Roosevelt Papers

The Acting Secretary of State to the President 1

My Dear Mr. President: I am enclosing herewith the papers which you requested at the meeting in your office yesterday.2

These papers comprise the redraft of the Four-Power Protocol and the original form of the suggested United Nations Protocol. The abbreviated and revised draft of the latter protocol which you requested is not yet completed and I am consequently sending you the original version. During the next few days the shortened and revised form which you desire will be sent to you at Hyde Park.3

There are also attached a memorandum prepared for you which gives you the history of the recent British proposal and our analysis of it; the telegram which contains the text of the British proposal, and also the drafts sent to you by Mr. Churchill which you gave us yesterday for our information.

Owing to Secretary Hull’s absence today, the redraft of the Four-Power Protocol has not been submitted to him but I understand from [Page 692] Dr. Pasvolsky that the present draft is in accordance with the Secretary’s ideas.

Believe me [etc.]

Sumner Welles
[Enclosure 1]

Draft Declaration4


Tentative Draft of a Joint Four-Power Declaration

The Governments of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China:

united in their determination, in accordance with the Declaration by the United Nations of January 1, 1942, and subsequent declarations, to continue hostilities against those Axis powers with which they respectively are at war until such powers have laid down their arms on the basis of unconditional surrender;

conscious of their responsibility to secure the liberation of themselves and the peoples allied with them from the menace of aggression;

recognizing the necessity of ensuring a rapid and orderly transition from war to peace and of establishing and maintaining international peace and security with the least diversion of the world’s human and economic resources for armaments;

jointly declare:

That their united action, pledged for the prosecution of the war, will be continued for the organization and maintenance of peace and security.
That those of them at war with a common enemy will act together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of that enemy, and to any occupation of enemy territory and of territory of other states held by that enemy.
That they will take all measures deemed by them to be necessary to provide against any violation of the requirements imposed upon their present enemies.
That they recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all nations, and open to membership by all nations, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.
That for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security pending the reestablishment of law and order and the inauguration of a general system of security, they will consult and act jointly in behalf of the community of nations.
That, in connection with the foregoing purpose, they will establish a technical commission to advise them on the military problems involved, including the composition and strength of the forces available in an emergency arising from a threat to the peace.
That they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other states except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation and agreement.
That they will confer and cooperate to bring about a practicable general agreement with respect to the regulation of armaments in the post-war period.

[Enclosure 2]

Draft Protocol


United Nations Protocol for the War and Transition Period

The United Nations:

dedicated to the advancement of the general welfare of mankind;

desiring to give immediate and practical effect to the principles proclaimed in the Atlantic Charter;

seeking to obtain the continuing benefits of economic and social cooperation;

determined to ensure their common security, and to attain the progressive lightening of the burden of armament; and

resolved to achieve these purposes through a development of the international organizations of a universal and regional character required for their fulfillment;

have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The signatory states agree that their united action, pledged for the prosecution of the war until the unconditional surrender of the enemy states, shall be continued for the organization and maintenance of the peace.

Article 2

The United Nations and the nations presently associated with them agree that a permanent international organization shall be established for the maintenance of peace and the advancement of human welfare. They agree to expedite the creation of this organization. Pending its inauguration, they hereby establish a Provisional United Nations Council to be representative of all states parties to the Declaration by the United Nations, at Washington, January 1, 1942, and of the nations presently associated with them. The member states agree [Page 694] to cooperate in carrying out the measures determined upon by the Council until permanent world peace is established.5

Article 3

The Provisional United Nations Council shall be composed of eleven members, including one designated by the United States of America, one by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, one by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, one by China, two by the group of European states, two by the group of American states, one by the group of Far Eastern states, one by the group of states of the Near and Middle East and of Africa, and one by the British Dominions, as these groups are defined in the first Annex to this Protocol.

Article 4

The members representing each group of states as represented in the Council shall be elected for one year by the group, in conference, from a panel consisting of nominees designated by the states comprising the group. Each state may designate three nominees who may be chosen from among nationals of any of the states of the group of which it is a part.

Article 5

Members of the Provisional United Nations Council shall represent the general interest of the region from which they are designated rather than the particular interests of the states of which they are nationals. They shall in all circumstances take into account the general interest of the whole community of states. In thus discharging their duties, they shall remain in close consultation with the governments of the several states in the regions from which they are designated, and they shall faithfully present to the Council the views of those governments.

Article 6

The Provisional United Nations Council shall formulate and recommend to the United Nations the plan for the permanent international organization envisaged in Article 2. Pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, and effective as to any particular region from the date upon which the military authorities therein determine, the Provisional Council shall assume in that region responsibility for the maintenance of international security and shall provide procedures for the pacific settlement of any disputes threatening the peace.

Article 7

The Provisional United Nations Council shall establish a Security and Armaments Commission and an Armaments Inspection Commission [Page 695] whose composition, powers, and functions shall be as stated in the second Annex to this Protocol.

Article 8

An effective procedure for the general limitation of armaments shall be instituted by the Council, assisted by the Security and Armaments Commission, as soon as practicable, in order to determine the maximum and minimum levels of armaments to be maintained by all states for the preservation of internal order and the discharge of their respective responsibilities for general security.

Article 9

The Provisional United Nations Council may utilize and establish such technical committees, services, and secretariats as may be required for carrying out the purposes of this Protocol. The Council shall appoint an individual of recognized standing to act as Chairman, without voting power, and to serve as Executive Director of such provisional international administrative organization as may be established. The Chairman of the Council may appoint, subject to confirmation by the Council, such administrative and other officers as may be required.

Article 10

The expenses of the Provisional United Nations Council and of any administrative or secretarial staffs which it may create shall be shared by the members in proportions to be determined by the Council.

Article 11

The Provisional United Nations Council shall meet in ordinary session at such times and places as it may determine. It may be convened in special session upon the call of the Chairman or of any member of the Council, or upon the initiative of any state party to this Protocol. The Council shall establish its own rules of procedure. Decisions shall be by two-thirds vote of the members present, including all of the members designated by individual states, except in instances when any one of these members, in advance of the voting, declares an intention to abstain from voting.

Article 12

This Protocol shall remain in force until superseded by the inauguration of the permanent international organization envisaged in Article 2. It may be amended by a decision of the Council proposing to the signatory states such amendments as it may consider desirable, which shall become effective when the ratifications of two-thirds of the signatory states have been received.

Article 13

This Protocol shall come into effect when it shall have been ratified by 20 states members of the United Nations, including the United [Page 696] States, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and China. It shall remain open for adherence by other sovereign and independent states, not original signatories, subject to approval by the Council.

[Annex 1 to Enclosure 2]

Representation on the Provisional United Nations Council

Representatives on the Provisional United Nations Council shall be designated by the following states and groups of states:

  • United States of America, 1 representative
  • United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 1 representative
  • Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 1 representative
  • China, 1 representative
  • European States
    • 2 representatives
    • Belgium
    • Czechoslovakia
    • United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
    • Greece
    • *Iceland
    • Luxemburg
    • Netherlands
    • Norway
    • Poland
    • Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
    • Yugoslavia
  • Far Eastern States
    • 1 representative
    • China
    • Philippines
  • Near and Middle Eastern States and African States
    • 1 representative
    • *Egypt
    • Ethiopia
    • *Iran
    • Iraq
    • *Liberia
  • American States
    • 2 representatives
    • United States of America
    • Bolivia
    • Brazil
    • *Chile
    • *Colombia
    • Costa Rica
    • Cuba
    • Dominican Republic
    • *Ecuador
    • El Salvador
    • Guatemala
    • Haiti
    • Honduras
    • Mexico
    • Nicaragua
    • Panama
    • *Paraguay
    • *Peru
    • *Uruguay
    • *Venezuela
  • British Dominions
    • 1 representative
    • Australia
    • Canada
    • [India]6
    • New Zealand
    • Union of South Africa

[Page 697]
[Annex 2 to Enclosure 2]

Technical Security and Armaments Commissions

Article 1

The Security and Armaments Commission, to be established by the the Provisional United Nations Council in accordance with Article 7 of the present Protocol, shall be composed of military, naval, aviation, and civilian representatives of the states and groups of states represented on the Council. Additional representatives may be designated by the Council. Each member of the Commission may be accompanied by alternates and experts. The Commission may set up a panel of special experts, and may appoint committees whose number, composition, and functions shall be subject to approval by the Council.

Article 2

The Security and Armaments Commission shall be charged with the following duties: (a) to recommend to the Council plans and procedures for the general limitation of armaments as provided in Article 8 of the present Protocol; (b) to supervise the execution of all armaments stipulations, including control over manufacture and trade in arms, which may be adopted in pursuance of the present Protocol, or required of the enemy states by the terms of surrender, and report regularly to the Council; (c) to propose to the Council any modifications and amendments it may deem desirable or necessary to make in armaments limitation agreements, or in armaments terms imposed upon the enemy states; (d) to advise and assist the Council in any emergency in the application of security measures; and (e) to discharge such other duties as may be assigned to it by the Council.

Article 3

The Armaments Inspection Commission, to be established by the Provisional United Nations Council in accordance with Article 7 of the present Protocol, shall be composed of military, naval, aviation, and other technical experts, a majority of the total number of whom shall be nationals of states other than those possessing individual representation on the Council. The Members of the Commission shall be chosen by the Council upon nomination by the Security and Armaments Commission.

Article 4

The Armaments Inspection Commission shall act under the direct authority of the Security and Armaments Commission. It shall regularly report to the Security and Armaments Commission on the armaments and armaments potential of all states, and shall be charged with the duty of inspecting the armaments and armaments potential of [Page 698] the former enemy states, and of other states in accordance with the agreements envisaged in Article 8 of the present Protocol.

[Enclosure 3]

Memorandum by the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant (Pasvolsky)

Memorandum for the President

1. On July 16, 1943, Mr. Eden communicated to our Ambassador in London,7 for transmission to the Secretary of State, an Aide-Mémoire, the text of which is attached, on “Suggested Principles which Would Govern the Conclusion of Hostilities with the European Members of the Axis.” The British proposal envisages the creation of an Inter-Allied Armistice Commission or an Inter-Allied Control Commission for each enemy country. It further envisages (paragraph 9) the creation of a supervisory body called “United Nations Commission for Europe”, to be situated at some point of [on?] the Continent, and to be composed of “high ranking political representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States, U.S.S.R., France and other minor European Allies, and, if so desired, of any Dominion prepared to contribute to the policing of Europe.”

This Commission would be the Supreme United Nations authority in Europe. It would “direct and coordinate the activities of the several Armistice Commissions, the Allied Commanders-in-Chief, and any United Nations civilian authorities that may be established.” It would also “deal with current problems, military, political and economic, connected with the maintenance of order.” It would have a “Steering Committee”, composed of representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States, the U.S.S.R., and of France, “if she should recover her greatness.” The Steering Committee would be the directing body of the Commission, and would operate under the unanimity rule.

In paragraph 10 of the British Aide-Mémoire it is further proposed that various civilian authorities, whether set up on a world or on a European basis, should, in respect of their European activities, establish their headquarters in the same city as the United Nations Commission for Europe, and should be responsible to the Commission. The activities indicated include relief and rehabilitation, refugees, shipping, inland transportation, telecommunications, propaganda, reparation, restitution, and other economic problems.

[Page 699]

2. The British proposal has been studied in the Department of State and by the Subcommittee on Security of the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy. The general comment of the Subcommittee on Security is as follows:

The Subcommittee agrees fully with the view expressed in the Aide-Mémoire to the effect that inter-allied agencies must be set up to supervise the execution of surrender terms by the defeated states, and to deal with problems relating to the rehabilitation of enemy and enemy-occupied territories during the first after-war period. Nonetheless, the Subcommittee questions the desirability of attempting to combine these agencies and functions with those which are general, i.e., worldwide or European in scope, and long-term in character. It is the feeling of the Subcommittee that the decision to create an agency, which would be essentially a kind of super-government for Europe, should be made exclusively on its own merits, and should not be confused with the making of necessary arrangements with respect to the enemy states. It is felt that the political reaction in this country would be unfavorable if the United States were to take such a major step involving general and long-run commitments, under the guise of making a settlement with the enemy. These policy issues should be determined separately.

3. The British Aide-Mémoire raises again the whole issue of regionalism in connection with international organization. That question has been raised several times by Mr. Churchill. His ideas are clearly expressed in the two documents addressed to the President, which are attached to this memorandum.8 The general thought seems to be that international relations should be basically organized on a regional basis, in the form of three regional Councils—for Europe, for the Western Hemisphere, and for the Far East. There would also be a World Council as a superstructure.

This question has been the subject of much study and discussion in the Department and in its various committees. The committee discussions have so far pointed to the following conclusions: (1) that the basis of international organization should be world-wide rather than regional; (2) that there are grave dangers involved in having the world organization rest upon the foundation of previously created, full-fledged regional organizations; and (3) that while there may be advantages in setting up regional arrangements for some purposes, such arrangements should be subsidiary to the world organization and should flow from it.

This points to the desirability of creating a general United Nations agency, operating on functional basis, and—when advisable—having [Page 700] some subsidiary regional structures. Such an agency could well be set up on a provisional basis during the war to perform concrete tasks involved in the transition from war to peace and to prepare the way for the establishment of a permanent world organization.

4. It is our thought that the first procedural step should be by way of securing agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China on the issuance by them of a joint declaration or parallel identic declarations containing their basic intentions and constituting a pledge on their part to act jointly for certain specified purposes. Such a declaration or declarations should be in the nature of an extension of the pledges undertaken by the four major powers in the Declaration by United Nations of January 1, 1942. There is attached hereto a tentative draft of a joint declaration.9

5. It is our further thought that the four-power declaration should be followed, as rapidly as possible, by the negotiation of a United Nations protocol and the setting up, under it, of the necessary provisional machinery for the performance of various tasks as they present themselves in point of time. A statement of the possible provisions of such a protocol will be ready in a few days.10

[Subenclosure 1—Telegram]

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

4626. For the Secretary and the Under Secretary.

When Mr. Eden gave me the following Aide-Mémoire he explained to me that although it had been considered by the War Cabinet, it was not intended to represent a fixed program but rather a document for consideration. It is the result of study and a realization that there is danger of over-simplification of the problems involved. They would much appreciate our comments and reactions.


Suggested Principles Which Would Govern The Conclusion Of Hostilities With the European Members Of The Axis

1. The terms to be imposed on any European member of the Axis should be presented as one comprehensive document covering all the United Nations at war with that member, and embodying the principle of unconditional surrender.

[Page 701]

2. If there exists a central enemy Government with which we are prepared to treat, a fully accredited representative of that Government should be associated with its Commander-in-Chief for purposes of signature; or alternatively the Armistice should not come into force until confirmed by that Government.

3. If there is no such Government the Armistice should be signed by the enemy Commander-in-Chief only. In that case provisions which the enemy Commander-in-Chief lacks authority to execute would have to be omitted from the Armistice, which would thus be primarily a military document. Non-military provisions should so far as necessary be embodied in a Declaration or Proclamation issued by the United Nations.

4. If there is neither an enemy Government nor Commander-in-Chief with whom we can or are prepared to treat, military resistance would presumably be brought to an end by a series of local capitulations. It would, however, probably be desirable that the United Nations should issue a declaration stating their intentions in respect of the defeated power. This would be followed by a series of proclamations issued by the Allied Commander-in-Chief containing instructions to the local authorities and population.

5. The administration of any armistice should be placed in the hands of an inter-Allied Armistice Commission, the President to be alternately a representative of the United States, U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom. The Commission would establish its headquarters in the Axis country concerned, and would be responsible for controlling the execution of the Armistice terms; in the first place, the disarmament and demobilization of enemy armed forces, the collection and disposal of surrendered war material and other mobile property and the handing over of fortifications and other fixed property. Representatives of the Armistice Commission would be dispatched to liberated Allied territory to perform a similar task in respect of the enemy troops there located and to regulate their evacuation or internment.

6. In the absence of an Armistice (see Paragraph 4) a Control Commission should administer the appropriate portions of the Declaration.

7. Any Armistice or Declaration would presumably provide for occupation, whether total or partial, of the countries concerned. In the case of Germany the exact method of organizing such an occupation should be the subject of technical discussions between the military advisers of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the U.S.S.R. in the first instance.

8. The United Nations Commander-in-Chief in any occupied country should have complete responsibility for the maintenance of law and order.

9. There should be established a supervisory body entitled ‘United Nations Commission for Europe,’ composed of high ranking political representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the U.S.S.R., of France and the other minor European Allies, and, if so desired, of any Dominion prepared to contribute to the policing of Europe. The Commission should be situated at some convenient point on the Continent.

[Page 702]

The Commission would act as the Supreme United Nations authority in Europe to direct and coordinate the activities of the several Armistice Commissions, the Allied Commanders-in-Chief and any United Nations civilian authorities that may be established; and to deal with current problems, military, political and economic, connected with the maintenance of order.

A ‘Steering Committee’, consisting of the representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the U.S.S.R., and of France, if she recovers her greatness, should be established as the directing body of the Commission. In the ‘Steering Committee’ the unanimity rule should apply.

10. It is likely that a number of civilian authorities will be set up by agreement between the United Nations, some on a world and others on a European basis. Apart from the United Nations relief and rehabilitation administration and the Inter-Governmental Committee which may emerge from the Bermuda Conference,11 the establishment of a United Nations Shipping Authority and a United Nations Inland Transport Authority for Europe have been suggested. Analogous bodies may well be required to control telecommunications and propaganda, and to handle reparation and restitution and other economic problems. These authorities might, in respect of their European activities, establish their headquarters in the same city as the United Nations Commission for Europe, to whom they would be responsible and provide the necessary technical advice.

Foreign Office. 14th July 1943.”

[Subenclosure 2]

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to President Roosevelt

most secret

Dear Mr. President, I enclose the further message from the Prime Minister12 which I mentioned in my earlier letter today.

I also enclose a copy of a personal message to you from Mr. Eden, which has just come in.13

Believe me [etc.]

[Annex to Subenclosure 2]

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

most secret

Morning Thoughts

note on post-war security

When United Nations led by three Great Powers, Great Britain, United States and U.S.S.R. have received unconditional surrender of [Page 703] Germany and Italy, Great Britain and United States will turn their full force against Japan in order to punish effectively that greedy and ambitious nation for its treacherous assaults and outrages and to procure likewise from Japan unconditional surrender.

In this, although no treaty arrangement has been made, it seems probable that Great Britain and United States will be joined by Russia.
The peace conference of the victorious powers will probably assemble in Europe while final stages of war against Japan are still in progress. At this conference the defeated aggressor countries will receive directions of victors. Object of these directions will be to prevent as effectively as possible renewal of acts of aggression of the kinds which have caused these two terrible wars in Europe in one generation. For this purpose and so far as possible total disarmament of guilty nations will be enforced. On the other hand no attempt will be made to destroy their peoples or to prevent them gaining their living and leading a decent life in spite of all the crimes they have committed.
It is recognized that it is not possible to make the vanquished pay for war as was tried last time, and consequently task of rebuilding ruined and starving Europe will demand from conquerors a period of exertion scarcely less severe than that of the war. Russia particularly which has suffered such a horrible devastation will be aided in every possible way in her work of restoring the economic life of her people. It seems probable that economic reconstruction and rehabilitation will occupy full energies of all countries for a good many years in view of their previous experiences and lessons they have learned.
Russia has signed a treaty with Great Britain14 on basis of Atlantic Charter15 binding both nations mutually to aid each other. The duration of this treaty is twenty years. By it and by Atlantic Charter the two nations renounce all idea of territorial gains. Russians no doubt interpret this as giving them right to claim, subject to their agreement with Poland, their frontier of June 1941 before they were attacked by Germany.
It is the intention of chiefs of the United Nations to create a world organisation for the preservation of peace based upon the conceptions of freedom and justice and the revival of prosperity. As a part of this organisation an instrument of European Government will be established which will embody the spirit but not be subject to the weakness of former League of Nations. The units forming this body [Page 704] will not only be the great nations of Europe and Asia Minor only. Need for a Scandinavian bloc, Danubian bloc and a Balkan bloc appear to be obvious. A similar instrument will be formed in the Far East with different membership and the whole will be held together by the fact that victorious powers as yet continue fully armed, especially in the air, while imposing complete disarmament upon the guilty. None can predict with certainty that the victors will never quarrel amongst themselves, or that the United States may not once again retire from Europe, but after the experiences which all have gone through, and their sufferings and the certainty that a third struggle will destroy all that is left of culture, wealth and civilization of mankind and reduce us to the level almost of wild beasts, the most intense effort will be made by the leading Powers to prolong their honourable association and by sacrifice and self-restraint to win for themselves a glorious name in human annals. Great Britain will certainly do her utmost to organize a coalition of resistance to any act of aggression committed by any power; it is believed that the United States will cooperate with her and even possibly take the lead of the world, on account of her numbers and strength, in the good work of preventing such tendencies to aggression before they break into open war.
The highest security for Turkey in post-war world will be found by her taking her place as a victorious belligerent and ally at the side of Great Britain, the United States and Russia. In this way a start will be made in all friendliness and confidence, and a new instrument will grow around the goodwill and comradeship of those who have been in the field together, with powerful armies.
Turkey may be drawn into war either by being attacked in the despairing convulsions of a still very powerful Nazi power, or because her interests require her to intervene to help prevent total anarchy in the Balkans, and also because the sentiments of modern Turkey are in harmony with the large and generous conceptions embodied in the Atlantic Charter, which are going to be fought for and defended by new generations of men.
We must therefore consider the case of Turkey becoming a belligerent. The military and technical side is under examination by Marshal Chakmak, Generals Brooke, Alexander, Wilson and other high technical authorities. The political aspect is no less important. It would be wrong for Turkey to enter the war unless herself attacked, if that only led her to a disaster, and her ally Britain has never asked and will never ask her to do so under such conditions. On the other hand if the general offensive strength of Turkey is raised by the measures now being taken, and also by the increasing weakness of Nazi Germany, or by their withdrawal to a greater distance, or by the great divisions [Page 705] taking place in Bulgaria, or by the bitter quarrel between the Rumanians and the Hungarians over Transylvania, or through the internal resistance to German and Italian tyranny shewn by Yugoslavia and Greece: for any or all of these reasons and causes, Turkey should play a part and win her place in the council of victors.
In the first instance it is possible that the military situation might be such that Turkey would feel justified in taking the same extended view of neutrality or non-belligerency as characterized the attitude of the United States of America towards Great Britain before the United States of America was drawn into the war. In this connexion the destruction of Rumanian oilfields by air attacks by British and American aircraft operating from Turkish airfields, or re-fuelling there, would have far-reaching consequences and might in view of the oil scarcity in Germany appreciably shorten the struggle. In the same way also the availability of air bases or re-fuelling points in Turkey would be of great assistance to Great Britain in her necessary attack on the Dodecanese, and later upon Crete, for which in any case, whether we get help or not, General Wilson has been directed to prepare during the present year. There is also the immensely important question of opening the Straits to Allied and. then closing [them] to Axis traffic. The case contemplated in this paragraph is one in which Turkey would have departed from strictly impartial neutrality and definitely have taken sides with the United Nations without however engaging her armies offensively against Germany or Bulgaria; and those nations would put up with this action on the part of Turkey because they would not wish to excite her to more active hostility.
However, we cannot survey this field without facing the possibility of Turkey becoming a full belligerent and of her armies advancing into the Balkans side by side with the Russians on the one hand in the north and the British to the southward. In the event of Turkey becoming thus directly involved either offensively or through being attacked in consequence of her attitude, she would receive the utmost aid from all her allies and in addition it would be right for her before incurring additional risks to seek precise guarantees as to her territorial rights after the war. Great Britain would be willing to give these guarantees in a treaty at any time quite independently of any other power. She is also willing to join with Russia in giving such guarantees and it is believed that Russia would be willing to make a treaty to cover the case of Turkey becoming a full belligerent either independently or in conjunction with Great Britain. It seems certain to Mr. Churchill that President Roosevelt would gladly associate himself with such treaties and that the whole weight of the United States would be used in peace settlement to that end. At the same time one [Page 706] must not ignore the difficulties which United States Constitution interposes against prolonged European commitments. These treaties and assurances would naturally fall within the ambit of the world-instrument to protect all countries from wrong-doing which it is our main intention and inflexible resolve to create, should God give us the power and lay this high duty upon us.
  1. A chronology by Pasvolsky entitled “Indications of Contact With President on Post-War Matters” contains the following information under the date of August 11 concerning Welles’ memorandum of that date to the President:

    “We worked intensively today to complete, a few minutes after five o’clock, the preparation of the papers which the President will use in the top-flight discussions with Winston Churchill this weekend. It came out in the course of the drafting that the President dislikes the concept of maximum and minimum levels of armament to be maintained. The Four Power Declaration was discussed in the Security Committee, with Davis insisting that it should take the form of an agreement, but on this he was overridden.

    “Welles similarly prefers agreement as the form the document should take, and his suggestion was the impossible one of calling it an agreement and having it take the form of a declaration.

    “Welles is Acting Secretary, from eleven o’clock today, and is taking the position that he and not Pasvolsky will transmit the memorandum to the President. And furthermore, he opposes the statements in the memorandum [see enclosure 3, below] which object to regional structure and organization, and consequently he is insisting and is carrying through the sending to the President of the full draft as worked out by him and his committee of the United Nations protocol which embodies the whole regional principle. Since he could not override the memorandum, he chose to write a letter to the President in transmitting the memorandum, in which he himself upholds the regional principle.

    “Welles delivered the material to the President that evening and promised him that the UN Protocol would be reduced to propositions and submitted to him.” (Lot 60 D 224)

    Concerning the committees referred to, see Notter, pp. 108–114, 124–131.

  2. See ante, p. 681.
  3. See post, p. 706. Welles had already given Roosevelt a copy of the “original form of the suggested United Nations Protocol” (enclosure 2, below) on or shortly before June 19, 1943.
  4. Cf. Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. i, pp. 522523.
  5. The last six words are a manuscript addition by Roosevelt.
  6. States marked with an asterisk are associated nations. [Footnote in the source text.]
  7. States marked with an asterisk are associated nations. [Footnote in the source text.]
  8. States marked with an asterisk are associated nations. [Footnote in the source text.]
  9. States marked with an asterisk are associated nations. [Footnote in the source text.]
  10. States marked with an asterisk are associated nations. [Footnote in the source text.]
  11. States marked with an asterisk are associated nations. [Footnote in the source text.]
  12. States marked with an asterisk are associated nations. [Footnote in the source text.]
  13. States marked with an asterisk are associated nations. [Footnote in the source text.]
  14. States marked with an asterisk are associated nations. [Footnote in the source text.]
  15. States marked with an asterisk are associated nations. [Footnote in the source text.]
  16. States marked with an asterisk are associated nations. [Footnote in the source text.]
  17. Brackets in the source text.
  18. John G. Winant.
  19. For the first document referred to, see subenclosure 2, below, and the annex thereto. The second document (not printed here) was a letter of May 28, 1943, from Halifax to Roosevelt, enclosing a memorandum of Churchill’s discussion of May 22, 1943, with Vice President Henry A. Wallace and others. For the text of this memorandum, see ante, p. 167.
  20. Ante, p. 692.
  21. This memorandum was transmitted to Roosevelt unsigned. See ante, p. 691, fn. 1.
  22. See Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. i, pp. 134 ff.
  23. Concerning the origin of this message, see ibid., p. 1051.
  24. Halifax’s “earlier letter” and Eden’s message were not included in the file of papers enclosed with Welles’ memorandum to Roosevelt of August 11, 1943.
  25. For the text of the Anglo-Soviet treaty of alliance signed at London, May 26, 1942, see British and Foreign State Papers, vol. cxliv, p. 1038.
  26. Released by Roosevelt and Churchill, August 14, 1941. For text see Department of State, Executive Agreement Series No. 236; 55 Stat. (2) 1603; Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, pp. 368369.