Foreign Relations of the United States, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943

Lot 60 D 224

The Secretary of State’s Special Assistant ( Pasvolsky ) to the Secretary of State ¹

[ Washington ,] August 18, 1943.

Memorandum for the Secretary

Subject: Italian Documents

The attached memoranda deal with the following questions:

1. Alternative methods of dealing with the Italo-Austrian and Italo-Yugoslav frontiers; with Italian colonial possessions; and with the island of Pantelleria.

2. Alternative methods of dealing with the internal political situation in Italy, from the viewpoint of the problems of central and local governments during the transitional period and later.

The memoranda are accompanied by appropriate maps.² They are based, in large measure, on discussions in various committees.³

L[eo] P[asvolsky]

[Enclosure 1]

Memorandum by Mr. David Harris, of the Division of Political Studies

secret
H–4

[ Washington ,] May 12, 1943.

Italy—Austria

Territorial Problems: Venezia Tridentina (South Tyrol)

i. the problem

The problem is whether the frontier should remain at the Brenner Pass or be moved further south to conform more nearly to ethnic distribution.

The South Tyrol was given to Italy in 1919 as a maximum satisfaction of the demand for security. The more than 200,000 Austrians placed under Italian sovereignty were subjected to ruthless Italianization. In 1939 an Italo-German treaty gave the German-speaking Tyrolese the choice of migrating to Germany or remaining in Italy. 185,000 (69 percent) voted to emigrate. Early in 1942, 66,000 were reported to have moved to Germany; more recent indications suggest that the number is now much higher. Aside from hydro-electric developments, no significant economic interests are involved.

ii. the solutions

(Indicated on Map 5, Italian Series)

A. The Line Demanded by Italy in May 1915

This solution was accepted as a first choice by the Political Subcommittee.

The Italian Government in 1915 demanded of Austria–Hungary a frontier that would have incorporated approximately 60,000 Austrians, most of them in and near the strategically important town of Bolzano. While that line would have provided good defensive terrain, the valley of the Upper Adige, remaining under Austrian control, would have been dependent on Italian communications and markets.

1. Discussion of the Political Subcommittee

In the discussion of the Political Subcommittee judgments were expressed against retaining the present frontier on the grounds of the execrable conduct of Italy, of the ethnic injustice done in 1919, and of the general unwillingness to give undue importance to strategic considerations. There was also disposition to believe that the restoration of territory to a revived Austria would provide for that state an increment of prestige, material resources and population.

The subcommittee, consequently, leaned to the tentative view that the United States Government should start its negotiations on the basis of the line demanded by the Italian Government of its own free will in May 1915.

B. The Present Boundary

The Brenner line conforms to the principle of minimum change, affords maximum security advantages to Italy, and would leave no basis for subsequent Italian grievances. How much of an ethnic problem will remain at the end of the war is at present uncertain.

1. Discussion of the Political Subcommittee

In the Political Subcommittee’s consideration of the problem concern was voiced lest any territorial gain by Austria become in the long run an advantage to Germany. Conviction was expressed that the United States has more to fear from Germany than from Italy on the Brenner Pass, and that the loss of the strategic frontier would create international instability through the fears and resentments engendered in Italy. For such reasons the subcommittee envisaged the possibility that subsequent developments might counsel the acceptance of the existing boundary.

2. Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee

The Territorial Subcommittee, taking into consideration the uncertainties as to the future of Austria and the great importance given by the Italians to the Brenner Pass, inclined to the maintenance of the present frontier. It was none the less disposed to admit a modification of views in the light of subsequent developments.

C. The American Proposal in 1919

American experts at the Paris Conference proposed a line designed to give adequate defense to Italy short of the Brenner Pass. That frontier, however, would have transferred 133,000 Austrians to Italian sovereignty. This proposal in 1919 received no attention because of President Wilson’s independent commitment to Italy.

D. The Ethnic Line

The ethnic line is fairly distinct and follows watersheds except for the valley at Bolzano. Such a line, the least favorable to Italy of those here noted, would deprive Italy of extensive hydro-electric developments and would give the Italians excuse for agitation on the grounds of defense.

[Here follows a section headed “Documentation”.]

[Enclosure 2]

Memorandum by Messrs. David, Harris and Leon W. Fuller, of the Division of Political Studies

secret
H–3

[ Washington ,] May 12, 1943.

Italy—Yugoslavia

Territorial Problems: The Italo-Yugoslav Frontier

i. the problem

The problem is the rectification of the Italo-Yugoslav boundary in the interest of reducing the number of Slavs under Italian control and of providing improved access to port facilities for Yugoslavia and Central Europe.

The Yugoslav Government-in-exile has asked for the cession of the Italian province of Venezia Giulia, Zara, and the Dalmatian islands, and that part of the Udine region inhabited by Slovenes.

Venezia Giulia has an area of 5,252 square miles and a population of approximately 950,000 inhabitants. The province contains coal, bauxite and mercury deposits of considerable importance. The ports of Trieste and Fiume are potentially more useful to Central Europe than to Italy. The large Slav minority (39 percent by the Italian census of 1921 and a larger percent by Yugoslav estimates) has been subject to a rigorous policy of Italianization. The population of Zara and the Dalmatian islands in 1921 was 19,000 of whom 12,000 were Italians.

ii. alternative solutions

(Indicated on Map 6, Italian Series)

A. Line Suggested by the Territorial Subcommittee (represented in red on Map 6)

In the north this line would follow the 1914 frontier southward from the southern boundary of the Tarvisio district. Gorizia might go either to Italy or to Yugoslavia, but the coastal railway connecting Trieste with Italy and the city itself would remain in Italian hands. From the outskirts of Trieste the line [would] follow the watershed in a southeasterly and subsequently in a southerly direction and reach the sea immediately west of the town of Fianona, thereby leaving the neighboring coal deposits to Italy. Approximately 140,000 Yugoslavs live in that part of Venezia Giulia left to Italy while less than 20,000 Italians, aside from those in Fiume and Zara, would come under Yugoslav sovereignty.

1. Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee

The Territorial Subcommittee in January 1943 proposed this line on the grounds that it represented the most equitable adjustment of economic, ethnic and—to a lesser degree—strategic considerations. A principle basic to the recommendation was the desire that as few Yugoslavs as possible be kept under Italian sovereignty because of the bad record Italy has made in its treatment of minorities.

With respect to the Istrian peninsula, minority opinion opposed retention of the coal fields by Italy out of conviction that the small percent of Italy’s total consumption that is mined in the province could well be bought in the world market. Likewise in opposition was the judgment that Italian population figures misrepresented the ethnic distribution and that the whole of the peninsula below Trieste should be given to Yugoslavia.

There was some disposition to make Trieste a free port because of its importance to Central Europe but the majority view leaned toward assigning Trieste to Italy and Fiume to Yugoslavia with possibly some guaranties of access from Central Europe.

2. Discussion of the Political Subcommittee

The Political Subcommittee concurred in the recommendation of the Territorial Subcommittee. While it was agreed that a solution of the transportation problem might be sought by international controls, strong reluctance was expressed to an international régime for the supervision of minorities because of the grave potentialities of disturbance involved.

B. A Compromise Line combining in the north the Italian Demand of 1915 and in the south the American Proposal of 1919.

This second solution would vary from the first by moving the frontier above Trieste a few miles to the East, thereby giving Italy the city of Gorizia and most of the valley of the Isonzo. By such a line the railway from Klagenfurt would be cut twice and Italy would retain control of approximately 185,000 Yugoslavs.

1. Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee

Several of the considerations advanced were as pertinent to the second solution as to the first here indicated. The Territorial Subcommittee originally was disposed to approve the compromise line but subsequently adopted the first alternative in the interest of removing more Slovenes from Italian control.

C. The American Proposal of 1919

Inspired by the desire to give Italy a defensible frontier west of the boundary demanded by the Italian Government, the American line followed the Istrian watersheds. It would divide the coal and bauxite but would give most of the industrial developments to Italy. Approximately 240,000 Yugoslavs would remain under Italy.

D. The Italian Demand of 1915

This line, demanded as the price of continued neutrality, would lie east of the Isonzo and include in Italy the cities of Gorizia and Monfalcone. The original demand specified a free city of Trieste, but made no claims to the Istrian peninsula. Such a frontier would give Italy few resources of value and would leave a large Slovene minority to Italy. It would likewise disrupt the railway systems of the area.

E. The Ethnic Line

Such an ethnic line as can be drawn on the basis of suspect and out-of-date census returns would leave minorities on each side and, in the north, would give to Yugoslavia territory held by Italy since 1866. This line would sever the Pola–Trieste railway and isolate Trieste from its hinterland.

1. Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee

While the Territorial Subcommittee agreed that ethnic considerations should take precedence over economic and strategic, it was pointed out that the existence of several strong forces made it impossible rigidly to apply the ethnic principle all over Europe.

Suggestion was made that the new frontier might be moved west of the 1914 boundary in order to incorporate the Slovenes of the Udine region into Yugoslavia but this proposal was opposed in anticipation that such action would create a new Italia irredenta.

F. The Yugoslav Claim

No subcommittee favored adoption of this solution.

The Yugoslavs claim, on ethnic grounds, a frontier running north from the vicinity of Monfalcone, crossing the 1914 boundary to include in Yugoslavia a part of the Udine region, which has been Italian since 1866. The territory claimed by Yugoslavia has an approximate area of 5,400 square miles and a population of about 930,000. An Italian minority of some 435,000 would be left in Yugoslavia, including some 200,000 in the strongly Italian city of Trieste.

[Here follows a section headed “Documentation”.]

[Enclosure 3]

Memorandum by Messrs. Leon W. Fuller and David Harris, of the Division of Political Studies

secret
H–2

[ Washington ,] May 12, 1943.

Italy—Greece—Turkey

Colonial Problems: The Dodecanese Islands

i. the problem

The problem is the disposition to be made of the Dodecanese Islands.

The Greek Government has formally asked for the cession of these islands. The islands were seized by Italy in 1912 and formally ceded by Turkey in the treaty of Lausanne in 1923. The twelve islands have a combined area of 1,035 square miles and a total of approximately 150,000 inhabitants, more than 80 percent of whom are culturally Greek. They have little economic importance but a certain strategic significance because of their location near the southwest coast of Anatolia.

ii. alternative solutions

A. Cession to Greece

This solution has been approved by several of the subcommittees though with the thought that some qualification might be desirable.

Cession of the islands to Greece would be most consonant with the ethnic character and wishes of the inhabitants. There is no strong evidence that Greek annexation would injure good Graeco-Turkish relations, although guaranties of demilitarization might reasonably be imposed as a contribution to continued understanding. On the other side is the prospect of creating for Greece additional economic burdens.

1. Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee

The Territorial Subcommittee held that Italy, because of imperialistic aggressions and misrule of the islands, had no valid claims. It was felt that the disposition of the Dodecanese should avoid prejudicing good relations between Greece and Turkey. In view of the Greeks’ abandonment of earlier ambitions for expansion in Anatolia, the Subcommittee believed that the islands could be entrusted to Greece. It recommended, therefore, that union be supported …

2. Discussion of the Political Subcommittee

The Political Subcommittee concurred in the recommendation of the Territorial Subcommittee, although some objection was voiced to the cession of Rhodes to Greece.

3. Discussion of the Security Subcommittee

The Security Subcommittee, likewise approving the recommendation, was of opinion that the islands had only slight strategic value and would not be a menace to Turkey if placed under the control of a weak power such as Greece.

4. Discussion of the Security Technical Committee

In the judgment of the military and naval members of the Subcommittee the islands were of no significant value either for surface warships or for air bases if the United Nations held other ports and bases in the East Mediterranean area. It was likewise pointed out that Italy had no valid claims to the islands on grounds of national security.

B. Cession to Turkey

Turkey has a potential claim rooted in four hundred years of ownership and a strategic interest in the fate of islands so close to its shores. The Turkish government, as a general policy, has disclaimed territorial aspirations, but there exists some evidence of a desire in Turkish military and diplomatic circles to annex at least some of the islands with a possible exchange of populations among the islands.

C. Internationalization

An international administration might offer the best government and dispel fears that the islands would be used for aggressive purposes. The close cultural ties of the inhabitants with Greece, however, would seem to suggest the desirability of such a solution only on the ground of the military needs of the international organization for strategic centers.

D. Cession to Great Britain

This proposal has received no favorable consideration.

This solution would perhaps strengthen British security arrangements in the Mediterranean but would leave unsettled the nationality problem and would engender Turkish resentment.

[Here follows a section headed “Documentation”.]

[Enclosure 4]

Memorandum by Mr. Philip W. Ireland, of the Division of Political Studies

secret
H–5

[ Washington ,] May 12, 1943.

Italy—Egypt

Colonial Problems: Libya

i. the problem

The problem is the disposition of Libya.

The occupation by Great Britain of this Italian colony and Mr. Eden’s statement that the British Government was determined that the Senussi should not again fall under Italian domination⁴ raises the question of its future.

Libya was taken by Italy in the Italo-Turkish War of 1911–1912 but not until 1932 was Italian domination established over the country by brutality and bloodshed which gained for Italy bitter hatred and an unenviable reputation. Libya has been a strategic asset to Italy. Italian colonists numbering about 20,000 have been placed on the land but on the whole the colony has been an economic liability.

ii. alternative solutions

A. International Trusteeship

This solution was preferred by the Political Subcommittee.

Under the proposal put forward by a special subcommittee (September 26, 1942) Libya would form a portion of a North African Region composed of all North Africa except Algeria and Egypt. The area was to be placed under a regional council composed of Great Britain, France, Spain, United States, Egypt, Turkey and possibly Italy. Libya was to be placed under the administration of Turkey, because this country was a Moslem state because it has reached a stage in its development entitling it to further international responsibility. This solution was incorporated with some modifications into an international trusteeship plan (December 3, 1942) subsequently narrowed in a revised plan (April 15, 1943) which places Libya under the direct administration of a North and East Africa Regional Supervisory Council composed of Great Britain, France and Egypt and, subject to reservation, Ethiopia, and possibly Turkey and Greece. Italy’s future participation was tentatively not precluded.

1. Discussion of the Political Subcommittee

It was the consensus, in view of the disastrous effect of Italian administration on the indigenous population, that the territory should not be left in Italian hands. No better solution existed than that of international trusteeship. It was held that the administration of Libya should be placed in the hands of an international council rather than any one power such as Turkey. Opinion was against the participation of the United States in a trusteeship in this part of the world.

2. Discussion of the Security Subcommittee

It was agreed in view of the rapid development of air-power that it was not important, from a security standpoint, who controlled Libya.

B. Division of Libya Between Egypt and Tunisia

This solution, suggested in a memorandum by the Council on Foreign Relations,⁵ involves the cession of Cyrenaica to Egypt, thereby providing the latter with a defensible western frontier, and of Tripoli to Tunis, with which it was held to be economically and geographically a unit.

1. Discussion of the Political Subcommittee

Opposition was expressed to the proposal on the ground that the poor administration of Egypt should not be extended and that the addition of Italians to Tunisia would further disturb the balance between French and Italians in Tunisia.

C. Return of Libya to Italy

This solution was rejected by the subcommittees, although a minority in the Security Subcommittee held that Libya should be retained by a demilitarized Italy. It was also pointed out that detachment of Libya from Italy might be interpreted as “veiled annexation” of Italian metropolitan territory. It was stressed, however, that no solution which was eventually adopted for Libya should preclude Italian migration into Libya or enjoyment of equal opportunities by Italians.

D. Establishment of Libya as a Refuge for Jews

This solution has not been discussed by the Subcommittees.

This solution, put forward by a recent observer, advocates the creation of a Jewish State in Cyrenaica and the settlement of Jewish refugees in the villages and farms vacated by the Italians and on additional land. Such a solution would alleviate the Jewish refugee problem somewhat and relieve pressure on Palestine. The proposal envisages negotiations with Arab leaders of the area and the Near East to permit the settlement of Jews.

One obstacle in the way of this plan is that little arable land is available beyond that already taken up by Italian colonists and indigenous cultivators. Even before the war, pressure on the land had led to increasing unrest. It is also doubtful if an agreement could be reached with the Arabs of Libya, particularly with the Senussi, whose power is growing. An increase in Arab nationalism in Libya has been reported. An attempt to foster Jewish settlement in Libya might result in extending the area of Arab-Jewish conflict without offering any substantial relief to the Jewish refugee problem.

[Here follows a section headed “Documentation”.]

[Enclosure 5]

Memorandum by Mr. Philip W. Ireland, of the Division of Political Studies

secret
H–7

[ Washington ,] June 1, 1943.

Italy—Ethiopia

Colonial Problems: Eritrea and Italian Somaliland

i. the problem

The problem is the disposition of Italian colonies in East Africa.

The problem arises through the ejection of the Italians from Eritrea and Italian Somaliland by British forces. It is intimately related to the Ethiopian ambition to secure an outlet to the sea.

From these colonies, acquired by Italy in the 1880’s and always economically unprofitable, Italian aggression against Ethiopia was launched. From Eritrea the Italians sought to enlarge their influence in Yemen and create a counterweight to Aden. The territories have not been popular with Italian colonists; only about 5,500 Italians lived there in 1931. Other groups in Eritrea are 255,000 Somalis, 45,000 Danakils and 375,000 Christians; most of the Christians are religiously, linguistically and ethnically part of the Amharic peoples of the Ethiopian plateau. Somaliland, with a population of one million persons, is inhabited principally by Somalis.

ii. alternative solutions

A. International Administration of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland

This solution was generally favored by the Political Subcommittee.

This solution would avoid replacing Italian sovereignty by any other national sovereignty. It would furnish a better administration than that which could be provided by Ethiopia in any part of these colonies ceded to that country. The cost of international administration might not be defrayable from local revenues. This solution would not meet the Ethiopian demand for an outlet to the sea under its own sovereignty, nor would it unite the related peoples of Ethiopia and Eritrea.

1. Discussion of the Political Subcommittee

The Political Subcommittee felt that, since Italian colonies should not be returned to Italy, the logical conclusion seemed to be to place these colonies under trusteeship of the United Nations. In them free ports should be granted to Ethiopia. Attention was called to the fact that the singling out of these two colonies to be placed under international administration would not be well received by American public opinion.

2. Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee

A majority of this subcommittee believed that, since Italy had used these colonies as bases for its attack on Ethiopia and since they had been economically unessential to Italy, there was no reason for returning them to Italy.

3. Discussion of the Security Subcommittee

It was the consensus that the control of air and naval bases in these areas would not be essential to an international security organization, although the United States might wish to retain an interest in the air base at Asmara. Eritrea, therefore, might be placed under international administration or fall within the British sphere of influence. Italian Somaliland should be left under Italian control. Ethiopia should receive an outlet to the sea. It was remarked that in any event a “grab” for territory should not be permitted.

B. International Administration of Northeastern Africa

This solution was held to be impractical by the subcommittees.

Under this solution, proposed by a special subcommittee (Sept. 26, 1942), all colonial territories in northeastern Africa from the Sudan to Kenya would be placed under international trusteeship, to be administered by a Regional Supervisory Council composed of Egypt, Great Britain, France and Ethiopia. Italian Somaliland would be placed temporarily under British administration, and portions of Eritrea sufficient to afford an outlet to the sea would be given to Ethiopia.

This solution would have the merit of avoiding discrimination against Italy. It would break the ring of territories surrounding Ethiopia and would meet Ethiopia’s desires for an outlet to the sea under its own sovereignty.

1. Discussion of the Political Subcommittee

This subcommittee believed that, if international control of colonial territories were to be established, it might well begin in this area, but that, in view of the opposition of France and Great Britain to pooling their colonies, the plan was impractical. Several members opposed (a) the assignment to Great Britain of the temporary administration of the colonies on the ground that such administration would tend to become permanent; (b) the inclusion of Egypt on the council since it had no interest in this area; and (c) the inclusion of Ethiopia on the council on grounds of its inability to govern well.

2. Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee

The view was also held by this subcommittee that the interests of France and Great Britain would render international administration impracticable.

C. Cession of Eritrea in Whole or in Part to Ethiopia and of Italian Somaliland to Great Britain

This solution, which found little favor with the subcommittees, was not discussed in detail.

This solution would have the merit of uniting peoples of the Ethiopian plateau having common ethnic, religious and linguistic ties. It would satisfy the major claim of Ethiopia for an outlet under its own sovereignty. It would give Italian Somaliland a higher quality of administration, comparable to that of British Somaliland. It would have the slight disadvantage of adding groups of backward Danakils and Somalis to the non-Amharic minority within the Ethiopian Empire.

1. Discussion of the Political Subcommittee

The Political Subcommittee held that no part of Eritrea should be added to Ethiopia. Great Britain was referred to as being the logical power to administer Italian Somaliland, although it was pointed out that a transfer of territory from Italy to Great Britain would have to be justified in terms of principle. The advantages or disadvantages of integrating ethnic groups in the area were not fully discussed.

2. Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee

The subcommittee doubted that Ethiopia could adequately govern additional territory.

D. Eritrea and Italian Somaliland To Be Administered by Great Britain

This solution, suggested in the Political Subcommittee on the grounds of economy and expediency, was held to be contrary to American public opinion. It was not further discussed.

E. Return of Eritrea and Somaliland to Italy

This solution found favor with a small minority of the members in the subcommittees.

This solution would presumably be connected with disarmament of Italy and pledges of non-aggression in this area. It might forestall the growth of Italian resentment at allegedly discriminatory treatment. It would, however, leave Ethiopia surrounded by territory controlled by European powers.

1. Discussion of the Political Subcommittee

A minority of this subcommittee expressed the view that the return of these colonies, which few other powers would desire, might be an inducement to Italy to cooperate with the United Nations and provide an outlet for Italian emigration. A majority held that the record of Italy indicated that it could not be entrusted with these colonies.

2. Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee

The view was expressed that the loss of the colonies would be regarded, wrongly or rightly, as the removal of potential outlets for Italian emigration. It was also believed that Great Britain, in view of its interests in the Red Sea areas, would oppose the return of the colonies to Italy.

[Here follows a section headed “Documentation”.]

[Enclosure 6]

Memorandum by Mr. Grayson L. Kirk, of the Division of Political Studies

secret
H–3000

[ Washington ,] May 12, 1943.

Italy

Security Problems: Pantelleria

i. the problem

The problem is the disposition to be made of the Italian island of Pantelleria.

This problem will require decision because of its relevance to future security arrangements in the Mediterranean. Although Pantelleria is a small island (32 sq. mi.) and lacking in good harbor facilities, its strategic location midway between Cape Bon and the Sicilian coast, and its proximity to Malta (approximately 150 miles to the eastward), give it a high strategical importance as an air base. Originally developed as a base for attacks on Tunisia, it has served during the present war as a refuelling depot for bombers en route to Libya, and its 4,000 ft. runway and underground repair shops and hangars have provided base facilities for fighter planes which have harassed British convoys to Malta and Egypt. The disposition of Pantelleria must be considered as one part of the general problem of control over Italian armaments.

ii. alternative solutions

A. Continued Italian Sovereignty, With Complete Demilitarization

This solution was tentatively accepted by the Security Subcommittee and the Security Technical Committee.

1. Discussion of the Security Subcommittee

The Security Subcommittee, while not excluding the possibility of direct administration by an international agency, felt that continued Italian sovereignty was preferable to a transfer to another power, e.g., Great Britain. Such a transfer might create lasting irredentism in Italy; it would be difficult to reconcile with the Atlantic Charter; and it would provide no security advantages which could not be assured equally well through a policy of enforced demilitarization.

2. Discussion of the Security Technical Committee

The Security Technical Committee inclined to the view that the central goal, i.e., the assurance that Pantelleria would not again be used to help block free use of the central Mediterranean, could be achieved under Italian sovereignty, provided a system of thorough demilitarization, coupled with inspection, were instituted.

B. Transfer to Great Britain

1. Discussion of the Security Subcommittee

The view was expressed that the transfer of Pantelleria to Great Britain might be contemplated because of its relationship to the defense of Malta, and because Great Britain would probably continue to bear the primary responsibility for the maintenance of security in the Mediterranean area.

2. Discussion of the Security Technical Committee

It was suggested that transfer to Great Britain would provide full assurance that the “waist” of the Mediterranean would be kept open in the future; also that the loss of the island would be resented by Italy far less than the loss of Sicily, or even a part thereof.

C. Administrative Control by the International Organization

This alternative was mentioned briefly, though not discussed, in the Political Subcommittee and the Security Subcommittee. It was mentioned in connection with the suggestion that certain areas in North Africa possessing special security significance might be placed under the permanent administration of an international security agency.

[Here follows a section headed “Documentation”.]

[Enclosure 7]

Memorandum by Mr. C. Easton Rothwell, of the Division of Political Studies

secret
H–9

[ Washington ,] June 9, 1943.

Italy: Political Reconstruction: National Government During the Transition Period

i. the problem

The problem is to determine what political elements should be supported in order to assure a stable and orderly transition government in Italy, without prejudicing the ultimate right of political self-determination and the development of democratic processes.

The problem arises because of the desirability of fostering a non-Fascist Italian government upon which the United Nations can rely either (1) to hasten Italy’s capitulation, or (2) in the event of invasion, to assume authority when the progress of military occupation permits. Since such a government would presumably be transitional in character, the further problem arises as to what safeguards may be necessary to assure the subsequent free choice of a permanent régime by the Italian people.

The United States and Great Britain have announced that they will not deal with any member or agent of the Fascist régime. The determination of what non-Fascist elements might be capable of forming a strong and stable transitional government is made difficult, however, by uncertainty as to political conditions at the moment of Fascist collapse and by the absence within Italy of any large or cohesive opposition group or any leader of commanding stature. Among the elements out of which a provisional government might be constructed are: (1) the House of Savoy; (2) the Army or certain of its representatives, divorced from the Fascist Régime; (3) conservative elements among the middle classes and the peasantry who may be drawn into some coalition with the monarchy and the army; (4) revolutionary elements, now scattered, that may emerge; and (5) Italian exiles, the largest organized body of whom is the Free Italy movement, headed by Count Sforza, Reliable appraisal of political groups and leaders within Italy is difficult at present because of the scant and often conflicting nature of available information.

ii. alternative solutions

A. A Government Under Auspices of the House of Savoy

This solution was generally regarded by the Political Subcommittee and the Territorial Subcommittee as the least unsatisfactory.

The House of Savoy has been the legitimate source of political authority in Italy ever since unification was consummated in 1871. Since 1848 the powers of the king have been limited by the Statuto Fondamentale del Regno, which made possible a liberal constitutional monarchy. Although widely popular under earlier monarchs, the House of Savoy has never won universal confidence and loyalty among the Italians, partially because of the lack of a strong tradition of monarchy, smouldering republican aspirations, and regional resentments against the ascendency of the Piedmontese dynasty.

The present monarch, Victor Emmanuel III, has not attained the prestige of his predecessors because his reign has lacked both luster and strength. Moreover, he is tainted in the eyes of many anti-Fascists because he called Mussolini to power in 1922 against the advice of his ministers and because he has since shown no convincing disposition to resist Fascist policies. His prestige was further undermined by an act of 1928 that placed under the custody of the Fascist Grand Council the succession to the Throne and the powers and prerogatives of the Crown.

There are conflicting reports from Italy and from neutral sources concerning the present strength and popularity of the Monarchy. On the one hand it is claimed that the House of Savoy has the confidence of conservative urban groups, of most of the peasantry (40–50% of the Italian population) and of the Vatican. Other sources suggest that the Monarchy has suffered irreparable loss of prestige and is widely unpopular, especially throughout Northern Italy. Republican-minded anti-Fascists maintain that a continuation of the monarchy would play into the hands of the allegedly reactionary and Fascist-minded upper-middle classes.

Many sources think it possible that the present King may, at the moment of political crisis, abdicate in favor of Prince Humbert,⁶ who, although not widely popular and giving no evidence of distinguished abilities, may be more generally acceptable. There are also rumors that a regency may be formed under the Crown Princess for her son born in 1937.⁷

The House of Savoy might conceivably assert itself with assistance from the Army to establish an authoritarian régime. This would mean a breach of the constitution and a repudiation of the dynasty’s liberal traditions. If the King were not strong enough personally to assert his authority, a struggle for dominant position might ensue among his supporters. It is more likely, however, that the ruling house by virtue of its historical position and present weaknesses, would continue as a constitutional monarchy under the Statuto. In this event it would remain a façade behind which a contest for power might develop among various political elements, particularly those of moderate or rightist tendency such as the Army, the Church, the financial and industrial classes, the more conservative lesser middle-classes and the peasantry. In either case, a government under the House of Savoy might afford only doubtful assurance of stability and might prejudice the subsequent free choice of a permanent government by the Italian people.

1. Discussion of the Political Subcommittee

The Political Subcommittee inclined to the view that there might be advantage in dealing with the House of Savoy as the nominal “legitimate authority”. Moreover, the people of Italy were thought to be devoted to the institution of the monarchy, regardless of the acknowledged weakness and disrepute of the present King. It was believed that under the House of Savoy, with its constitutional tradition and its continuity with pre-Fascist Italy, a liberal government might be developed and no better combination was thought possible for establishing strong and orderly government than one headed by the House of Savoy with the properly subordinated support of the Army. As between the present King and the Prince of Piedmont, some preference was indicated for the Prince.

The consensus was that a transitional government under the House of Savoy would be the least objectionable of the various possibilities. One view was, however, that although military requirements might make it necessary to deal with the House of Savoy, this should be a last resort because the monarchy’s record under Fascism is in conflict with the aims of the United Nations. It was emphasized that any action that might appear to impose a government on the Italian people against their will should be avoided, both on the basis of United Nations principles and because it might provoke revolution. Moreover, the recognition of any provisional government should be accompanied by provisions to assure the right of the Italian people to choose their own government when they have time to think coolly and to express themselves clearly. If the people meanwhile indicate a preference for the House of Savoy and if the monarchy shows promise of enabling the development of democratic government, the United Nations could scarcely refuse to deal with it.

2. Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee

The Territorial Subcommittee discussed this alternative briefly. It was suggested that the Italian people would rally around the King (or the Prince, if the King abdicates) despite the weaknesses of the monarchy, because the House of Savoy is a symbol of continuity and might provide a means of returning to older institutions, somewhat modified by Fascist changes. Relations between the Holy See and the House of Savoy were said to be very close, although the Vatican does not regard political adjustments as its proper field of activity.

B. A Government Headed by the Army, Divorced From the Fascist Régime

Opposition to the Fascist régime has grown within the Army since the attack upon Greece in 1940. It is pronounced among certain higher officers who have been made scapegoats for Italian military disasters; among them are Generals Badoglio and Caviglia, both of whom have been mentioned as possible leaders of a transitional government.

Those who advocate a provisional régime under Army leaders reason that only such a government could assure the cessation of Italian resistance or could deliver to the United Nations the support of Italian armed forces, both within Italy and throughout Southeastern Europe. These observers also believe that an Army government would best assure stability and order following the overthrow of Fascism. Opponents of this solution fear that control by the Army might lead to another dictatorship, might obstruct the free choice of a permanent government by the Italian people and might prevent the ultimate development of a liberal and democratic régime. Luigi Sturzo, former leader of the Popular Party, maintains that the Italian people would have no confidence in a civilian authority under Army leadership, as evidenced by their turning out of the repressive government of General Luigi Pelloux in 1900.

1. Discussion of the Political Subcommittee

The Political Subcommittee was disposed to agree that the United Nations may have to deal with a government under the Army or some element of the Army in order to hasten the defeat of the Axis and to gain any military assistance from the Italians. The possibility of military dictatorship was thought to make this a dangerous solution, however, especially if it should interfere with the subsequent free political choice of the Italian people and the development of democratic government. Doubt was expressed as to whether an army leader could be found who would be capable of forming the government, because most of them are either too old or without popular following.

2. Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee

The possibility of a transitional government under the Army was given only brief consideration, in the Territorial Subcommittee. The subcommittee noted that there might be a period when questions of governmental form and civil liberty would have to be subordinated to primary questions of police order, but recognized that these temporary necessities might prejudice the subsequent free choice of a government by the Italian people.

C. A Revolutionary Régime

According to available information there are no present indications of a substantial and well-integrated revolutionary movement in Italy. Disaffection with the Fascist régime has spread in varying degrees throughout the professional and business classes, the university faculties and students, sections of the peasantry and the independent farmers, the laboring classes, and the rank and file of the Army. These diverse elements range in political complexion from moderate to communist, and have in common only their opposition to Fascism, motivated principally by its failures both in war and in domestic policy. Only the small communist group appears to be closely-knit. The possibility is not precluded, however, that a nation-wide revolutionary movement may be engendered by military events leading to the defeat of Italy.

Among the opposition groups of the center and left there is some demand for a republican form of government. This is true of those elements within Italy that are sympathetic towards the exile Free Italy movement under the leadership of Count Carlo Sforza.

1. Discussion of the Political Subcommittee

The Political Subcommittee discounted the probability of a revolutionary government because of the present lack of organization. It questioned whether a régime established by a popular uprising could take over without violence, or would have sufficient authority to govern, even during an interregnum. This would be true even though the Socialist Party and the Labor Unions might regain strength.

2. Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee

The Territorial Subcommittee inclined to believe that considerable time would be required to build up the prestige of possible leaders in labor circles or other underground movements. The subcommittee reached no conclusion concerning the advisability of dealing with a revolutionary régime, although it emphasized that the government of Italy must ultimately be based upon the people. The subcommittee noted that a chaotic revolutionary situation, in which various leaders would contend for control and in which the Italian armed forces might be divided, would create difficulties for the United Nations.

D. A Government Organized by Italians in Exile

Numerous groups seeking the overthrow of Fascism have been formed among Italian exiles in the Americas, Great Britain and the Near East. Predominant among them is the Free Italy movement led by Count Carlo Sforza, which has an extensive following among the large Italian population in the United States and the other American republics. The Free Italy movement has declared for a democratic republic in Italy and the right of political self-determination for the Italian people. Count Sforza has further projected a plan for the reorganization of Italian government that includes administrative decentralization as an assurance for the preservation of liberties. At a conference in Montevideo during August 1942, the Free Italy movement laid plans (as yet unrealized) for a National Council headed by Count Sforza, who was authorized to approach the United Nations for recognition of Free Italy. None of the major United Nations has officially recognized the movement. Moreover, the governments of the United States and Great Britain have indicated that they will pursue a cautious policy toward “free movements”.

1. Discussion of the Political Subcommittee

The Political Subcommittee inclined to the belief that Count Sforza has no great following in Italy and does not possess the attributes of a successful leader of a government-in-exile, despite his long record as an anti-Fascist. One member suggested that Count Sforza is not irrevocably opposed to the monarchy and might add strength to any government organized under a regency.

2. Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee

The Territorial Subcommittee felt that it would be unwise for the United States to support an exiled Italian leader lest this nation give the impression of wishing to impose a government on the Italian people. The subcommittee noted that the United States Government had for this reason avoided political commitments to “free movements”. Count Sforza, although widely respected, was thought to have no organized or politically significant following.

[Here follows a section headed “Documentation”.]

[Enclosure 8]

Memorandum by Mr. C. Easton Rothwell, of the Division of Political Studies

secret
H–11

[ Washington ,] June 9, 1943.

Italy: Political Reconstruction: Establishment of a Provisional Central Government

i. the problem

The problem is to determine whether, in the event that the whole or part of Italy is occupied by military forces of the United Nations, a provisional government should be established during occupation and, if so, at what stages and in what degree the provisional government should assume responsibility for civil administration.

The problem arises because some military experts believe that military exigencies may require that supreme authority remain in the hands of military officials until final peace arrangements are made; because a non-Fascist central government may be formed that will seek recognition as the ruling authority in liberated areas, or because the United Nations may find it expedient to recognize a provisional government for military and political reasons.

Normal civil functions, particularly the police powers, the dispensation of justice, and measures of health and sanitation must be carried forward, subject to military requirements, during the period of occupation. Certain civil activities, such as public finance, and monetary control will be more than local in scope and will probably require coordination throughout the occupied area. While these activities may be conducted under military auspices with the assistance of local functionaries, it is possible that they might be better administered under an Italian provisional government collaborating with the military commander. It is also reasonable to anticipate that civilian activities will gain importance as the occupation period lengthens, and that the demands for recognition of a provisional government may become more insistent.

ii. alternative proposals

A. Control of Civil Administration by the Occupying Military Authorities Until the Establishment and Recognition of a Permanent Government

This proposal was favored by the Security Subcommittee for enemy states in general, without specific reference to Italy.

Under this plan, supreme authority would remain throughout the occupation period with the commander of the occupying forces, who would exercise control and veto power over local civil government. Subject to these limitations, the local courts, administrative agencies, and legislative groups would continue to operate.

The principal arguments in favor of this proposal are that it will be made necessary by military requirements, that the local population will accept and respect a military authority more readily than a civilian authority during the period of occupation, and that such a policy accords with the laws of war. Opposition to the proposal is based upon the belief that the prolongation of foreign military control would provoke resentments that would obstruct the transition to a permanent political régime, and that the recognition of an Italian provisional government during this period would offer administrative advantages and might facilitate the ultimate realization of United Nations political aims.

B. Establishment of a Provisional Government During Occupation

This plan contemplates the recognition during occupation of an acceptable provisional government to administer such civil responsibilities as military requirements permit. It is presumed that this government would collaborate with the military commander and would remain in power until a permanent government acceptable to the United Nations had been chosen by the Italian people. Such a plan would require decision by the political authorities of the United Nations as to what form of provisional government should be recognized and what Italian political elements should be dealt with.

The recognition of a widely-supported provisional government might hasten the overthrow of Fascism, the collapse of Italian resistance and the capitulation of Italian armies elsewhere in Europe; and might even gain Italian military assistance for the United Nations. A provisional government might also be useful for the integration of civil administration in the occupied areas and for the conclusion of peace, Its collaboration in the establishment of a permanent régime might minimize the danger that the permanent government would be weakened later by allegations that it had been created under duress. While the political experience gained under a provisional government might facilitate an orderly transition to a permanent régime, it is equally possible that a provisional government might give rise to disruptive political struggles and might prejudice the subsequent free choice of a permanent régime by the Italian people. It is possible that military security would not permit the sharing of administrative responsibility with a provisional government during occupation and that any attempt to do so might lead to embarrassing political complications to the detriment of the military effort.

C. Recognition of a Provisional Government Prior to Occupation

The recognition of a provisional government in advance of occupation would doubtless be governed by political considerations related to obtaining the capitulation and possible support of Italian army forces. Such an arrangement might require commitments to the provisional government with regard to the assumption of certain phases of civil administration. In other respects, this proposal would be subject to the same considerations as B (Establishment of a Provisional Government During Occupation).

1. Discussion of the Security Subcommittee

The Security Subcommittee has discussed the possible recognition of a provisional government during the period of occupation principally in terms of “enemy states”, and has given only cursory consideration to its specific application in Italy. The subcommittee was in general agreement that military authority should dominate throughout the entire period of occupation and should terminate only when a permanent government acceptable to the victor powers had come into existence.

One member stated that even during occupation the military officials will have to decide with what civil government, if any, they will deal. This political decision would be more urgent if the occupation is of skeletal character rather than in full force, and would have to be based both upon military requirements and upon an estimate of the relationship of any particular government to United States security. The prevailing view, however, was that there can be no question of recognition during the period of occupation, and that any government would necessarily have to serve as “a minion” of the military commander until such time as the United Nations political authority terminated occupation and accorded full recognition to a permanent government.

At a subsequent meeting, however, after brief discussion the subcommittee approved a set of principles relating to the military occupation of Italy which provided that: “Whether or not an Italian national government shall be recognized and, if so, the degree of authority which should at various stages of the occupation be accorded to that government will be determined by the United Nations political authorities in consultation with the military commander”.

The consensus was that the occupying authority would make use of local officials under military supervision and that local courts and other civil agencies should continue to function subject to veto. The subcommittee did not consider the possible advantage of recognizing a provisional government as a means towards hastening the termination of resistance.

2. Discussion of the Political Subcommittee

The Political Subcommittee appeared to assume tacitly, when discussing what Italian individuals and groups should be dealt with, that a provisional government should be recognized during the occupation period, but did not consider that problem specifically.

3. Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee

The discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee was similar to that of the Political Subcommittee.

[Here follows a section headed “Documentation”.]

[Enclosure 9]

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Political Studies (Rothwell)⁸

secret
H–25a⁹

[ Washington ,] August 17, 1943.

Italy: Political Reconstruction: Nature of a Permanent National Government

i. the problem

The problem is to determine what form of permanent national government in Italy will be acceptable to the United Nations as a basis for recognition. The problem arises because the United States has assured the Italian people that when Fascism has been overthrown, they shall be free to choose whatever non-Fascist form of government they may wish to establish.

This commitment gives use [rise] to questions as to what definition of “non-Fascist” the United States may wish to apply, and as to whether the United Nations may wish to assure before recognition that the new government holds promise of stability, conforms to the requirements of international security, and gives expression to the liberal principles of the Atlantic Charter and of the Four Freedoms.

ii. basic institutional factors

A. Pre-Fascist Experience

From 1848 until the advent of Fascism in 1922 Italy was governed as a liberal constitutional monarchy under the House of Savoy and under the Statuto Fondamentale del Regno granted by the King. Because of serious weaknesses in the political environment, however, responsible parliamentary institutions did not function in the manner of their English counterparts; instead, the ministries centered around dominant personalities and were organized chiefly on the basis of political expedience. The liberal régime did not acquire either the roots or the strength to survive the economic and social chaos and the national resentments of the post-war period. Anti-liberal forces finally triumphed in 1922 when King Victor Emmanuel III called Mussolini to power against the advice of his ministers.

B. Institutions of the Fascist Régime

Under Fascism authoritarian institutions replaced liberal government. Parliament was reduced to a rubber-stamping body and finally abandoned in 1939 in favor of an appointive Chamber of Fasci and Corporations. Mussolini, in his dual capacity of Head of the Government and leader of the Fascist party, dominated every phase of administration as well as legislation. Civil liberties were set aside and the judicial structure was subordinated to the Totalitarian state. The Fascist party not only served as an instrument for controlling the government, but also was legally integrated with the governmental structure. Mussolini’s régime also undertook to regiment economic activity through the corporate system, a pyramided structure of workers and employers syndicates culminating in twenty-two corporations under Fascist control.

Throughout twenty years of Fascism the King, although actually exercising little power, remained the titular head of the Italian state. The Statuto nominally remained in force, but was completely perverted, its perversion having been facilitated by serious weaknesses in the document itself.

iii. present political forces

Many uncertain factors, including the course chosen by the present government under Marshal Badoglio and military events leading to Italy’s surrender, will undoubtedly influence the Italian people’s choice of a permanent government. What that choice may be can best be approached through an estimate (necessarily based on inadequate information) of the present and potential strength of various non-Fascist groups. These would include:

A. Supporters of the Monarchy, who would probably include a large proportion of the numerous peasantry, together with such influential conservative groups as the prominent industrialists and large land-owners. The support of the army is also probable but dependent upon military developments, while the navy and Carabinieri are reported to be obediently loyal to the House of Savoy.

B. The Catholics, whose leaders, guided by the interests of the Church, may be expected to exert considerable influence on the new government through the numerous Catholic organizations. While the Vatican and higher officials of the Church in Italy are reported to support a continuation of the monarchy, Don Luigi Sturzo, former leader of the Popular Party, believes the Vatican would bow to the wishes of the Italian people if they choose a republic, provided the new régime were not anti-clerical. A Catholic opposition party of moderate views and with wide-spread influence is reported to exist in Italy, despite the opposition of influential Catholics to a party tied to the Church. This party is said to favor the free choice of a government by the people.

C. The Liberals, principally members of the middle classes, the professions, and the intelligentsia, are not well integrated. At least eight distinct liberal groups, richer in leaders than followers, are said to exist. Their political objectives range from a desire to restore responsible parliamentary government under the King and the Statuto to a desire for a democratic republic with some degree of collectivism.

D. Leftist Groups. The socialist party, whose membership, like that of the communist party, is drawn chiefly from among the working classes of northern Italy, favors the establishment of a free and democratic socialism in Italy. It has recently joined other leftist groups in seeking the establishment of a republic. The communist party, although small in numbers, is reported to be the most closely organized of all left groups. The party’s present policy is collaboration with all anti-Fascist groups for the overthrow of Fascism and monarchy and the establishment of a democratic republic.

iv. alternative possibilities

A. Constitutional Monarchy Under the House of Savoy and the Statuto

This would mean a return to the pre-Fascist forms of government. It would restore responsible parliamentary institutions on a democratic basis under the monarch as the source of authority. Civic freedoms would be restored and placed under the custody of an independent judiciary.

Such a government would be supported by conservative elements and would probably also have the backing of the Catholic groups and of many liberals. It would be opposed by liberals who favor a republic, and by all leftist groups. Question remains, however, as to whether such a government would afford assurance of future political stability, since the weaknesses of the parliamentary system and the party structure revealed by previous experience may be expected to reappear, perhaps in more intense form.

If this form of government is chosen, certain changes in the Statuto may be desirable in the interest of stability. Among these would be provision for a special amending process, the insertion of a bill of rights, and the establishment of some instrumentality (perhaps like the Supreme Court of the United States) to pass upon the constitutionality of legislation. Some change may also be desirable to free the executive from the incubus of parliamentary instability without at the same time making possible any abuse of executive authority.

B. A Democratic Republic

The establishment of a democratic republic would mean the triumph of liberal and leftist forces at the expense of the more conservative groups which seek to retain the monarchy. In the absence of detailed specifications it may be assumed that the construction of a republic would follow the essentially liberal traditions of Mazzini, with a responsible, popularly elected executive and legislature and with adequate safeguards for individual liberties. A republican government might, however, reflect the desire of the socialists and other left-wing groups for some degree of collectivism.

The probable stability of such a régime is difficult to estimate at present. In its favor would be the still vital republican traditions and the wide-spread support it would probably receive from liberal and left groups, and possibly from the peasantry and the Church. On the other hand, a democratic and republican form of government would be subject to many of the weaknesses of a constitutional monarchy described above, and in addition, might be confronted for a considerable period with serious hostility from rightist groups.

C. A Communist Régime

There does not appear to be serious possibility of a communist régime in Italy unless the subsequent course of the war should lead to serious social disturbances and full-blown popular revolution. The communist party, although well-integrated, remains small, even when its reputed gains among the industrial classes are taken into consideration.

Discussion of the Subcommittees

Neither the Political Subcommittee nor the Territorial Subcommittee has considered the problem of a permanent national government for Italy. In discussing what groups to deal with during the transitional period, however, both subcommittees inclined to the view that a régime under the House of Savoy would be less objectionable and more stable than a military dictatorship, and would appear to be the only logical acceptable choice available. The subcommittees were skeptical of the possibilities of a revolutionary régime and discounted the possible influence of exile groups.

[Enclosure 10]

Memorandum by Mr. C. Easton Rothwell, of the Division of Political Studies

secret
H–25

[ Washington ,] August 4, 1943.

Italy: Political Reconstruction: Nature of a Permanent National Government

i. the problem

The problem is to determine what form of permanent national government in Italy will be acceptable to the United Nations as a basis for recognition. The problem arises because the United States has assured the Italian people that when Fascism has been eliminated they shall be free to choose whatever non-Fascist form of government they may wish to establish.

This commitment gives rise to questions as to what definition of “non-Fascist” the United States may wish to apply, and as to whether the United Nations may wish to assure before recognition that the new government holds promise of stability, conforms to the requirements of international security, and gives expression to the liberal principles of the Atlantic Charter and of the Four Freedoms.

ii. basic institutional factors

A. Pre-Fascist Traditions

From 1848 until the advent of the Fascist dictatorship in 1922 Italy was governed as a liberal constitutional monarchy under the House of Savoy. The Statuto Fondamentale del Regno, granted by the King, provided for a popularly-elected parliament and a responsible ministry, which Italian liberals hoped would perform the roles of their respective English counterparts. These aspirations were never fulfilled because of limitations in the Italian political environment such as a crippling heterogeneity of interests, of occupations and of living standards throughout the peninsula, the absence of any strong liberal tradition antedating the Risorgimento, a general lack of political experience, and low levels of literacy. The possibilities for democracy were curbed by suffrage restrictions until 1911, while the development of responsible parliamentary government was retarded by a multiplicity of relatively ineffectual parties. These conditions resulted between 1876 and 1922 in a succession of twenty-two ministries. Many of these centered around dominant personalities, were organized chiefly on the basis of political expediency, and were weakened by corruption. Despite these handicaps liberal institutions gained some strength, while the Italian nation made substantial headway toward political unity, higher levels of economic development and a significant program of social legislation.

The liberal régime nevertheless did not become sufficiently deep-rooted and vigorous to weather the severe trials of the post-war period, 1919–1922, in which nationalist resentment over the alleged defeat of Italian ambitions at the Peace Conference combined with economic readjustment and depression to arouse deep dissatisfactions and to stimulate anti-liberal tendencies. While the nation was beset by strikes and alarmed by the never very real spectre of Bolshevism, while injured national pride was finding active expression through returned soldiers and other social groups, and while violence was finding justification in the seizure of Fiume, the Italian parliament remained relatively ineffectual, and the growing Fascist movement received clandestine protection from sections of the bureaucracy. Anti-liberal forces finally triumphed in 1922, despite evidences of economic and political recovery in that year, when King Victor Emmanuel III disregarded the advice of his ministers and called Mussolini to power.

B. Institutions of the Fascist Régime

Under Fascism the liberal and democratic structure was gradually supplanted after 1925 by authoritarian institutions. The Parliament was reduced to a one-party instrument with little more power than the rubber-stamping of administrative decrees. Even the pretense of popular election was abandoned in 1939, when the old Chamber of Deputies was replaced by an appointive Chamber of Fasci and Corporations. The Council of Ministers, formerly responsible to Parliament, was made solely responsible to Mussolini, who, moreover, gained control of every governmental agency directly or indirectly in his dual capacity as Head of the Government and leader of the Fascist Party.

The Party, regimented according to a strict hierarchy, not only served as an instrument for the control of political institutions, but was also legally integrated with the governmental structure. After 1928 the Fascist Grand Council was a constitutional organ of the state, with the right to review all constitutional questions, including the prerogatives of the crown and the succession to the throne, and with power to propose new legislation, to sanction international treaties and to maintain a list of successors to Mussolini as Head of the Government.

Even the judicial structure was subordinated to the totalitarian state. The courts were deprived of independence and their jurisdiction was narrowed by the transfer of a wide range of political offenses to a Special Tribunal for the Defense of the State and by the expansion of the summary administrative powers of the police and other officials.

The most sweeping Fascist change in the Italian political structure was the establishment of the corporate system. This system, designed to regiment economic relations, was based on guild-like syndicates of workers and of employers (represented separately by government-appointed spokesmen), which in 1939 had a total of more than eleven million members. These syndicates were associated within a pyramidal organization that culminated in nine great confederations representing every aspect of Italian economic life and controlled by the Ministry of Corporations. In 1934 there were superimposed on the syndical structure twenty-two corporations, which were essentially councils to integrate the interests of labor, employers, the Fascist Party and the State.

The activities of the corporations have been correlated in part through the National Council of Corporations, but the principal centralizing agency was the Central Corporative Committee, which consisted of the principal ministers of state, other functionaries, officials of the Fascist Party, and officers of the corporations. A further integration of corporate institutions with the regular machinery of the state was effected in 1939 by the establishment of the Chamber of Fasci and Corporations, whose members were appointed from the councils of the Fascist Party and from the National Council of Corporations.

Through the corporate system, the Fascist state endeavored to abolish labor conflicts, to fix wages and working conditions and to provide means for the “unitary discipline of national economy”. Even before the war, and to a greater extent since 1940, this system of economic control was utilized in the pursuit of Fascism’s ultimate political ends.

C. Role of the Monarchy and the Statuto

During twenty years of Fascism, the king remained the titular head of the Italian state. In practice the monarchy exercised little or no power and was in fact subjected to political control by an act of 1928 which placed under the custody of the Grand Council of Fascism the powers and prerogatives of the crown as well as the succession to the throne. The Statuto was circumvented rather than abolished; it remains today the legal basis for Italian government despite the complete perversion of its liberal intent under Fascism. This distortion of the fundamental law was facilitated by serious weaknesses in the document itself. The statute contains no provision for amendment, being so phrased that it could be amplified and interpreted by ordinary legislation and usage. Protection of the constitution was implicitly and explicitly the duty of the king. When his powers were curbed by parliament, and later by the Fascist dictatorship, there was no instrumentality to review the constitutionality of legislation.

iii. present political forces

The Italian people’s choice of a permanent post-Fascist régime will undoubtedly be influenced by the course chosen by the government of Marshal Badoglio. If the Marshal and the King choose to continue the war, it is possible that military events leading to Italy’s surrender will discredit both the monarchy and the conservative elements supporting it, and that other, more revolutionary, elements will be strengthened. On the other hand, if Marshal Badoglio and the King arrange Italian capitulation, and if the present régime continues in power as a provisional government without adequate safeguards by the occupying forces, it is possible that the prestige of the monarchy and of the elements behind Marshal Badoglio may be such as to enable them to dominate the subsequent choice of a permanent régime. These and other present uncertainties make difficult any satisfactory estimate as to what form of permanent government the Italian people may choose when they have the opportunity. That problem can be approached only through an estimate of the present and potential strength of the various non-Fascist groups that will be contending for popular support.

Since all opposition groups have been rigorously suppressed in the Fascist state, information concerning their size, strength and political objectives is scanty and often unreliable, and must be interpreted with caution. The principal sources of opposition, which may seek to influence the character of the post-Fascist government, would include:

A. The Monarchists

The participation of King Victor Emmanuel III in the ousting of Mussolini may possibly restore to the monarchy some of the prestige and respect it had lost through its compromised position under Fascism. While the House of Savoy has never gained universal support throughout Italy, there are evidences that the institution of monarchy would have the loyalty of a large proportion of the numerous peasantry. Moreover it appears to have the backing of influential conservative groups, including prominent industrialists and large land owners, who are reputed to regard the House of Savoy as a bulwark against popular revolution or a leftist régime. There are also evidences that the monarchy would be supported by the Vatican and by the Catholic Church in Italy. The extent to which the army will remain loyal to a régime under the monarchy will undoubtedly be affected by military developments, but at the present time it would appear that almost all higher officers, together with most of the rank and file, would stand behind a government under the throne. The navy, as well as the Carabinieri, who dominate internal policing, are reported to be obediently loyal to the Royal House. All these groups, together with many other Italians, favor the monarchy, among other reasons, because they believe it would offer continuity and stability in Italian political life.

B. The Catholics

Although the Catholic Church, the most powerful non-Fascist organization in Italy, collaborated with the Fascist régime particularly after 1928, it preserved a considerable measure of independence and its leaders have been guided principally by Catholic objectives. With the disappearance of Fascism these leaders may be counted upon to assert the interests of the Church in the formation and conduct of any new government. In doing so, they could exert considerable influence through the numerous and strong Catholic organizations in Italy. While it is likely that differences in political preference will exist within Catholic ranks, there are indications that the Vatican and higher officials of the Church in Italy would support a continuation of the monarchy. On the other hand, Don Luigi Sturzo, former leader of the Catholic Partito Popolare Italiano, believes that the Vatican would not undertake to defend the monarchy if the Italian people decided in favor of a republic, provided the anti-monarchist groups were not also anti-clerical.

It has been reported to the Department that a Catholic opposition party is active in Italy, that it has widespread influence among the masses, and that its strength and influence exceed those of other opposition groups with which it maintains liaison. This party, which is said to have as its nucleus remnants of the Partito Popolare, is described as being more moderate than other opposition groups. Its membership is alleged to be divided between a rightist minority who believe in a semi-theocratic state and a leftist majority with more opportunistic political inclinations. While the party has been generally pro-monarchy, it is reported to have accepted the Sforza formula that the choice of a government should be left to the people. It is further reported that the strength and activity of the Catholic opposition party is being curbed by strictly Catholic circles which object to a political party specifically tied to Catholicism and which therefore oppose the reconstitution of the Partito Popolare.

C. The Liberals

The Italian liberals, who are principally members of the middle classes, the professions, and the intelligentsia, do not constitute a homogeneous or well-integrated group. Among them are liberals of the pre-Fascist era who have managed to maintain their beliefs despite Fascist repression. There are also younger men and women whose liberalism is essentially a reaction against Fascism. The political objectives of these liberals range from a desire to restore responsible parliamentary government under the king and the Statuto to a desire for a democratic republic with some degree of collectivism.

At least eight distinctive liberal movements are reported to exist within Italy, some of them under leadership as distinguished as that of Benedetto Croce, and Ivanoe Bonomi. The entire liberal movement is described by observers, however, as being richer in leadership than in following. Although the various liberal and democratic forces are said by some observers to have united in a single movement for the realization of democratic principles, there is more reason to believe that the younger liberals and those of republican views have joined forces with the socialists and other left-wing groups in opposition to Fascism and military dictatorship and in seeking the elimination of monarchy and the establishment of a democratic republic. It has also been reported that a Partito d’Azione (Party of Action) including persons from the above groups, has pronounced for social reforms and the nationalization of heavy industry. Although certain of the liberal and democratic groups are said to view with favor Count Sforza and the Free Italy movement, there is some doubt as to the influence which the exiled movement would exert within Italy.

D. Leftist Groups

The Italian Socialist Party, one of the strongest parties of the pre-Fascist period, has maintained a clandestine existence within Italy and is likewise represented among exiled groups. Like that of the Communist Party, its membership is drawn principally from among the working classes in northern Italy. In a May Day proclamation this year the Socialist Party demanded peace, the overthrow of Fascism, the abandonment of imperialism, and the establishment of a free and democratic socialism in Italy and in Europe. More recently the socialists have joined with other leftist groups such as the Action Party, the Proletarian Union, the Communist Party and the Communist-Anarchist Federation in seeking elimination of the monarchy and establishment of a democratic republic. The Socialist Party is also reported to have formulated a “Pact of Freedom” for presentation to other anti-Fascist groups, in which the liquidation of trusts along with the monarchy is stipulated. Coordination of the various groups is to be effected through joint committees. The Communist Party, although small in members, is reported to be the most closely organized and cohesive of all left groups. Many of its leaders are imprisoned or in exile, but they appear to have maintained communication with party members throughout northern Italy. The party’s present policy is one of collaboration with all anti-Fascist groups for the overthrow of Fascism and monarchy and the establishment of a democratic republic.

iv. alternative possibilities

A. Constitutional Monarchy Under the House of Savoy and the Statuto

This would mean a return to the pre-Fascist form of government. It would restore responsible parliamentary institutions on a democratic basis, provided the legislation amplifying the Statuto in these respects were revived. The monarch would remain the source of authority, but government would be carried on by responsible ministers. Civil liberties would be restored and placed in custody of an independent judiciary.

This form of government would be supported by the conservative elements favorable to the House of Savoy and would probably also have the backing of the Catholic groups and of many liberals. It would be opposed by republicans and by all leftist groups.

If freely adopted by the Italian people, this form of government would appear to meet most requirements of the United Nations. Question remains, however, as to whether it would afford assurance of future political stability. The weaknesses of the parliamentary system and the party structure, revealed by previous experience, may be expected to reappear. They may, in fact, be intensified in the earlier stages of the reconstituted régime by the readjustments necessary after twenty years of Fascism. They may be further intensified by the hostility of liberal and leftist groups to retention of monarchy, and by the desire of those groups to effect basic social and economic reforms.

Certain changes in the Statuto would seem desirable in the interest of stability. Among these would be provision for modification of the Statuto by a special amending procedure rather than through the process of ordinary legislation that has made it susceptible of political change. A further safeguard might be the establishment of some instrumentality (perhaps like the Supreme Court of the United States) to pass upon the constitutionality of legislation. Some change may also be desirable in the direction of freeing the executive from the incubus of parliamentary instability that characterized the old liberal régime, without at the same time making possible any abuse of executive authority. If the Senate is to serve as a stabilizing and conservative force in a new liberal régime, some change in the Statuto would seem necessary in order to limit the Senate membership and to introduce the representative principle.

All civil liberties are placed by articles 24–32 of the Statuto at the mercy of legislative enactment. This weakness contributed to the destruction of the bill of rights under Fascism and could be remedied only by a modification of the Statuto to place civil liberties under constitutional guarantee and to remove them from the sphere of ordinary legislation.

B. A Democratic Republic

The establishment of a democratic republic would mean the triumph of liberal and leftist forces at the expense of the more conservative groups which seek to retain the monarchy. No detailed specifications as to the form and functions of such a republic have been set forth by its proponents, who have taken the position that the Italian people should participate in shaping the new government after the overthrow of Fascism and the monarchy. It may be assumed, however, that the organizers of a republic would intend to follow the essentially liberal traditions of Mazzini, with a responsible, popularly elected executive and legislature and with adequate safeguards for individual liberties. This form of government is implicit in the statements attributed to liberals and socialists within Italy, and has been more explicitly outlined by Count Sforza and other spokesmen of the Free Italy movement, which has some following among the republicans at home.

It is also possible that a republican government would reflect the desire of the socialists and other left-wing groups for some degree of collectivism in industry and for a further breaking-up of the large land holdings. It might also mean the retention, on a democratic basis, of some institutions developed under the Fascist régime, such as occupational representation.

The probable stability of such a régime is difficult to estimate because of present uncertainty as to military and political developments that might bring it into being. In its favor would be the republican traditions that have never lost their vitality in parts of Italy. It would also have wide-spread support among the industrial classes, parts of the middle classes, and sections of the professional groups and intelligentsia. There is also reason to believe that it would receive some support from the peasantry, particularly if an attempt were made to redistribute the land. As suggested above, it is also possible that the Church would accept a republican régime provided it were not anti-clerical.

A democratic and republican form of government would be subject to many of the weaknesses that might contribute to instability in a constitutional monarchy as described above. In addition, it might be confronted for a considerable period with serious hostility from rightist and perhaps extreme left, groups, including such armed forces as may remain. Its stability would also be affected, as would that of any other régime, by the nature of the peace and the future international position of Italy.

C. A Communist Régime

There does not appear to be serious possibility of a communist régime in Italy unless the subsequent course of the war should lead to serious social disturbances and full-blown popular revolution. The communist party, although well-integrated, remains small, even when its reputed gains among the industrial classes are taken into consideration.

At present the communists appear to be joined with other leftist and moderate groups in a front to overthrow Fascism and monarchy. What would be the party’s policy if elevated to power remains conjectural, as does the degree of support which it would then receive from groups now allied with it. For these and other reasons the probable stability of a communist régime cannot be predicted with any certainty.

Discussion of the Subcommittees

Neither the Political Subcommittee nor the Territorial Subcommittee has considered the problem of a permanent national government for Italy. In discussing what groups to deal with during the transitional period, however, both subcommittees inclined to the view that a régime under the House of Savoy would be less objectionable and more stable than a military dictatorship, and seemed the only logical acceptable choice available. The subcommittees were skeptical of the possibilities of a revolutionary régime and discounted the possible influence of exiled groups.

[Here follows a section headed “Documentation”.]

[Enclosure 11]

Memorandum by Mr. C. Easton Rothwell, of the Division of Political Studies

secret
H–10

[ Washington ,] June 9, 1943.

Italy: Political Reconstruction: Reconstruction of Local Government

i. the problem

The problem is to determine what reforms in Italian local government, if any, the United Nations might desire as a condition for the recognition of a permanent régime.

The problem arises because communal and provincial government has been highly centralized by the Fascist régime at the expense of whatever representative and democratic character it had in the pre-Fascist period. With Fascist collapse it will be necessary to determine whether a decentralization of local government and a restoration of democratic processes, in addition to a purge of loyal Fascist personnel, should be insisted upon prior to recognition of a permanent régime.

The Italian Constitution (Statuto Fondamentale del Regno) does not prescribe the forms of local government, but provides that communal and provincial institutions shall be regulated by law. The local government of Italy was therefore based upon laws codified by a series of decrees between 1889 and 1908. These led ultimately to the creation of ninety-five provinces (excluding three in Libya) and of more than seven hundred communes which were administered prior to the advent of Fascism in a manner similar to the French system. The communes were governed in the pre-Fascist period by elective councils having control over the budget and over many aspects of local administration. These councils chose the sindaco or mayor, who was none the less regarded as a functionary of the national government, removable only with the consent of the provincial prefect. Under Fascism communal government has been subjected to central control by the abolition of the communal councils (except in the largest communities where appointive bodies with purely advisory powers are tolerated) and by the concentration of communal authority in the podestà or magistrates appointed by and responsible to the national government.

Self-government in the provinces was restricted even prior to the Fascist régime. The prefect, appointed by and directly responsible to the Minister of the Interior, exercised broad administrative powers in the interests of the central government. There was only limited popular participation in provincial government through an elective council whose most important function was to vote the budget. Both the prefects and the councils have been retained by the Fascist régime, but the supervisory powers of the prefects over all local government have been greatly increased and the council has been reduced to an appointive and purely advisory body, supplemented by other advisory agencies, all under strict Fascist control.

ii. alternative solutions

This problem has not been considered in any of the subcommittees.

A. Return to the Pre-Fascist Status

This solution would mean a return to the structure of local government described above. Such a solution would be legitimate and constitutional and would offer the advantage of continuity with past experience. Its effect would be to re-establish the elective principle in local government subject to the limitations of centralized control provided in the Decrees. A possible disadvantage of the solution is that developments leading to the fall of Fascism may give rise to demands for more thoroughly democratic and decentralized local government, or that a revolutionary régime may seek a new basis for local government. There is at present no substantial evidence of such demands.

B. Decentralization and Democratization Beyond the Pre-Fascist Status

This solution would require legislative changes to provide greater autonomy for both provincial and communal government. In extreme form it might mean that the prefects would be elected in the provinces instead of appointed by the central government, and that they would be responsible to elective councils with broad legislative and administrative powers. The sindaco, or mayor, of a commune would become a strictly local official without responsibilities to the national government.

Although there is apparently little demand so far among Italian anti-Fascists for such a decentralization of local government, it might provide freer expression for the political wishes of the Italian people in local affairs and might have the further advantage of establishing bulwarks in local government against the resurgence of authoritarian tendencies in national affairs, although this conclusion is open to question. Previous Italian experience does not justify an assumption that better or more efficient government would result from increased decentralization; neither does it offer assurance that the greater opportunities for self-government would not be seriously undermined by political corruption.

C. Retention of Fascist Structural Changes But a Purge of Fascist Personnel

This solution would offer the advantage of minimum change, together with the possibility that the present structure, under a liberal and competent national government, might lead to more efficient and better co-ordinated government in the communes and provinces. On the other hand, it would carry the stigma of Fascism and might be as unacceptable to the people of Italy as to the United Nations.

[Here follows a section headed “Documentation”.]

[Enclosure 12]

Memorandum by Mr. C. Easton Rothwell, of the Division of Political Studies

secret
H–12

[ Washington ,] June 9, 1943.

Italy: Political Reconstruction: Methods for the Reform of Local Government

i. the problem

The problem is to determine what method should be favored for the reform of local government in Italy.

The problem arises because the United Nations may desire that local institutions be modified in the direction of greater decentralization and democratization before recognizing a permanent régime. Since certain military experts believe that the occupation should terminate only when a permanent régime acceptable to the United Nations has been established and recognized, the desired reforms in local government would necessarily take place during the occupation period. During that period, the occupying military authorities will in all probability make use of local administrative agencies and will be in a position to exercise influence, if that is desired, in the direction of reforms.

The question is involved whether the military authorities should exercise such influence, or whether the Italian population, itself, should be provided opportunity to effect the necessary reorganization, and in what manner. In any case, a decision would be required by the political authorities of the United Nations, either in advance of occupation or during occupation, as to the changes in local government to be required as a basis for recognition.

ii. alternative solutions

This problem has been discussed briefly and indirectly in the Security Subcommittee.

A. Reform by the Italian Population Within the Occupied Areas

If the principle is adhered to that the Italian people should have opportunity freely to choose their permanent political institutions, popular assemblies or some other form of popular expression would be necessary to express the public will on the reform of local government. The conduct of elections during the occupation period would involve serious political responsibilities for the occupying authorities, and might even lead to political conflicts that could interfere with the realization of military objectives. The popular choice of local government might, however, be regarded by the Italian population both within and outside the occupied area as an earnest of United Nations intentions and might thereby encourage their good will and co-operation, or even hasten the cessation of resistance in unoccupied areas. Difficulties may be encountered, however, in attempting to bring about reforms in only the occupied areas, since the local government of Italy has always been in large measure centrally directed, and the decisions of a national assembly rather than those of local assemblies may be required to effect a nation-wide reform.

B. Reform by Local Officials, Subject to Later Ratification by the Italian People

The necessary reforms in local government might be carried out by local officials, provided the functionaries were non-Fascists. The occupying military authorities could facilitate such a procedure by careful discrimination among the local officials upon whose administrative assistance they rely. This method of obtaining reforms would offer the advantage of minimizing political disturbance during the critical phase of occupation. If the local populations were assured the right of referendum upon any changes made whenever the conditions of occupation would permit, the principle of self-determination would be preserved. This proposal, like proposal A, would be subject to the danger that a piece-meal reform of local government might prove impracticable in view of the previously centralized direction of local affairs.

C. Reform by Local Commissions, Subject to Later Ratification by the Italian People

A commission to recommend the reorganization of local government either in the commune or in the province, might be appointed by the military governors from among proved non-Fascists. The recommendations of the commission, after having been approved by the military authorities and by the political authorities of the United Nations, might then be put into effect during the occupation, subject to ultimate approval by the local population. This procedure would be influenced by the same considerations affecting alternatives A and B.

D. Reform of Local Government as Part of a General Political Reorganization Leading to the Establishment of a Permanent Régime

The reform of local government as part of a general political reorganization leading to the establishment of a permanent government might prove to be the most practicable and desirable method. In this case the reform might be effected, subject to popular ratification, by a provisional government, should such a government be recognized during the occupation period; or the reorganization might be planned by a special commission and submitted to the Italian people for approval; or it might be brought about by means of a national constituent assembly. Any one of these methods or a combination of them would have the advantage of assuring a common nation-wide plan for local institutions that would be adequately integrated with the central government, and would therefore be in harmony with previous experience. On the other hand, the general reorganization of Italian government will be possible only when Italy has completely capitulated and the Fascist régime has fallen. To await a general political reorganization, therefore, would mean to delay the reform of local government in the occupied zone.

E. Imposition of Reforms by the Occupying Authorities

The imposition of reforms by the military authorities of the occupants could have the advantage of assuring that local government was reorganized in accordance with United Nations requirements during the period of occupation. Such a procedure would, however, be subject to all the hazards and criticisms of an imposed reform. It might well stultify any sincere and spontaneous movements for reform among the Italian opponents of Fascism and might lead to the weakening or repudiation of the established system of local government some time after the termination of occupation. Moreover, the imposition of reforms would violate the principle that the Italian people should have the right ultimately to set up non-Fascist political institutions of their own choice. The military exigencies of occupation may also be such that the command of the occupying forces will find it inexpedient or impossible to concern itself with political matters, and will instead utilize local administrative or judicial agencies without regard to their character purely as an adjunct to the military structure of occupational administration.

Discussion of the Security Subcommittee

The Security Subcommittee has referred to the problem of reorganizing local government only indirectly, and as applied to “enemy states” in general or to Germany. No specific consideration has been given the reform of local institutions in Italy. The subcommittee was in general agreement that the military authority should remain in predominant control throughout the entire period of occupation and that military rule should terminate only when a permanent government acceptable to the victor powers had come into existence. Meanwhile, administrative civilian agencies and courts would be reestablished in the occupied areas under ultimate military control, as soon as military requirements would permit. At a subsequent meeting, however, the subcommittee approved a set of principles relating to the military occupation of Italy which provided that the possible recognition of a permanent national government during occupation and the degree of authority to be accorded it at various stages of the occupation, should be determined by the United Nations political authorities in consultation with the military commander.

[Here follows a section headed “Documentation”.]

1. Although this memorandum was submitted to Hull in anticipation of the First Quebec Conference, the subjects covered in the enclosures to the memorandum were not discussed in detail at that conference.
2. The accompanying maps are not reproduced.

3. Specifically, the following groups subordinate to the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy: the Subcommittee on Political Problems, the Subcommittee on Territorial Problems, the Subcommittee on Security Problems, and the Security Technical Committee. See Notter, pp. 96–108, 117–133.

   Following this covering memorandum in the file is a one-page table of contents (not printed) to the documents which follow.

4. For the statement referred to, made on January 8, 1942, see Parliamentary Debates: House of Commons Official Report, 5th series, vol. 377, col. 78.
5. No. T–B 49, entitled “Libya: Alternative Proposals Affecting Its Future Status”; not printed.
6. Grown Prince Humbert, Prince of Piedmont.
7. Victor Emmanuel, Prince of Naples.
8. Rothwell, who had earlier prepared a number of the other enclosures in this file in his capacity as a Divisional Assistant, was promoted to be Assistant Chief of the Division on August 16, 1943.
9. The source copy bears the typed endorsement: “(abridgement of H–25)”. For the text of H–25, see post, p. 815.