Foreign Relations of the United States, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943

740.00119 EW/8–943

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State

most secret

Washington, August 9th, 1943.

Dear Mr. Hull, On returning to the Embassy¹ I found that three further telegrams had come in on the subject of Italian surrender. I enclose copies, and will be grateful if you could inform the President as soon as possible.²

Yours very sincerely,

Halifax

[Enclosure 1—Telegram]

The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to the British Ambassador in the United States (Halifax)

most secret

London, August 8, 1943.

Text of a telegram of August 8th from the British Consul-General at Tangier to Mr. Eden. Most secret.

I had further conversation last night with Signor Berio at his request. Signor Castronuovo was present. I told him that I have received no reply to my telegram sent on August 6th at 4:30 a.m.³ after our previous talk and I asked him whether he had any further instructions from Rome. He said that he had not and that he supposed that his Government was waiting for a reply from London through this or some other channel indicating whether His Majesty’s Government wishes to initiate some sort of negotiation.

2. Signor Berio produced Tangier Gazette (French edition) of August 7th and he showed me an article headed “La Guerre Continue”. He asked whether this article could be considered to be a reply to his démarche. I told him from the time of publication and from its language it was quite clear to me that it was not. He asked whether such an article was officially inspired and I replied that, without giving away secrets, lie could be assured that it was based on a telegram received from London but it might be an editorial from London press and not officially inspired but approved for publication here.

3. He then asked me to allow him to go through the article paragraph by paragraph and to forward his comments to the Foreign Office if I thought fit.

4. Paragraph 2 reads “The new Italian Government has sent no official communication to the Allies in reply to speeches pronounced by Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt, nor to the warnings given by the radio to the Italian people in the name of General Eisenhower”. Signor Berio said that an official communication by speech or wireless would be impossible owing to immediate effect it would have on the Germans, but that his communication to me on Thursday was intended to be official.

5. Paragraph 4 reads “It is difficult to understand, what Badoglio hopes to gain by his policy of temporization”. Signor Berio replies to this that Marshal Badoglio is temporizing with the Germans and not with us for he has decided to make peace but what can he do until we say what we want.

6. In paragraph 5 it is stated “It is asked why he delays so long in accepting the terms proposed by Allies”. What are these terms? asked Signor Berio.

7. Paragraph 6 reads “The only conclusion which the Allies can draw from policy at present adopted by Badoglio is that he and his Government have decided to help the Germans”. This is absolutely denied. Why should they do so? Surely complete suppression of the Fascist Party shows that Marshal Badoglio’s Government is not prepared to help Germans any more than it is compelled to do by circumstances. Badoglio is doing all he can to establish a channel for negotiation with Allies. If he continues to give lip-service to the Germans that is merely eye-wash for their consumption and he is giving them no physical help of any kind and is encouraging every obstruction.

8. Signor Berio asked me to give my personal opinion as to what further reply Badoglio could give pending the receipt of news of reaction in London to his message. I said that we must wait but that I thought he might state definitely that he is prepared to place himself unreservedly in the hands of the Allied Commander-in-Chief trusting in the honourable conditions which have been promised by Eisenhower and by Churchill and that he therefore begs to be informed as to what the terms are.

9. Signor Berio then asked me what I thought was likely to be the nature of those terms ‘and whether they would include any decision about colonies. I replied that I did not know and that I must await instructions before having such discussions.

10. He finally said that he knew that much harm had been done to us by Fascist Government but that it was the work of one man who had now gone. I said that the one man was apparently supported by the majority of his countrymen for a very long time and that the evil that they had done could not be put right by a stroke of the port nor by the mere announcement that Mussolini had been replaced and his Party dissolved.

11. We parted on very friendly terms.

12. I do not propose to have any further discussions with the Italians until I receive your instruction. Ends.

Please inform the President.

For my comments see my immediately following telegram.¹

[Enclosure 2—Telegram]

The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to the British Ambassador in the United States (Halifax)

most secret

London, August 8, 1943.

My immediately preceding telegram.⁵

I think we should reply to this on lines previously suggested in paragraphs 5 and 6 of my telegram of August 6th.⁶ You will see that Acting Consul-General in speaking to Berio has already on his own authority used similar language when he said that he thought that if Badoglio wished to make any further move it must be to state definitely that he was prepared to place himself unreservedly in the hands of Allied Governments.

2. May I now send reply as suggested in my previous telegram saying that I am sure we should insist expressly on unconditional surrender before we name our terms. Apart from our public declaration any other course would inevitably involve us in long and tortuous negotiations.

3. Please inform President of foregoing.

[Enclosure 3—Telegram]

The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to the British Acting Consul General at Tangier (Watkinson)

secret

London, August 9, 1943.

I approve your decision to have no further meeting with the Italians until you receive instructions which I hope to send you shortly.

2. For your own guidance, our position is that we must insist on unconditional surrender before we name our terms.

1. No record has been found of a conversation between Hull and Halifax on August 9, 1943, concerning Italy.
2. Hull showed the enclosures to Roosevelt on either August 9 or August 10. Attached to copies of the enclosures in the Roosevelt Papers is the following memorandum from George W. Renchard of Hull’s office to Roosevelt’s secretary (Tully): “Although I believe the President read the attached messages during the Secretary’s call on him the other day, I am sending them to you in the event you wish to retain them in your files for future reference.” (Roosevelt Papers)
3. Ante, p. 566.
1. See enclosure 2, below.
5. See enclosure 1, above.
6. Ante, p. 567.