Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943

W.P.B. Files

Memorandum by Mr. Nelson

December 30, 1941.

Memorandum

Subject: Notes on meeting held in the office of the Vice President in the Capitol on Monday, December 29, at 2:30 p.m.

Lord Beaverbrook emphasized the fact that we must set our production sites [sights] much higher than we have for the year 1942, in order that we might cope with a resourceful and determined enemy.¹ He pointed out that we had yet had no experience in the losses of matériel incidental to a war of the kind we are now fighting. He also felt we had very little conception of the productive facilities of the Axis powers. He said that in talking to Stalin, Stalin told him that Germany had thrown 30,000 tanks into the fight with Russia, and in starting from scratch as we were we had to build up a reserve in addition to supplying our forces with the necessary tanks to fight. He made the statement that if an invasion of America [Europe?] was attempted we had no conception of the number of tanks we would have to cope with. He emphasized over and over again the fact that we should set our sites [sights] higher in planning for production of the necessary war matériel. For instance, he thinks we should plan for the production of 45,000 tanks in 1942 against Mr. Knudsen’s estimate of 30,000.²

I want to take up the question of what is preventing us from producing 25,000 medium and 15,000 light tanks per month [year?]. I want to check merchant shipping, the conversion factor from dead weight, gross weight and cargo carrying capacity. I want to check the bottlenecks on the 3 inch versus the 57 millimeter gun, the number of man-hours, machinery involved, etc.

Donald M. Nelson

1. See Beaverbrook’s letter to Hopkins of December 29, post, p. 337, and his letter to Wallace of December 30, post, p. 338. See also the account in Nelson, p. 185.
2. In response to an inquiry from the Editors, Mr. Wallace wrote as follows: “Out of all these [meetings] I have no recollection whatsoever except the dynamism of Lord Beaverbrook. He was a power house with regard to what could be done and what had to be done. From a practical point of view I would remember him as having much more of an influence on Don Nelson and myself than Churchill. Some people did not like the Beaver but he stands out in my mind more than anyone else at this particular moment. The meeting with Beaverbrook which really counted was the one at 2:30 Dec. 29 at my office in the Capitol.…” (Wallace to the Historical Office, May 4, 1963).