Foreign Relations of the United States, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943

740.0011 EW/8–2045

Department of State Minutes¹

August 20, 1943

secret

1. “ Lifebelt ”

Mr. Eden first spoke of the operation “ Lifebelt ”. He said that arrangements had now been approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the President and the Prime Minister² for entry into the Azores by British forces, exclusively, on the understanding that within two weeks after the start of the operation efforts would be made by the British to obtain the consent of the Portuguese for American forces to join them in the islands. He further said that such assurances as the Portuguese had asked had been given by the British Government with respect to the withdrawal of British forces from Portuguese territory after the war and also with respect to the maintenance of Portuguese sovereignty in all her territories. Mr. Eden suggested that assurances along similar lines would be asked by the Portuguese from the United States. Such assurances might be given if we felt like doing so at the time request was made for American forces to join the operation. Comment was made that this was a reversal of the previous position taken by the United States Chiefs of Staff, who had stated their objection to confining the operations exclusively to the British and had referred to the original decision to use force, if necessary, in order to make the Islands available for Allied operations.

2. Conditions of Surrender for Italy

Mr. Eden brought up the question of the discussions which had been going on between the Prime Minister and the President as to the conditions of surrender to be given the Italians in the event of tender of unconditional surrender being received by the Allied forces or governments. He said that it was the Prime Minister’s view that the long, comprehensive document³ was the form to be preferred.

The Secretary said that he had gone over this document, which, as far as he was concerned, appeared to be satisfactory but that he understood the President’s view to be that General Eisenhower was now empowered to present the military requirements⁴ which would be imposed in the event of an Italian surrender, and that any further political, financial and economic terms which had not yet been finally agreed upon as between the two Governments would be handed to the Italians at a later time.

Both the Secretary of State and Mr. Eden agreed that this matter would take further discussion with the Prime Minister and President before being entirely clarified.

3. Russia and China

The Secretary then, stated there had been some considerable publicity giving the impression that Stalin had not been invited to the Quebec Conference and remarked that it appeared to be rather fruitless to continue the system of inviting Stalin to the conferences, and that some attempt should be made to arrive at a basis of talks with Stalin in order to come to grips, if possible, with Soviet general policy and cooperation, if possible, in the much broader picture of the maintenance of peace and world security. The Secretary pointed out that everything seemed to go back to the Russian demands for territory, which was another way of looking for security. He made the point that security was world-wide, and if we could draw the Russians into a broad discussion, then the emphasis would not remain merely on the smaller countries on Russia’s western border.

Mr. Eden agreed to the necessity of making a new approach to this problem, but stated frankly he had no suggestions to make and would welcome any ideas that were put forward to accomplish this purpose. He furthermore felt that this should be done without any loss of time.

The Secretary said that he had given a great deal of thought to this problem and would come back to the subject again with Mr. Eden.

(He did not touch on the four-power declaration⁵ which he had already drafted and placed in the hands of the President as he preferred to await the President’s move on that subject first. The first mention of the four-power arrangement in the form of a draft declaration was made by the President at the dinner that same evening attended by the Prime Minister, the Secretary, and Mr. Eden at the Citadel.)

The Secretary also spoke of the necessity for keeping China not only closely informed but cooperating in the general broad over-all picture as we went forward with the war. He said he realized that the Chinese could not be brought into all of the strategic conferences naturally, but he had had visits from Chinese representatives⁶ who indicated that the Chinese were feeling rather badly about not being included in discussions pertaining to the war against Japan in which they were important factors, and they were convinced conversations on this subject would take place in Quebec.

4. Rome an Open City

Mr. Eden brought up the question of the Italian move to have Rome declared an open city.

The Secretary brought Mr. Eden up to date on the American position which was disclosed in the correspondence between the Papal Delegate in Washington and the Department.⁷ Upon receiving word from the Papal Delegate that the Italians had decided to have Rome declared an open city and asking for the conditions under which the Allies would be prepared to accept such a declaration, the Papal Delegate was informed that the matter was under consideration and that there was no reason why the Italian authorities could not proceed in any manner they desired to fulfill the requirements of such a declaration.

The Secretary went on to say, however, that the American Government had made no commitment whatever on the subject, nor was any commitment contemplated as far as we were concerned.

Mr. Eden expressed his agreement and satisfaction with the position thus far taken, which left entire freedom of action to the two governments.

5. Dependent Peoples

The Secretary brought up the subject of dependent peoples, but Mr. Eden did not appear to be ready to go forward with this subject.

6. Greece and Yugoslavia

Mr. Eden then spoke of the message which had been sent by the King of Greece to both governments,⁸ requesting advice on their part as to the position he should take in the face of demands of certain Greek elements that he renounce any intention of coming to Greece until a plebiscite on the subject of the monarchy had been taken in that country.

Mr. Eden then went on to say they were having great difficulties with the Yugoslav Government as the young king had just accepted the resignation of the Yugoslav cabinet in connection with the refusal of the Croat member of the cabinet to agree to the transfer of the Yugoslav Government from London to Cairo. It was Mr. Eden’s opinion, however, that the transfer would be accomplished within two or three weeks, and that it was much better for the Yugoslav Government to carry on its operations from Cairo where it was nearer the situation.

7. Senate Cooperation in Approval of Wartime International Agreements

Mr. Eden inquired as to the recent published stories that an agreement had been arrived at between the Senate and the State Department which would provide for approval by the Senate of international agreements entered into by the United States during the wartime period.

The Secretary explained that the situation was not exactly as reported. He said that for some time now he had been carrying on conversations with members of the Foreign Relations Committee in the Senate and other important Senators, with a view to keeping them informed of the Government’s plans with regard to certain international arrangements which became necessary in the carrying out of the war effort. He cited as an example the United Nations arrangement with respect to relief and rehabilitation (U.N.R.R.A.). He told how he had shown copies of the draft arrangement on this subject to the Senators, had explained to them how the legislative function in connection with providing of funds and approval of the arrangement was provided for in the text of the draft, and had offered to meet any reasonable suggestions with respect to changes of wording in order to make the position of the legislative branch of the government clear in all respects. He said that he had met with considerable success in these conversations up to the present, and he proposed to continue along those lines in as great a detail as was necessary in order to keep the Senate informed of the plans of the Executive in all these respects.

8. French Committee of National Liberation

Mr. Eden brought up the subject of relationship with the French Committee of National Liberation. There was a somewhat lengthy review of the negotiations extending over a period of two years or more, in which the Secretary made the point that at no time had the policy of the American Government not been fully agreed in, by telegrams from the Prime Minister to the President, which Mr. Eden admitted.

The discussion ran along the lines of the British taking the position that de Gaulle was their only friend in 1940, the Secretary raising as against this attitude the objectives and actions of the United States Government, including the prevention of the French Fleet and the French North African bases from falling into German hands, Admiral Leahy’s work in keeping up the spirit and courage of the French population in France, the U.S. naval support long before we were in the war, and the lease-lend aid. It then became evident that neither Mr. Eden nor Sir Alexander Cadogan had seen the last State Department Formula⁹ which had been transmitted to the President within a few days after receiving the last British Formula on the subject.¹⁰ Copies of the State Department draft, which was almost word for word the same as the British last suggested formula, were then produced. After examining them, Mr. Eden said he felt that the Prime Minister could not accept a formula which did not contain the word, “recognition.” There was some discussion on this point in order to bring out the American view that “recognition” was only given to a government or some form of government, whereas in this case it was understood that both the British and the U.S. Governments had no intention whatever of considering the French Committee as a government.

Mr. Eden made the suggestion at the end of this discussion that it might be necessary for the two Governments to adopt their own formulas and make their announcements in their own separate ways.

The Secretary followed this by a remark that such a procedure, even if done at identically the same moment, would mean an obvious divergence of views.

Mr. Eden said that he realized any such policy would be so considered and regretted any such possibility.

The Secretary replied that he very much regretted the consideration of such a divergence of views but that if the British could stand it, we could.

The Secretary then made a convincing and reasoned marshalling of the situation as it affected the long-term view of the United States toward the whole French situation and the future of France itself.¹¹

1. The source text bears no indication of the authorship of these minutes. Excerpts typed later in Washington, however, ascribe the authorship jointly to Hull and Dunn. (These excerpts are located in Department of State files under the file numbers appropriate to individual paragraphs of the minutes, viz., 741.53/8–2043, 740.00119 EW/8–2043, 740.0011 EW/8–2043, 868.00/8–2043, 711.00/8–2043, and 851.01/8–2043.) The source text has been stamped “Secret” and “Secret—Security”, but it is probable that these classifications were applied in the Department of State long after the Conference. The excerpts mentioned above all bear the typed notation, “Strictly Confidential”.
2. See ante, pp. 887, 899.
3. See ante, p. 538.
4. See ante, pp. 519, 522, 565.
5. Ante, p. 692.
6. See Hull’s memorandum of his conversation with Soong on August 18, 1943 (ante, p. 440), and Soong’s communication to Hull of the same date (ante, p. 441).
7. See ante, pp. 528, 572.

8. For the text of King George II’s message to Churchill, see Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 536. King George’s parallel message to Roosevelt, transmitted by the Ambassador to Greece (Kirk) in a telegram of August 18, 1943, was as follows:

   • “1. On July 4 I declared to my people that after their liberation they will be invited to determine by means of free elections the form of their government.
   • “2. I am now suddenly faced by the most curious situation, of the unexpected arrival of certain individuals from Greece, who are supposed to represent various guerrilla bands. In addition a representative of certain old political parties, who wish to press me to declare that I should only return after a plebiscite which would decide on form of the future régime.
   • “3. This request raises a new issue on which I feel you should be consulted before any decision is made. I am adverse to taking a final decision. For in my opinion what is now proposed, although primarily a Greek matter, may have repercussions outside Greece, which might well create precedence [precedents] or affect political developments in other countries and specially in the Balkans. This apparently local issue may assume a wider character. In these circumstances I would much appreciate your advice as to [the] policy, which would at this time best serve the cause of Greece and the United Nations.
   • “4. My present personal inclination is to continue the policy agreed with Prime Minister Churchill before I left England. I feel very strongly that I should return to Greece with my troops, even if I left my country after a short period, to work [for?] its national interests among our Allies, should subsequent developments make it politic for me to do so.” (868.01/374)

   Concerning King George’s broadcast of July 4, 1943, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. iv, p. 135.

9. i.e., the draft which Hull had sent to Roosevelt on August 5, 1943, ante, p. 666.
10. i.e., the draft contained in Churchill’s telegram No. 400 to Roosevelt, August 3, 1943, ante, p. 662.
11. For a further exchange between Hull and Eden concerning politicians and statesmen, which apparently took place at this meeting, see Hull, p. 1233; Eden, p. 467.