Roosevelt Papers
McCrea Notes1
The President met General de Gaulle with much cordiality and, after the exchange of pleasantries, proceeded to tell General de Gaulle the reason for his, the President’s and the Prime Minister’s visit to North Africa. The President stated that after the occupation of Morocco had become an accomplished fact, it seemed most necessary to him, late in 1942, that plans be made for the calendar year 1943. The President stated that it had originally been intended that Mr. Stalin attend the conference, but that due to the urgency of the Russian Campaign and the fact that Mr. Stalin occupied the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Russian forces, he had been compelled to decline the invitation to be present. In brief, the President remarked [Page 695] that the whole purpose of his meeting with Mr. Churchill was “to get on with the war,” and supply an answer to the question, “Where do we go from here?”
The President proceeded to discuss the political situation in North Africa, stating that he recognized that there existed many points of view, almost as many as there were people involved, and that accordingly, there were some conflicting thoughts. The President added, however, that so far as he was able to determine, there were no substantial differences which could not be readily reconciled.
The President stated that he supposed that the collaboration on the part of General Eisenhower with Admiral Darlan had been the source of some wonderment to General de Gaulle. Continuing, the President stated that he had felt from the outset that the problem of North Africa should be regarded as a military one and that the political situation should be entirely incident to the military situation. General Eisenhower had found that Admiral Darlan was very willing to collaborate with the end in view of bringing as much pressure as possible to bear on the enemy at the earliest possible moment. To this end General Eisenhower expressed his willingness to collaborate to the utmost with Admiral Darlan. The President stated that he thoroughly approved of General Eisenhower’s decision in this matter and that real progress was being made when the Admiral met his untimely death.
At this point General de Gaulle evidently made some remark to the President with reference to the sovereignty of French Morocco. The President continued, stating that the sovereignty of the occupied territory was not under consideration, that none of the contenders for power in North Africa had the right to say that he, and only he, represented the sovereignty of France. The President pointed out that the sovereignty of France, as in our country, rested with the people, but that unfortunately the people of France were not now in a position to exercise that sovereignty. It was, therefore, necessary for the military commander in the area to accept the political situation as he found it and to collaborate with those in authority in the country at the time that the occupation took place so long as those in authority chose to be of assistance to the military commander. The President stated that any other course of action would have been indefensive [indefensible].
The President again alluded to the lack of power on the part of the French people at this time to assert their sovereignty. The President pointed out that it was, therefore, necessary to resort to the legal analogy of “trusteeship” and that it was his view that the Allied Nations fighting in French territory at the moment were fighting for the liberation of France and that they should hold the political situation in “trusteeship” for the French people. In other words, the President stated that France is in the position of a little child unable to look out [Page 696] and fend for itself and that in such a case, a court would appoint a trustee to do the necessary. The President stated that he had been twice in consultation with General Giraud and that General Giraud was very definite on the one point that mattered; namely, “to get on with the war.” The President further remarked that General Giraud recognized fully the conflicting political situation, but stated that he would, under no circumstances, let it divert him from the immediate and urgent task of freeing French territory of the enemy.
The President stated that following the Civil War in our home country, there was conflict of political thought and that while many mistakes were made, nevertheless, the people realized that personal pride and personal prejudices must often be subordinated for the good of the country as a whole, and the contending French leaders could well follow such a program. The only course of action that would save France, said the President, was for all of her loyal sons to unite to defeat the enemy, and that when the war was ended, victorious France could once again assert the political sovereignty which was hers over her homeland and her empire. At such a time all political considerations would be laid before the sovereign people themselves and that by the use of the democratic processes inherent throughout France and its empire, political differences would be resolved.
After about 20 minutes of conversation, General de Gaulle, with some show of cordiality withdrew.2
Captain, U.S. Navy
- McCrea’s record of the Roosevelt–de Gaulle conversation is accompanied by the following note: “The following brief summary of the conversation which took place between the President and General de Gaulle on the evening of 22 January 1943 at Casablanca would not be complete without stating that the following observations were made by me from a relatively poor point of vantage—a crack in a door slightly ajar. In view of the fact that General de Gaulle talked in so low a tone of voice as to be inaudible to me, I cannot supply any comments made by him.” For de Gaulle’s version of the conversation, see de Gaulle, pp. 87–89. For a brief description of the extraordinary security precautions in effect during this meeting, see the undated Hopkins memorandum in Sherwood, pp. 685–686. Hopkins, who was present only for the opening of the meeting and did not record any of the substance of the conversation, does recall that de Gaulle arrived “cold and austere” and was accompanied by an aide. In this same undated memorandum, Hopkins suggested that Murphy was always in attendance at Roosevelt–de Gaulle meetings at Casablanca. In information supplied to the Historical Office, however, Murphy stated that he did not attend this first Roosevelt–de Gaulle conversation inasmuch as the President had expressed a desire to speak to de Gaulle privately.↩
- According to Murphy’s recollections as given to the Historical Office (023.1/12–2456), Roosevelt told Murphy after the meeting with de Gaulle that the conversation had been unsatisfactory and that he had found the General rigid and unresponsive to his urgent desire to get on with the war. Roosevelt thought that de Gaulle placed too great an emphasis on French national politics, forgetting the pressing need for a military victory as a condition precedent to any French political settlement.↩