Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943

Defense Files

United States Minutes

secret
JCCSs–8

January 10, 1942.

1. Super Gymnast

Admiral Pound said that the British Chiefs of Staff had made a careful examination of the various factors which affected the timing of this operation, and the earliest date on which the first convoy could arrive at Casablanca. He explained these to the Conference and undertook to let the United States Chiefs of Staff have a note on the subject. So far as the British were concerned, it appeared that if January 7 were taken as the date on which planning really began, the earliest date for D–1 on which the decision to load the first convoy could be given would be February 4. In this event the first convoy would arrive at Algiers and Casablanca on D–28, that is, March 3, depending upon the availability of shipping on that date. He also pointed out that the whole undertaking would depend upon the planning, the shipping, and the availability of troops and matériel. As to details at points of debarkation, Admiral Pound said that he anticipated no difficulty in Algiers, and that in the British opinion, 29,000 men and 3,500 vehicles could be unloaded at Casablanca in the fortnight.

General Marshall asked Admiral Pound if the British could undertake both Casablanca and Algiers.

Admiral Pound replied in the affirmative.

General Marshall then expressed some concern about the availability of shipping for the second convoy and undertook to confirm that January 7 could be accepted, from the American point of view, as the date on which planning began.

2. Directive for the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area—Attitude of the Dutch

Admiral Stark recalled that certain amendments to Annex 2 of the draft directive for General Wavell had been proposed by the British in order to meet certain points raised by the Dutch.¹ These had not yet been accepted by the Dutch, but had been approved by the President and the Prime Minister. He confirmed that these proposed amendments were acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff.

General Marshall said that the Dutch representative in Washington had come into the War Department a good deal over the question of the Dutch position. It appeared that the population of the Netherlands East Indies were feeling rather hurt at not having been consulted over the question of supreme command. They did not consider that the Dutch Government in London was fully representative of them. Some trouble had also been caused through the omission from General Wavell’s directive of any instruction to set up his Headquarters in Java. In the original communication to the Dutch Government, which proposed the setting up of a Supreme Commander, a passage to this effect had been included.²

Every endeavor had been made by Brigadier General Gerow to smooth down the feelings of the Dutch representative in Washington and to induce him to fall in with the agreed views of the United States and British Chiefs of Staff,³ but in view of the fact that negotiations with the Dutch Government were being conducted by the British, the position was somewhat embarrassing.

Admiral Pound expressed the appreciation of the British Chiefs of Staff for the way in which the United States Staffs were dealing with this matter. A telegram had been sent to General Wavell instructing him to set up his Headquarters in Java,⁴ and in fact, he was establishing himself at Batavia on January 10.

The Chiefs of Staff took cognizance of the prior approval of ABC–4/5, WW 6, with Annex 2 amended, and also of the fact that further amendments would possibly be made upon reply from the Dutch and Australian Governments. (See Annex 1)⁵

3. Procedure for the Assumption of Command by General Wavell

The Conference had before it an amendment by the British Chiefs of Staff on the procedure for the assumption of command of General Wavell (US–ABC–4/CS–3, British WW–9).⁶ Various minor amendments were agreed to.

Admiral King suggested that it would be advisable to insert in the draft telegram to General Wavell a sentence to indicate that instructions were being sent to Admiral Hart and General Brett telling them to report to him for duty in their respective posts. The following addition to the draft telegram at Annex B was accordingly agreed to:

“General Brett and Admiral Hart are being ordered by the United States Government to report to you as Deputy Supreme Commander and Commander of the Combined Naval Forces in the ABDA area respectively.”⁷

It was agreed:

a. That the draft telegram in Annex C to the Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff should be dispatched forthwith. (See Annex 2)⁸

b. That the procedure proposed in the Memorandum should be adopted and the Memorandum, subject to the amendments agreed upon in discussion, should be approved. (See Annex 2)⁸

4. Immediate Assistance to China

The Conference had before it a memorandum received from the United States Chiefs of Staff on immediate assistance to China. (ABC–4/9, WW(J.P.C.)9).⁹

Admiral Pound said that the British Chiefs of Staff recognized the importance of doing everything possible to facilitate assistance to China, and were in general agreement with the proposals in the paper. They wished to suggest certain amendments to it, which were designed to make it conform to the idea of Unity of Command.

The British Chiefs of Staff proposed certain amendments, which were discussed at some length.

At the suggestion of General Marshall the word “operate” in the fourth line of the first amendment was altered to “engage in joint operation”. Similarly in the last line but one of the second amendment the words “General Wavell” were altered to “the Supreme Commander in the ABDA Area”.

The following further amendment was agreed to.

On page 3, paragraph 4, line 5, the words “General Drum” were amended to read, “the United States Representative”.¹⁰

Marshal Dill suggested that the United States Representative in China might be informed of the existence and scope of the organization which had been built up in China under General Dennys. He undertook to forward a note on this point to General Marshall.¹¹

The Conference approved the memorandum on immediate assistance to China as amended in discussion. (See Annex 3)⁹

5. Post-Arcadia Collaboration

This paper was brought up by British Chiefs of Staff and discussed briefly. (See Annex 4)¹²

The Conference adjourned at 5:30 P.M., to meet at 4:00 P.M., January 11, 1942.

1. See the letter from Hollis to Hopkins. January 5. 1942. post, p. 304.
2. The “original communication” to the Netherlands Government, as well as to the Governments of Australia and New Zealand, was made by the British Government on January 2, 1942; see the statement in ABC–4/CS3, WW–9 (Revised), post, p. 317.
3. See the letter from Gerow to Loudon, January 2, 1942, post, p. 303. See also Roosevelt’s memorandum of January 9 to Marshall, post, p. 313.
4. Not printed.
5. Post, p. 313.
6. Post, p. 317.
7. The revised draft telegram is post, p. 318.
8. The annexed paper was ABC–4/CS3, WW–9 (Revised), post, p. 317.
8. The annexed paper was ABC–4/CS3, WW–9 (Revised), post, p. 317.
9. The paper, as revised and approved, was serialized as ABC–4/9, WW–10, dated January 10, 1942, post, p. 319.
10. For the initial consideration of sending Drum to China, see Romanus and Sunderland, pp. 63–70.
11. Not printed.
9. The paper, as revised and approved, was serialized as ABC–4/9, WW–10, dated January 10, 1942, post, p. 319.
12. The paper under reference is WW–8, dated January 8, 1942, post, p. 217.