Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the British Joint Planning Staff¹

secret
C.C.S. 157

[Casablanca,] January 18, 1943.

Allied Plans Relating to Turkey

part i

entry of turkey into the war on the side of the united nations

1. The following extract from C.C.S. 135/2² has been taken as the basis for our further examination of the problem of inducing Turkey to join the Allies and of using that country for the development of offensive operations against the Axis.

“Our motives in inducing Turkey to join us in the war would be:

(a) To use Turkey as a base for air attacks on important objectives, such as the Rumanian oilfields and Black Sea communications.

(b) To close the Dardanelles to the Axis and open them to the United Nations.³

(c) To force an increased dispersal of German forces by using Turkey as a base for potential threats in the Balkans and South Russia.

(d) To deny Turkish chrome to Germany.”⁴

Inducements to Turkey:

2. The two main factors upon which Turkey’s entry into the war depend are:

(a) Her fear of Germany now;

(b) Her fear of Russia after the war.

In order to make Turkey enter actively into the war at an early date, we must convince her that (a) is unfounded, and at the same time exploit her fear of (b).

Fear of Germany:

3. Turkey’s anxieties under (a) will only be assuaged when she is satisfied either that the Allies have so stretched the Axis as to restrict the latter’s ability to hurt her, or that material provision of the Allies to defend her against Axis air or land attack is forthcoming in time. The former may result from a development of our existing strategy in the Mediterranean and from continued Russian successes. The latter is examined in Part II.

Fear of Russia:

4. With regard to (b), Turkey must now appreciate that her hopes of a weak Russia are not likely to be realized. Consequently, her best chance of post-war security lies in obtaining for herself a place and support at the Peace Conference. She is particularly afraid that Russia may spread her influence through Rumania and Bulgaria and confront her with the fact of being the power in control at Turkey’s western door into Europe as well as at her back door into Asia. She also fears that Russia, having secured complete control of the Black Sea, will demand unrestricted rights of passage through the Dardanelles. She would look to the Allies, and especially to the British Empire, to support her in resisting exaggerated Russian claims in regard to passage of the Straits.

5. Whether it would be wise for His Majesty’s Government to oppose Russian desires regarding passage of the Straits seems a matter for urgent consideration, for if we thwarted Russia in that respect we should probably be confronted with a claim for rights of transit through Persia to a port on the Persian Gulf. This, from our point of view, would be most undesirable.

6. British and American diplomacy should be directed to exploit Turkish fears of Russia, It should be made clear that public opinion will have little sympathy, when peace comes, for a country which remained aloof when we needed her aid.

Economic and Territorial Inducements:

7. Guarantees of continued financial and economic assistance, of which details are given in Enclosure “A”,⁵ might be a useful weapon, particularly in view of the deterioration of the Turkish position.

8. There are certain territorial adjustments by which Turkey sets store. Firstly, she is determined to have complete control of the railway which at present runs out in Syrian territory at Aleppo. Secondly, she requires some material facilities in, and some guarantees for, the Turkish population of the Dodecanese Islands. Thirdly, she desires a rectification of her frontier with Bulgaria. We can see no strategical objection to their realization after the war provided we can retain certain rights to use the Aleppo-Mosul railway, but we must not lose sight of the fact that there is a strong French interest in this railway. We have also guaranteed the future integrity and independence of Syrian territory.

Greek interest would be directly affected by the realization of the second aim and it would be difficult for the Allies to encourage the appetite of an allied but still neutral country at the expense of a fighting ally.

We doubt whether these three sops would materially affect Turkey’s decision on the main issue.

Summary of Diplomatic Policy:

9. We should exploit Turkish fears that she stands to lose if she remains out until the eleventh hour, making it clear through diplomatic channels that the extent of Allied support for Turkey at the Peace Conference will be conditioned by her entry into the war without delay.

part ii

initial military assistance to turkey

10. An undertaking to assist Turkey against Axis aggression has already been given. This includes a plan for establishing certain forces in Turkey (Sprawl Plan) and the provision of equipment and supplies to augment Turkish resources. A summary of these measures is given as Enclosures “B”, “C” and “D”,⁶ from which it will be seen that a substantial quantity of material together with some aircraft have already reached Turkey.

11. The roles of the force earmarked under the Sprawl Plan were:

(a) To gain and maintain air superiority.

(b) Assist Turkish land and air forces in the defense of Thrace and Western Anatolia.

(c) Provide support for Turkish forces against seaborne attack in the Izmir area.

(d) Assist in the defense of Ankara.

(e) Attack strategic objectives in Southeast Europe.

(f) Protect base ports.

Changed Conditions:

12. Existing plans assume that Turkey had already been attacked. The conditions under review are somewhat different. In the first place the threat we are now considering is potential rather than actual, although there is still a possibility that if the Germans believed that Turkey was about to enter the war they would try to overrun Thrace and at the same time bomb vital areas. In the second place Turkey is not compelled to fight but must be induced to come in of her own free will. As already stated, this she is unlikely to do unless she is satisfied that the general situation severely restricts German offensive potentialities in the Balkans.

The Air Threat:

13. The ability of the Axis to deliver a heavy air offensive against Turkish vital areas cannot be forecast. It is certain, however, that Turkey will require the provision of air and ground defenses. The extent to which she will regard these as an inducement to fight will depend upon the rapidity with which they can be rendered effective. Should Turkey be prepared to take the plunge it would be to her advantage to augment her defenses with Allied help before she actually declares war. We can, however, undertake—provided ground equipment is installed and preparations made in Turkey beforehand—to have operational about 6 Fighter squadrons with limited antiaircraft defenses within three days of the Turkish invitation. To achieve this, approximately 100 transport aircraft would have to be made available.

The Threat Through Thrace:

14. The Turks at present intend, if attacked in Thrace, to hold a forward line near the frontier until a “scorched earth” policy has been effected, and then to withdraw to the Catalja and Bulair lines. These are sound defensive positions, and we see no object in persuading the Turks to establish a main position forward, as this would be weak in defense. If, on the other hand, the attack does not develop, the forward area will remain available for the subsequent concentration of our offensive forces. The Turks will have, in any case, to rely initially on their own resources, since communications prevent any substantial Allied military assistance reaching Thrace quickly.

Allied Military Policy:

15. The force which we should establish in Turkey, in the first place, should comprise the minimum defensive element to satisfy the Turks, and the maximum offensive element, within the limits of communications, to meet our own future requirements.

16. We consider that the following constitute a suitable defensive offer to the Turks:

Air:

26 squadrons. Of this force, 6 Fighter squadrons would constitute the immediate air defense contingent referred to in paragraph 13 above. The types of the remaining squadrons proposed in the Sprawl Plan may require adjustment in the light of changed conditions, but since a total of 26 squadrons has been offered to Turkey and the arrangements for the installation of this force are in hand, we consider that the total figure of 26 squadrons should stand. Additional aircraft for use by the Turks can be supplied from resources in the Middle East if priority over other commitments is considered to justify such a course.

Land:

72	H.A.A. guns for defense of Istanbul, etc.
96	H.A.A. guns	}	for airfield defense.
215	Lt. A.A. guns
4	Battalions for defense of the L. of C.

It is possible that the Turks will regard the provision of armored fighting vehicles as an added inducement. In view of the Turks’ inability to use or maintain armored fighting vehicles we should prefer to supply complete armored formations with our own personnel, and this we should be prepared to do.

Naval:

A striking force of submarines, M.T.B.’s and possibly destroyers.

17. The next step is to build up forces to undertake offensive operations and to secure air bases in Turkey. This is considered in Part III.

part iii

development of the offensive

18. Turkey will be of value to the Allies as an offensive base for air rather than land operations. Owing to the initial defensive needs of the Turks it will be impossible to include in the first air contingent a striking force adequate for a widespread heavy and sustained offensive. Since, however, trans-Anatolian communications will be stretched to the limit of their capacity, the first step must be to open up the Aegean sufficiently to make use of Turkish ports. For our use Smyrna is of primary importance.

19. Any land offensive we may wish to mount from Turkey must be based on Thrace, but the Turks themselves will be making great demands on the limited Thracian ports and communications for their own maintenance.

Phase I—Opening the Aegean

20. It is considered that the opening of the Aegean could be achieved by the capture of the Dodecanese. With air protection based on Turkey and the Dodecanese it should then be possible to pass sufficient shipping through to make full use of Turkish port capacities in spite of the Axis threat from Crete and Greece.

21. The capture of the Dodecanese is at present being studied by the Middle East [Command?]. We estimate that a force of some three divisions will be required, supported by 12 squadrons of aircraft operating from Southwest Anatolia. These squadrons will have to be included in the initial force sent to Turkey. Airfields in the coastal area opposite Rhodes will have to be constructed in advance and stocked with supplies so that operations can begin as early as possible. The subsequent garrisons might be found by our Balkan allies.

Protection of Shipping:

22. As soon as the Dodecanese have been captured it will be necessary to provide for the protection of our shipping through the Aegean. The estimated forces required for this purpose are given below.

Named:

23. With Crete still in enemy hands, shipping must be routed as far east of that island as possible. It is not likely that the threat in the Aegean will exceed that of submarines, E-boats and aircraft. It is estimated that 8-knot convoys of 20 ships running every 14 days between Alexandria and Istanbul will meet requirements and would need an escort group of about 8 ships.

Air:

24. A regrouping of the squadrons already in Turkey should suffice both for protection of shipping and general defensive requirements. The necessary airfields exist but must be developed and supplied in advance.

Land:

25. No additional land forces will be required other than a few L. of C. battalions and antiaircraft protection for the new ports and airfields brought into use, for which about 48 Heavy and 84 Light A.A. guns will be needed.

Phase II—Subsequent Operations

The Task of Offensive Forces:

Air:

26. Air forces operating from Turkey will be required for:

(a) Attacks on Rumanian oil refineries and their communications. This is the primary task.

(b) Attacks on Balkan chrome mines and communications generally, both of which are difficult targets.

(c) Attacks against Axis shipping in the Black Sea and the Aegean.

(d) Support of any Allied land operations.

(e) Assistance to the Russians in the Ukraine.

For these purposes a force of 15–20 Heavy Bomber squadrons will be required and could be maintained through Smyrna. Existing airfields in Northwest Turkey will require development.

Naval:

27. While the Black Sea should become a Russo-Turkish sphere of responsibility, British light naval forces will be required for the attack, in conjunction with the Turks, on Axis communications in the Aegean.

Land:

28. The object of a land offensive from Thrace would be to stretch Axis forces and to support Balkan patriots. The mounting of any offensive is dependent on the Turks holding an adequate bridgehead in Europe.

29. There are two alternative lines of advance from Thrace into the Balkans: North into Bulgaria; or West into Macedonia.

North Into Bulgaria:

30. The objectives for a northward drive would be Axis communications in the Danube Basin and the oilfields of Ploesti, which are so vital to Germany that she would defend them if necessary at the expense of other areas. The line of advance would be through a hostile country, where communications, which always strongly favor the enemy, are initially so bad as probably to prevent much progress being made. This course might contain some Axis forces, but would have little effect on the Balkans generally.

West Into Macedonia:

31. The objective for a westward drive would be Salonika. Once established there, further forces could be landed and arms for patriot forces of Greece, Albania, and Southern Yugoslavia imported. It should then be possible, in conjunction with the patriots, to sever Axis communications with Southern Greece and to gain control of the whole area.

32. This should result in the abandonment of Crete by the Axis. Alternatively, it might be desirable to capture Crete at an earlier stage to assist in operations on the Greek mainland. Such an operation would be best mounted in Africa, though some air support could be given from the Dodecanese and Southwest Anatolia.

33. The capture of Salonika from Thrace will, however, be a formidable and lengthy operation if the enemy puts up much resistance. Communications are bad, but not so greatly in the German’s favor as those into Bulgaria. By supplementing road communications with coastwise shipping it should be possible to maintain 2½ divisions, but in winter conditions this would be very difficult. A further 2½ divisions could be maintained by rail as far forward as railhead, but the line is an easy one for the enemy to disrupt and repairs might take a very long time.

34. A further adverse factor is that while the line of advance itself is badly served with airfields, it is flanked by a limited number of indifferent airfields in enemy hands within S. E.⁷ fighter range. Therefore, airfields will have to be provided in Turkish Thrace before operations can start, and others constructed as the advance progresses. This will take time.

35. It is impossible to assess the chances of success of land operations through Macedonia without making a detailed study, and without a firmer forecast than is now possible of the Axis military position as it will then be. The prize is great but the prospects are poor.

summary

Course of Operations:

36. Offensive operations might take the following course:

(a) The capture of the Dodecanese and the establishment of naval and air forces for the protection of shipping to Istanbul, in order to open the Eastern Aegean.

(b) The assembly of air forces in Anatolia for offensive operations against the Balkans and sea communications.

(c) A possible land offensive from Thrace directed against Salonika.

(d) After reinforcement through Salonika, the severance of Axis communications with Southern Greece and assistance to guerrilla forces in Greece, Albania, and Southern Yugoslavia.

(e) The elimination of the Axis from Greece and Crete.

part iv

summary of forces required

Air:
	37.	Immediate Air Defense  6 Squadrons Balance of Defensive Requirements  20 Squadrons Opening of the Aegean and Support of Land Offensive  12 Squadrons (additional to those above) Bomber Offensive  15–20 Heavy Bomber Squadrons
Land:
	38.	Defensive Requirements  4 battalions for local defense
		168 Heavy A.A. guns	}	For ports, airfields and vital areas.
		215 Light A.A. guns
		Opening the Aegean  3 divisions  3 battalions for local defense
		48 Heavy A.A. guns	}	For ports airfields.
		84 Light A.A. guns
		Operations in Greece
		2½ to 5 divisions, including at least 1 Armored division		With possible subsequent reinforcement of up to 4 divisions (to include Crete)
Naval:
	39.	Forces as necessary to assist in the capture of the Dodecanese. A striking force of destroyers, submarines, M.T.B.’s and M.G.B.’s A commitment of about 8 escort vessels for shipping in the Aegean.

part v

conclusions

40. (a) We do not consider that Turkey will enter the war unless the general situation is such that she is satisfied that she can initially hold Thrace without Allied assistance and that immediate air defense is forthcoming.

(b) Turkey will be of value to the Allies as an offensive base for air rather than land operations.

Policy To Hasten Turkey’s Entry Into the War:

41. (a) Political:

We should make clear to Turkey that our good offices at the Peace Conference will depend upon her entry into the war without delay.

(b) Financial and Economic:

Turkey should be assured of the continuance of our present economic and financial assistance. This might be extended to the provisions of wheat and sugar in the near future, but our commitments elsewhere in the Middle East may prevent this.

(c) Military:

We should offer:

(1) An “immediate air defense” contingent for the protection of vital centers in Western Turkey (paragraph 16).

(2) The balance of forces up to the limit of trans-Anatolian communications (paragraph 16).

(3) Military equipment to bring all Turkish infantry formations in Thrace up to a satisfactory scale of weapons.

(4) Armored fighting vehicles only if these are considered necessary from the psychological point of view. We should prefer to send armored formations since the Turks cannot be relied upon to operate or maintain armored fighting vehicles efficiently.

Allied Military Policy:

42. (a) The provision of assistance to Turkey as in paragraph 41(c) above.

(b) Opening of the Aegean by the capture of the Dodecanese.

(c) Development of the air offensive from Turkey.

(d) If practicable, to open up and rearm the Balkans by an advance westwards from Thrace with limited forces directed on Salonika.

Preparatory Measures in Turkey:

43. (a) Airfield Development.

Certain airfield developments are already included in the Sprawl Plan. We should press for further development of air fields and supplies in the following areas:

(1) In the Istanbul and Ankara areas to operate fighters for the defense of those sites.

(2) In the Southwest of Turkey to assist our capture of the Dodecanese.

(3) In Anatolia and Armenia to operate bombers against Rumanian oil, Balkan communications, and in support of the Russian southern front.

We must insure that the air defense equipment, including A.A. guns, ammunition and R.D.F., necessary for the defense of at least those airfields which will be used by our initial air contingent, is ready in Turkey for immediate operation.

(b) Personnel:

We should send in to Turkey under cover the following personnel:

(1) Such specialists as are acceptable by the Turks to insure proper instruction in the maintenance and use of the Allied military equipment.

(2) Reconnaissance parties for preparing the layout of airfield defenses and for studying the administrative and transportation problems.

A number of Turkish-speaking liaison officers should be collected in the Middle East.

(c) Communications:

We should continue and, where necessary, augment supplies of locomotives, rolling stock and port facilities. The provision of coal dumps at strategic centers is important for the operation of communications.

recommendations

44. We recommend that:

(a) The Foreign Office be invited to examine the possibilities of diplomatic action in the light of the suggestions contained in this paper. We particularly urge that a firm policy should be decided with regard to our post-war attitude on the Dardanelles question and other matters of a primary interest to the Turks.

(b) A copy of this paper should be sent to the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East, in reply to their telegram (C.C./166 dated December 29, 1942)⁸ and that they should be invited to comment on the proposals contained herein.

[Here follow enclosures “A” through “D”, not printed, entitled respectively: “Financial and Economic Assistance for Turkey”; “Our Military Commitments to Turkey”; “R.A.F. and Army Stores Already Dumped Into Turkey”; and “Supply of Equipment”.]

1. This paper was discussed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their afternoon meeting, January 19, 1943; see ante, p. 649.
2. Ante, p. 741.
3. For additional documentation regarding the representations by the American and British Governments relative to the transit of the Straits by German vessels, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. iv, pp. 805 ff., and ibid., 1943, vol. iv, pp. 1086 ff.
4. For additional documentation regarding the efforts of the American and British Governments to acquire Turkish chrome and to prevent its sale by Turkey to Germany, see ibid., 1942, vol. iv, pp. 742 ff., and ibid., 1943, vol. iv, pp. 1150 ff.
5. Not printed.
6. Enclosures “B”, “C” and “D”, none printed, are entitled “Our Military Commitments to Turkey”, “R.A.F. and Army Stores Already Dumped Into Turkey”, and “Supply of Equipment”, respectively.
7. Presumably “single engine.”
8. Not printed.