J.C.S. Files
The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President 1
Memorandum for the President
The Joint Chiefs of Staff are in accord that it is inadvisable, from a purely military viewpoint, to decide the question of the recognizing of Rome as an open city at the present time. By such recognition we would deny ourselves the use of communications through Rome which would be vital to operations to the north. On the other hand, our willingness to recognize Rome us an open city has been mentioned in press conferences.2
The Italian Government through the Vatican has stated its intention to declare Rome an open city and has asked for the conditions [Page 562] we would impose before acceptance of this arrangement.3 For political reasons it would appear that the necessity of a direct denial of this request should be avoided. It seems advisable, particularly in view of the channel of communication use[d] and the special status of Rome, to delay answering this request as long as practicable. This action is justified by the fact that Rome has been within range of Allied bombers for a long time during which the Germans have profited by the use of rail communications through that city. Now that our use of these same communications appears probable, the Italians propose that it be made an open city. Their delay justifies our delay.
The action we propose is—furnish the State Department the views given in the preceding paragraph as a guide for their immediate action with a request that prior to any positive and final action the matter be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their views from the viewpoint of the military situation existing at the time. The present military situation is subject to a decided change in a short time.
As to the matter of “military necessity for future bombing raids on Rome” General Eisenhower, in his W–6509 4 August4 has indicated that for the present, at least, there are more important targets for the forces he has available. It is our view, and upon it was based the original recommendation for bombing Rome, that the communication facilities, plants, and airfields in Rome and its immediate vicinity are important military targets and should be attacked. In the Italian Peninsula there are 4 railroad routes from north to south, 2 of these pass through the city. A severance of railroad facilities at Rome would prevent movement of troops from northern to southern Italy except by 2 routes. Probably General Eisenhower’s views just referred to have been influenced by the delicacy of the situation and the differences of opinion of which he is aware.
In Rome or its immediate surroundings are factories, plants, and installations producing small arms of various types, heavy machine guns, hand grenades, mortar bombs, rifles, fuses, and fire control instruments, such as artillery sights, range finders, telescopes, etc.
There are 12 airfields in Rome or immediately adjacent thereto within a radius of 10 miles. Rome is the seat of the Italian Government. It is a focal point of wire communications. There are 5 principal radio broadcasting stations in Rome. All of the above indicate the importance of Rome to Italy from the standpoint of prosecution of the [Page 563] war. This is further emphasized by the immediate and decided reaction of the Italian Government to our first attack on Rome.
The Secretary of State has read this paper and concurs.
- The source text has neither a typed date nor a signature, but bears the following manuscript endorsement: “Sent to the President 8/5/43 1700”, i.e., at 5 p.m., August 5, 1943. A draft of this memorandum in Department of State files is endorsed “OK CH” in Hull’s handwriting, and an accompanying manuscript memorandum indicates that the War Department was informed at 3:30 p.m. on August 5 that Hull approved the memorandum as amended (740.0011 EW/8–543).↩
- Roosevelt had stated in a press conference on July 23, 1943: “We have been very anxious to have Rome declared an open city.” See Rosenman, p. 309.↩
- See ante, p. 528.↩
- For text, see Eisenhower Papers, p. 1313.↩