Roosevelt Papers

Draft Memorandum by President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill 1

Memorandum for W.S.C.

I am sorry, but it seems to me the conduct of the Bride2 continues to be more and more aggravated. His course and attitude is well nigh intolerable.

The war in North Africa has terminated successfully without any material aid from de Gaulle and the civil situation with all its dangers seems to be working out well.

I think that Macmillan concurs in this.

However, de Gaulle is without question taking his vicious propaganda staff down to Algiers to stir up strife between the various elements including the Arabs and Jews. He is expanding his present group of agitators who are working up counter demonstrations and even riots.

Unfortunately, too many people are catching on to the fact that these disturbances are being financed in whole or in part by British Government funds.

De Gaulle may be an honest fellow but he has the Messianic complex. Further he has the idea that the people of France itself are strongly behind him personally.

This I doubt. I think that the people of France are behind the Free French Movement; that they do not know de Gaulle and that their loyalty is to the fine objectives of the movement when it was started and to the larger phase of it which looks to the restoration of France. If they only knew what you and I know about de Gaulle himself, they would continue to be for the movement but not for its present leader in London.

That is why I become more and more disturbed by the continued machinations of de Gaulle.

In my judgment, there should be a reorganization of the French National Committee, removing some of the people we know to be [Page 321] impossible such as Philippe [André Philip?], and include in it some of the strong men like Monnet and others from Giraud’s North African Administration, and possibly one or two others from Madagascar, etc.

Furthermore, I am inclined to think that when we get into France itself we will have to regard it as a military occupation run by British and American generals.

In such a case, they will be able to use 90% of the Mayors of Arrondissements, many of the subordinate officials of the cities and departments. But the top line, or national administration must be kept in the hands of the British or American Commander-in-Chief. I think that this may be necessary for six months or even a year after we get into France, thus giving time to build up for an election and a new form of government. The old form simply will not work.

I enclose extracts from some of the reports I recently have received from North Africa relating to de Gaulle,3

“De Gaulle’s dictatorial speech in London on May fourth, Catroux intimated, made it clear that Catroux’s role as negotiator has been ended, because de Gaulle is conducting his own negotiations by public speeches.

“De Gaulle in messages to Catroux, and in an almost childish manner, kept saying that he would come to North Africa when he pleased and to whatever place he chose.

“De Gaulle charged Giraud of welching on his original invitation to come to the City of Algiers. Catroux agreed that Giraud had never invited him to come straight to Algiers. Catroux seemed wholly disgusted and felt that de Gaulle’s speech was an open confession that he was seeking personal power.

“Monnet thought the speech sounded like pages out of Mein Kampf.

“Macmillan felt that de Gaulle’s speech dodged every question of principle involved.

“In de Gaulle’s telegram to Catroux on May third, there were derogatory references to the United States, saying in effect that it was the power against which the French must join forces.”

All in all, I think you and I should thrash out this disagreeable problem and establish a common policy.

I think we might talk over the formation of an entirely new French Committee subject in its membership to the approval of you and me.

I do not think it should act in any way as a provisional government, but could be called advisory in its functions.

Giraud should be made the Commander-in-Chief of the French Army and Navy and would, of course, sit on the Advisory National [Page 322] Committee. I think he has shown fine qualities since we saw him in Casablanca.

I do not know what to do with de Gaulle. Possibly you would like to make him Governor of Madagascar!

F[ranklin] D. R[oosevelt]

P.S. I hear the rumor that Leclerc forces in Tunisia have been permitted to recruit from the neighboring forces of Giraud because Leclerc offered more pay and better rations and clothing than Giraud’s men got.4 I do not know if this is true. The same source reports that the de Gaulle mission in Algiers seems to have abundant funds and has put together an active and effective propaganda.

F.D.R.
  1. This draft memorandum was transmitted to Hull under cover of the following initialed memorandum by Roosevelt: “I enclose copy of memorandum I thought of taking up with the Prime Minister.” No official record has been found as to whether Roosevelt did take up this memorandum with Churchill.
  2. In connection with the efforts at the Casablanca Conference to reconcile the factions in the French liberation movement, Roosevelt had referred to de Gaulle as the “Bride” and Giraud as the “Bridegroom”; see Roosevelt’s telegram of January 18, 1943, to Hull, Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943, p. 816.
  3. The following quoted paragraphs appear to be paraphrased excerpts from telegram 805, May 6, 1943, from Algiers, Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. ii, p. 108.
  4. Regarding the differences between Leclerc and the French military forces under Giraud, see Howe, pp. 669671.