[Attachment]
Memorandum by Messrs. Joseph W. Ballantine and
Max W. Bishop, of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs
strictly confidential
[Washington,] August 19,
1943.
U.S.S.R. Aims in the Far
East
I
The fundamental aims in the Far East of the Soviet Union do not
differ from its aims in Europe, in the Near East, or in other
areas
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adjacent to or
near the U.S.S.R. The perhaps primary motivating factor in
Soviet policy is a natural desire to promote national
security.
The Soviet Government has as one of its paramount political
objectives the creation of well disposed and ideologically
sympathetic governments in nearby areas. As outstanding examples
we have the Soviet Union’s infiltration into Outer Mongolia
(where a Soviet Government has been created) and its influence
in Sinkiang and among the so-called Chinese Communists in
northwest China. It is believed that Korean guerrillas operating
in Manchuria have close Soviet connections.
The Soviet Government has a deep organic suspicion of any and all
non-Soviet governments. This suspicion gives rise to determined
efforts to bring neighboring governments and peoples into Soviet
Russia’s orbit, to exercise control over them, and to influence
and gain control of radical social and economic movements.
The Soviet Government still has a strong desire for warm water
ports. It is to be expected, therefore, that one of its basic
objectives in the Far East is to obtain access to the Pacific
through a port or ports in north China or in Korea. The Soviet
Union would probably be satisfied if such port or ports were
under a government subservient to the Soviet Union. As a
corollary to this objective, we may also expect Soviet Russia to
desire transit privileges via the railways across Manchuria to a
warm water port or ports and to Vladivostok.
II
So long as the military situation in Europe is such as to require
the concentration of practically all of the offensive strength
of the U.S.S.R. against Germany, it is probable that the
implementation of Soviet policies in the Far East will be
confined for the most part to political measures—including
especially propaganda and intrigue. In the meantime the Soviet
Government will take full advantage of every possible
opportunity to prepare for more positive action in the
future.
It is likely that the Soviet Union will at some time in the
future depart from its present policy of not offering material
assistance in substantial amounts to the Chinese Communists and
of not openly opposing the Japanese. It is notable that while the Soviet Union remains engaged in
Europe on the present scale it will continue to follow
a policy of expedient stability in its relations with Japan and
of maintaining at least openly a neutral attitude between the
Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang.
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One effect of peace in Europe will be to strengthen Soviet
Russia’s hand in the Far East.
Areas in the Far East where there exist social unrest and
political instability, conducive to radical political and social
movements, are likely to furnish fertile fields for the
extension of Soviet influence. Such a development might take the
form not of a positive move on the part of the Soviet Government
with the objective of territorial aggrandizement but of
gravitation by the peoples of those areas toward the Soviet
Union in consequence of their dissatisfaction with their
condition under the governments to which they have been and are
subject. There will of course be a natural tendency on the part
of the authorities in the areas concerned, such as in China, to
blame those developments on Moscow rather than on their own
failure to deal effectively with social unrest.
It is to be expected that the Soviet Union will seek to have an
important voice in any conference in relation to the settlement
of Far Eastern affairs and to influence post-war settlements
relating to the Far East in a way favorable to the realization
of fundamental Soviet desiderata. The Soviet Union will probably
seek to gain control of or to create Sovietized governments
among the peoples of Inner Mongolia, Manchuria, Korea and
possibly other areas in the Western Pacific; in the matter of
influence, Soviet desires would include substantial influence in
and over Japan.
Should the Soviet Union, as is likely, enter the war against
Japan in its later stages, she would probably endeavor to send
troops into Manchuria, southern Sakhalin and Korea. Were she to
achieve this, she would probably make demands for some
territorial and/or administrative advantages in those areas for
Soviet account; but this is problematical.
Should the Soviet Union not actively enter the war against Japan,
it still probably would wish to move into areas, if any, in
north China and possibly Korea, where a political vacuum might
have been created by the defeat of Japan.
(The foregoing estimate takes no account of the possibility of a
separate peace between Germany and the U.S.S.R. Should a
separate peace be made between these two countries more active
Soviet interference in China might well be forthcoming, as well
as efforts to bring about peace between Japan and China in order
for obvious reasons to prolong Japan’s war with the United
States and Great Britain.)
Existing conditions in China and the probable conditions
throughout the Far East at the end of the war make it likely
that the Soviet Union will be in a strong position toward
achieving its fundamental aims in regard to those areas.
