Office of the Historian

J.C.S. Files

Memorandum by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff1

secret
C.C.S. Unnumbered Memorandum
[Washington,] 25 May 1943.

Suggested Statement To Be Made to the Chinese

Following is a suggested statement to be made to the Chinese authorities with regard to decisions reached at the Trident Conferences.

[Page 378]

“It has been decided to pursue the operations in the Anakim theater which were discussed at the Calcutta Conference with certain modifications. The following are the decisions:—

  • First, the concentration of available resources as supreme priority within the Assam-Burma area on the building up and increasing of the Air route to China to a capacity of 10,000 tons monthly by early Fall, and the development of Air facilities in Assam with a view to:
    a.
    Intensifying Air operations against the Japanese in Burma;
    b.
    Maintaining increased American Air forces in China; and
    c.
    Maintaining the flow of airborne supplies to China.
  • Secondly, vigorous and aggressive land and Air operations will be begun at the end of 1943 monsoon from Assam into Burma via Ledo and Imphal in step with an advance by Chinese forces from Yunnan, with the object of containing and engaging as many Japanese forces as possible, covering the Air route to China, and as an essential step towards the opening of the Burma road.
  • Thirdly, amphibious operations against the Burmese coast with the purpose of cutting Japanese communications between the coast and their northern front.
  • Fourthly, the interruption of Japanese sea communications into Burma.

For the above purposes all possible measures will be taken to secure the Naval Command of the Bay of Bengal by an adequate force. No limits, except those imposed by time and circumstances, will be placed on the above operations, which have for their object the relief of the siege of China.”

H. Redman
J. R. Deane

Combined Secretariat
  1. The authorship of the suggested statement contained in this memorandum is not indicated, but in the course of the meeting of Roosevelt and Churchill with the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 24, 1943 (ante, p. 196), the Prime Minister had indicated that he would prepare such a written statement. This memorandum was considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on the morning of May 25, 1943; for the record of that meeting, see ante, p. 201.↩