Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the Commanding General, Services of Supply (Somervell)

secret
C.C.S. 162/1¹

[ Casablanca ,] January 20, 1943.

U. S. Aid to Russia

1. Existing U. S. estimates on the availability of shipping and the possibility of moving troops, naval forces, supplies and equipment during 1943 allow for the following U. S. sailings for Russian aid.

Table I

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	Total
(a) To North Russia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
(b) To Persian Gulf	15	15	15	15	15	15	90
(c) In Pacific (Average from U. S. and Russian Pool)	31	31	31	31	31	31	186
	46	46	46	46	46	46	276

Shipments beyond June are estimated at the same rate.

2. Owing to limited capacity of Persian Gulf ports and the discontinuance of the North Atlantic route, U. S. commitments under the existing Protocol² have been only about 50 percent of requirements for the last six months, necessitating the shipment of three-fourths of the year’s total during the first half of the year 1943. This will require a total of 432 sailings from the U. S. to Russia prior to July 1, 1943. If Protocol commitments after July 1 are at the same rate as for the year prior to that time, two-thirds this number, or 288 sailings, will be required.

3. As the route through the Pacific is subject to interruption by the Japanese at any moment and as arms and ammunition do not move via that route, it cannot be relied on for any great increase above the present sailings.

4. It is expected that the capacity of Persian Gulf ports can be expanded to handle a total of 26 ships per month by June 1943.

5. For the northern route on the basis of 12 British cargo ships and two tankers there would remain available 16 sailings from the U. S. every convoy. Owing to the restricted supply of escorts, it seems that the convoy interval will not be reduced below 42 days. With ice hazards and the menace of submarines and air attacks, it is hardly possible that total sailings will exceed this rate.

6. The total sailings for the year could therefore be on the following order:

Table II

north russia

Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
16	16	—	16	16	—	16	16	—	16	16	—	128

persian route

16

18

20

22

24

26

16

16

16

16

16

16

222

pacific route

31

31

31

31

31

31

31

31

31

31

31

31

372

total

63

65

51

69

71

57

63

63

47

63

63

47

722

Sailings on this order would fail to meet Protocol requirements in July by 56 ships, but would permit meeting full commitments by the end of the calendar year.

7. It will be noted from Tables I and II that the following additional sailings would be required for such a program resulting in the necessity for the use of additional cargo ships for the period of a year.

Table III

additional sailings required

Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
17	19	5	23	25	11	17	17	1	17	17	1	170

8. The effect of meeting the Russian Protocol on the movement of U. S. troops overseas and maintaining them thereafter would be on the following order:

table iv

1943	No. of troops
1st Quarter	46,000
2nd Quarter	82,000
3rd Quarter	55,000
4th Quarter	4,000
Total	187,000

9. As requirements for other theaters are more or less fixed, the blow would fall on movements to the U. K. Some adjustment might be necessary in timing of Russian shipment to avoid interference with special requirements.

10. Additional tonnage above that assumed in existing estimates might be made available: (a) by reduction in the rate of submarine losses below the 2.6 percent assumed in these calculations; (b) by eliminating conversion of 100 EC 2’s into transports; (c) by savings through the use of the Mediterranean route; (d) release of U. S. from obligation to replace British losses in like amount.

11. A reduction in rate of loss of United Nations shipping from 2.6 percent per month to only 2.0 percent per month would increase the troop carrying capacity in 1943 by 500,000 men. Even a third of this, or a reduction of the loss rate to 2.4 percent, would make these shipments to Russia possible, without lessening troop movements. With the measures projected by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, such an improvement is a possibility.

12. If conversion of EC 2’s were stopped at the end of February, a gain in transport capacity of 153,000 would be possible. If losses are not reduced or no assistance from British sources for this purpose can be obtained, such a course would be desirable.

13. The British have already discounted the estimated gain in the Mediterranean by diverting this tonnage to British imports.

14. The U. S. is committed to replace losses in British tonnage in accordance with an agreement dated November 30, 1942. If there is a reduction in the number of sinkings the assistance required will be reduced. As a reduction is expected in some measure there will be a credit on this account.

15. It is concluded from the above that the possibility exists of meeting Russian Protocol deliveries on the present scale during 1943 without reducing tentative schedules, but that the possibility exists that movements to the U. K. may be reduced by as much as 100,000 men. The advantages of furnishing aid to Russia are such that this hazard should be accepted. Owing to the scarcity of shipping, there should be a general agreement that all tonnage above minimum requirements should be assigned to combined troop movements.

1. With the exception of paragraphs 14 and 15, the revisions of which were discussed and agreed upon at the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the morning of January 20 (ante, p. 656), this paper is identical with the earlier version, C.C.S. 162, January 19, 1943, not printed.
2. Regarding the Second (Washington) Soviet Supply Protocol of October 6, 1942, see footnote 3, ante, p. 596.