditional basis the Combined Staff Planners
consider that the plan contemplates a war in the Pacific so
prolonged as to be unacceptable to the United Nations. They feel
that the situation existing at this time is that the Japanese have
won the war and that operations which do not contemplate the
complete nullification of Japanese gains before 1947 will produce
the serious hazard that the war against Japan will not, in fact, be
won by the United Nations.
8. The United Nations’ over-all objective, as approved in C.C.S. 242/63 during the
Trident
Conference, states:—
“The over-all objective of the United Nations is, in
conjunction with Russia and other Allies, to bring about at
the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of
the Axis Powers.”
[Page 977]
9. The Combined Staff Planners feel that the conduct of the war to
bring about the defeat of Japan must be in consonance with the
overall objective, as well as with the over-all strategic concept
for the prosecution of the war against Japan, which reads (C.C.S. 242/6, Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3):—
- “1. In cooperation with Russia and other allies to
bring about by the earliest possible date the
unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.
- “2. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific
Powers concerned to maintain and extend unremitting
pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually
reducing her military power and attaining positions from
which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect
of any such extension on the over-all objective to be
given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff
before action is taken.
- “3. Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in
cooperation with other Pacific Powers and, if possible,
with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United
States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest
possible date the unconditional surrender of
Japan.”
10. At the present time a great preponderance of the United Nations
Forces is deployed against the Axis Powers in Europe. At the time of
the defeat of Germany large forces will become available for
redeployment against Japan. This redeployment will require a long
period of time. During this period the will to prosecute the war to
the defeat of Japan will suffer from the stultifying effect caused
by long delays in the increase of offensive action in the Pacific
and Far East.
11. The Combined Staff Planners feel, therefore, that, if we are to
comply with the approved over-all objective and strategic concept
and are to ensure the complete defeat of Japan, we must contemplate
the start of the reorientation of forces from four to six months in
advance of the prospective date of the defeat of Germany, adjusting
the tempo and scale of the reorientation to the progress of the war
in Europe, as determined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff from time
to time.
12. The U.S. Planners feel that our plans and preparations should
contemplate the defeat of Japan not later than 12 months after the
defeat of Germany. This timing should itself now be established as a
more or less controlling objective with which our efforts, measures,
and courses of action should conform. If, in the future, the
measures set forth in the proposed plan do not prospectively provide
for this desired rate of progress of the war, other measures should
be sought—as, for instance, inducing Russia to enter the war.
The British Planners, however, while fully conscious of the need to
shorten the war against Japan and to take all possible measures so
to shorten it, cannot accept such a target date. In their opinion
such acceptance would necessitate an entirely new concept of
operations
[Page 978]
involving an
assault on the Japanese homeland without the preparatory bombing
from bases in China and/or Formosa which they believe will be
required. This course, though worthy of consideration nearer the
time, is insufficiently certain to provide a basis for long term
planning.
13. The chief value of an over-all plan of this kind is the guidance
of action now and in the immediate future. Operations now underway
in the North, Central, South, and Southwest Pacific, as well as
those Pacific operations set forth in C.C.S. 301,4—Specific Operations in the Pacific and Far
East, 1943–1944—are in conformity with the plan. Operations for the
seizure of Burma are in conformity with the plan, but the date that
they should be undertaken is in dispute.
14. The U.S. Planners consider that the Southwest Pacific operations,
through New Guinea, and to the Northwest of New Guinea, provide for
a line of advance which at this time must be considered concurrent
and coordinated with the advance in the Central Pacific and in this
respect do not agree with the plan that these operations should he
considered subsidiary in character.
The British Planners however consider that operations in New Guinea
will be slow and very expensive in resources. They therefore support
the view set out in the summary that when we turn to our main
Pacific effort, through the Marshalls and Carolines, operations in
New Guinea should become subsidiary and should only be pursued in so
far as they are necessary for the success of our main effort.
15. The U.S. Planners assume that the operations in North Burma, as
approved at the
Trident
Conference5—advance from Ledo and Imphal, and increase of
supplies by air to China, and the Akyab and Ramree operations—will
be firmly carried out in 1943–1944. Beyond these operations the plan
submitted by the British Members does not contemplate offensive
operations from the West (other than further operations in North
Burma) until March, 1945. In other words, during the period March,
1944, to March, 1945, the efforts from the West to “maintain and
extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of
continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from
which her ultimate unconditional surrender can be forced” would be
only those possible to the forces deployed in North Burma. The U.S.
Planners feel that a more extensive contribution to the war effort
is necessary along this line of advance during this period. They
feel that the support rendered in 1944, even though smaller than
could be afforded in 1945, will give better and more needed support
to the Pacific Theater.
[Page 979]
16. The U.S. Planners consider that Course B, the capture of South
Burma, beginning in November, 1944, should be carried out.6 This
operation is regarded as necessary not only for the improved line of
supplies to China through Rangoon, but as a preliminary to the
further movement of the advance from the West through the Strait of
Malacca. In this they are in disagreement with the British Planners
who concur with Course C, the attack against Singapore to by-pass
South Burma, and to be inaugurated in March, 1945.
17. The British Planners feel that the question of whether or not
China remains in the war will not be decided by the choice between
Course B (the prior capture of Burma) and Course C (the prior
capture of Singapore) since China’s darkest hours will be in the
early half of 1944, before Germany is defeated. Thereafter, the
obvious weight of the United Nations offensive against Japan in
general and the prospect of an early opening of the sea route in
particular will do more to sustain morale than the arrival of
limited additional material through Burma, always provided supply by
the air route continues at the maximum.
18. The British Planners feel strongly that the recapture of Southern
Burma and Rangoon would be a small strategic gain for the
expenditure of great effort. At best it would:—
-
a.
- Produce limited pressure on Japanese land and air forces
for two dry seasons with little attrition during the
intervening wet seasons.
-
b.
- Open the Burma Road. As this cannot in any case be in full
operation before some time in 1946, whether we go for
Rangoon or Singapore first, the results are long term. In
the unlikely event of the Japanese in the meantime occupying
Kunming, all our efforts in Burma would be nullified.
19. On the other hand, the British Planners feel that the recapture
of Singapore before Rangoon is a full and correct application of sea
and air power. It will electrify the Eastern world and have an
immense psychological effect on the Japanese. It will threaten the
Japanese communications to Thailand and so to Burma, enable direct
attack to be brought to bear on the Dutch oilfields, and in fact
flank and undermine the whole Japanese defense structure in
Southeast Asia. It provides a base for the great naval and air
forces available for deployment against Japan from the West. Above
all, it provides for an advance complementary to that being
undertaken by the U.S.A. from the
East, and converging upon the same objectives, i.e., the capture of
Hong Kong or Formosa and the control of the South China Sea. It thus
accelerates the opening of a sea supply route to China. Operations
against Singapore will, moreover, provoke intense Japanese
[Page 980]
reaction to preserve the
material gains of the Japanese Empire in the West as opposed to its
strategical position and gains in the East, thereby relieving
Japanese pressure on China and stretching Japanese ability to resist
the Eastern advance possibly to the limit.
recommendations
20. To summarize, it is recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff
should take the following action:—
|
Recommendations By U.S. Planners
|
Recommendations By British
Planners
|
| (a) Approve
the general objectives and the general lines of advance
set forth in the plan, as a basis for planning and
preparation. |
(a)
Agreed. |
| (b)
Disapprove, as unacceptable those aspects of the plan
which contemplate a prolonged war lasting into 1947 or
1948. |
(b)
Agreed. |
| (c) Direct
that plans and preparations for the defeat of Japan
shall have as their objective the accomplishment of this
defeat not later than 12 months after the defeat of
Germany. |
(c) Direct
that intensified study of ways and means for shortening
the war should be undertaken at every stage; and that
theater commanders should be so instructed. |
| (d) Approve,
in principle, the inauguration of reorientation of
forces from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far
East Theaters from four to six months in advance of the
prospective date of the defeat of Germany, the scope and
timing of reorientation to be adjusted to the
requirements of the European Theater, as determined by
the Combined Chiefs of Staff from time to time. |
(d)
Agreed. |
| (e) Recognize
that the deployment of forces and the operations to be
undertaken in the war against Japan must be in accord
with the over-all objective and strategic concept
defined in C.C.S. 242/6,
Sections I and II. |
(e)
Agreed. |
| (f) Re-affirm
the
Trident
decision that approved operations in North
Burma and against Akyab and Ramree will be executed
during the coming dry season. |
(f) The
British Planners consider that the form of this decision
must await the outcome of discussion on C.C.S. 301. |
[Page 981]
| (g) Re-affirm
the
Trident
decision to undertake such measures as may be
necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort
of China as an effective ally and as a base for
operations against Japan. |
(g)
Agreed. |
| (h) Direct the
maximum possible expansion of the air supply route into
China. |
(h)
Agreed. |
| (i) Approve
the Pacific operations as accepted in the final version
of C.C.S. 301. |
(i)
Agreed. |
| (j) Make a
decision at this time as to operations to be undertaken
in the west (South Burma or toward Singapore) in
1944. |
(j) Approve
planning and preparations for the start of operations
for the capture of Singapore with a target date of 1945,
followed by the recapture or re-occupation of Southern
Burma during the season 1945–46. This decision to be
reviewed in the spring of 1944 in the light of the then
existing German situation. |
| (k) Agree that
the forces to carry out the operations from the East,
including Southwest Pacific, will be provided by the
U.S., Australia and New Zealand; operations to be
carried out from the west to be with forces provided by
Great Britain, except that special types not available
to Great Britain will be added by the U.S. |
(k) Agree that
the forces to carry out the operations from the East,
including Southwest Pacific, will be provided by U.S.[;]
operations to be carried out from the west to be with
forces provided by Great Britain, except that special
types not available to Great Britain will be added by
the U.S. The employment of Dominion forces will be a
matter for discussion between all the Governments
concerned. |
Appendix
Summary of Appreciation and Plan for the
Defeat of Japan
secret
Summary of Appreciation and Outline Plan
for the Defeat of Japan
1. The following is a summary of C.P.S. 83 (Appreciation and Plan for the Defeat of
Japan). We have based the outline plan that follows on our best
evaluation of what may have to be undertaken.
[Page 982]
2. We have assumed that Japanese resistance will be continuously
stubborn, and have taken no credit for a decline in the morale
of the Japanese people or fighting services. Nevertheless we do
not believe that it will be necessary to carry out the whole
program of operations in order to defeat them. Even if Japanese
morale remains high, at some point the continuous process of
weakening the enemy’s forces and reducing his war potential will
cause a rapid decline in his ability to fight and a consequent
acceleration of our advance. Since it is impossible to forecast
the stage of the operations at which this critical point will be
reached, we have throughout endeavored to make the plan
sufficiently flexible to permit of considerable acceleration at
any stage.
basic conclusions
3. We summarize below the basic conclusions of our
appreciation:
4. To achieve the ultimate defeat of Japan we must destroy her
capacity to resist and this may well involve the invasion of
Japan.
5. The security of the Japanese position in the Pacific depends
primarily on the Japanese Fleet and Air Forces. We must
therefore destroy them as soon as we can.
6. Heavy and sustained air bombardment of Japan proper should
cripple the Japanese war industry and destroy her ability to
continue her main war effort. It might cause the surrender we
demand but we cannot rely on this. In any case, air bombardment
of this nature is probably an essential prelude to bring about
the defeat of Japan.
7. To bring about the sustained air offensive against Japan we
shall almost certainly require the use of China and/or Formosa
as the bases for our long-range bombardment. These two areas
will also go a long way towards meeting our requirements for
mounting invasion forces. We shall require Chinese assistance in
seizing and holding the area in China required for our air
bases.
8. To secure and develop airfields on the mainland of China, it
will be necessary to acquire ports in China. So far as we can
see, Hong Kong will be the most suitable port to open
initially.
9. We therefore require a sea route to China and/or Formosa and
the interruption of the enemy’s lines of communication thereto.
This will entail control of the South Japan and South China
Seas.
The best route of advance from the East lies through the Mandated
Islands, and then either through the Celebes and Sulu Seas or
north of Luzon.
The best route of advance from the West lies through the Straits
of Malacca.
10. In reaching these conclusions we have been guided by certain
[Page 983]
principles, which
in turn should be applied throughout the execution of the
plan:
a. We should attack Japan along as many
lines of advance as are profitable, in order to make use of our
superior forces and to extend the enemy defense.
b. Every possible means of taking short
cuts to our objectives should be adopted. The superior forces,
particularly Air Forces, available to us and the opportunities
for surprise should enable large and bold steps to be taken
without unacceptable risk.
c. Shortage of bases will initially
restrict our possible lines of advance. We should therefore take
the first opportunity of securing additional bases from which to
deploy our superior strength.
d. Our strength, particularly in the air,
should be concentrated against Japan’s weaknesses, which lie in
her shortage of aircraft, warships, shipping and oil.
Conversely extensive campaigns against Japanese land forces in
difficult country, where we cannot use our own forces to the
best advantage, should be avoided until they have been weakened
by lack of supplies and support from the Japanese navy and air
forces.
Whenever possible, we should, in fact, aim at leaving Japanese
land forces in possession of outlying territory, in order that
they may continue to be a liability to Japanese shipping, air
and naval forces.
e. Wherever practicable, direct attacks
on our objectives should be aided, and if possible preceded, by
attack against Japanese communications leading to them. The
extremely extended nature of their communications, together with
the notorious inability of the Japanese to deal with the
unexpected, are likely to render such methods very
profitable.
f. Since shipping is unlikely to be a
limiting factor after the defeat of Germany, our lines of
advance need not necessarily be selected so as to take the
shortest route from the U.S. or U.K. to our ultimate objective,
but rather the one most easily established and protected.
g. We should devise every possible means
of exploiting to the full, the vast technical and numerical air
superiority which we shall enjoy over the Japanese after the
defeat of Germany.
h. Whilst recognizing that every effort
must be made to retain China in the war and to develop her bases
and land forces, our plans should retain the necessary
flexibility to enable our program against the Japanese to be
continued if China should drop out of the war or prove less
effective than we now hope.
i. Whilst being prepared to achieve our
aims without Russian assistance, our plans should nevertheless
retain the necessary flexibility to exploit the situation fully
if Russia should join in the war at any stage.
[Page 984]
j. We cannot forecast the date at which
Germany will be defeated. To minimize the delay in turning the
full weight of our offensive against Japan after the defeat of
Germany, the bases from which our initial advances are to be
launched should be developed as soon as possible and plans for
reorganization and redeployment made without delay.
general concept of the war
11. Applying these principles to the basic conclusions set out
above, the general concept of the war which emerges is as
follows:
first phase—action prior to capture of a
port in china and/or formosa
12. In the East, our main effort should be
through the Mandated Islands. Until we are ready to launch this
main effort, we should maintain increasing pressure on the
Japanese by means of offensive operations in the Solomons–New
Guinea area and in the Aleutians. When we turn to our main
effort these latter operations should become subsidiary, and
should only be undertaken insofar as they are necessary for the
success of our main effort.
Having completed our advance through the Mandated Islands, we
should then proceed either to the South Philippines or to the
north of them. Our choice should be made in the light of
whichever course will most quickly achieve our object of
reaching the China Coast and/or capturing Formosa.
13. In the West, we should maintain China
and build up our air forces there by stepping up the air supply
route from Assam and by operations to clear Northern Burma, thus
permitting the opening of a land route to China.
Meanwhile we should make preparations in India for the launching
of the major campaigns to recapture the whole of Burma and to
break into the Japanese perimeter from the west by the recapture
of Singapore.
Once that has been accomplished we should make our way through
the South China Sea towards the coast of China and Formosa.
coordination
14. To integrate our advances from the West and the East, the
timing of the various operations should, if possible, be so
arranged that they afford one another the maximum amount of
mutual assistance at each stage.
15. For our advance from the East, & very large fleet, but
comparatively small land and shore-based air forces will be
necessary, and therefore comparatively little shipping, until we
have completed
[Page 985]
our
advance through the Mandates, when our ground and land-based air
forces may well be of a very large order.
Our advance from the West, on the other hand, will require large
land and air forces and much shipping, but probably a
considerably smaller fleet than in the case of our advance from
the East.
16. Our advance from the east should provide opportunities for
bringing the Japanese fleet to action in favorable
circumstances. It will enable us to threaten and strike at Japan
herself, and, in conjunction with air forces from China, to
strike at the focal point of the Japanese sea communications in
the Yellow Sea–Formosa areas. This will greatly assist our
advances from the west by forcing the Japanese fleet and air
forces on to the defensive in their Home area and by enabling
our forces in the east to strike at the Japanese communications
leading to the objectives of our advance from the west.
17. In executing our advance from the west, and after completing
the capture of North Burma (Course A),
two courses of action remain open to us in the west.
Course B—(Recapture of South Burma
followed by recapture of Singapore) probably offers the best
chance of maintaining China in the war by insuring that the
overland supply route is developed as early as possible and with
the greatest reliability. On the other hand, the delay in the
recapture of Singapore is likely to mean that our advance to
open the sea route to China would have to be undertaken from the
east alone, and would receive little aid from the west.
Course C—(Recapture of Singapore,
followed by recapture of South Burma) would enable a much
greater degree of coordination and mutual assistance to be
achieved in the later stages of our two advances since we should
expect to reach Singapore and advance therefrom a year earlier.
It would stretch Japanese resources over a wide area and would
enable the British Fleet to operate off the China coast. Our
land and air forces could also be moved up the South China Sea
along routes far removed from the main enemy naval strength in
Japan.
On the other hand, we should run the risk of delaying the
development of the overland routes to China, although there
would be no appreciable delay if all
operations go according to plan.
18. Irrespective of whether the advance from the east or the west
approaches China first, it is unlikely that we shall be able to
capture Shanghai direct. In conjunction with shore-based air
support from China, and Chinese land forces, we might, however,
be able to undertake a direct assault on Hong Kong, subsequently
taking Formosa.
If the capture of Hong Kong is impracticable, we should endeavor
to seize Formosa first, or, if this too is impracticable,
Luzon.
[Page 986]
If neither of these can be seized direct, we should assault
Hainan and if possible one of the Ryukyus.
If the above are impracticable we should continue operations
against the South Philippines and complete our control of the
Celebes and Sulu Seas, subsequently carrying out our program to
capture a port in China and/or Formosa.
second phase—action subsequent to the
capture of a port in china and/or the capture of
formosa
19. This phase will involve overland and amphibious operations in
China and direct air and naval action to weaken Japanese
capacity to resist. It will probably culminate in the invasion
of Japan.
20. If we are established in Hong Kong before Formosa has been
captured, we shall be in a position to build up the necessary
land forces in China, secure the air bases most accessible from
Hong Kong, and start the bombing of Japan at long range.
If, on the other hand, we capture Formosa before Hong Kong, or
find that the Chinese assistance on the mainland is
disappointing, the bombing of Japan can start from Formosa.
21. It is possible that, with the assistance of sea-borne air
forces, Japan may be sufficiently weakened to enable us to
invade her when our bomber offensive has been developed from
either Formosa, or the area most accessible from Hong Kong.
On the other hand, to bomb Japan effectively we may have to move
further northwards from Hong Kong in order to use the area up to
the line Wenchow–Nanchang–Changsha.
From the invasion point of view, we may possibly have to secure
the Shanghai area, and if this is the case, we should be well
placed from our positions in Hong Kong and Formosa to undertake
such an advance both overland and coastwise.
22. If Chinese assistance proves to be effective, our main effort
will probably be made overland. If, on the other hand, it is
disappointing, our main effort would be concentrated in
amphibious operations along the China coast as far northwards as
necessary.
subsidiary and alternative lines of
advance
23. Meanwhile, subject to the requirements of our main advance,
we should:
- (i)
- undertake subsidiary operations along the Malay
Barrier to bring increased pressure to bear on the
Japanese;
- (ii)
- prepare plans and bases for the capture of the
Northern Kuriles and the reinforcement of Petropavlovsk,
in order to secure a sea route to Russia in the event of
her entering the war;
- (iii)
- prepare plans and bases for the capture of Hokkaido
should
[Page 987]
the
opportunity arise for assisting our bombing or
undertaking our invasion of Japan from this direction,
possibly in conjunction with Russian action from the
Maritime Provinces, Sakhalin or Petropavlovsk.
outline plan
24. Based on our appreciation, we indicate below an outline plan
for operations against Japan:—
|
Action in the West
|
Action in the East
|
|
Serial 1—Up to November 1943
|
| Development of air
routes to China. |
Offensive operations
against Solomons and New Guinea. |
| Holding operations in
North Burma and China. |
Offensive operations
against the Aleutians. |
|
Serial 2—November 1943 to May
1944
|
| Offensive operations in
Northern Burma and on Arakan coast. |
Offensive operations
against Gilberts and Marshalls. |
| Developing Northern
routes leading to China. |
Subsidiary operations in
Solomons and New Guinea and air operations from the
Aleutians. |
|
Serial 3—June 1944 to November
1944
|
| Holding operations in
Burma. |
Offensive operations
against Carolines. |
|
Subsidiary operations in
New Guinea area. |
|
Serial 4—November 1944 to May
1945
|
|
Course B
|
Course C
|
|
| (Favored by U.S.) |
(Favored by British) |
|
| Offensive operations in
North Burma and capture of Rangoon. |
Offensive operations in
North Burma.
Offensive operations against
Northern Sumatra and Malaya. |
Offensive operations
against the Pelews and possibly
Marianas.
Subsidiary operations in the New
Guinea area.
Commence offensive operations
against South Philippines.*
|
[Page 988]
|
Serial 5—June 1945 to November
1945
|
| Holding operations in
Burma. |
Holding operations in
North Burma.
Continue offensive operations in
Malaya and against Japanese communications to
Burma. |
Continue offensive
operations against the South Philippines. |
—or Offensive operations against Luzon,
Formosa or Ryukyus. |
|
Serial 6—November 1945 to May
1946
|
Complete offensive
operations to clear Burma.
Offensive operations
against N. Sumatra and Malaya. |
Offensive operations
against North Burma and Rangoon, subsequently
clearing the whole of Burma.
Offensive
operations against Camranh Bay.†
|
Continue offensive
operations [against the] South Philippines. |
—or Launch offensive operations against Hong
Kong or Formosa (if not already captured). |
|
Serial 7—During the remainder of
1946
|
| Complete capture of
Malaya. |
Launch offensive
operations against Luzon, Formosa, Hong Kong, Hainan
and/or Ryukyus from East and West. |
—or Establish the strategic bombing force in
China and/or Formosa. |
|
Serial 8—From 1947 onwards
|
|
Establish the strategic
bombing force in China and/or Formosa.
- Bomb Japan.
- Invade Japan.
|
|
