[Attachment]
Memorandum by the Adviser on Political
Relations (Murray)
secret
[Washington,] August 12,
1943.
The proposed joint statement by the American and British
Governments regarding the situation in Palestine as it affected
the security of [Page 675]
American and British military forces in the whole of the Middle
East was, in agreement with the British Government, to have been
issued on July 27, 1943.2
The idea of issuing some sort of statement on Palestine in order
to ease the critical situation existing in the Middle East was
not a new one. Information during the past two years or more has
been accumulating in the War Department and this Department
indicating that the security of our military forces in that area
might be greatly compromised unless some action were taken by
either the British Government, this Government, or both, with a
view to countering the serious effects of Axis propaganda in
that area based largely on irresponsible statements made in this
country regarding Palestine.
The situation was brought to a head by a report submitted by
Colonel Harold Hoskins who was sent … on a special mission to
the Middle East in the Spring of 1943. A copy of Colonel
Hoskins’ preliminary telegraphic report on the situation, as
well as a résumé of his longer report submitted subsequent to
his return, to this country, are attached.3
As will be noted, Colonel Hoskins, after consultation with
highest British military and civilian authorities in that area,
quoted them as convinced that hostilities in Palestine between
the Arabs and the Jews would in any case break out at the close
of the war in Europe and many authorities were of the opinion
that the outbreak of such hostilities could not be avoided
before the close of the war.
After his return to Washington, Colonel Hoskins reported on the
situation in Palestine in greater detail to the Secretary of
State and to other competent officials. After his talk with the
Secretary, Colonel Hoskins reported to the Division of Near
Eastern Affairs that the Secretary had asked him to prepare, in
consultation with that Division, a statement on Palestine that
might be submitted to the President for his consideration.
A statement was accordingly prepared in consultation between
Colonel Hoskins and the Division of Near Eastern Affairs and
submitted to the President on May 7, 1943. This statement was
returned on the following day approved by the President.4
Certain minor modifications in the statement having been
suggested in the Department, the statement was again returned to
the President on June 9, 1943, and was again approved and sent
back to the Department.5
[Page 676]
Immediately prior to the proposed date of issue of the statement
which had been agreed upon by the British Government, the
Secretary again submitted the statement personally to the
President, together with a draft letter of submittal which the
Secretary contemplated signing. The President again approved the
statement and asked the Secretary to sign the letter of
submittal enclosing the final draft of the statement. This step
was duly taken and the statement was once again returned to the
Department with the President’s approval.6
The date for issue of the statement, namely July 27, 1943,
(postponed until July 28 and subsequently again postponed)
having been agreed upon, the Secretary thought it desirable to
postpone action pending further discussion with competent
officials of the War Department with a view to obtaining from
that Department, preferably in writing, an expression of full
concurrence of that Department7 as to the necessity of issuing the
joint American-British statement on Palestine. The Secretary
took the view that since the purpose in issuing such a statement
was based wholly on military considerations the War Department,
in advance of the issue of any statement on this subject, should
furnish the State Department in writing with its own estimate of
the military requirements in the area of the Middle East upon
which the joint statement of the two governments was based.
On July 26, 1943 the proposed statement was shown to Acting
Secretary of War Patterson by General Strong, Assistant Chief of
Staff, G–2, with a suggestion
that the Acting Secretary might hold a press conference in the
War Department explaining the War Department’s interest in the
statement.
Judge Patterson informed General Strong that while he was not in
a habit of holding press conferences he was in full accord with
the contemplated statement and would be willing to sign any
letter addressed on this subject to the Secretary of State which
would receive the prior approval of the Chief of Staff.8
Judge Patterson accordingly directed General Strong to draft the
necessary letter.
The draft of the letter prepared by General Strong under
instructions from Judge Patterson is attached.9 This draft letter,
which appeared to cover the situation fully both in this country
and in the Middle East was, so we are informed, approved by the
Chief of Staff for signing by the Acting Secretary of War. A
draft of the letter was [Page 677] sent informally to the Secretary of State and seemed to him
adequate for the needs of the situation.
On July 27, 1943, the Acting Secretary of War signed and sent to
the Secretary of State a letter regarding the military situation
in Palestine and the Middle East, which is attached.10 In this letter Judge
Patterson eliminated all references made by General Strong in
his draft letter to the dangerous repercussions in the Middle
East caused by irresponsible agitation in this country on the
subject of Palestine.
The Secretary of State was not satisfied that Judge Patterson’s
letter would justify any inclusion in the proposed statement of
policy of a reference to the dangers that might be incurred by
the military forces in the Middle East as a result of continued
irresponsible agitation in this country. The Secretary of State
accordingly communicated by telephone with Mr. Stimson, the
Secretary of War, who had meanwhile returned to Washington and
taken charge of the War Department and asked him to discuss the
situation with Judge Patterson with a view to having the Judge’s
letter revised along lines of the original draft prepared by
General Strong. Mr. Stimson stated that he was lunching with
Judge Patterson and would discuss the matter with him at that
time.
On July 28, 1943, inquiries began to reach the Department from
Zionist quarters regarding the proposed statement. On that day
Mr. Welles, who was then at Bar Harbor, telephoned the Secretary
of State to say that he had been approached by Zionist leaders
in the matter and that he had informed them that he knew nothing
about the matter.
Meanwhile, on July 29, 1943, Congressman Sol Bloom, Chairman of
the Foreign Affairs Committee, called upon the Secretary of
State and reported that Zionist leaders had gotten in touch with
him and were apprehensive lest any proposed statement might be
harmful to their cause. At the Secretary’s suggestion, Mr. Bloom
conferred with officials of the Near Eastern Division and was
furnished with a brief background of the situation at that time
and permitted to see the proposed statement as well as certain
important reports available both to the War Department and to
this Department regarding the serious military situation in the
Middle East.
Congressman Bloom was in full accord with the proposed statement
and even suggested that it should be strengthened. He at the
same time felt that it would be desirable for a person like
Judge Rosen-man to meet, preferably in New York, with
outstanding Jewish leaders in order to explain to them in
advance the military necessity for the proposed statement.
[Page 678]
In a memorandum to the President drafted by the Secretary of
State on July 29, 1943,11 the Secretary supported the suggestion that
Judge Rosenman could be helpful in handling this matter. As the
President was about to depart for Hyde Park word was received
from the White House that the President would take all the
papers along with him for discussion with Judge Rosenman.
Judge Rosenman called on the Secretary of State on August 3,
1943, and later at the Division of Near Eastern Affairs where he
was fully acquainted with all the papers of the case and given a
full background of the situation. The Judge stated that he had
already discussed the matter fully with General Strong and that
General Strong had furnished him with certain data on the
military situation in the Middle East and had promised to
furnish him with fuller reports. Judge Rosenman stated that he
intended to go to New York over the weekend where he would
discuss the matter in detail with competent Jewish leaders.
On August 5, 1943, the Secretary of War called the Secretary of
State by telephone to say that he had examined the military
situation in the Near East, that he considered General Strong an
“alarmist” in the matter and in effect “withdrew” Judge
Patterson’s letter supporting the need for a joint
American-British statement on Palestine at this time. The
Secretary of State prepared a memorandum12 of his
above-mentioned telephone conversation dated August 6, 1943,
with the Secretary of War, a copy of which is being sent to the
Secretary of War for his information.
As a result of Mr. Stimson’s action in this matter, the
Department in a telegram dated August 7, 1943, informed the
British Government that for reasons stated in the telegram, a
copy of which is attached,13 this
Government would not contemplate making any statement on
Palestine for the time being.
For the completion of the file, there is attached a copy of a
telegram from Mr. Kirk, our Minister at Cairo, dated July 28,
1943,11
expressing apprehension over the delay in the issue of the
statement and impressing upon the Department the urgent need of
such action. It may be explained in this connection that Mr.
Kirk had been furnished with the text of the contemplated
statement and had been advised that it would be issued shortly.
He was to have repeated the text to various American diplomatic
missions in the Near East where it was believed a statement
would have had a very salutary effect in quieting the agitated
sentiments of the native populations.
[Page 679]
There is also attached a copy of a telegram dated August 10,
1943, from the Embassy at London14
expressing the disappointment of Mr. Eden and Colonel Stanley at
this Government’s decision not to issue the proposed
statement.
