Roosevelt Papers: Telegram
Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt
1
most secret & personal
most immediate
[Quebec, August 16, 1943.]
Following from Former Naval Person to
President dated August 16th.
1. I send you herewith 4 telegrams I have received from London about
a renewed approach by Badoglio. The following is the kind of answer
which I suggest should be made. Begins. We
note the following statement of the Italian Envoy. “We are not in a
position to make any terms. We will accept unconditional surrender
provided we can join the Allies in fighting the Germans.” We for our
part cannot make any bargain about Italy changing sides nor can we
make plans in common at this stage. If, however, serious fighting
breaks out between the Italian Army and the German intruders, a new
situation would be created. The Italians know quite well that the
British and United States Governments do not seek to deny to Italy
her respected place in a [future2]
Europe. The Italian Government should therefore resist the Germans
to the best of their ability as soon as possible pending the arrival
of the Anglo-American Armies. In particular they should stop further
invasion of Italy by the German troops by blowing up bridges and
tunnels and tearing up railways lines and roads in the north of
Italy and thus cutting the communications of the German troops in
the South of Italy. Effective action of this kind would be regarded
by the victorious Allies as a valuable service and would render
further co-operation possible against the common foe. There is no
doubt of the ability of the Italian government and people to destroy
and paralyse the German communications and action of this kind would
be a proof of their sincerity. Another proof would be the
safeguarding of British and Allied prisoners from being taken away
to Germany, in any case where this is attempted by the Germans
[Page 589]
and the Italian Government
have not the power to resist the prisoners should be set free and
succoured by the Italian people. A further vital service which the
Italian Government certainly has it in its power to render to the
Allies is to sail the Italian warships to any ports in Allied
occupation. Fourthly the furnishing by the Italian Government of any
information of the German dispositions and any assistance given by
the Italian troops and people to the disembarkations of the Allies
when they take place, especially if accompanied by fighting between
the Italians and the Germans, would be favourably recognised.
Fifthly, any co-operation between the Italian troops in the Balkan
peninsula and the various patriot forces in the field, taking the
form of resistance to the Germans and leading to bloodshed, would be
favourably viewed. Thus, by taking hostile action against the common
enemy, the Italian Government, Army and people could, without any
bargain, facilitate a more friendly relationship with the United
Nations. In particular, we state that if the Allied troops arrive at
any point where they find Italians fighting Germans, we shall aid
the Italians to our utmost. Ends. Eden should
be here tomorrow and we can discuss the whole position together. I
send you this budget in order that you may see the way my mind is
working.
[Attachment 1—Telegram]
The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to Prime Minister Churchill
3
most secret
most immediate
London, August 16,
1943.
Concrete No.
231—16th August. Following for Prime Minister from Foreign
Secretary.
Following Telegram No. 1404 of August 15th just received from His
Majesty’s Ambassador, Madrid.4
Begins:
A letter was handed me this morning from His Majesty’s
Minister to the Holy See5 asking me to see the bearer.
When I agreed two Italians entered the room who
introduced themselves as General Castellano,6 Chief of General Ambrosio’s Military
Office, and Signor Montanari of Consulta.7 General
Castellano informed me that he came officially and with
full authority from Marshal Badoglio to put before
[Page 590]
His Majesty’s
Government the Italian position and to make a specific
and very urgent proposal. The Marshal wished His
Majesty’s Government to know that Italy was in a
terrible position. Practically the whole country was in
favour of peace, the Italian Army was badly armed, there
was no Italian Aviation and German Troops were streaming
in by the Brenner and Riviera. Feeling against the
Germans was intense. The Italian Government however felt
powerless to act until the Allies landed on the
mainland. If and when however the Allies landed, Italy
was prepared to join the Allies and to fight against
Germany. If the Allies agreed in principle to this
proposal General Castellano would immediately give
detailed information as to the disposition of German
troops and stores and as to co-operation that the
Italians would offer Mihailovitch in the Balkans.
General Castellano was also empowered to concert
operations e.g. connected with the Allied landings from
Sicily. Marshal Badoglio regarded it as essential that
action should be taken immediately as every hour meant
the arrival of more German Units in Italy and at present
there were thirteen Divisions and the German plan was to
hold the line of the Apennines and Ravenna.
- 2.
- I then put the following questions—What would the
Italian Government do in answer to the Allied demand
of unconditional surrender? The General’s answer was
“We are not in a position to make any terms. We will
accept unconditional surrender provided we can join
the Allies in fighting the Germans”. I then asked
whether similar proposal had been made to the United
States Government or in other Quarter? He replied
“No. This was the first official proposal”. I then
asked how he had got out of Italy. He answered on a
false passport under the name of Raimondi as a
member of the Italian Mission en route for Lisbon to
meet returning Italian Ambassador from [to] Chile.8 He would have to return to Home with
the Ambassador on August 20th. He then asked whether
I could give him an immediate answer and said that
if so he would at once give my military Attaché
complete military information about German and
Italian Dispositions. I said I could not do this but
that I would telegraph urgently and ask His
Majesty’s Government to send instructions to His
Majesty’s Ambassador at Lisbon.9
I then gave him a letter asking His Majesty’s
Ambassador to see him. He said provided he could
rejoin his Mission by August 20th he would be ready
to fly to London.
- 3.
- I made it clear that I was expressing no opinion
whatever on the offer but that I would transmit it
most urgently and secretly to His Majesty’s
Government. He impressed me as a man of weight and
sincerity. He arrives at Lisbon tomorrow Monday
afternoon and wall immediately give my letter to His
Majesty’s Ambassador. The letter merely introduces
him. I assume that you will send His Majesty’s
Ambassador at Lisbon instructions as to the next
step. General Castellano insisted repeatedly on the
great urgency.10
Ends.
[Page 591]
Following are our comments on the above. Begins:
It is to be noted that the whole of this Italian approach is
based on combined operations with us against Germans, “Italian
Government feel powerless to act until Allies land on Mainland”.
General Castellano says he is empowered to “concert operations,
e.g., connected with the Allied landings from Sicily”. As
regards unconditional surrender, he says “We will accept
provided we can join the Allies in fighting the Germans”. The
only military advantages which these proposals offer are
unopposed landings by Army and Navy and Italian co-operation in
running railways, ports, etc. but if conditions in Italy are as
stated by Castellano we are reasonably sure of this co-operation
even though we insist on unconditional surrender. In view of the
quality and morale of the Italian Troops in the Balkans, the
offer of co-operation with Mihailovitch is not likely to be a
very substantial contribution to military operations and would
give rise to considerable political complications. Moreover
military co-operation would mean at least that the Italians
retained their Arms, including the Fleet and would probably
eventually claim Allied status and advantages. We could not in
any case concert operations with them if that means revealing
any of our plans. I am instructing His Majesty’s Ambassador to
hold these Envoys in Lisbon where it appears that they
contemplate staying until August 20th. At the moment, of course,
he can only listen to what they have to say and tell them he is
seeking instructions. I presume you will wish to return the
answer, already given through Signor Berio at Tangier,11 that the
Italian Government should place themselves in the hands of the
Allied Governments, who will then state their terms adding that
the question of the assistance that Italy could give us against
the Germans cannot be determined until this has been done.
Although at first sight this offer of co-operation sounds
tempting I feel that if we accept it will land us in all sorts
of difficulties both military and political with few if any
corresponding advantages. If this judgement is correct I am sure
we ought to stick to our present policy of refusing to make the
Italian Government any promises or enter into any bargain with
them in return for their surrender. It is notable that General
Castellano has produced no written credentials, though that may
be explained by the furtive manner of his departure from Italy.
I am telegraphing to Vatican to ask for further information and
am asking His Majesty’s Ambassador in Lisbon to try to extract
more from the Envoys as to their bona fides. I am not repeating
this Telegram or Madrid Telegrams to Washington or to Algiers.
Leaving it to you to act as you think fit about communicating
with Americans.
[Page 592]
[Attachment 2—Telegram]
The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to Prime Minister Churchill
most secret
most immediate
London, August 16,
1943.
Concrete
232—16th August. Following for Prime Minister from
Foreign Secretary.
My immediately preceding telegram. Following telegram received
from Madrid No. 1405 of 15th August. Begins:
General C. has called again to ask whether General
Eisenhower could send a senior staff officer to join the
Lisbon talks. I said I would immediately transmit to you
this request. When I asked General C. why Marshal
Badoglio had not made these proposals direct to General
Eisenhower he said the Italian Government was so closely
watched by the Germans that they did not dare and that
it seemed safest to use the pretext of Lisbon mission
for talks in Madrid or Lisbon. Marshal Badoglio, knowing
me personally as a result of my military service in
Italy, had hoped for talks in Madrid but General C.
understood that [as] I was neither authorised to give
him any discussions, authorised to give him any answer
nor was my Military Attaché available for discussions,
they must be transferred to Lisbon. I should be grateful
of course if you could keep me generally in touch with
any developments. See my immediately following telegram.
Ends.
[Attachment 3—Telegram]
The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to Prime Minister Churchill
most secret
most immediate
London, August 16,
1943.
Concrete No. 233
16th August. Following for Prime Minister from Foreign
Secretary.
My immediately preceding telegram.
Following telegram received from Madrid No. 1406 of August 15th.
Begins.
General C. made following additional points.
- (a)
- Fascist militia has been disarmed. Their hostility to
the Army is however very bitter and if the Government
cannot reach agreement with the Allies on basis of
Marshal B’s proposals,
Germans may try to stage a, comeback for Mussolini
militia and Fascist leaders although Mussolini and
Fascism are discredited.
- (b)
- Although the country is almost solidly for peace, the
inhabitants scarcely less solid against the Germans and
will consequently support an Italian military alignment
with the Allies.
- (c)
- Germans are deeply entrenched in Government machine
and Hitler sent the 2 S.S. Division[s] Adolf Hitler and
Deutschland to Reggio Emilia to intensify German
control.
- (d)
- All the Italian troops have been withdrawn from the
Russian front. German troops have taken over garrison of
Greece. Salonika in particular is in exclusively German
hands.
- (e)
- Italian Government if aligned with the Allies is ready
to repudiate the independence of Croatia and to reach
agreement with Yugoslavia over Dalmatia.
- (f)
- Line that the Germans intend to hold in Italy is Genoa
to Ravenna. They are threatening the Italian Government
with air and gas reprisals if they do not continue
resistance.
- (g)
- Recent Allied air attacks particularly the last on
Rome and Milan have done great damage but almost
exclusively to Italians. The Italian Staff in the event
of an agreement will give the Allies fullest possible
details for the purpose of inflicting the maximum damage
on German troops and stocks. The Italian Army could in
this event do much to cut the Germany supply line. Pope
knows nothing of General C’s proposals but Cardinal
Maglione helped to obtain letter of introduction from
His Majesty’s Minister at the Holy See to me.
- (h)
- General C. and Signor M. although they possess
individual passports are travelling on omnibus papers
covering the whole mission en route for Lisbon; if
Germans discover General C’s identity they will kill him
on his return to Italy.
- (i)
- Chilean [Italian] Ambassador
[to Chile] and Staff are on the Spanish S.S.
Cabo De Buena Esperanza and
General C. and Signor M. will have to return with them
immediately after her arrival, e.g. August 20th or
August 21st in Lisbon.
See my immediately following telegram. Ends.
[Attachment 4—Telegram]
The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to Prime Minister Churchill
most secret
most immediate
London, August 16,
1943.
Concrete No. 234.
Following for Prime Minister from Foreign Secretary. My
immediately preceding telegram. Following telegram received from
Madrid No. 1407 of August 15th. Begins;
3.12 My comment, based of course solely on
this interview, is that Italian Government seem definitely
prepared to accept unconditional surrender provided
- (1)
- Allies land on the mainland.
- (2)
- Italian army fights the Germans.
Without these two conditions Italian
Government will not have sufficient courage or justification
to make a complete volte-face and
will drift impotently into chaos. Whilst His Majesty’s
Government alone can judge of wider issues at stake, my
advice would be to give urgent
[Page 594]
and serious attention to General C’s
proposal if for no other reason than to obtain intelligence
about the German intentions and dispositions. These he will
only disclose to a senior military officer after agreement
has been reached upon for this alignment of Italy with the
Allies. This being so, you may wish to send immediately some
senior staff officer to meet him in Lisbon. [Garble] he was
careful to say that whilst his mission was military, he was
authorised to speak for the whole of the Government
including Minister for Foreign Affairs. Italian Embassy in
Madrid know nothing of the mission or proposals. He had,
however, been given a message for Marquis Ajeta, Italian
Chargé d’Affaires [Counselor of
Legation] at Lisbon, but in view introduction to
His Majesty’s Ambassador and of the need of great secrecy,
he does not propose to deliver it. He will therefore appear
in Lisbon as Signor Raimondi official of Italian [Ministry]
of Finance and member of delegation of welcome to Chilean
Ambassador.
4. You will note that I had no opportunity of consulting you
as to my meeting these enemy subjects. Until they started
talking, I had no idea of their nationality and their
apparent bona fides and letter of introduction from His
Majesty’s Minister at the Holy See convinced me that you
would wish me to listen very carefully to their statements.
Signor M. took no part in the discussion except to clear up
one or two points on which I needed an interpreter. He
speaks English perfectly. Ends.
