Editorial Note
No American record of the conversation at this meeting has been found. A brief reference by Roosevelt to the subjects discussed appears post, p. 69. The information respecting the time and place of the meeting and the participants is taken from Churchill, The Grand Alliance, p. 664, where there is printed Churchill’s telegraphic report of the meeting to the British War Cabinet. The Prime Minister [Page 64] noted that the President “had not of course at this time read the papers I had written on board ship, which I could not give him till the next day” but that he had “evidently thought much about my letter of October 20”, the major portion of which is printed ibid., pp. 544–548. In view of the importance of the discussion and the absence of other direct accounts of this meeting, the Churchill report to London is reproduced at this point:
“The President and I discussed the North African situation last night [December 22]. Mr. Hull, Mr. Welles, Mr. Hopkins, Lord Beaverbrook, and Lord Halifax also took part in the discussion.
“2. There was general agreement that if Hitler was held in Russia he must try something else, and that the most probable line was Spain and Portugal en route to North Africa. Our success in Libya and the prospect of joining hands with French North African territory was another reason to make Hitler want, if he could, to get hold of Morocco as quickly as possible. At the same time reports did not seem to suggest threat was imminent, perhaps because Hitler had enough on hand at the moment.
“3. There was general agreement that it was vital to forestall the Germans in Northwest Africa and the Atlantic islands. In addition to all the other reasons, the two French battleships, Jean Bart and Richelieu, were a real prize for whoever got them. Accordingly, the discussion was not whether, but how.
“4. Various suggestions were made:
- (a)
- The United States Government might speak in very serious and resolute terms to Vichy, saying that this was final chance for them to reconsider their positions and come out on the side that was pledged to restoration of France. As a symbol of this Pétain might be invited to send Weygand to represent him at an Allied conference in Washington.
- (b)
- An approach might be made to Weygand in the light of a North African situation fundamentally changed by British advance and by United States entering into war and their willingness to send a force to North Africa.
“5. It was suggested, on the other hand, that the effect of such procedure might be to extract smooth promises from Pétain and Weygand, the Germans meanwhile being advised of our intentions, and that, accordingly, if these approaches were to be made, it would be desirable to have all plans made for going into North Africa, with or without invitation. I emphasised immense psychological effect likely to be produced both in France and among French troops in North Africa by association of United States with the undertaking. Mr. Hull suggested that it might well be that a leader would emerge in North Africa as events developed.
“The President said that he was anxious that American land forces should give their support as quickly as possible wherever they could be most helpful, and favoured the idea of a plan to move into North Africa being prepared for either event, i.e., with or without invitation.
“6. It was agreed to remit the study of the project to Staffs on assumption that it was vital to forestall the Germans in that area and that the Libyan campaign had, as it was expected to do, achieved complete [Page 65] success. It was recognised that the question of shipping was plainly a most important factor.
“7. I gave an account of the progress of fighting in Libya, by which the President and other Americans were clearly much impressed and cheered.
“8. In the course of conversation the President mentioned that he would propose at forthcoming conference that United States should relieve our troops in Northern Ireland, and spoke of sending three or four divisions there. I warmly welcomed this, and said I hoped that one of the divisions would be an armoured division. It was not thought that this need conflict with preparations for a United States force for North Africa.”