Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

January 23, 1943, 10 a.m.

secret

1. Bolero Build-Up
(C.C.S. 172)²

General Somervell said that his paper had been prepared in collaboration with Lord Leathers, and the figures of U. S. troops to arrive in the United Kingdom in 1943 were dependent on certain assistance being provided by the British. A figure of 50,000 men per division had been taken as a basis of calculation, but this was very high owing to the inclusion of a large overhead in the first half year. The figures would be reduced to about 40,000 in the latter part of the year. In this event, the total number of divisions might rise from fifteen to nineteen by the end of the year. Every means would be used of increasing the number of troops shipped by additional loadings in personnel ships during the summer months and the fitting of more cargo ships for troop carrying.

The Committee:

Took note of paper C.C.S. 172.

2. Continental Operations in 1943
(C.C.S. 167)³

(Previous reference C.C.S. 67th Meeting, Item 3)

General Marshall said that the proposals in the paper by the British Joint Planning Staff were acceptable to the U. S. Chiefs of Staff subject to the following comments:

It appeared that the availability of the British airborne division referred to in paragraph 4 was now doubtful in view of the demands of Husky. The dispatch of an American airborne division to the United Kingdom, possibly in June, was, therefore, being considered by the U. S. Chiefs of Staff. The first airborne division which would be ready for overseas would be required for Husky. The chief difficulty lay in the provision of the necessary air transports, but these could be moved across to the U. K. more quickly than the personnel, who would have to go by sea.

The U. S. Chiefs of Staff considered it most desirable that any operation of the type mentioned in paragraph 2 (a) of the paper, e.g., against the Channel Islands, should be coordinated in time with Husky.

As regards the larger operation against the Cotentin Peninsula, for which the target date given in paragraph 19 (b) was August 1st, it must be made clear that the plan was only to be based on the U. S. resources available at that time in the United Kingdom. First priority was given to Husky, and the U. S. did not wish to accept any additional commitment for operation Hadrian beyond what was at present envisaged. It was highly improbable that any U. S. landing craft crews would be available for operations from the United Kingdom this summer.

Sir Alan Brooke said that, as a result of the decision on Husky, paragraph 4 was not now correct. There would only be 11 British divisions and a part of one British airborne division available.

The Committee:

Approved the proposals contained in C.C.S. 167 subject to the reservations of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff recorded above.

3. Report to the President and Prime Minister
(C.C.S. 170)⁴

The Committee:

(a) Approved the draft submitted by the Secretaries, subject to minor amendments agreed in the discussion, and the inclusion of a paragraph on the Bolero build-up based on C.C.S. 172.

(b) Instructed the Secretaries to prepare and submit a final draft forthwith.

4. Operation Husky—Directive to General Eisenhower
(C.C.S. 171)⁵

General Marshall proposed certain amendments to the text of the draft directive, which were accepted.

The Committee:

Approved the directive as amended and instructed the Secretaries to transmit it to General Eisenhower.

5. Landing Craft

Lord Louis Mountbatten said that the Admiralty had been asked to complete another 160 L.C.A. during the next four months to provide American requirements for Husky and training. He might have to send British L.C.A. from Force J (the Channel Assault Force) for the U. S. share of Husky, but it was essential that these should be replaced in time to enable cross-channel operations to be undertaken this summer. All L.C.A. engines come from America; and he would, therefore, require 400 Scripps-Ford conversion engines at the rate of 100 a month for the next four months. Each craft had two engines, and 25 percent spares were required. It was of great importance that the Channel Assault Force should be kept in being, even though temporarily short of L.C.A. to make up U. S. requirements. Otherwise, there would be no force available for cross-channel operations. Once broken up, this force would be very difficult to reform again.

Admiral King said that no firm promise could be given that this large number of engines would be provided from the U. S. where production resources were already strained. He undertook to see what could be done.

The Committee:

(a) Agreed that it was most desirable for the Channel Assault Force to be kept in being for cross-channel operations this summer.

(b) Took note that the U. S. would endeavor to provide the necessary engines for any L.C.A. hulls produced in Great Britain during the coming months.

2. C.C.S. 172, January 22, 1943, note by Lieutenant General Somervell entitled “Shipping Capabilities for Bolero Build-Up”, not printed; for a summary of the salient points of this paper, see Leighton and Coakley, pp. 676–677,
3. C.C.S. 167, January 22, 1943, post, p. 785.
4. C.C.S. 170, January 22, 1943, note by the Secretaries entitled “Report to the President and Prime Minister”, not printed. As revised by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at this meeting, C.C.S. 170 was redesignated C.C.S. 170/1, January 23, not printed. C.C.S. 170/1 as revised in conformity with the wishes of the President and Prime Minister during their meeting with the Combined Chiefs of Staff on January 23 (post, p. 707) was redesignated 170/2, January 23, 1943, post, p. 791. Variations between C.C.S. 170/1 and 170/2 are indicated in footnotes to the latter paper.
5. C.C.S. 171, January 22, 1943, not printed. As amended by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at this meeting, the paper was redesignated C.C.S. 171/1/D, and as further amended by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the 69th meeting on January 23, post, p. 719, the directive received its final designation of C.C.S. 171/2/D, January 23, 1943, for the text of which see post, p. 799.