Foreign Relations of the United States, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943

J. C. S. Files

Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff

secret
C.C.S. 239/1

[Washington,] 23 May 1943.

Operations in the Pacific and Far East in 1943–44

Reference:	a. C.C.S. 2201
	b. C.C.S. 92nd Mtg., Item 42

1. The enclosed report by the United States Joint Staff Planners, in the form as amended and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 92nd Meeting, is circulated for the information of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

2. The operations set forth in this paper are in support of the overall “Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan” as set forth in C.C.S. 220, already noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This plan for 1943–1944 operations is based on the premises:

a. That China must be retained as a base for operations against Japan.

b. That Japanese lines of communication must be subjected to continuous attack.

c. That Japanese Military forces must be subjected to continuous and increasing pressure to prevent consolidation and to effect attrition on Japanese Military power.

d. That positions must be secured in readiness for full-scale operations when such operations can be undertaken.

H. Redman
J. R. Deane

Combined Secretariat

[Enclosure]

Report by the United States Joint Staff Planners³

Operations in the Pacific and Far East in 1943–44

1. An analysis has been made of possible United Nations courses of action in the Pacific-Asiatic area in 1943 and 1944 to conform to the objectives set forth by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 219.⁴ The analysis is contained in Enclosure “A”.⁵

2. The courses of action examined and conclusions reached are as follows:

a. Far Eastern Theater

(1) Operations in Burma to augment supplies to China

Vital to implementing the strategic plan for the defeat of Japan and to keeping China in the war.

(2) Air Operations in and from China

Close coordination with other elements of plan are essential.

b. Pacific Theater

(1) Operations in the Solomons and Bismarck Archipelago

Provides for retaining the initiative, maintaining pressure on Japan, and the defense of Australia.

(2) Operations in New Guinea

The capture of New Guinea will facilitate the opening of a line of communications to the Celebes Sea and contribute to the defense of Australia.

(3) Operations in eastern Netherlands East Indies

Due to limitation of forces, operations other than air warfare should be restricted to the seizure of those islands necessary to the capture of New Guinea.

(4) Operations in the Marshall Islands

Shortens line of communications to Southwest Pacific and Celebes Sea.

(5) Operations in the Caroline Islands

Necessary to gain control of Central Pacific, thereby facilitating establishment of line of comunications to Celebes Sea. Will enable United Nations forces to directly threaten the Japanese Archipelago.

(6) Intensification of Operations against Enemy Lines of Communication.

All the foregoing operations are essential to the attainment of positions which enable the intensification and expansion of attacks on the enemy lines of communication in the Pacific.

3. Conclusions:

a. Offensive operations in the Pacific and Far East in 1948–1944 should have the following objectives:

(1) Conduct of air operations in and from China.

(2) Operations in Burma to augment supplies to China.

(3) Ejection of the Japanese from the Aleutians.

(4) Seizure of the Marshall and Caroline Islands.

(5) Seizure of the Solomons, the Bismarck Archipelago, and Japanese held New Guinea.

(6) Intensification of operations against enemy lines of communication.

b. Operations to gain these objectives will be restricted by the availability of trained amphibious divisions and amphibious craft.

1. Ante, p. 289.
2. See ante, p. 145.
3. The conclusions set forth in this report were later included in the “Report to the President and Prime Minister,” C.C.S. 242/6, May 25, 1943, post, p. 364.
4. Ante, p. 227.
5. Not printed.