A.E.C. Files (Historical Doc. No.
235)
The Director of the Office of Scientific Research
and Development (Bush) to the British Lord
President of the Council (Anderson)
secret
[Washington,] August 3,
1943.
Dear Sir John: In accordance with my
conference this afternoon,1 I transmit an extract from
the report we discussed. I trust that you will soon have an
opportunity to review this, and both Dr. Conant and I will be very
much interested in your statement as to the ways in which this
should now be extended in order to proceed with the war effort to
full advantage.
I also enclose a copy of a letter2 which you may not already have in
your file and which covers some of the same ground.
As a further matter, I include a preliminary statement3 on one aspect of this
subject which was drafted on July first, and which is concerned with
one exceedingly important technical point. You will note that this
contains Dr. Conant’s recommendation that the memorandum and the
subsequent report4 be transmitted to the British authorities. I
felt that you might care to have this promptly, in order that our
conversations might have one very prompt result in the transmission
of a specific document, even although it had been planned to make
this transmission before we conferred, and even although this is
soon to be followed by a more detailed report on the same
subject.
I will look forward to seeing you again shortly.
Cordially yours,
[Enclosure]
The Director of the Office of Scientific
Research and Development (Bush) to
the British Lord President of the Council (Anderson)5
secret
[Washington,] August 3,
1943.
Memorandum for Sir John Anderson
Extracts from a report dated December 15,
1942.6
Rules regarding interchange as approved by the Policy Committee,
included in the report and there approved by the President:
[Page 641]
Restricted interchange of information only to the extent that it
can be used now by the recipient.
The interpretation of this policy under present circumstances,
would be as follows:
- 1.
- Electromagnetic method—no interchange. (British doing
no work on this method.)
- 2.
- Diffusion—unrestricted interchange between the U.S.
firms designing and constructing the Plant and the
British concerned with the same project.
- 3.
- Manufacture of “49”7 and heavy water—interchange only
of scientific research; no interchange of the design of
plants. If all of the information obtained would be made
available to U.S. Engineers, the initial Trail product
could be made available to the Canadian group to an
extent sufficient for them to pursue their
experimentation. Since there would be no developmental
work in Canada, British or Canadian access to the design
of our plants or to the plants after construction would
not be provided for.
- 4.
- No interchange on research or development being
conducted in special secret laboratory on bomb
design.
Attached to the report was a more complete statement giving the
reasoning behind each step in the interchange arrangements as
follows:
Principle
Restricted interchange of information only to the extent that it
can be used now by the recipient.
Present interpretations
As now set by Military Policy Committee:
- 1.
-
Electromagnetic method—no
interchange. On basis that British are doing no work on
this method.
- 2.
-
Diffusion—unrestricted
interchange between U.S. firms designing and
constructing the plant, and the British concerned with
the same project. Based on plan to build full-scale
plant in U.S., and belief that exchange of experimental
results on models is all that is needed to enable this
to go ahead effectively.
- 3.
-
Manufacture of “49” and heavy
water. Interchange only of scientific results; no
interchange of the design of plants. If all of the
information obtained would be made available to U.S.
Engineers, the initial Trail product (heavy water made
in a plant in Canada at U.S. expense) could be made
available to the Canadian group to an extent sufficient
for them to pursue their experimentation. Since there
would be no developmental work in Canada, British or
Canadian access to the design of U.S. plants or to the
plants after construction, would not be provided
for.
- 4.
- No interchange on research and development being
conducted in special secret laboratory on bomb design. Continuation of
theoretical interchange, except with the group to be
isolated at this laboratory. Based on the need for the
utmost security on this phase. It is the intention to
isolate this special laboratory group from American as
well as British scientists working outside.
