J. C. S. Files
The Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill 1
Enclosure to C.C.S. 226/2
Memorandum for the President and the Prime Minister:
Subject: Use of Portuguese Atlantic Islands
The Combined Chiefs of Staff are agreed as to the tremendous benefits which the United Nations would gain from the earliest possible2 use of the Azores Islands. They recommend that the Portuguese Government should be approached at once on this subject, but that no guarantee should be given and that every endeavor should be made to persuade the Portuguese that no threat exists. They consider that Germany is unlikely to invade the Iberian Peninsula if the Azores Islands are so used, and that the risk is acceptable.
In submitting this recommendation the Combined Chiefs of Staff propose that while the diplomatic approach is being made forces should be prepared for the prompt seizure and use of the Azores if diplomacy fails.3 Plans are therefore being prepared and will be submitted. [Page 308] showing the earliest date for their execution and how, if at all, they will affect operations now in view.
General Chief of the Imperial General Staff
Admiral, U.S. Navy Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy
- Circulated in the Combined Chiefs of Staff under cover of the following note by the Secretaries: “The enclosure is a memorandum for the President and the Prime Minister which has been approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.” This memorandum is a revision of an early version, C.C.S. 226/1, May 17, 1943 (not printed), which was considered and amended by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on May 18, 1943; see ante, p. 98. The revisions made in C.C.S. 226/1 are indicated in the two following footnotes. The memorandum was signed by Leahy and delivered to Roosevelt and Churchill on May 19.↩
- The words “earliest possible” did not appear in C.C.S. 226/1.↩
- In C.C.S. 226/1, this sentence reads as follows: “In submitting this recommendation the Combined Chiefs of Staff suggest that any diplomatic approach should be backed by readiness for forcible occupation if diplomacy fails.” (J.C.S. Files)↩