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Memorandum Prepared by the Subcommittee on Territorial Problems of the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy 1
Limits of Land Settlement in Libya
[The first four numbered sections of the memorandum consist of a ten-page survey of the geography of Libya, arranged under the following headings: I. The Land, A. Areas for European Settlement, (1) Tripolitania, (2) Cyrenaica; II. Italian Improvements, A. Dry-Farming, B. Subterranean Waters; III. Population, A. Number of Italian Colonists; IV. Italian Colonization, A. Size of Colonists’ Holdings, B. Land Tenure, C. Factors in Italian Colonization.]
[Page 339]v. possibilities of future land settlement
Limits to future land settlement may be set by the technical aspects—the amounts of arable land available, the supply of water and the degree to which the land is already settled. The possibilities of settlement are also subject to political considerations.
Although no precise figures exist on the quantity of land available, an insight into the situation may be gained from Italian experience. In 1922 the Italian Government began to acquire land for settlement by dispossessing the Arab occupiers and by 1938 had acquired 875,000 acres. In view of the official objective, the Government probably selected the land best suited for agricultural settlement. Yet this amount was not entirely available for cultivation, including as it did, large areas of rocky land, sand dunes, ravines and eroded soil in addition to areas fit only for grazing, as in the coastal plains of Cyrenaica. It is not surprising, therefore, that of the 875,000 acres acquired by the Italian Government, only 200,000 acres had been, developed by 1937 and an additional 160,000 acres by 1938, a total of 360,000 acres. On this area, including the large concessions, were settled from 1921 to 1938 only 30,000 Italian agriculturists. Settlement of an additional 20,000 persons was proposed by the Italian Government in 1939–40 for which the sum of 450,000,000 lire, or $22,500,000, was budgeted. None of these persons were settled in Libya.
It has been suggested, on the basis of the Italian figures, that the best land has already been used for settlement. All the Italian settlers were placed in areas having 10 or more inches of rain. It seems certain that additional numbers of settlers, whether from Italy or from Central Europe, would find the land increasingly marginal for profitable exploitation.
It may be suggested also that, considering the population pressure in Italy, the nationalistic fervor of Fascism and the prestige factors involved, more Italians would have settled in Libya had land and water been available in sufficient quantities and quality. Italians did migrate to Libya but they found their places in the cities and not on the land.
In Libya, however, it is not so much a question of land, poor and scanty as it is, but rather a question of available water. It is also this factor which has limited Italian settlement and which must continue to limit large scale settlement.
From the evidence available it would seem that a large increase of cultivable area and of the agricultural population by use of surface water is impossible. Further increase by use of high-level wells must also be ruled out as these are already inadequate for present demands. Further drilling may endanger the present flow. This is a problem to be scientifically explored on the spot.
[Page 340]Increase of land through irrigation by artesian wells cannot be pronounced feasible on the basis of present information. The water table is not the only problem. There is also a question of the salinity of water, already necessitating the irrigation of crops only once every three years in areas where artesian wells are being used.
Some increase of agricultural land can be expected by the use of water pumped and brought in by aqueducts. The Italian authorities estimated that a total of 40,000 settlers or about 30,000 additional persons could be settled on Akhdar, with a provision of about 25 gallons of water per day per person, when the aqueduct is completed. An additional 1,500 or 2,000 persons were also expected to be settled on Jebel Nefusa in Tripolitania when the aqueduct and the canals on this mountain were completed. Some additional agricultural settlement may be made by the use of dry farming but it seems apparent that the Italians have pushed beyond the profitable limits, given the current yields and the competition of other areas as measured by market prices.
Additional land for settlement is also restricted by the fact that land both agricultural and pastoral, other than state domain, is becoming increasingly overpopulated in Libya. Approximately 625,000 of the 875,000 acres incorporated by the Italians into state domain was taken from the Arabs whose early resentment was manifested in rebellion. In the expropriation of 1937–38 clashes were reported between the Italian government and pastoral Arabs, who have remained sullen and restive at the loss of their lands. This attitude has continued notwithstanding the digging of new wells and the creation of new Arab agricultural settlements on marginal land.
Should additional land be acquired for agricultural settlements, particularly for settlers to whom the Arabs are hostile, the present competition between pastoral Arabs for grazing land for increasing herds and flocks and agriculturists for cultivable land, is likely to break info open conflict. The basic struggle between the economy of the Arabs and of European Jews now existing in Palestine would thus be carried into Libya.
Under these conditions it may be suggested that between 32,000 and 35,000 additional settlers or a total of about 60,000 to 65,000 could be settled on land in Libya. To settle even this number, consideration of other conditions seem essential. Among these are:
- (1)
- The placing of the entire holdings of the Italian settlers at the disposal of new settlers by expropriation or purchase.
- (2)
- The repairing and reconstruction of the buildings and public utilities on the present settlements, where they have been damaged by war and by pillaging Arabs;
- (3)
- Completion of aqueducts and canals;
- (4)
- The clearance of land and construction of new buildings for the new settlers. It may be noted that it required 32,000 laborers seven months to prepare the land and buildings for settlement of 1,800 families in 1938;
- (5)
- Provision of essential funds for these operations and for the maintenance of the settlers until they are self-supporting. In the case of Italian settlers, the Italian government expected to subsidize them for at least five years after settlement and in the case of settlers growing olives—which was the majority—to subsidize such settlers for 15 years;
- (6)
- Settlement of political difficulties with the local Arab and Moslem population and with the Arab and Moslem world, not only in relation to the new settlers but also in relation to the place and prestige of the powers and International Organization among the Arabs and Moslems.
vi. arab and moslem opposition
The settlement of Libya by Jewish refugees would undoubtedly meet hostile opposition from local Arabs and from the Arab and Moslem world in general.
A. Opposition of Libyan Arabs
The Libyan Arabs would reject any settlement which would threaten their grazing land and facilitate the infiltration of European Jews into the cities. For political reasons also the settlement and the Intern rational Organization responsible for it, would be met with hostility, particularly by the Senussi.
The Senussi, who form the most powerful of the north African Arab brotherhoods, are already evincing increasing strength. The London Times has already written of their incipient nationalism, to which their recent employment as auxiliary troops by the British may have contributed. Mr. Eden, speaking in the House of Commons, on January 8, 1943 [1942], stated the determination of the British Government that the Senussi should not fall again under Italian domination.2 It would seem probable that settlement of refugees could be made without use of force only if the acquiescence of the local Arabs is obtained through some form of negotiation.
B. Opposition of Other Arab and Moslem Countries
The settlement of Jews in Libya would undoubtedly lead to protests throughout the Arab and Moslem world. Part of the Arab hostility to Jewish immigration into Palestine has been occasioned by fear that Jews desired to acquire domination of other Arab countries. The establishment of Jews in Libya with the aid of the United Nations would presumably be regarded by Arabs as an indication that those ambitions had received the support of the responsible United Nations, [Page 342] which already are believed by most Arabs to desire the creation of the feared Jewish State in Palestine.
Egypt as a neighboring Arab state which has officially voiced its desire to further Arab interests and in which unofficial interest has been manifested in the extension of its frontier into Libya, would assumably not view with sympathy Jewish settlement in Libya. It has already opposed further Jewish immigration in Palestine.
Iraq, which officially and unofficially has shown its interest in Pan-Arabism and its opposition to Zionism might also be expected to oppose Jewish immigration into Libya unless the number of settlers were set at a definite limit and unless the settlement as a whole were related to a solution of the Palestine question in accordance with moderate Arab wishes.
The securing of acquiescence of Arabs and Moslems would undoubtedly involve negotiations with Arab leaders in Libya, notably in the Senussi, and in countries from Iraq to Morocco. In such negotiation, the solution of the Palestine question, the limitation of the number of settlers to be introduced into Libya, guarantees for Arab land holders, and provisions for capital expenditure on behalf of the Arabs would expectedly be put forward among the conditions which the Arabs might raise if their settlement in Libya is to be won.
[Here follow five pages of tables and bibliography.]
-
Attached to the source text is a handwritten chit by Harley Notter, dated August 3, 1943, which reads: “This is that missing document that was prepared on secret instrucs while Churchill was here.” Notter’s handwritten marginal notation on the first page of the source text reads as follows: “Sent to Pres. Roosevelt 8 p.m. May 22 by Dr. Bowman.” In a memorandum of May 24, 1943, to Leo Pasvolsky (printed in Notter, p. 514), Isaiah Bowman, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Territorial Problems, described the preparation and delivery of this memorandum. According to this account, Bowman met privately with Roosevelt at the White House on May 18, 1943, at the latter’s request, and discussed the question of Libya. Roosevelt asked Bowman to prepare a memorandum on the subject for his personal use in connection with a conversation with Churchill scheduled for May 23. The memorandum, which was prepared by specialists on the Research Staff of the Department of State, was delivered to the White House late on May 22, 1943.
Included among the Roosevelt Papers is the following memorandum of May 21, 1943, from Roosevelt to Churchill: “I have started to get a brief report on Libya and Tripoli and we will have it by Sunday.” It is likely that this memorandum was taken up by Roosevelt and Churchill at their meeting on the evening of Sunday, May 23, 1943; see the editorial note, ante, p. 183
↩ - For the statement referred to, see Parliamentary Debates: House of Commons Official Report, 5th series, vol. 377, col. 78.↩