Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943

Roosevelt Papers

Draft Telegram From President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Premier Stalin ¹

secret

[Casablanca, January 23, 1943.]

Draft Telegram From the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain to Premier Stalin

1. We have been in conference with our Military Advisers for the past ten days,² and we have decided the operations which are to be undertaken by American and British forces in the first nine months of 1943. We think that you would wish to know our intentions at once. We believe these operations, together with your powerful offensive, may well bring Germany to her knees in 1943. Every effort must be made to accomplish this purpose.

2. We are in no doubt that our correct strategy is to concentrate on the defeat of Germany, with a view to achieving early and decisive victory in the European theatre. At the same time, we must maintain sufficient pressure on Japan to retain the initiative in the Pacific and Far East, sustain China, and prevent the Japanese from extending their aggression to other theatres such as your Maritime Provinces.

3. A constant consideration has been the necessity of diverting³ strong German land and air forces from the Russian front and of sending to Russia the maximum flow of supplies. We shall spare no exertion to send you material assistance by every available route.

4. Our immediate intention is to clear the Axis out of North Africa and set up the naval and air installations to open:—

(1) An effective passage through the Mediterranean for military traffic, and

(2) An intensive bombardment of important Axis targets in Southern Europe.

5. We have made the decision to launch large scale amphibious operations in the Mediterranean at the earliest possible moment. The preparation for these operations is now under way and will involve a considerable concentration of forces, particularly⁴ landing craft and shipping in Egyptian and North African ports. This concentration will certainly be known to our enemies, but they will not know where or when, or in what strength, we propose to strike. They will, therefore, be compelled to reinforce with both land and air forces the South of France, Corsica, Sardinia, Sicily, the heel of Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece, Crete and the Dodecanese.

6. We shall concentrate in the United Kingdom the maximum American land and air forces that shipping will permit.⁵ These, combined with the British forces in the United Kingdom, will prepare themselves to re-enter the Continent of Europe as soon as possible.⁶

7. In Europe we shall increase the Allied Bomber offensive from the U.K. against Germany at a rapid rate and, by midsummer, it should be more than double its present strength. Our experiences to date have shown that the day bombing attacks result in destruction and damage to large numbers of German Fighter Aircraft. We believe that an increased tempo and weight of daylight and night attacks will lead to greatly increased material and morale damage in Germany and rapidly deplete German fighter strength in Germany and occupied Western Europe. As you are aware, we are already containing more than half the German Air Force in Western Europe and the Mediterranean. We have no doubt that our greatly intensified⁷ bombing offensive, together with the other operation which we are undertaking, will compel further withdrawals of German air and other forces from the Russian Front.

8. In the Pacific it is our intention to eject the Japanese from Rabaul within the next few months and thereafter to exploit in the general direction of Japan. We also intend to increase the scale of our operations in Burma in order to reopen our channel of supply to China. We intend to increase our air force in China at once. We shall not, however, allow our operations against Japan to jeopardize our capacity to take advantage of every opportunity that may present itself for the decisive defeat of Germany in 1943.

1. This undated paper appears to be a revision of C.C.S. 165/2, January 22, 1943 (ante, p. 782), which was prepared by Roosevelt and Churchill and their advisers at their meeting on the evening of January 23, ante, p. 722. This paper was considered further at the meeting of Roosevelt and Churchill and their advisers at Marrakech late on the evening of January 24, 1943, at which the final text of the message to Stalin was completed; see ante, p. 732. One of the three copies of this draft telegram found among the Roosevelt Papers bears a number of handwritten corrections and emendations by Harriman. These corrections are indicated in footnotes at the appropriate places. For the final version of the message to Stalin, see infra.
2. In the corrected copy, the phrase “for the past ten days” is crossed-out.
3. In the corrected copy the phrase “A constant consideration has been the necessity of diverting” is in penciled brackets.
4. In the corrected copy the word “particularly” is crossed-out and replaced by the phrase “with the necessary”.
5. In the corrected copy the phrase “that shipping will permit” is crossed-out and replaced with the phrase “to the limit of our shipping resources.”
6. In the corrected copy the word “possible” at the end of this sentence is crossed-out and replaced with the phrase “it is practical.” The following additional sentence is written in at the end of this paragraph and then crossed-out: “The enemies will be compelled to strengthen their defenses in Northern France and the Low countries.”
7. In the corrected copy the phrase “and diversified” is added at this point.