Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943

Defense Files

United States Minutes

secret
JCCSs–1

December 24, 1941.

The substance of the conference consisted of informal discussions of various points which had been brought up at a conference the previous evening at the White House, at which the President and Mr. Winston Churchill had been present.

1. Defense of the British Isles

Admiral Stark opened the discussion with the remark that he believed it apparent to all that the British Isles was the fortress which must be protected at all cost, and that in this there was no serious difference of opinion. He remarked that he was wondering as to the effectiveness of the United Kingdom defenses as regards invasion from the Continent, remarking that at least two Marine Corps observers, after an inspection of the Island defenses, had come to the conclusion that they left much to be desired. Admiral Stark stated that the comments of these officers would be transmitted to the British for such use as they might care to make of them.

Marshal Dill remarked that the defenses were constantly being improved.

Admiral Pound welcomed Admiral Stark’s proposal.

2. Heavy Bombers

Admiral Stark made the point that in the future, heavy bombers sent to Great Britain would be manned by American crews; that some would be sent as units.

Air Chief Marshal Portal remarked that this had not been the original agreement. General Arnold stated that the R.A.F. was not to be deprived of any heavy bombers previously agreed to, but that units would be sent in addition. Details to be worked out later.

General Marshall remarked that Mr. Churchill had mentioned that the presence of American bombers, even in small numbers, in England would have an important influence on the French and the Germans.

3. Relief of British Troops in Northern Ireland and Iceland

The Prime Minister had requested that three British divisions in Northern Ireland be relieved at the earliest practicable date.

Marshal Dill remarked that it was his understanding that the relieving force was to consist of three divisions plus one armored division. General Marshall agreed. Admiral Pound asked at what time the troops in Ireland could be relieved. General Mar-shall replied that the troops are available now; the question is the availability of tonnage.

Admiral Pound asked with whom he could get in touch on the tonnage matter, and was told that his representatives should see Colonel Gross of the G–4 Division, War Department General Staff.

Admiral Stark stated that the United States was ready to take over the defense of Iceland, following which, however, base facilities would still be available to Great Britain. He also stated that the Marines in Iceland are an important element of the United States amphibious force, and that it was desired that they be relieved prior to beginning the relief of the British troops there.

Marshal Dill remarked that this would have to be worked out, and asked when the relief of the British could be accomplished. General Gerow replied that it could be completed by March, 1942.

Admiral Stark added that the whole question of relief was largely a matter of shipping, and added that United States production is behind in antiaircraft weapons, and that the British might be able to help out.

The Conference agreed that the program for these reliefs should be studied by the Joint Committee.

4. Greenland

Admiral Stark brought up the question of Greenland and asked General Arnold the status of air fields there. General Arnold stated that the United States now has a small force in Greenland; that two fields are projected; one field is ready now, but in the fog belt; another field, farther to the north, will be ready very soon. He stated that Greenland will be used essentially as a staging area between the United States and Europe. He added that he could furnish more details later.

5. Anti-Submarine Measures and Escorts

Admiral Stark stated that these would continue, in collaboration with the British; that the Prime Minister had mentioned the possibility of getting additional United States destroyers. Admiral Stark continued, “We just don’t have any destroyers to spare, and in fact have far fewer than we require for our own needs.” The construction program, he stated, was farthest behind in destroyers, battleships, and patrol vessels. He said that the situation along American seacoasts, with regard to the need for corvettes and other small patrol craft, is critical. In fact, it is desired that the British lend to the United States any available vessels suitable for coastal patrol work.

Admiral Pound then suggested that the whole question of general Naval dispositions of the two Navies be discussed.

6. Portuguese and Spanish Islands in the Atlantic

Admiral Stark asked Admiral Pound what importance he attached to the Azores. Admiral Pound stated that the British attached tremendous importance to these Islands, particularly if Gibraltar should become untenable. He said, “We need the Azores very much; they have great importance from every point of view.” Admiral Pound went on to say that the Canaries also are important; that they might be invited to go in there.

Admiral Stark then asked what importance the British attach to the Cape Verde Islands. Admiral Pound replied that it was only a question of denying them to the enemy, rather than their actual use by the British. Admiral King then remarked that United States interest in the Cape Verde Islands is strategic, because of their locations between Dakar and Brazil. He went on to say that “we can not do all these things”; the British should take the responsibility for the Azores, and the United States for the Cape Verde Islands.

Admiral Stark suggested that further study be given to this question, to which Admiral Pound agreed.

7. Occupation of Africa

Admiral Stark said that he felt it undesirable for the United States to consider sending troops to Egypt or Libya. If the British can continue there and clean up, it would automatically protect Dakar, and at the same time Iran and Iraq would be of no great concern. So far as West Africa is concerned, the United States should fall in line with British action.

General Marshall read notes taken from a memorandum made at the White House conference yesterday, to the effect that if the British should reach Tunis there was the possibility of a French invitation to occupy North Africa.¹

Marshal Dill pointed out that the British had available to move on 23 days’ notice an expeditionary force of 55,000 men which could be reinforced from Malta; that the Prime Minister had thought that if this occasion arose, it would be desirable for United States forces to land in Morocco, possibly to precede the British.

General Marshall said that at the present time a Corps Commander is planning an expedition to Africa which would include an amphibious corps. That this would be a task force, ready for any action that might present itself; and that if an opportunity existed to occupy North Africa without difficulty, the United States should take advantage of it. That United States troops for this purpose are available, but that there is a shortage in antiaircraft guns, .50 caliber ammunition and 37 mm. ammunition for both antiaircraft and anti-tank guns; also a shortage of planes. However, if the initial move could be made without fighting, the United States has already organized a sufficient number of squadrons to take care of the operation; that time is of greatest importance, and that while the American force could not complete its movement within 23 days, it could within approximately 30 days at the earliest, contingent on the availability of tonnage.

Admiral King asked as to the possibility of furnishing an American token force, such as a regiment.

General Marshall said that a token force as part of the British forces would be feasible, but that he could not put a lone regiment on the coast of Africa. The question was asked as to whether the Marines now in Iceland could be ready for this move. General Holcomb agreed that they could be.

The Conference agreed that this question should be studied by the Joint Planning Committee.

8. Brazil

Admiral King said that the political situation in Brazil made the United States Marine-Naval position of a “touch and go” nature; that the Germans are well organized in Brazil and have followers among important members of the Government.…

General Marshall said that after prolonged negotiations, the United States has been able to place only a small number of unarmed Marines in Brazil.²

9. The Curaçao-Aruba Area

Admiral Stark brought up the question of the critical situation in the Curaçao-Aruba area with respect to Allied oil supply, pointing out that 95% of the oil used on the eastern coast comes from that area; and that one-half of the Lend-Lease oil for Britain comes from that area. He stated that the troops on these Islands should be placed on the strictest alert; that time was of the greatest importance; and suggested that the British Chiefs of Staff do everything they could with their own authorities in London to expedite American entry into these Islands, particularly aviation units.³

Admiral Pound agreed to take the matter up that afternoon.

10. Pacific Area

Admiral Stark listed the joint aims in the Pacific, as follows:

• Protection of the Burma Road
• Aid to China
• Aid to the Netherlands East Indies
• To hold Singapore
• To hold the Philippine Islands
• Use of Australia as a base.

Admiral Stark then reviewed the Naval situation in the Far East as pertains to the Asiatic Fleet. General Marshall reviewed the arrangements which had been made to get planes to the Philippines, not only from Australia, but by convoys; also by flying by way of the eastern route. General Marshall stated that the critical feature of assistance to the Philippines from Australia was the existence of fields in Borneo; and that the present issue is to elaborate our plans for building up bases in Australia.

Admiral Pound then reviewed what ships the British Navy has around Singapore.

The question was asked Marshal Dill as to his opinion of the situation at Singapore, to which he replied that, with reinforcements, the British would be able to hold Johore State.

11. Bombardment of Japan

Admiral Stark asked as to the situation in China for air fields to be used as bases for bombing attacks against Japan.

General Arnold stated that General Brett had written for air transport planes for use in reconnaissance work and for supply. He stated that no bombing operations should be undertaken against Japan unless they are strong enough to create substantial damage; that the minimum number of bombers should be 50; that unsustained attacks would only tend to solidify the Japanese people.

12. Russian Situation

It was stated that it is not practicable at this time for Russia to begin operations in the Far East, as it might jeopardize her efforts in the west, and that Stalin should not be urged. The Prime Minister had quoted Stalin as saying that Russia was not ready to enter the war in the Far East now, but perhaps would be able do so in the spring.⁴

13. Spain and Portugal

Admiral Stark brought up the question of German intentions in the Iberian Peninsula, and expressed fear of German action through that area. He asked Admiral Pound for his views, who replied that British Joint Intelligence reports no signs of concentration of German troops in the south of France. Admiral Stark remarked that, nevertheless, everyone should be on guard. He then asked Marshal Dill as to the significance of the change in the German high command. Marshal Dill stated that it probably concerned a difference of opinion on future operations.⁵

14. Airplane Carriers

Admiral Stark said that the United States situation with respect to airplane carriers was very bad, and that while the Navy was making plans to convert passenger ships and tankers into airplane carriers, in view of possible troop transport requirements, he had agreed to discuss proposed conversions with General Marshall. Admiral Stark stated that with respect to flying boats for the British, the situation was such that the United States could not furnish any.

15. P.B.Y.’s for the British

The conversation then was directed to the supply of heavy bombers and P.B.Y.’s for the British. Admiral Towers remarked that our present production of P.B.Y’s was 46 per month, and that this was being stepped up to 150 of all types. Admiral King pointed out that the bottleneck was really one of personnel rather than anything else. Admiral Stark remarked that all possible help has been given the British in the matter of aircraft. Bear Admiral Towers pointed out that the four-engine bomber program can not but interfere with the Naval aircraft progress for at least the next eight months. To emphasize his statement, he remarked that some American Naval aircraft factories, because of the four-engine bomber program, can only obtain material enough for an eight-hour, five-day week.

16. British Crews for American Ships

Admiral Stark said that available personnel for American merchant ships is so limited that he would like the British to consider the possibility of having British crews man American ships. Admiral Pound said the matter was questionable and that it should be discussed with Admiral Little.

17. Guns for Merchant Ships

The question of guns for American ships was brought up. The United States Navy has furnished the British with 400 guns for arming merchant vessels. Admiral Stark inquired if any of these could be returned, as there was a shortage.

Admiral Pound stated that he would have the matter examined and do the best he could to meet the American requirements, which were to be made known to him.

18. Naval Dispositions in the Atlantic

Admiral Stark proposed that the British take over capital ship responsibility in the Atlantic, and listed fleet elements that would be required in that ocean.⁶

19. Priorities in Expeditions

General Marshall brought up the question of priorities in expeditions, and asked Marshal Dill if he had set up any such priorities. Marshal Dill said that the priorities were in the following order:

• Africa
• Iceland
• North Ireland.

General Marshall then asked if the French do not invite an occupation, what disposition will be made of the expeditionary force of 55,000.

Marshal Dill said that if the Germans go through Spain, the British hope to take the Canaries, whether invited or not.

General Marshall then asked how many troops would be required, and Marshal Dill replied only a small force of a few battalions. The British do not want any more than that down there. The question was then asked, if the British take the offensive and occupy the Canary Islands, what cooperation would be expected of the United States. Admiral Pound, by nodded consent, indicated that the United States should take action in the Cape Verde Islands.

20. West Africa

General Marshall brought up the question of what was to be done at Freetown and Bathurst. This question was not settled.

Admiral Pound then asked about Dakar. Admiral Turner stated that the United States is getting up a plan for its occupation.

Admiral Stark asked Marshal Dill if he agreed that Dakar could be taken by direct attack. Marshal Dill stated that it could be done.

21. British Chief of Staff Memorandum

Admiral Pound then read a memorandum signed by the British Chiefs of Staff, which was amended in minor points. (See Annex 1 for Revised Version).⁷ During the discussion, the following points were brought out:

Marshal Dill was asked what is the maximum estimated need in United States troops for an offensive against Germany. The answer was 15 to 17 divisions in 1942, or early 1943, including armored divisions. Admiral Turner then stated that 45 divisions was the maximum which could be transported and supplied by available shipping in sight.

Admiral King pointed out that the most mischievous naval operations which the Germans could make at this time would be a mass surface and submarine attack on convoy routes in the Atlantic. Admiral Stark then stated that a most important target for the bombing operations against Germany should be shipyards where submarines and airplane carriers are being built. Air Chief Marshal Portal agreed.

Admiral Pound was given a copy of the American Naval building program.⁸ He stated to General Marshall that the United States Army should look into the matter of putting a force into North Africa if the British do, under either of the following conditions:

a. If invited by the French.

b. If Germany makes a move through the Iberian Peninsula.

In either case the attack should be a surprise.

22. British Estimate of Attack on West Coast of North America

In response to a request from Admiral Stark, Admiral Pound read to the Conference a note which had been prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff on the probable scale of attack on the West Coast of North America.

In view of the short time which the United States Chiefs of Staff had had to study the British Chiefs of Staff memorandum, further discussion on it was deferred. (See Annex 2)⁹

The meeting adjourned at 1:30 p.m., with instructions given that the Planning Committee would meet in the afternoon and that the Chiefs of Staff Conference would reconvene at 10:30 a.m., December 25th.¹⁰

1. Ante, p. 78.
2. See Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. vi, pp. 490 ff. See also Conn and Fairchild, pp. 303–311.
3. For negotiations on sending American military forces to Curacao and Aruba, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. iii, pp. 49 ff.
4. See Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, p. 200, and post, p. 128.
5. The reference is presumably to the retirement of Field Marshal von Brauchitsch and the assumption by Hitler on December 19, 1941, of the High Command of the Army. See United States Navy, Office of Naval Intelligence, Fuehrer Directives and Other Top-Level Directives of the German Armed Forces, 1939–1941 (Washington: 1948, processed), pp. 238–239; see also Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, vol. 4, p. 4949.
6. See the proposed modification of ABC–1, ante, p. 16.
7. The memorandum under reference is WW1 (U.S. Revised), post, p. 210.
8. Not printed. According to a statement prepared by the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board (post, p. 339), the program included 112 major combat ships and 600 minor naval craft to be completed in 1942. For the production actually achieved in 1941 and 1942, see Civilian Production Administration, Industrial Mobilization for War (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 541.
9. The memorandum under reference is the memorandum of December 24, entitled “Probable Maximum Scale of Enemy Attack on West Coast of North America”, post, p. 265.
10. The Chiefs of Staff met at 4 p.m. on December 25, at which time a report was made on the work of the Planning Committee; see post, p. 91.