740.00119 EW/8–1943
Briefing Paper for the Secretary of State1
Memorandum
S—Mr. Secretary: It may be useful for you to have a brief review of the various serious approaches made by the Italian Government to British or American officials abroad during the past two weeks.
- 1.
- On August 5 the Foreign Office informed Lord Halifax that the British Minister [Ambassador’] at Lisbon had been approached by the new Italian Counselor of Legation, Marquis Lanza d’Ajeta. While he declared himself to be acting on behalf of and under orders from the Marshal and his Government, he was authorized apparently only to explain the present Government’s predicament in the face of the immediate German threat and to beg the Allies’ forbearance and assistance by diverting the Germans to another front.2
- 2.
- On August 6 the [Acting] British Consul General at Tangier reported that he had been approached by Signor Berio, the recently arrived Italian Chargé d’Affaires of the Italian Consulate General in that city. He stated that Marshal Badoglio’s government was ready to treat with the British but were prevented from doing so because entirely under German control. He warned that if Badoglio’s government should fall, it would be replaced by a German government with a suitable Italian quisling in power. The Italian stated that he was authorized to treat with the British official or a representative of General Eisenhower. He asked that we cease bombing Italian cities to make Badoglio’s task of policing the country easier and come to the assistance of the Italians by creating a diversion for the Germans in the Balkans or France.3
- 3.
- On August 14 the American Legation at Lisbon forwarded a message of August 8 from Mr. Tittmann at Vatican City.4 Mr. Tittmann had been approached by a representative of the Italian Government. Although he did not reveal the source he said that it was “sure”. He reported that Marshal Badoglio desired immediate peace, that fear of the Germans prevented him from acting, that he was trying desperately to maintain authority in the face of our bombing of civilian populations, that the Marshal would like to know our plans for Italy and that he had already tried to communicate with us through Lisbon and Tangier.
- 4.
- The Prime Minister informed the President on August 16 of the following message from the British Ambassador at Madrid. [Here follows a summary of Hoare’s telegram No. 1404, quoted in Eden’s telegram No. Concrete 231, ante, p. 589.]
Only one reply has been made thus far to any of these various approaches, so far as we are informed. On August 13 the British Consul General at Tangier was instructed to give Signor Berio a reply along the following lines:
[Here follows a summary of the two quoted paragraphs in Churchill’s telegram No. 409 to Roosevelt, ante, p. 578.]
In reply to the military approach through Madrid, the Prime Minister suggested to the President on August 16 a reply along the following lines:
[Here follows a summary of the suggestion contained in Churchill’s telegram to Roosevelt, ante, p. 588.]
The various channels which the Badoglio Government has chosen tend to confirm each other and in sum emphasize Italian desire for peace, fear of the Germans, and their helpless and hopeless attitude unless or until we come to their aid by an invasion of the mainland.
On the assumption that from a military point of view it is desirable to facilitate our occupation of at least southern and central Italy in the most expeditious manner possible and at minimum cost, we [Page 600] think the formula suggested in Mr. Churchill’s draft reply of August 16 is the best that could be devised in the circumstances. It extracts all the cooperation from the Italians that they may be in a position to give and avoids the political disadvantages arising from any preliminary bargains with the present government.
However, in following such a line of action we run the following risks:
Unless we are prepared to move in with a considerable military force in a reasonable time and thus capitalize on the wishes of the people to get out of the Axis, it is quite possible that the Italians may not be able to resist the Germans, the country will be thrown into further chaos and might be occupied more fully than present reports indicate (the Po Valley) and thus make it more difficult for us to obtain air bases in the near future in central and southern Italy.
In accepting military collaboration from the Badoglio Government and its temporary maintenance in power, careful consideration should be given to and plans made to meet the various implications of such policy and the possible repercussions which might arise therefrom.
Some of these would be:
1. In maintaining the Badoglio Government in power we lay ourselves open to the criticism that we are backing a reactionary, “semi-Fascist” régime.
The criticism of that Government so far has reached such proportions in the American press that it is probable that far-reaching repercussions might ensue if it could be alleged that we were collaborating with such a “reactionary” Government. Furthermore, it will be recalled that Marshal Stalin last week indicated to the American and British Ambassadors in Moscow his distrust of Badoglio.
It should be borne in mind that it became apparent in connection with the North African difficulties that there are in the United States, and to a somewhat lesser extent in Great Britain, powerful ideological groups who seek to convince the world that we desire to back only reactionary elements in Europe in contrast to the attitude of the Soviet Union which is endeavoring to encourage the establishment of really “democratic” régimes.
2. In order to minimize such criticism there should be inserted in any terms we make after unconditional surrender, a definite stipulation to the effect that free elections, supervised by impartial observers, are to be held in Italy in order that the people may determine the type and form of government they desire.
Furthermore, in the post-armistice period definite provisions should be made to have a United Nations advisory body to control the provisional government until a permanent national government is established.
3. In accepting Italian military collaboration we, morally at least, admit Italian participation in the United Nations peace arrangements, with the implication that she can lay claim to the return of at least part of her Colonial Empire.
[Page 601]4. In regard to the proposal that the Italian troops assist General Mihailovich in Yugoslavia in his resistance to the Germans, we should be most careful to avoid any commitments of this kind unless it should be made with the approval of the Soviet Government and with the definite stipulations that the Italian troops should also assist the Communist controlled partisan groups in that country or unless in our basic strategy a decision had already been taken to make our principal attack against the Germans through the Balkans. As a matter of fact, if neither one of these conditions are fulfilled we should indicate emphatically to Badoglio that we would not countenance any assistance whatsoever from Italian troops in Yugoslavia. In this connection the possibility should be borne in mind that if any encouragement whatsoever is given to the Italian Government to assist General Mihailovich in Yugoslavia it is possible that these groups might not concentrate their entire efforts against the Nazis but might join forces in an attempt to liquidate the Communist partisan groups.
5. In continuing the Badoglio Government in power we would give official recognition to a new government in Italy which on the surface at least would be similar to the government envisaged in the recently announced Free Germany manifesto in Moscow.5 By such action we would make it possible for the Soviet Government to openly and officially sanction the Free Germany movement which so far has studiously maintained the facade of a purely private organization. By maintaining the Badoglio Government in power, even temporarily, it would be difficult for us to resist any attempt on the part of the Soviets to establish a somewhat similar Soviet-controlled government in Germany.
It is perhaps unnecessary to point out that from all indications the “democratic” government envisaged in the Free Germany manifesto would have little if anything in common with the type of democratic government which we eventually hope to establish in Italy or in other countries.