Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943

J.C.S. Files

Memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff¹

secret
C.C.S. 165/2

[Casablanca,] January 22, 1943.

Draft Telegram From the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain to Premier Stalin

1. We have been in conference with our Military Advisers for the past ten days, and we have decided the operations which are to be undertaken by American and British forces in 1943. We think that you would wish to know our intentions at once.

2. We are in no doubt that our correct strategy is to concentrate on the defeat of Germany, with a view to achieving early and decisive victory in the European Theater. At the same time, we must maintain sufficient pressure on Japan to retain the initiative in the Pacific and Far East, sustain China, and prevent the Japanese from extending their aggression to other theaters such as your Maritime Provinces.

3. A constant consideration has been the necessity of diverting strong German land and air forces from the Russian front and of sending to Russia the maximum flow of supplies, consistent with equally urgent requirements in other theaters. We shall spare no exertion to send you material assistance by every available route, but it would be no more in your interest than ours to do so at a cost which would cripple our capacity to relieve pressure on you by continuing an intensified offensive effort on our part.

4. Our immediate intention is to clear the Axis out of North Africa and set up the naval and air installations to open:

(a) An effective passage through the Mediterranean for military traffic, and

(b) An intensive bombardment of important Axis installations in Southern Europe.

5. We have made the decision to launch large scale amphibious operations in the Mediterranean at the earliest possible moment.² The preparation for these operations is now under way and³ will involve a considerable concentration of forces, particularly landing craft and shipping in Egyptian and⁴ North African ports. This concentration will certainly be known to our enemies, but they will not know where or when, or in what strength, we propose to strike. They will, therefore, be compelled to reinforce with both land and air forces the South of France, Corsica, Sardinia, Sicily, the heel of Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece, Crete, and the Dodecanese.⁵

6. These operations may result in the collapse of Italy. The defection of other German satellite states would probably follow. Germany would then be faced with the choice of shortening her eastern line by a major withdrawal on your front, or of accepting a shortage of some fifty divisions and 2,000 aircraft in her global requirements.

7. In Europe we shall increase the Allied Bomber offensive from the U. K. against Germany at a rapid rate and, by midsummer, it should be more than double its present strength. Our experiences to date have shown that the day bombing attacks result in destruction and damage to large numbers of German Fighter Aircraft. We believe that an increased tempo and weight of daylight and night attacks will lead to greatly increased material and morale damage in Germany and rapidly deplete German fighter strength in Germany and occupied Western Europe. As you are aware, we are already containing more than half the German Air Force in Western Europe and the Mediterranean. We have no doubt that our greatly intensified bombing offensive, together with the other operations which we are undertaking, will compel further withdrawals of German air and other forces from the Russian front.⁶

8. We shall also concentrate in the United Kingdom the maximum American land and air forces that shipping will permit.⁷ These, combined with the British forces in the United Kingdom, will be held in constant readiness to reenter the Continent of Europe as soon as this operation offers reasonable prospect of success.

9. In the Pacific it is our intention to eject the Japanese from Rabaul within the next few months and thereafter to exploit in the general direction of Japan. We also intend to increase the scale of our operations in Burma in order to reopen our channel of supply to China. We shall not, however, allow our operations against Japan to jeopardize our capacity to take advantage of any favorable opportunity that may present itself for the decisive defeat of Germany in 1943.

1. At their meeting on the morning of January 19, the Combined Chiefs of Staff appointed a Subcommittee to prepare a draft telegram from Roosevelt and Churchill to Stalin setting forth American-British intentions for 1943; see item 4 of the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting, ante, p. 640. The first version of the draft telegram, designated C.C.S. 165, January 20, 1943, was considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on January 21; see ante, p. 672. Changes suggested by the Combined Chiefs of Staff were embodied by the Subcommittee in a revised version of the draft telegram designated C.C.S. 165/1, January 21, 1943. At their meeting on January 22, the Combined Chiefs of Staff considered and slightly revised C.C.S. 165/1; see ante, p. 680. The paper printed here incorporates the additional changes made by the Combined Chiefs. Variations between C.C.S. 165, C.C.S. 165/1, and C.C.S. 165/2 are indicated in the following footnotes.

   The paper printed here was revised still further by Roosevelt and Churchill and their advisers at meetings at Casablanca on January 23 and at Marrakech on January 24; for the subsequent revision and the text of the telegram as actually sent to Stalin, see post, pp. 803 and 805.

2. In C.C.S. 165, this sentence read as follows: “It is our intention to undertake considerable amphibious operations in the Mediterranean at the earliest possible moment.”
3. The phrase “is now under way and” was not included in C.C.S. 165 but was included in C.C.S. 165/1.
4. The phrase “Egyptian and” was not included either in C.C.S. 165 or in C.C.S. 165/1.

5. In C.C.S. 165 this paragraph continued as follows:

   “In particular, they will be compelled to spread their fighter defences over a very wide area in order to meet the continuous and ever-increasing bombardment to which they will be subjected as soon as we can release our bomber forces from the task of clearing North Africa. As you are aware, we are already containing more than half of German air force in Western Europe and the Mediterranean. We have no doubt that the operations which we are undertaking will compel further withdrawals from the Russian Front.”

   Paragraph 5 of C.C.S. 165/1 contained the following additional sentence: “In particular, they will be compelled to spread their fighter defenses over a still wider area in order to meet the continuous and ever-increasing bombardment to which they will be subjected.”

6. In C.C.S. 165 the equivalent paragraph, paragraph 8, read as follows: “We shall, of course, continue and intensify the Allied bomber offensive from the United Kingdom against German.”

   Paragraph 7 of C.C.S. 165/1 read as follows:

   “In Europe we shall increase the Allied bomber offensive from the U.K. against Germany at a rapid rate and, by midsummer, it will attain great destructive power. By the middle of the year, it should be more than double its present strength. Our experiences to date have shown that the day bombing attacks result in destruction and damage to large numbers of German Fighter Aircraft. We believe that an increased tempo of daylight attacks will lead to greatly increased material and morale damage in Germany and rapidly deplete German fighter strength in Germany and occupied Western Europe. As you are aware, we are already containing more than half the German Air Force in Western Europe and the Mediterranean. We have no doubt that our greatly intensified bombing offensive, together with the other operations which we are undertaking, will compel further withdrawls of German air from the Russian front.”

7. In C.C.S. 165 the first sentence of the equivalent paragraph, paragraph 7, read as follows: “Concurrently with amphibious operations from the North African shore, we shall concentrate in the United Kingdom the maximum American land and air forces that shipping will permit.”