Foreign Relations of the United States, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

May 15, 1943, 10:30 a.m.

secret

1. Conclusions of the Previous Meeting

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Approved the conclusions of the 84th Meeting as recorded in the Minutes.²

2. Future Work of the Committee

Admiral Leahy said that the Committee had not yet directed the Planners to prepare an agenda for future work. He suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should first consider various courses of action open to achieve the defeat of the Axis in Europe and then similarly the defeat of Japan.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff held much the same views. He felt that Roundup should first be considered, and for this it would be desirable to have expositions of the U.S. conception of this operation and a study of conditions and feasibility; next, operations in the Mediterranean might be discussed based on the British Chiefs of Staff memorandum; and, lastly, the war with Japan, considering operations in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, and their coordination.

When the scope and requirements of operations in the theaters had been defined, the Combined Chiefs of Staff would then proceed to examine the extent to which our demands for shipping resources could meet what was proposed. After that, the Committee would consider the global strategy in terms of concrete facts and deal with miscellaneous points such as the Portuguese islands and Ploeşti.

Admiral King felt that the first step should be to set out agreed basic fundamentals: for instance, the vital importance of Atlantic and Pacific lines of communications, security of the citadel of Britain, and the fact that the full weight must be thrown first on the defeat of Germany. To this might be added others. Was China essential as a basis for the defeat of Japan? These fundamentals, when agreed, would constitute a point of departure and yardsticks by which our strategy could be judged. Many of these points had been contained in previous papers, but he felt it important that a fresh statement should be got out as early as possible.

Sir Alan Brooke agreed with Admiral King’s views and suggested that the Planners should be instructed to prepare a document on those lines.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed:

a. That the Combined Staff Planners should prepare for consideration on Monday morning, 17 May:

(1) A statement of agreed essentials for the effective prosecution of the war, which would serve as a background for the formulation of future plans, e.g., security of essential sea communications; security of the citadel of Britain; etc.³

(2) A draft agenda for the remaining conferences in the light of the discussion which had taken place.⁴

3. Operations in Burma

Sir Alan Brooke said that at the White House the previous day⁵ it had been agreed that the staffs should, in consultation with the U.S. and British commanders in the area, examine the best means of expanding the air route to China and of opening a land route from India.

Sir Charles Portal said that he considered it important that the commanders concerned should be consulted so that the orders the Combined Chiefs of Staff would give as a result of their deliberations would be related to practical possibilities.

Admiral Leahy suggested that it would be desirable that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should offer Dr. T. V. ‘Soong and General Chu an opportunity to express the views of General Chiang Kai-shek at an early date.⁶

The Committee then discussed a draft directive to the Combined Planners with reference to a study of operations in Burma.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed:

a. That the Combined Staff Planners, in consultation as necessary with the British and U.S. Commanders in Chief, India and China Theaters, should examine and report on:

(1) The potentialities of the air route from Assam to China given complete priority for its development except for the minimum requirements of the forces defending the air field areas, and whether any further steps can now be taken to enable these potentialities to be realized.⁷

(2) The most promising operation, having regard to the various considerations brought to light in previous discussions, for the opening of a land route to China, and what resources and conditions are necessary for carrying it out without prejudicing the development of the air route.⁸

b. That Dr. T. V. Soong and Major General Shih-ming Chu should be invited to appear at the meeting on Monday, 17 May, and express the views of the Generalissimo regarding operations in the Burma-China Theater.⁹

4. Operations in Europe

Sir Alan Brooke considered the possibilities of undertaking Roundup should be examined in relation to the results which would accrue from the shutting down of future operations in the Mediterranean. United States views on the possibilities of the Bolero buildup and their conception of the scope and results of cross-Channel operations would be of value. Similarly, operations in the Mediterranean should be examined with the British Chiefs of Staff paper as a basis for discussion.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff then discussed the acceptance of General Eaker’s plan for the build-up of Sickle as one of the fundamentals of our agreed strategy.¹⁰

Sir Alan Brooke believed that at this stage Sickle should not be accepted as a fundamental since it might on further examination be found to tie our hands with regard to future plans.

After further discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff were in general agreement that Sickle should not at this stage be accepted as a fundamental, though it was obvious that the intensity of our air bombardment would have a material effect on any land operations, whether undertaken across the Channel or in the Mediterranean and should not therefore be reduced except after critical examination.

Sir Charles Portal said that the most important point was to decide whether the defeat of Germany would be brought nearer by immediate Mediterranean operations at some expense to Bolero , or, alternatively, by stopping operations in the Mediterranean in order to build up at the maximum rate for cross-Channel operations. The Planners should examine this problem with a view to a combined assessment of the effect on Germany of the two alternatives.

Sir Alan Brooke said that both the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff were agreed that Roundup must be undertaken as early as possible, but in the British view it was necessary, before Roundup could be successful, to create a suitable situation by diversion of German forces. The United States view was that the war could be won by cross-Channel operations in 1944, but he was not clear as to the exact plan by which decisive results would be achieved.

General Marshall said that great faith was being pinned to the results of the bomber offensive. We must be ready to take advantage of these results. He was concerned lest any delay in building up forces in the United Kingdom would result in our not being ready when the moment presented itself. The British believed that operations in the Mediterranean would not materially slow up the Bolero movement. The exact results of the air attacks might be problematical, but the availability of tonnage to move troops could be calculated.

Sir Alan Brooke said that it was estimated that further operations in the Mediterranean would only result in some three to four fewer U.S. Divisions being available in the United Kingdom.

General Marshall said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had last year considered the necessity of undertaking operation Sledgehammer to relieve pressure on the Russian Front, but the situation there was now very different. The landing of 25 divisions in France at that time might have been suicidal, but now there was the possibility of concentrating our vast air superiority in direct support of the land forces in the bridgehead, thereby materially altering the balance of force in our favor.

Sir Alan Brooke agreed that our air power could be withdrawn from attacks on German industry and transferred to the direct aid of our land forces, but even if the area of ground operations could thereby be isolated, the penetration of these forces inland could not be assisted since the British Air Force was not yet fully on a mobile basis.

General Marshall said that certain U.S. fighter units in the U.K. were on a fully mobile basis. He stressed the psychological effect of a landing in France. He did not believe that the effect of overwhelming air superiority on the Continent had been appreciated, whereas great stress had been laid on its value in the Mediterranean.

Sir Alan Brooke said that in considering the results to be expected from air support of ground operations, it must be remembered that, in North Africa, though we had had air superiority since El Alamein, Rommel had been able to move his army back into Tunisia relatively intact. Similarly in Tunisia the enemy had been able to reinforce by some 100,000 men.

General Marshall pointed out the outstanding results achieved by the use of air power in Tunisia as soon as the weather had improved.

Sir Charles Portal pointed out with regard to air power that fighter cover was essential.

General McNarney agreed but said that he believed that a bridgehead in France would enable us to move forward the necessary fighter cover. Air power must be related to our ground power. For instance, it might well be that the correct application of air power might halve the number of divisions required to overcome a given resistance, The seizure of the bridgehead would insure that the fighter line could be advanced and air power applied at the correct moment in support of ground operations.

Sir Charles Portal said that he entirely agreed in the abstract with General McNarney’s last statement but it was important that in considering the seizure of, say, the Brest Peninsula, the Planners should carefully work out the rate at which fighter cover could be developed in that area in order that the plan could be assessed on a sound tactical and logistic basis.

Sir Alan Brooke pointed out the further limitations of port capacity in the bridgehead.

Admiral Leahy agreed to the study suggested by Sir Charles Portal. The U. S. Chiefs of Staff had prepared a brief outline plan for Roundup which would be circulated for the information of the British Chiefs of Staff.¹¹ He believed that the results expected from the air bombardment of Germany should be taken into consideration both, in connection with cross-Channel and Mediterranean operations.

Sir Charles Portal said that one of the main features of the air plan outlined by General Eaker was not only its tremendous effect both on production and morale, but also, and perhaps most important, the elimination of the German fighter force. This would have an immense effect on any operations against Germany, whether across the Channel, in the Mediterranean, or on the Russian Front. He did not maintain that the utmost priority should continuously be accorded to Sickle , but it must be realized that its value was fundamental. The longer the destruction of the German fighter force was delayed, the longer would the ultimate defeat of Germany be delayed.

Admiral King said that operation Roundup must be carefully examined. While it had originally been believed that cross-Channel operations could be undertaken in 1943, April of 1944 now appeared to be the earliest possible date. This must be fixed as a firm date, or we should never come to grips with Germany by cross-Channel operations in 1944. He appreciated the value of operations in the Mediterranean, but they would, he believed, render cross-Channel operations in 1944 impossible.

Sir Alan Brooke said that only by Mediterranean operations to draw off and hold German forces could a situation be achieved in which a successful Roundup is possible. Otherwise at best only Sledgehammer could be undertaken and we should then be committed in France and pinned down to a bridgehead.

Sir Charles Portal said that all were agreed that Roundup was essential and that a strategy should be adopted which would produce the earliest possible successful invasion of the Continent. The British believed that Mediterranean operations were first necessary, whereas the United States Chiefs of Staff believed in piling up forces in the United Kingdom to give more strength to the blow. The British Chiefs of Staff believed that the balance of force on the Continent would alter more rapidly in our favor if Mediterranean operations were undertaken.

Admiral King said that he did not believe it would be possible to build up sufficient forces in the United Kingdom if Mediterranean operations were undertaken, since these would cause a vacuum into which our forces would be sucked.

Sir Charles Portal said it must be remembered that this vacuum would suck in not only Allied Forces, but also Axis Forces.

With regard to General Morgan’s plans, General Marshall said that these, without forces to implement them, were of little value. He feared that unless we concentrated on the United Kingdom build-up, we should lack the necessary punch to undertake cross-Channel operations when the critical moment arose.

Sir Alan Brooke undertook to circulate a note giving an estimate of the shipping commitment to meet the economic situation that would arise in the event of an Italian collapse.¹²

Admiral King drew attention to the dangers of tying down forces and equipment to await eventualities. If a definite date was not decided on for Roundup , valuable equipment, such as landing craft, which was urgently required in the Pacific, would be lying idle in England.

Sir Charles Portal said that this also applied to air-borne forces which were also essentially offensive and absorbed much air power which might well be used in active attack, but he believed that both with landing craft and air-borne troops their use was so essential to achieve success at the critical moment that their inactivity until this moment arrived must be accepted.

General McNarney said that he regarded Sledgehammer as a preliminary to Roundup . Even a bridgehead was valuable in that it would bring ground and air forces into active contact with the enemy, diverting German forces from the Russian Front and inducing attrition. When, during operation Torch , it had been obvious to the Germans that no cross-Channel operations were possible, they had sent part of their garrison from Western France to the Eastern Front at a critical moment.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the commitment of our forces to a bridgehead such as the Brest Peninsula would enable the enemy to concentrate rather than force him to disperse.

General Marshall said that on two previous occasions the forces which it had been believed would be available for cross-Channel operations had dwindled to very small numbers due to the demands of operations Torch and Husky , which had exceeded expectations. Unless Bolero build-up was now given priority over operations in the Mediterranean, similar results might be expected and no forces would be available to undertake the operation at the critical moment.

Sir Charles Portal pointed out that it had always been agreed that the build-up in the United Kingdom should take place subject to the requirements of the agreed operations in North Africa and the Mediterranean. These requirements had not greatly exceeded expectations but rather the availability of shipping had not proved so large as had been expected.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

a. Agreed that the Combined Staff Planners should prepare for consideration on Monday morning, 17 May, two papers as follows:

(1) A plan for the defeat of Germany (showing the course of operations and their feasibility) by concentrating on the biggest possible invasion force in the U.K. as soon as possible. This paper to be prepared by the U.S. planners in consultation with the British.¹³

(2) A plan for the defeat of Germany (showing the course of operations and their feasibility) which accepts the elimination of Italy as a necessary preliminary. This paper to be prepared by the British Planners in consultation with the U. S.¹⁴

In the preparation of the above plans cognizance should be taken of the effects of a full-scale Sickle .

In submitting the above two papers, the Combined Staff Planners should make such recommendations as they feel able to on the respective plans.

b. Took note that a paper which had been prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff on the economic results of the defeat of Italy would be circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.¹⁵

5. Directive to Allied Authorities in the Far East

The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed the terms of a directive to the U.S. and British authorities in the Far East on the expansion of the capacity of the air route to China.

In the course of discussion, General Marshall outlined certain steps which General Wheeler, in cooperation with the British authorities concerned, was taking for the improvement of these facilities. He mentioned the difficulties with which General Stilwell was faced, and in this connection paid tribute to the outstanding success achieved by Sir John Dill on his visit to Chungking, in convincing the Chinese of British good will.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed:

That the following telegram should be despatched forthwith by the appropriate Chiefs of Staff to the appropriate Commanders in Chief:¹⁶

“Give first priority to effort to prepare Assam air fields in order that not less than 7,000 tons per month may be transported to China by 1 July 1943.

“It is considered essential that facilities for the monthly transportation of 10,000 tons should be provided at the earliest practicable date and not later than 1 September, and that adequate defensive measures for the air field area must be maintained.”

6. The Azores

Admiral King, in stressing the urgency of action with regard to the Azores as a vital factor in the battle of the Atlantic, asked if any further developments had taken place.

7. General Ismay stated that the British Chiefs of Staff had prepared a paper on this subject which had been submitted to the Prime Minister and which he had invited them to discuss with the United States Chiefs of Staff.¹⁷ This paper will be circulated. The military desirability of obtaining these islands was generally agreed. He believed that the Prime Minister and President were discussing means of achieving our object.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed that the paper on the Portuguese Atlantic Islands, by the British Chiefs of Staff, which is now being circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, should be considered at the meeting on Monday, 17 May.

2. Ante, p. 66.
3. In pursuance of these instructions, the Combined Staff Planners prepared and circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 16, 1943, a report designated C.C.S. 232, not printed. The report was discussed and agreed to by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on May 17, 1943, post, p. 93 subject to certain emendations. For text of the final version of the report, designated C.C.S. 232/1, May 18, 1943, see post, p. 231.
4. Pursuant to this directive, the Combined Staff Planners prepared a draft agenda which was circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 16, 1943, as C.C.S. 233, not printed. At their meeting on May 17, 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff considered and approved the draft agenda, subject to certain amendments; the revised agenda was subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 233/1, May 17, 1943, post, p. 229.
5. For record of the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill on May 14, 1943, see ante, p. 66.
6. Regarding Soong’s request to be allowed to participate in the Conference, see the letter of May 13, 1943, from Soong to Hopkins, post, p. 288.
7. C.C.S. 229, “Potentialities of Air Route From Assam to China”, circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 19, 1943, not printed. At their meeting on May 20, 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff directed that C.C.S. 229 be withdrawn from the Agenda; see post, p. 142.
8. C.C.S. 231, “Operations in Burma To Open and Secure an Overland Route to China”, circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 19, 1943, not printed. At their meeting on May 20, 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff directed that C.C.S. 231 be withdrawn from the Agenda; see post, p. 142.
9. See post, p. 87.
10. A brief presentation of Eaker’s plan for the combined bomber offensive from the United Kingdom is set forth in enclosure B to C.C.S. 217, May 14, 1943, post, p. 241.
11. The plan under reference was circulated on May 15 as C.C.S. 215, May 13, 1943, “Invasion of the Continent from the United Kingdom in 1943–1944”, post, p. 238.
12. The reference is presumably to C.C.S. 227, May 16, 1943, a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff, entitled “Relief and Supplies for Occupied and Liberated Territories” (not printed). This memorandum, which was circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 16, estimated the monthly food and fuel requirements for Italy, Greece, Albania, and Yugoslavia to be provided from United Nations stocks and the number and type of ships needed to move such relief supplies.
13. The paper prepared was circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as C.C.S. 235, May 18, 1943, “Defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe”, post, p. 273.
14. The paper prepared was circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as C.C.S. 234, May 17, 1943, “Defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe (Elimination of Italy First)”, post, p. 261.
15. The reference is presumably to C.C.S. 227, May 16, 1943, “Relief and Supplies for Occupied and Liberated Territories”; see ante, p. 83, footnote 12.
16. The telegram was sent as No. 1371, May 15, 1943, from Marshall to Wheeler (J.C.S. Files). For an indication of parallel action by the British Chiefs of Staff, see item 2 of the minutes of the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff: on May 17, post, p. 87.
17. The reference is to C.C.S. 226, post, p. 304.